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Review

Nietzsche’s Place in Nineteenth Century German Philosophy*

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I

The standard view is that Nietzsche made a radical break with nineteenth-century philosophical traditions. Recently, however, a new historical school of English-language Nietzsche scholarship has emerged, which insists that he read and borrowed from his contemporaries and predecessors and is best understood in the light of these influences.¹

Insofar as it brings Nietzsche ‘into direct engagement with German Idealism’ (p. 9), Will Dudley’s Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom looks like an example of this new historical school. Dudley challenges the view – most forcefully presented by Deleuze,² but prevalent among Nietzsche scholars of virtually every stripe – that Hegel and Nietzsche are antipodes. Dudley argues that the two philosophers in fact shared a common project: to formulate a conception of human freedom as self-determination.³ Freedom, as the two conceived it, is more than the ability to do as one chooses. It is also the ability to determine what one chooses. But because the content of our choices inevitably depends on the external world – be it family, society, the state, or simply our drives and inclinations – freedom means being able to identify with, and be at home in, this world. Both Hegel and Nietzsche saw the activity of philosophy as playing a crucial role in making freedom possible, because it is only through philosophy that genuine reconciliation with the world can be obtained.⁴

But is Dudley really a member of the new historical school? Doesn’t he argue, correctly, that ‘Nietzsche’s understanding of Hegel, if it could be called that, was minimal, distorted, and based on little or no direct confrontation with the texts’ (pp. 244–45)?⁵ To be sure, Dudley insists that this should ‘rule out neither the possibility that Hegel and Nietzsche were both

concerned with the question of freedom, nor the possibility that their responses to that question are both importantly similar and complementary divergent’ (p. 245). But that means that Hegelian themes can be found in Nietzsche, not due to Hegel’s influence, but because the two philosophers were concerned with similar problems and the internal logic of those problems led their philosophies to unfold in similar (as well as divergent) ways.

Dudley can be seen as an example of the new historical school, however, in a different sense. His book is about the influence on Nietzsche, not of Hegel, but of Immanuel Kant. Dudley argues that both Hegel and Nietzsche were attracted by Kant’s idea of freedom as autonomous self-legislation. But the two were dissatisfied by, and attempted to overcome, the emptiness and formality of Kantian autonomy (pp. 7–8). In this sense, Hegel and Nietzsche were co-participants in the nineteenth-century reception of Kant.

Dudley’s book is a promising contribution to Nietzsche scholarship precisely because Nietzsche’s relationship to Kant has not been sufficiently explored. Furthermore, Dudley is clearly on the right track in arguing that Nietzsche, like Hegel, rejected the emptiness of Kant’s account of the free self. He is also right in insisting that Nietzsche, like Hegel, attempted to replace Kant’s account with an alternative that involves reconciliation with nature – reconciliation that ultimately depends upon the activity of philosophy.

What’s missing in Dudley’s book, however, is the dramatically different – indeed antipodal – ways in which Hegel and Nietzsche pursued these goals. The view that Hegel and Nietzsche are antipodes became a commonplace because, like most commonplaces, it is true.

Dudley could have kept his useful parallels between Hegel and Nietzsche – parallels that have their source in Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s common rejection of the formality of Kantian autonomy – even as he conceded that these other differences between the two exist. But Dudley does not make this concession. What’s worse, he does not argue why the concession should not be made. Indeed, one wonders whether he appreciates why so many people have thought the two philosophers were antipodes in the first place. This is surprising, because not merely Deleuze, but a number of other less polemical authors have discussed their differences at length. A prominent example is Stephen Houlgate’s excellent Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics, which Dudley himself cites in other contexts.

In what follows, I will offer an explanation of why Hegel and Nietzsche took such different paths and how this undermines the parallels that Dudley sees between the two thinkers. Dudley had no obligation to respond to the details of my explanation, which looks to Neo-Kantian influences on Nietzsche’s thought. But the view that the two thinkers did take these different paths has had many able defenders – it is, after all, a commonplace – and it is not unreasonable to expect some explanation in Dudley’s book of why this view is mistaken.
I begin by outlining Dudley’s admirably clear and persuasive account of Hegel, in which reconciliation with the world, and so freedom, are made possible through an awareness of the inseparability of reality and thought (p. 97). Empirically-situated autonomy is possible for Hegel because nature, which provides the contents of our desires, is inseparable from the spontaneity of the thinking self. I then argue that the inseparability of reality and thought has its source in a radical response to the problem of the schematism in Kant’s first *Critique*. Hegel, like other German Idealists, believed that the very distinction between thought and sensation that generated the problem of the schematism is misguided. Although this connection to Kant’s schematism is not a theme in Dudley’s book, it is compatible with his reading of Hegel.

But Nietzsche adopted a dramatically different solution to the problem of the schematism. Rather than blurring the distinction between thought and sensation, he made the inability to bridge the two the centerpiece of his epistemology and metaphysics. The key to seeing this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is the influence exerted upon him by the late nineteenth century Neo-Kantian philosopher Afrikan Spir. For this reason, I will spend a good deal of time outlining the parallels between Spir’s thought and Nietzsche’s on these matters.

The difference between Hegel and Nietzsche is striking. Hegel rejected the distinction between thought and sensation and so concluded that reality and thought are inseparable. Nietzsche denied that the gap between thought and sensation can be bridged and so concluded that reality and thought exclude one another. Indeed Nietzsche believed that reality is, strictly speaking, *unthinkable*. This contrast between the two thinkers caused them to take radically different positions in precisely those areas where Dudley finds analogies.

