Home > Journals > WMLR > Vol. 58 (2016-2017) > Iss. 4 (2017)
William & Mary Law Review
Abstract
This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.
Repository Citation
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1335 (2017), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol58/iss4/5Included in
Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Securities Law Commons