Miranda only protects suspects who the police subject to custodial interrogation. The concept of custody is tethered to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; thus, to render a suspect in custody, law enforcement officials must subject the suspect to a compelling environment that tends to undermine that privilege. In this article, Professor Richard A. Williamson examines the application of Miranda to Terry stops. He reviews the impact of the Beheler and Berkemer decisions, which held that suspects who officials stop based on reasonable suspicion, as opposed to suspects who officials arrest, are not entitled to Miranda warnings. Professor Williamson generally approves the Supreme Court's refusal to extend Miranda protections to Terry stops. Yet he observes that the Fourth Amendment values underlying the distinction between stops and arrests are not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment values underlying Miranda Emphasizing the expansion in recent years of the permissible scope of Terry stops, he concludes that circumstances may arise in which officials must give Miranda warnings to suspects stopped but not arrested.

Document Type


Publication Date

Spring 1993

Publication Information

1993 University of Illinois Law Review 379-409 (1993)