Home > Journals > WMLR > Vol. 64 (2022-2023) > Iss. 2 (2022)
William & Mary Law Review
Abstract
In NCAA v. Alston (2021), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that NCAA rules governing student-athlete eligibility are subject to full federal antitrust scrutiny. While the immediate effect was limited to allowing education-related benefits, the decision signaled broader judicial skepticism toward the NCAA’s amateurism model and foreshadowed potential future mandates for direct athlete compensation. Simultaneously, the NCAA capitulated to state legislation recognizing athletes’ rights to monetize their name, image, and likeness (NIL). These developments spurred the association to decentralize governance and revise its constitution in 2022. This Article argues that decentralization, though a logical response to antitrust risk, will likely exacerbate structural problems in college sports, including unsustainable deficit spending, competitive imbalance, and insufficient protections for student-athletes’ educational and medical well-being. Because the industry cannot legally implement salary caps or collectively bargain with athletes, unrestrained market competition may further destabilize intercollegiate athletics. The Article therefore proposes congressional intervention through a limited, conditional antitrust exemption for the NCAA. Two reform models are advanced: (1) an “Olympic model” permitting NIL monetization while restricting direct pay, and (2) a “free-market model” allowing limited athlete compensation alongside NCAA authority to cap expenditures. Both approaches would condition immunity on meaningful reforms to safeguard student-athletes’ rights. In doing so, the Article highlights the paradoxical nonprofit economics of college sports, explains the implications of Alston for antitrust law, and offers a framework for sustainable governance of intercollegiate athletics.