Home > Journals > WMLR > Vol. 65 (2023-2024) > Iss. 1 (2023)
William & Mary Law Review
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed systemic quality-of-care problems in American nursing homes as well as the deadly consequences of a regulatory system that has enabled nursing homes to divert funds needed for care to profit. Policy experts have responded by urging regulators to improve nursing-home oversight practices and by calling for new regulatory and statutory authority to increase accountability. These calls, however, have been met with sharp political headwinds. This Article suggests a path around the political impasse. Specifically, it identifies and explores four opportunities to leverage existing statutory schemes to create stronger incentives for nursing homes to provide high-quality care. It then explores how politics, administrative complexity, and ageism have come together to prevent this existing authority from being used to its full potential. It concludes by situating the current regulatory failure to hold nursing homes accountable in the context of a larger discussion about the costs of federalism in the health care arena.