Home > Journals > WMLR > Vol. 58 (2016-2017) > Iss. 6 (2017)
William & Mary Law Review
Abstract
When it comes to the First Amendment, commerciality does, and should, matter. This Article develops the view that the key distinguishing characteristic of corporate or commercial speech is that the interest at stake is “derivative,” in the sense that we care about the speech interest for reasons other than caring about the rights of the entity directly asserting a claim under the First Amendment. To say that the interest is derivative is not to say that it is unimportant, and one could find corporate and commercial speech interests to be both derivative and strong enough to apply heightened scrutiny to the restrictions that are the usual subject of debate, namely, restrictions on commercial advertising and restrictions on corporate campaigning.
Distinguishing between derivative and intrinsic speech interests, however, helps to uncover three types of situations in which lesser or no scrutiny may be appropriate. The first is in the context of compelled speech. If the entity being compelled is not one with intrinsic speech rights, this undermines the rationale for subjecting speech compulsions to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. The second is in the context of speech among commercial entities. In these cases, the transaction may be among entities none of which merit intrinsic First Amendment concern. The third is in the context of unwanted marketing. It makes no sense to protect listeners’ access to information they do not want to receive.
Highlighting the difference that commerciality makes helps to better explain certain exceptions, or apparent exceptions, that existing case law already makes to heightened scrutiny. It also provides insight into a number of current controversies, such as those over cigarette and product labeling. It has particularly important implications for consumer privacy regulation, suggesting that regulation of both the consumer data trade and commercial data collection merit significantly less scrutiny than might be applied to restrictions on the privacy-invasive practices of ordinary individuals.