Although both Hegel and Nietzsche understood freedom as self-determination, Hegel’s conception of freedom preserves Kantian autonomy, in the sense that one retains the ability to be other than nature as a whole. One retains this ability, while remaining situated within nature, because thought’s spontaneity and nature’s content are inseparable. In contrast, Nietzsche’s conception of freedom rejects Kantian autonomy. Because nature and thought are incompatible, Nietzsche had to choose one or the other as a source of the self. He chose nature. The self for Nietzsche is simply a piece of nature and, for this reason, lacks the ability, essential to Kantian autonomy, to reflect upon its empirical character. For Nietzsche, freedom is self-determination only in the sense that one part of the self (a ruling drive or set of drives) establishes dominance over and organizes the other parts of the self. In no sense are ruling drives themselves chosen.

The same point applies to identification with nature, which, according to Dudley, both Hegel and Nietzsche considered essential to freedom. For Hegel
such identification makes compatible nature’s determination of the contents of our desires and the Kantian ideal of self-determination of these same contents. For Nietzsche, however, the contents of our ruling drives are simply given by nature in a way that is incompatible with Kantian self-determination. Indeed, identification with nature for Nietzsche means recognizing that one is a piece of nature and that Kantian self-determination is impossible. Such identification is necessary for freedom only because decadence has led us to deny our natural existence and this denial stands in the way of the healthy control and organization of the instincts, which, as we have seen, is all that Nietzsche understands freedom to be.

Finally, although Dudley is right that both Hegel and Nietzsche considered philosophy necessary for identification with nature, this is true for very different reasons. For Hegel, philosophy reveals the inseparability of thought and reality, which makes an empirically-situated form of Kantian autonomy possible. For Nietzsche, philosophy is necessary because the very character of thought – and particularly categories such as substance and causality – rejects the true nature of reality. Thought attempts to force an image of simplicity and permanence upon nature’s particularity and change. Through tragic philosophy we obtain a perspective on ourselves that is beyond these categories of thought, thereby doing justice to ourselves as natural beings.

II

Hegel, as Dudley understands him, conceived of freedom as both incorporating and improving upon the Kantian ideal of freedom as rational self-legislation. Like Kant, Hegel rejected ‘liberalism’ (p. 4), that is, the view that freedom consists solely of an unconstrained ability to act as one chooses. Someone who is free in the liberal sense can nevertheless fail to be free if his choices themselves are not self-determined. Although freedom requires a lack of external constraint, freedom must also consist in responsibility for one’s choices (pp. 33–34).

On the other hand, Hegel believed that Kantian autonomy is inadequate because it is ‘incapable of generating purposes entirely out of itself’ (p. 228). This emptiness or formality to Kant’s conception of freedom creates a dilemma. Something outside the self – even if it is only the ‘desires and instincts driving [our] choices’ (p. 228) – must provide our choices with content. But because these sources of content are external, they are incompatible with the self-determination that is essential to freedom.

The solution to this dilemma rests in our ability to identify with the world. But how is this identification achieved? Not by simply making over the world such that it satisfies our desires. Even if we succeeded, the world would still be alien and indifferent to us. Indeed, we would still be alienated from the
very desires in the light of which we made over the world, since we did not choose their content.

Identification also cannot be achieved by simply discovering that our character is given by the world. Self-determination, and so freedom, would not exist under such circumstances (pp. 110–11). As Dudley puts it:

On the one hand, spiritual beings must continue to be conceived as not merely natural, so that their difference from natural beings, in virtue of which they are capable of overcoming necessity, is preserved. But on the other hand, spiritual beings must not be conceived as merely not-natural … . Taken together, these two requirements entail that spiritual beings must be conceived in such a way that they internalize their connection to the natural world and thus come to be at home with it, but without lapsing back into a merely natural existence. (p. 23)

The reconciliation with the world must be such that the freely self-determining character of the Kantian self is preserved – but in a way that depends upon the natural world: ‘Only a being capable of internalizing its external limitations, of achieving a genuine infinity by overcoming the apparent finitude of both itself and its other through a demonstration that the two are members of a larger, self-determining unity, can be free’ (p. 21). Reconciling spiritual beings ‘with the natural world while preserving their differences from it comprises the entire philosophy of spirit’ (p. 23).

What makes the concept of absolute spirit so difficult to get one’s mind around is its ability to preserve the Kantian conception of a self-legislating subject, rather than simply rejecting it in favor of a non-critical communion with nature. I can live a life that is situated within nature and yet not sacrifice the infinity of my free self. I can see myself in particular attachments and institutions without giving myself up to them or losing the capacity for critical reflection. How is this possible?

Hegel solved this problem by reconceiving the relationship between thought and the world. The world with which I am confronted depends upon thought. In the activities of absolute spirit, and particularly in philosophy, one comes to an awareness of this ‘inseparability of thought and being’ (p. 97). To be sure, thought is confronted by a world that resists its demands. But this is because ‘the determinacies of thought include determining themselves to take the shape of both spiritual subjectivity and natural objectivity’ (p. 98). That there is a recalcitrant world is the development of thought itself.

