Authors

Kevin S. Marshall

Free Enterprise and the Rule of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies)

Abstract

Economic theory teaches that if all of the operational conditions of the perfectly competitive model hold, then certain efficiencies may be achieved to the favor of a wealth-seeking society, ceteris paribus (assuming all other things remain equal and/or the absence of all other disturbing influences). This Article observes the asymmetrical enforcement of relevant governing laws, regulations and rules eliminates any possibility that all other influences with respect to the performance values of the perfectly competitive model have been neutralized. Under such regulatory enforcement conditions, there can be no wealth-creation expectations.

Repository Citation

Kevin S. Marshall, Free Enterprise and the Rule of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 235 (2010), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol1/iss2/2