Abstract
Many Americans take time on the Fourth of July to reflect on the blessings of liberty and how our nation might enhance and extend such liberty throughout the land. Lina Khan, Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, is one example. On July 4, 2024, while millions were attending parades, grilling hamburgers or lounging by the pool, Chair Khan took to X to promote the Commission's regulatory agenda, which she claimed was enhancing Americans' liberty. Among other things, she asserted that, by "tackling noncompetes," the Commission was helping to "ensure that all Americans can enjoy real liberty."
"Tackling noncompetes" referred to the Commission's legislative rule, announced in May 2024, banning all employee noncompete agreements ("NCAs"). Such agreements prevent departing employees from working for rival employers or starting competing businesses for a defined period. Historically state courts have assessed such agreements under a searching rule of reason, and this approach still survives in nearly all states. Before Chair Khan's arrival, the Commission had never challenged a freestanding NCA.
This article critiques Chair Khan's claim that banning NCAs enhances liberty. Simply put, the claim lacks any meaningful theoretical or empirical basis. Chair Khan is certainly correct that NCAs can, when enforced, significantly restrict the occupational liberty of employees considering whether to start new businesses or work for other firms. However, NCAs potentially implicate a second form of liberty as well, namely, the right not to exercise one's faculties, including the freedom not to pursue a particular vocation in certain places or times.
Contract Law bolsters such negative rights, by empowering individuals to enter enforceable obligations to refrain from working in a particular way, thus facilitating cooperation that generates wealth shared between the parties. Antitrust Law has long declined to condemn outright numerous agreements, including NCAs, that voluntarily restrict such liberty, recognizing that these restraints often facilitate overall collaboration between the parties and enhance interbrand competition.
The Commission's Final Rule, joined by Chair Khan, found that NCAs can produce significant cognizable benefits that manifest themselves as higher employee productivity and improved product quality. The Final Rule also recognized that NCAs can be voluntary and that employers sometimes compensate employees for entering such agreements, thereby sharing the benefits of wealth-creating cooperation. Banning such voluntary agreements would of course reduce the second form of liberty described above, by preventing employees from agreeing not to pursue their vocation in certain times and places.
To be sure, the Final Rule also found that only "senior executives" enter NCAs voluntarily and receive compensation for doing so. The Final Rule also defined "senior executive" to exclude more than 99 percent of employees subject to NCAs. The Rule also found that employers use a "particularly acute" imbalance of bargaining power unilaterally and coercively to dictate "almost all" NCAs entered by employees who are not senior executives.
The Final Rule did not define "coercion" or explain how much bargaining power an employer must possess unilaterally to dictate such onerous terms upon employees accepting initial offers of employment. Instead, the Commission invoked numerous supposed factors indicating the possession and exercise of such power, including labor market concentration, such employees' supposed ignorance of NCAs before they accept employment offers, and a grab bag of other factors that can, if present, theoretically confer labor market power in otherwise competitive markets. The Final Rule also purported to find that nonexecutive employees almost never bargain individually over such restrictions or receive compensation in the form of higher wages for accepting them.
Of course, an NCA unilaterally and coercively dictated by an employer, with no compensation, would be an involuntary restriction of the sort of occupational liberty Chair Khan invoked. Banning enforcement of such agreements would enhance the liberty of employees subject to them. If most or "almost all" NCAs arise in this manner, such a ban would enhance the liberty of employees as a class. If on the other hand, most NCAs are voluntary, such a ban would reduce liberty overall.
Because individual NCAs can enhance or reduce liberty, the aggregate impact of banning all such agreements turns on which type of NCA coercive or voluntary predominates. Chair Khan's claim that banning NCAs will enhance liberty necessarily depends upon an assumption that coercive NCAs outnumber those that are voluntary. As explained above, the Commission found exactly that, that is, that nearly all NCAs are the result of a coercive process of contract formation.
The Commission of course bore the burden of adducing evidence to support its claim that employers almost always possess a "particularly a cute imbalance of bargaining power when recruiting new employees and use such power coercively to dictate agreement to NCAs as a term of initial employment. The Commission also had a duty to respond to comments that adduced significant evidence or argument that contradicted the rationale for the ban articulated by the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM"). The Commission failed on both counts, and this failure undermines Chair Khan's claim that banning NCAs enhances the occupational liberty of American employees.
The Final Rule's finding that employers use a "particularly acute" bargaining power advantage unilaterally and coercively to impose NCAs without compensation lacked any substantial basis in the record. For instance, the Commission cited no evidence regarding how many Americans bargain and work in concentrated labor markets. Moreover, the Commission relied on evidence from members of a single trade association, representing fewer than one percent of the nation's employees, to support its claim that employees usually learn of NCAs only after accepting employment offers.
The Commission also offered no evidence regarding how often various market conditions that confer labor market power on employers are present. Finally, the Commission offered no meaningful evidence that "almost all" nonexecutive employees receive no compensation for entering NCAs. Instead, the Commission seemed to rely upon a theoretical assertion that individualized bargaining is necessary for employees to receive such compensation.
The Final Rule also ignored evidence and comments in the record that contradicted its various findings regarding the supposed coercive formation of NCAs. For instance, the Petition that asked the Commission to ban NCAs itself invoked peer-reviewed research concluding that 77 percent of employees work in unconcentrated labor markets. These were the only data in the record regarding the proportion of employees that work in such markets. Moreover, at least two sets of comments repeatedly cited, quoted and discussed these data and the research methodology that produced them.
The Commission also ignored evidence that most employees have precontractual knowledge of NCAs. Ironically, these data appeared on the very same page of a source the Commission repeatedly invoked for other purposes, reporting the results of what the Commission called the "most representative survey" regarding NCA formation. Here again, comments called these data to the Commission's attention several times, and the Commission nonetheless ignored them. Finally, comments described academic literature explaining how employers can compensate employees for voluntarily agreeing to NCAs without any individualized bargaining. The Commission ignored these comments and the literature they invoked. Given the lack of empirical or theoretical support, any claim that banning NCAs will enhance the liberty of employees is mere speculation.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2026
Publication Information
20 Ohio State Business Law Journal 116-188 (2026)
Repository Citation
Meese, Alan J., "Lina Khan's Make-Believe Liberty: Debunking the Claim That Almost All Employee Noncompete Agreements Reduce Freedom" (2026). Faculty Publications. 2473.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/2473