Because thought and reality are inseparable, the self can see itself in the world in a way that does not involve resignation or defiance:

The spiritual subject has overcome its presupposition that it is confronted by an independent and indifferent objective world, in which it must continually strive to realize its purposes, despite that indifference. … Although the willing subject continues to encounter objective immediacy as a limitation, resistant to its purposes, in moving beyond the willing sphere the spiritual subject has come to know that this
limitation is the necessary manifestation of the determinacies of thought, and is thus a
limitation internal to the spiritual subject itself. (p. 98)

Dudley’s emphasis on the inseparability of thought and reality as a
condition for freedom explains two features of his account of Hegel that,
although not completely unprecedented, are somewhat unusual. Consider
ethical life, as articulated in the Philosophy of Right, in which an individual
identifies with and finds the conditions for her freedom in the family, civil
society, and the state. Ethical life is often treated by Hegel scholars as the
fully realized ideal of freedom (pp. 56–68). But Dudley insists, rightly, that
the will is not truly free in ethical life, because it remains externally deter-
mined (pp. 9, 69, 245–46). The ethical will ‘continues to understand natural
objectivity as external to and other than itself’ (p. 87). ‘An insuperable gap
between itself and the world of objective existence’ (p. 229) remains.
Although family, civil society and state are conditions for one’s freedom, one
has not reached a stage at which their particular characteristics can be seen as
inseparable from oneself. The activities of absolute spirit, and particularly
philosophy, are crucial for freedom, because it is only through them that the
recognition of such inseparability can be achieved.

Second, Dudley devotes an unusual amount of attention to the relationship
between Hegel’s Logic and his account of freedom. The contradictions in our
conception of free will (contradictions that transform it into a conception of
ethical life) are intimately tied to contradictions in the concept of judgment
(contradictions that transform it into syllogism) (p. 70). Furthermore, the
inadequacies of ethical life that ultimately lead to its transformation into
genuine freedom (through the activities of absolute spirit) are intimately tied
to contradictions within the syllogism that lead beyond that logical form (pp.
87–100).

This relationship between logic and freedom makes sense given Dudley’s
insistence on the inseparability of thought and reality. If freedom is possible
because reality is itself laden with the demands of thought, logic, which is
simply the immanent character and development of thought, should reveal the
possibility of freedom.

III

By arguing that Hegel’s account of freedom depends upon the inseparability
of thought and reality, Dudley places Hegel within the German Idealist
tradition. This tradition has at its heart a radical answer to the problem of the
relationship between thought and sensation in Kant’s schematism.

Just as Kant divorced the practical self from nature, including its own
desires, so he divorced the thinking self from nature, including those desires
and dispositions to judge that can be observed in psychological introspection.
Nature is unable to generate thought because empirically known associations of ideas (of the sort that figure in Hume’s philosophy) merely concern the temporal flow of representations in consciousness. To think about an object is to unify representations in a manner that stands above this temporal flow. It is only in this way that these ideas can be unified in the same mind, rather than simply blindly following one another. For this reason, Kant insisted that thought cannot be experienced, whether through psychological introspection or observation of the physical world. The ‘I’ that thinks is not a part of nature. Conceptualization is instead a form of spontaneity similar to one’s spontaneity as a moral agent.

But Kant did not want to argue that sensations play no role in our judgment, that judgment is entirely a question of the spontaneity of thought. So how does the thinking self connect with the passivity of sensation? For there to be thought at all, a judgment must be an act of spontaneity. But for thought to be about anything in particular, it must be passively determined by sensation. Kant’s unhappy solution to this problem was the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is widely acknowledged to be the weak link in Kant’s transcendental deduction. The imagination links the passive and the spontaneous elements in cognition by uniting intuitions together so that they can be taken up by the thinking subject.

It’s not hard to see why Kant’s schematism has been criticized. Either the sensory elements of the synthesis of the imagination limit the thinking self or they do not. If they limit it, then they undermine its spontaneity and indeed, its ability to think at all. If they do not, representations are unconstrained by sensory content.

Fichte accepted that the gap between thought and sensation, as Kant conceived them, could never be bridged. If the thinking self is constrained by sensory content, this can be explained only through thought’s self-limitation. Sensory content is not something separate from thought, but is part of the development of thought itself. Hegel followed Fichte in seeing the objective world as the manifestation of thought, because, like Fichte, he rejected Kant’s distinction between sensation and thought in the schematism (p. 98). Thought’s spontaneity would be undermined if thought were determined by passive sensation. For Hegel, as for Fichte, thought and sensation must be inseparable, but in a manner that preserves their difference.

By transcending the distinction between thought and sensation, Hegel transformed the entire Kantian enterprise. Consider the place of the antinomies in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant argued that when reason takes a category of thought ‘beyond the limits of the empirical’ the results are paradoxical. We are compelled to two incompatible positions with equal force. The world must be seen as an unending chain of causal dependence and as beginning with a first cause. Kant thought that the contradictions in the antinomies provided an indirect argument for transcendental idealism. Both
the thesis and the antithesis can be rejected once one realizes that the world to
which either would refer exists only as represented by us through the
synthesis of sensory content.

But when the distinction between sensation and thought is denied, the
demands of reason can no longer be set aside as irrelevant to the empirical
world. Because the world is the development of thought, it must suffer from
the antinomies: the very nature of reality must be contradictory. The
challenge for the Idealist is to explain how these contradictions can be
overcome in thought’s development.

Kant’s ethics are also transformed when the distinction between thought
and sensation is rejected. Because they saw the spontaneity of thought and the
passivity of nature as interdependent, the Idealists were no longer compelled
to conceive of the practical subject as incompatible with nature’s particu-
larity. The practical self could be seen as spontaneous and self-legislating
without being formal and empty.

