William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Abstract
This Note argues that a national U.S. Citizens’ Assembly for Climate would not violate the non-delegation doctrine which prevents Congress from improperly delegating its constitutional legislative power to another body. A climate assembly could potentially be authorized in several ways; this Note explores that of Congress convening a climate assembly through statute, either as an independent body or as a body under the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency. Part I examines the current state of American climate policy and the political debate surrounding it, putting forward a case for a novel approach, and also examines the concept of climate assemblies, detailing their composition and function, and briefly reviews the experience of citizens’ assemblies (those focused on climate policy and other policies) in other countries as well as the experience of the Washington State climate assembly. Part II examines Congress’s power to authorize and delegate power to a U.S. Climate Assembly. This Part also explores the feasibility of Congress’s establishing a U.S. Climate Assembly under the Environmental Protection Agency. Part III proposes how Congress could design a U.S. Climate Assembly and analyzes potential challenges in its structure and function. The Conclusion summarizes these sections and offers further remarks on the feasibility and utility of citizens’ assemblies in an American political context.
This abstract has been taken from the author's introduction.