Authors

Duane Rudolph

Of Moral Outrage in Judicial Opinions

Abstract

This article argues that moral outrage should function as an emphatic judicial remedy in U.S. law, particularly in cases involving the dignity of historically vulnerable communities such as women and religious minorities. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, Rudolph contends that expressions of outrage from the bench are not merely rhetorical but essential acts of interpretation that affirm human dignity and signal the boundaries of justice. Through analysis of three anchor cases—Kansas v. Nebraska (2015) on interstate water rights, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (2015) on religious discrimination, and Sheridan v. Sheridan (1990) on family law—the article demonstrates when judicial outrage is appropriate and when it may be misplaced. Rudolph develops a normative framework reserving judicial outrage for situations where vulnerable communities face silencing, marginalization, or systemic risk. In doing so, the article extends scholarship on remedies, hermeneutics, and law-and-emotion, proposing that courts recognize moral outrage as a dignitary remedy that can reinforce equity, counter prejudice, and strengthen protections for disenfranchised groups.

Repository Citation

Duane Rudolph, Of Moral Outrage in Judicial Opinions, 26 Wm. & Mary J. Race, Gender, & Soc. Just. 335 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol26/iss2/6