IV

But Nietzsche cannot be placed within the German Idealist tradition, because
he took a dramatically different approach to the problem of the schematism. To be sure, Nietzsche, like Hegel, considered Kant’s solution a failure. But
rather than denying the distinction between thought and sensation, Nietzsche
not only retained it, he made the inability to bridge the two the foundation of
his epistemology and metaphysics. Reality proceeds in a manner contrary to
the laws of thought, in a way that cannot be comprehended by thought.

It may come as a surprise that Nietzsche had an opinion about the tortured
details of the schematism at all. But this is only because so few have bothered
to examine the obscure Neo-Kantian philosophers that Nietzsche himself
read, in particular Afrikan Spir. On the problem of the schematism, Nietzsche followed Spir closely.

Spir, like Kant, argued that thought is a spontaneity that is always other
than nature. For this reason, he, too, faced the problem of the schematism. How
can the passivity of sensation connect with the spontaneity of the thinking
self, or, as Spir generally put it, what is the relationship between sensation’s
temporality and particularity, on the one hand, and the timelessness and
simplicity of the thinking self, on the other? Spir took this gap so seriously
that he denied that it can be bridged. Thought cannot admit sensory content.
Therefore, insofar as we think, the only thing that we can be thinking of is a
world without any time or particularity – an atemporal Parmenidean One.
That there appear to be many particular representations is only an illusion
created by the presence of a sensory manifold.

Because all that can be thought is an absolutely simple unity, the funda-
mental categories used in judgments about the world of experience, such as
substance and causality, must be contradictory. Through these categories, we attempt to force the simple unity of thought (or ‘Being’ as Spir calls it) onto the particularity and change met in experience (or ‘Becoming’). Insofar as Becoming is explained, Being must be appealed to, for to fail to rely upon Being is to fail to think at all. But, in the end, Becoming can never be explained by Being. Change and plurality can never be explained on the basis of something unchanging and unitary. For this reason there is a ‘fundamental antinomy’ in empirical judgment.

Spir’s argument that categories contain contradictory elements of Being and Becoming is derived in large part from Kant’s antinomies. Imagine that something changes – say, a billiard ball moves. To explain this change, one links the change to another change under a causal law. The billiard ball moved, for example, because of the movement of the cue ball that bumped into it. But because causal explanation merely explains one change in terms of another change, it fails to explain change. Change is, so to speak, displaced from one object to another in a movement of infinite regress. This problem both invites and forbids the introduction of first causes. On the one hand, we are invited to introduce first causes, because without them it is impossible to explain why change occurs at all. On the other hand, we are forbidden from introducing first causes, because they can never connect with the changes they were supposed to explain.

In applying the principle of causality to change, we attempt to see nature as a whole as one simple unchanging substance. If the totality of causal conditions were known, the world could be seen as an unchanging thing. The totality would be one without change, for this totality would have nothing within it by virtue of which it would deviate from itself. But the principle of causality’s attempt to force this image of Being onto Becoming fails. A simple, unchanging world-substance can never connect with the change it is supposed to explain.

Because causality fails to explain change, Spir argued, ‘that something happens at all, that alterations occur at all, that change exists, that cannot have a condition or cause’. If one tries to do justice to change, without attempting to falsify it by explaining it through the unitary and the permanent, one must say, in the end, that change simply happens without a cause: ‘Thus we must view change in general simply as a given state of reality, which is maintained through its own impulse, and not ask about its original source’. Our feeling that this is intolerable and that there must be a reason for change is simply our desire to apply the concept of Being to Becoming.

But in attempting to speak of change without a cause, one has violated the very conditions for thought. For this reason, Spir argued, change as it really is cannot be thought. The ultimately unsuccessful attempt to understand change without a cause – to understand Becoming without the imposition of Being – is what Spir called a theory of ‘absolute Becoming’ [ein absolutes Werden].
Spir argued that someone who attempts to articulate such a theory will be inclined to understand Becoming in terms of centers of force of the sort presented by the eighteenth-century physicist Boscovich. These centers of force are something like bare effectuation itself:

By force [Kraft] one means the actual driving effectuating principle of Becoming. This makes it sound as if force is the cause of change. Only this view is indefensible. The driving principle is not something different from or separate from the change itself, but rather, so to speak, simply the power of constancy [Beharrungsvermögen] of the general change, its inner impulse to continue moving forward.

Force cannot be thought of as the cause of change, because that would mean conceiving of force as one relatum in a necessary relation between changes, which, as we have seen, fails to explain why change occurs. The idea of force is, instead, an attempt to get behind causal relations and explain what really goes on when change occurs. Force is the stuff that, considered all by itself—without having to think of any relation to the cue ball’s movement—was sufficient to bring about the billiard ball’s movement. Such a theory is attractive because it seems to get behind causal laws and explain why change occurs.

According to Spir, an ontology of absolute Becoming would consist of a plurality of forces that do not causally interact. If an object turns from red to green to blue, the turning from red to green must be understood in terms of a green force arising out of nothing, and the turning from green to blue must be understood in terms of a blue force arising from nothing. The two color changes have no dependence upon one another.

But Spir also argued that the thought of absolute Becoming is unsustainable. For it is impossible to think of a force as something individual—when one thinks of a force, one is always thinking of a relationship between changes according to necessary laws, that is, a causal relationship. And when we think of such causal relationships, change is seen as external to reality.

