William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Abstract
This Note argues that the marketplace of ideas may not always be a workable theory for the election misinformation that pervades social media platforms. Social media is a unique medium because it does not have the same safeguards as television, radio, and newspapers that are used to filter out false claims and information. In addition, social media “[a]lgorithms that track user engagement to prioritize what is shown tend to favor content that spurs negative emotions like anger and outrage . . . . [S]ocial media amplifies [online misinformation’s] reach and influence.” Due to the lack of safeguards and the algorithms that promote misinformed posts, social media platforms provide a thriving environment for election misinformation. In addition, the presence of online “echo chambers” and the speed at which misinformation can spread calls for some form of government regulation. In Part I, this Note explores France and Indonesia’s attempts to regulate election misinformation and the success of each program’s efforts toward combating election misinformation. Part II of this Note analyzes how France and Indonesia’s regulations would fare under the United States’ First Amendment doctrine. Part III of this Note offers recommendations for the United States to effectively and constitutionally regulate election misinformation, in part based on the analysis of French and Indonesian misinformation regulations.
This abstract has been taken from the author's introduction.