Authors

Mark Tushnet

Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law

Abstract

This Article considers First Amendment Internet exceptionalism. I use that term in what I think is a reasonably standard way to refer to the question of whether the technological characteristics of the Internet (and, more generally, twenty-first-century information technologies) justify treating regulation of information dissemination through the Internet differently from regulation of such dissemination through nineteenth- and twentieth-century media, such as print, radio, and television. My aim here is not to provide an answer to that question, but to identify several subquestions whose answers must be part of the larger answer.

Repository Citation

Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1637 (2015), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol56/iss4/15