For this reason, Spir argued that an ontology of force must collapse into one in which Becoming is seen from the perspective of Being. Those attempting to explain change in the world have the choice ‘between logical contradictions, that is, mental suicide, on the one hand and the acceptance of the incomprehensibility of the world on the other’.

V

In an important passage from *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche explicitly endorsed Spir’s critique of Kant’s schematism. As we have seen, Spir rejected the schematism because he denied that the temporal and particularized flow of sensations can ever be taken up by an atemporal
and simple consciousness. According to Spir, one way Kant attempted to solve the problem was to insist that the flow of sensations and thoughts exists only as represented to a timeless consciousness. There is no need to explain how something timeless connects with temporal ideas, because the ideas only appear temporal to something timeless. As Nietzsche put it: ‘[W]hat has to be distinguished here is pure thinking, which is timeless like the one being of Parmenides, and our consciousness of this thinking. The latter comes already translated by thinking into the forms of semblance, i.e., into succession, multiplicity and motion’ (PTG, § 15). For this reason our capacity to think is not undermined by the fact that our thoughts appear to flow in time.

But relying on a long passage from Spir, Nietzsche argued that Kant’s approach fails and that time must be thought of as objectively real (PTG, § 15). It is impossible to think of the flow of time solely as something represented to a timeless consciousness, for the very fact that ideas appear to be occurring over time requires that something happens over time. Indeed, Kant must assume that this temporal flow is objectively real. Otherwise there is nothing that needs to be brought into the unity of consciousness, and so no transcendental synthesis of the imagination takes place (and no synthetic a priori truths exist). And because what the transcendental synthesis works upon is in time, one cannot imagine it as anything but a temporal process, something happening in time. But, so understood, it is impossible to see how this process can be hooked up to the thinking self, which stands outside time.

Because Nietzsche believed that the gap between sensation and thought is unbridgeable, he followed Spir in arguing that empirical judgment must contain contradictory elements of Being and Becoming. Insofar as we think at all, we must apply Being: ‘[K]nowledge is possible only on the basis of belief in being’ (WP, § 518). But Becoming resists this imposition: ‘A world in a state of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be “comprehended” or “known”’ (WP, § 520). Empirical judgment contains an antinomy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Nietzsche spoke of categories such as causality as falsifying the Becoming that shows itself through the senses (e.g., KSA 9:6[412 & 433]; GS, § 112; WP, § 551). Also following Spir’s suggestion, Nietzsche attempted to do justice to change through a theory of Becoming or flux that does not rely upon categorization. Indeed, he often used Spir’s term ‘absolute Becoming’ (KSA 9:11[162]; 9:11[281]; 9:11[293]; 10:4[83]; 11:26[58]). And, as Spir predicted, an essential part of Nietzsche’s theory of absolute Becoming are Boscovichean centers of force (BGE, § 12).

But despite these strong similarities between the two thinkers, Spir and Nietzsche took different sides in the conflict between Being and Becoming. Spir took what both he and Nietzsche identified as the path of Parmenides, in which the true nature of reality is Being – and Becoming is mere appearance. Nietzsche took what both he and Spir identified as the path of Heraclitus, in which Becoming is considered the true nature of reality and Being is a
deception created in the process of Becoming. The path of Being preserves our ability to think about reality, but at the cost of denying particularity or change. The path of Becoming preserves the particularity and change, but makes reality unthinkable. One cannot think of Becoming without falsifying it through the categories of Being. One can only gesture to an unthinkable multiplicity of evanescent and dissociated forces.

I have relied upon Spir’s philosophy to argue that Nietzsche believed that reality resists thought. But this interpretation of Nietzsche is hardly novel; indeed it is part of the commonplace that Nietzsche and Hegel are antipodes. For example, Stephen Houlgate distinguishes the two thinkers on this ground. According to Houlgate, Nietzsche believed that ‘consciousness is unable to articulate life and life ultimately eludes the unity and coherence of thought’. The contrast with Hegel is striking:

Like Nietzsche, Hegel dismisses the idea that there is a realm of being ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the sphere of becoming which we experience. But unlike Nietzsche, Hegel does not therefore understand the concept of being to be a mere fiction produced within that sphere of becoming. … Hegel sees being (at least when it is fully determined as Idea) as the inherent dynamic form and continuity of becoming itself; and he sees the ‘apparent’ world of linguistic terms and concepts as revealing rather than concealing the nature of the reality they describe.

For Hegel, reality develops according to the laws of thought. For Nietzsche, reality is unthinkable.

This difference between the two thinkers manifests itself in their attitudes toward Kant’s antinomies. Because Hegel sees reality as developing according to the laws of thought, the antinomies themselves are part – indeed the engine – of this development. For Nietzsche, in contrast, the antinomies show why reality cannot be thought without falsification.

Mysteriously, this fundamental difference between the two thinkers that Houlgate and others have identified is almost entirely ignored in Dudley’s book. In what follows I will argue that the difference undermines the analogies Dudley sees between Hegel and Nietzsche.

