Home > Journals > WMLR > Vol. 52 (2010-2011) > Iss. 2 (2010)
William & Mary Law Review
Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreement on a standard contract, sometimes under the aegis of state actors. Multifirm contract standardization can provide not only the usual transaction-cost advantages of standard-form contracts, but also increased competition among firms, because a standard contract makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier. But standardization among firms also eliminates competition on the standardized terms, adding market power to bargaining power and making it less likely that the needs of all parties will be served. The collective formation of standard-form contracts has recently begun to receive academic attention. This attention, however, has for the most part focused on contract interpretation, emphasizing the fact of standardization and the nature of the standardizing entity. Less attention has been paid to issues of contractual fairness. Moreover, the competitive effects of contract standardization, which implicate primarily antitrust law, are distinct from those addressed by contract law. When sellers agree on contract terms, they eliminate competition among themselves on those terms. This sort of agreement can be undesirable even if the agreed-upon terms of the contract are fair and reasonable in themselves, because the standard contract can eliminate competition among reasonable terms. Fundamentally, the standardization of contracts is a standardization of the package offered to customers, in much the same way as is standardization of a product, and antitrust law has often been skeptical of such standardization. But contract standardization can also be viewed as altering not the product itself, but the legal background governing the purchase. Under that view, the contract simply standardizes the legal backdrop for what otherwise continues to be a competitive and vigorously bargained transaction. Which of these perspectives more accurately describes contract standardization likely differs from case to case, yet the courts generally have considered neither whether competition law should apply differently to standardization of contracts than to standardization of other “products” nor whether and how contract law should alter the competition analysis. This Article addresses the issue of contract standardization by exploring the interaction of antitrust and contract law in three basic respects. The first is substantive, focusing on product terms and considering standardization of terms both to reduce costs (interoperability standards) and to improve the contract (quality standards). This focus on terms is consistent with the antitrust approach of the Department of Justice, which has asked whether standardization involves “competitively significant” terms, but as the Article describes this standard is not well defined. The Article then moves to procedure, considering different contexts in which contract standardization occurs and discussing the implications of different means of negotiation. Third, the Article considers the possibilities both of voluntary adoption of contracts and of adoption incentives created by private organizations and by the state. The Article then draws on these discussions to suggest some analytical approaches to contract standardization.