Abstract

Sixty percent of low-income countries are currently at “high-risk” of insolvency, necessitating debt relief, according to the International Monetary Fund. The enormity of the problem cannot be overstated; a prospective sovereign debt crisis and economic collapse threatens hundreds of millions of people around the world.

At the same time, the tools to address these challenges are wholly inadequate. Typically, debt reduction is effectuated through statutory systems; sovereign debt is a critical exception, as there is no bankruptcy court for countries. Historically, this void was filled through a complex architecture based on custom, ‘soft law,’ and contractual mechanisms. However, that construct has grown increasingly ill-suited for contemporary challenges. A new system for sovereign debt renegotiation—the Common Framework—was established in late 2020 to much fanfare. It has universally underwhelmed.

This Article provides an early assessment of the Common Framework, finding that it has failed because it: (i) lacks institutional infrastructure; (ii) exacerbates conflicts amongst creditors; and (iii) delivers insufficient benefits for debtors while unduly restricting nations’ eligibility—including, perhaps most pertinently, Ukraine and Sri Lanka.

Yet, because it remains the “only game in town” for addressing the coming sovereign debt crisis, the Common Framework must be amended, rather than discarded—and, to that end, this Article prescriptively recommends a number of steps. Most significantly, to support Common Framework implementation, the Article proposes establishing a ‘Coordinating Forum’—a mechanism distinct from a court of law, intended to fill critical gaps in informational and coordinating infrastructure. In addition, the Common Framework should provide greater benefits for debtors, while being available to more nations.

Finally, the Common Framework must require private investors to share the burden, which this Article posits can be accomplished by leveraging innovative ESG and climate-linked instruments, with Belize’s recent ‘debt-for-nature’ restructuring transaction—which tied debt reduction to environmental conservation— providing an attractive template.

It is imperative that policymakers develop sufficient tools to address the coming sovereign debt storm. The economic and public health implications cannot be overstated; no nation should be forced to choose between vaccines and interest payments.

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 2023

Publication Information

23 Nevada Law Journal 463-532 (2023)

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