VI

Dudley is on firm ground in arguing that Nietzsche, like Hegel, rejected the liberal conception of freedom, that is, the view that freedom is merely the ability to do as one chooses (pp. 126, 227–28). Instead, Nietzsche understood freedom as self-determination:

This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this master of a free will, this sovereign man – how should he not be aware of his superiority over all
those who lack the right to make promises and stand as their own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how much reverence he arouses – he ‘deserves’ all three – and of how this mastery over himself also necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all more short-willed and unreliable creatures? … The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct. What will he call this dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to give it a name? The answer is beyond doubt: this sovereign man calls it his conscience. (GM II:2)

Dudley is at his best when he describes how the noble give form to their multiplicity of drives by uniting them under an overriding goal, thus creating free wills (pp. 160–74). But is this conception of self-determination similar to Hegel’s? Dudley suggests that it is:

Both Hegel and Nietzsche argue that [liberalism] fails to account for the externality endemic to choice itself. Their critiques turn on the same fundamental point, made before them by Kant: if a person’s choices are to be free, not only must she be unconstrained by other persons, but the choices themselves must truly be hers. To the extent that her choices are determined by a source external to herself, a person cannot be said to be responsible for them. In this case, a person does not achieve self-determination, is instead determined by the desires and instincts driving her choices as by an external force, and is not free. (p. 228)

The analogies that Dudley sees between Hegel and Nietzsche depend upon the two sharing Kant’s understanding of desires and instincts as an ‘external force’ that is incompatible with self-determination. Dudley’s problem is that, although Hegel shared Kant’s understanding, Nietzsche did not. For Hegel, desires remain external as long as their determination of choice is incompatible with spirit, with one’s ability to stand apart from the entirety of nature, including one’s own desires. Dudley himself insists upon this point. For Hegel, ‘spiritual beings must continue to be conceived as not merely natural, so that their difference from natural beings, in virtue of which they are capable of overcoming necessity, is preserved’ (p. 23). This is the great mystery and attraction of Hegel’s conception of freedom. Kantian autonomy is not discarded – it is preserved in a way that is compatible with our dependence upon nature. I can both identify with my drives and retain a conception of the self as standing apart from and critically assessing my entire affective makeup. The reason, once again, is that nature partakes of thought – it has within itself the capacity, over time, to reflect upon itself.

But for Nietzsche, desires and instincts, far from being an external force, are precisely what the self is. For this reason, the sovereign individual has no capacity to reflect on his affective makeup. Ruling drives cannot reflect upon themselves (WP, §275; BGE, §117). Because evaluations are the expression of ruling drives, action in accordance with those drives – and so life itself – cannot be assessed, positively or negatively: ‘One would have to be situated
outside life … to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all: sufficient reason for understanding that this problem is for us an inaccessible problem. When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life evaluates through us when we establish values’ (TI, § 5: 5, see also GS, § 310; WP, § 675, TI, § 2: 2).

VII

But if Nietzsche thought we simply are our ruling drives, why did I agree with Dudley that Nietzsche considered the internalization of ‘external’ drives to be necessary for self-determination? Dudley himself provides the answer in the distinction between nobility and decadence. The decadent, in addition to having unstructured impulses, flees from nature as a whole. Because of his suffering at the hands of the healthy, he creates a metaphysic of a true world, in which the natural world is rejected as illusory. Because he rejects nature, the decadent must lie to himself about the natural origins of this very rejection. In contrast, the noble, who overcomes decadence, is able to affirm his own instincts and so effectively harness them in the service of a higher goal (pp. 172–73). This process is the internalization of ‘external’ desires required for self-determination. Such internalization does not require that the noble be other than his ruling drives, that he reflect upon and obtain self-consciousness concerning them.

The attraction of Hegel is that he allows for the development of complete self-consciousness – complete transparency of the self to itself – even while accepting that the self is situated in nature. Because thought and nature are interdependent, nature has the capacity to overcome its self-opacity. But because Nietzsche treats the self as particularity – as a multiplicity of forces – such self-consciousness cannot arise.38

Nietzsche’s and Hegel’s different conceptions of self-determination and identification with nature come down to their different conceptions of the relationship between thought and reality. For Hegel the self is both a particularity that is situated within nature and thought’s universality, in a way that preserves each. It is a particularity in the sense that the content of its aims is derived from nature. But it is universal in the sense that nature has the potential, over time, to reflect upon anything natural.

Nietzsche, in contrast, sees the self as pure particularity. The self simply is a collection of forces. The only reason that reconciliation with nature is necessary is that decadence has alienated us from what we essentially are.

For this reason, Nietzschean freedom does not consist in internalizing those parts of the world standing beyond the self and its drives (for example, one’s community). Dudley, seduced by the analogies he sees between Hegel and
Nietzsche, argues that nobility, like ethical life, requires a relationship to community:

Their rejection of the Kantian will as empty and therefore subject to external authorities for the source of its contents leads both Hegel and Nietzsche to conclude that a freely willing subject must be one that is able to reconcile itself with, or come to find itself at home in, a world whose contents it has helped to produce and that it understands to be its own. Hegel calls such a willing subject ethical, and considers it to be epitomized by the citizen of the rational state. Nietzsche’s freely willing subjects are noble, those whose customs grow out of their own instincts, and who dwell happily in a community made up of others like themselves. (pp. 228–29)

Dudley offers the following passage from The Wanderer and His Shadow as an example of Nietzsche’s belief in ‘the interconnectedness of the flourishing and liberation of individuals and culture’ (p. 193):

Humanity ought one day to become a tree, which overshadows the whole earth with many billions of blossoms, which all alongside one another ought to become fruit, and the earth itself ought to be prepared for the nourishment of this tree. That the presently still small roots of this should increase in sap and force, that the sap should flow throughout countless canals for the nourishment of the whole and the individuals—from these and similar tasks is the standard to be derived, as to whether a person of the present is useful or useless. (WS, § 189)

Apparently Dudley believes that anyone, like Nietzsche, who thinks that a flourishing culture, in which each individual supports others’ activities, is a worthy goal also shares Hegel’s view that relationship to a culture is constitutive of freedom. That hardly follows.

For Hegel, such a relationship is constitutive of freedom, because as Dudley himself puts it, ‘only a being capable of internalizing its external limitations, of achieving a genuine infinity by overcoming the apparent finitude of both itself and its other through a demonstration that the two are members of a larger, self-determining unity, can be free’ (p. 21). Every apparent finitude – and most importantly the finitude of participation in community – must be shown to be part of a larger self-determining whole. But for Nietzsche, the self is essentially a particular finite constellation of forces, in conflict with other forces. Freedom consists in the healthy organization of those forces out of which one is composed. It does not require identification with those forces to which one is in opposition. Hence the radical individualism in Nietzsche’s thought, an individualism that is, remarkably, entirely lost in Dudley’s account.

VIII

For Hegel, freedom requires philosophical activity, because we need to make compatible two things: our dependence on nature and our capacity, as self-determining beings, to be other than nature. Philosophy does this by revealing
the interdependence of thought’s universality and reality’s particularity. But freedom, as Nietzsche conceives it, does not require the ability to be other than nature. One simply is a constellation of drives and is free when that constellation is sufficiently organized. Identification with nature is needed for freedom only to the extent that decadence leads to a denial of one’s natural character. This denial inhibits the organization in which freedom consists.

Why then did I agree with Dudley that Nietzsche considered philosophy necessary for freedom? Why isn’t the noble’s overcoming of decadence, a process that does not require philosophy, enough? Dudley argues as follows:

The noble subject is at home because of its ability to construct a world based on its own values and the thoughts that undergird them. Success in this endeavor depends precisely upon the noble’s avoidance of that to which those values and thoughts cannot be assimilated. This means that the noble, at home in its world, is limited by that which it cannot engage, that for which its categories of appropriation are themselves inappropriate. … It has to reject as alien to itself both forms of willing other than its own, and the world itself, for the world is continually becoming and therefore resistant to the establishment of any and all particular forms of being that noble moralities might embrace. Reconciliation with the world thus requires not only embracing a particular form of being, but also embracing becoming, the impermanence to which all forms of being are subject. This embracing of becoming, however, is the activity of the tragic, not the noble. (pp. 229–30)

Nobility appears to have two problems that philosophy can solve, one affective and one cognitive. The first problem is ‘the particularity of the reconciliation afforded by willing’ (p. 229) and the second is the noble’s categories of thought denying Becoming. The first problem is overcome, Dudley argues, through the sickness of modernism. The moderns, unlike the noble, have a rootless, experimental ability to displace settled perspectives. To be sure, their failure to close themselves off is sickness. As Dudley puts it, ‘The experimenter is always sick, in every present, because her self consists in continually transgressing the measure that defines the health of her “self” at any given time’ (p. 186). But because their sickness causes them to ‘run through the range of human values’ (BGE, § 211), these free spirits escape being limited by a particular established valuation (p. 186). Nobility needs to be ‘reinfected with modern openness in order to overcome the limitations of its own healthy closure’ (p. 178).

Dudley’s reading of Nietzsche seems once again to be driven by the parallels he insists on seeing with Hegel. Nietzsche undoubtedly praises the free spirit’s ability to adopt a multiplicity of values. But is this goal one of overcoming particularity or instead achieving a form of particularity that is healthier because it has a larger universe of resources for appropriation? Dudley makes Nietzsche sound as if he, like Hegel, believed that the ability to be other than and reflect upon nature as a whole can arise through nature. This is contrary to the entire tenor of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

The second problem with nobility is its denial of Becoming. Dudley argues
that the tragic perspective solves this problem. Philosophy aids the tragic perspective by ‘exposing the invisible prejudices contained in common words and conventions, as well as disrupting those prejudices by using common words and conventions in unconventional and transformative ways’ (p. 219).

Here Dudley is on firmer ground. We have already seen how the affirmation of Becoming is inhibited by categories of thought. This should be as true for nobles as it is for the decadent. But because he has suppressed this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which puts Nietzsche in a different philosophical tradition from German Idealism, Dudley has a hard time explaining just why categories falsify Becoming. He argues that ‘decadent metaphysics is supported by our tendency to reify linguistic subjects and objects; we are prone to assume that discrete and stable units of language – words – must refer to units of reality that are equally discrete and stable’ (p. 214).

Furthermore, although ‘noble values are self-generated, rather than externally imposed, the noble continues to share with the decadent a firm commitment to her established perspective, to her fixed set of convictions and values. This means that … noble language is therefore equally likely to foster a metaphysics of stability and being’ (p. 215). But Dudley leaves it a mystery why noble language must assume that things do not change. Don’t nobles have words, like ‘change’, that do a perfectly good job of describing the change in the world?

It is only through the arguments I have outlined above that the falsification of Becoming can be explained. Because any act of thought (even the judgment that something is changing) employs categories such as substance or causality, it must deny the change in the world. All thought is the falsification of Becoming through Being. Once these arguments are acknowledged, however, the differences between Nietzsche’s and Hegel’s conceptions of freedom and self-determination become clear. It should also be noted that once thought’s falsification of Becoming is recognized, the project of affirming Becoming becomes problematic. How can one affirm Becoming when merely thinking about it means denying it exists?

It is not surprising, therefore, that the tragic attitude would be so difficult to attain, that adopting a curious attitude toward the world like the eternal return would be necessary. Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return is an attempt to present a theory of absolute Becoming in a way that can be thought. It ‘is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being’ (WP, §617).

The flip-side of Dudley’s inability to explain just why the noble’s language must deny Becoming is his inability to explain why the eternal return is necessary to affirm it. If denying Becoming simply means thinking that the world is stable and discrete, why not just recognize that the world isn’t and affirm the fact that it isn’t? Why do we need the eternal return to affirm what is essentially a very simple fact?
To sum up, the following are the analogies that Dudley sees between Nietzsche and Hegel: both believe that freedom is self-determination, that self-determination requires identification with nature, and that philosophy is essential to this identification. I have argued that Dudley’s analogies depend upon suppressing important differences between the two thinkers, differences that follow from the relationship between thought and nature in their philosophies.

For Hegel, thought and nature are interdependent. This allows Hegel to retain a Kantian conception of self-determination, while making it compatible with our status as natural beings. Thought’s universality and nature’s particularity do not exclude one another. But self-determination requires recognizing this interdependence between thought and nature. This recognition, or identification with nature, occurs through philosophy.

For Nietzsche, thought and nature are incompatible. Because the self is a part of nature, it can never possess self-determination in the Kantian sense. Self-determination instead means that one part of the self successfully dominates the other parts. Identification with nature means recognizing one’s status as a purely natural being. Such identification is necessary for self-determination as Nietzsche understands it because, having denied our true nature through decadence, we are unable to organize and control our drives. Tragic philosophy in turn is necessary for identification with nature, because the essential categories of thought deny our true character as natural beings.

Dudley ends his book, however, by suddenly conceding that some of the differences between the two thinkers that I have insisted upon exist after all. He admits that Hegel and Nietzsche have importantly different conceptions of the practice of philosophy. Hegel is committed to thought’s self-determination, which rests upon the abilities of categories to generate particularity or determinateness from themselves (pp. 235–36). Nietzsche, in contrast, understands ‘philosophy as the disruption of thought: conceptual systems must be resistant to closure’ (p. 236). In fact, as we have seen, Nietzsche was interested in far more than disrupting settled conceptual systems in favor of new ones. He engaged in a radical critique of conceptual systems in their entirety. But Dudley at least recognizes, albeit belatedly, the importantly different attitudes that the two thinkers had toward thought’s adequacy to reality.

Dudley goes on to suggest that Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical methods are complementary, however, if Nietzsche’s project of ‘exposing and transforming particular configurations of thought’ is limited to ‘non-categorical concepts’ and Hegel’s project of enabling thought’s self-determination is limited to categories (p. 237). Dudley recognizes that such an approach limits Nietzsche’s project beyond what Nietzsche would accept.
But he argues the compromise is nevertheless acceptable, because ‘Nietzsche himself does not even engage, much less successfully undermine, Hegel’s account of categorical development. It thus remains to be seen whether some concepts are in fact categories’ in the Hegelian sense (p. 237).

The lack of engagement is Dudley’s, not Nietzsche’s. Nietzsche’s works are filled with arguments that thought can never be adequate to particularity – much less generate particularity from within itself – and these arguments are nowhere to be found in Dudley’s book. This is not to say that Nietzsche’s arguments cannot be criticized. But it is a slander to say that Nietzsche did not offer them at all. Dudley’s eleventh hour bad compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche does reveal where his true sympathies lie however: with Hegel and the tradition of German Idealism. This is not surprising, given that Dudley does a far better job articulating Hegel’s views than he does Nietzsche’s. But Dudley should have simply admitted the antipodal character of the two thinkers and then come down on Hegel’s side–instead of insisting on drawing parallels between the two thinkers that simply cannot be sustained.

Scholarship on Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly his epistemology and metaphysics, has tended toward anachronism. Usually Nietzsche is wrongly treated as a contemporary of people who wrote decades after his death. Dudley wrongly treats him as a contemporary of the German Idealists. The unsurprising truth is that Nietzsche was a contemporary of his contemporaries: the mid- and late-nineteenth century neo-Kantians, who wrote largely in reaction to German Idealism. Viewing Nietzsche in the light of these influences not only gives us a better understanding of his thought; it also reveals him to be a far more interesting and sophisticated thinker than has been assumed.

NOTES

3 Dudley’s book is not completely unprecedented in examining Nietzsche in the light of Hegel. See, for example, Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture
4 Although Dudley’s book is an interpretation of both Nietzsche and Hegel, I primarily speak of it as an interpretation of Nietzsche alone because (with two exceptions to be noted later) his views on Hegel are uncontroversial. It is his interpretation of Nietzsche in the light of Hegel that is the most challenging and exciting aspect of the book.


6 Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics, op. cit.


9 For example, Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, op. cit., pp. 160–4.


11 ‘The intellect… is only active and absolute, never passive… [For the same reason, it also has no being proper, no subsistence, for this is the result of an interaction and there is nothing either present or assumed with which the intellect could be set to interact.]’ J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 21. See also Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 44, 52.

12 Fichte’s approach is analogous to the denial of the cognitive determinateness of any element passively given to cognition, which can be found in twentieth-century Anglo-American analytic philosophers, such as Wilfred Sellars, who deny the existence of noninferential awareness of sense data. See Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd edn. 1999), ch. 2.

13 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, op. cit., p. 9.

14 Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 123. See also G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) §38A (‘Since this sensuous content is and remains for empiricism something given, so empiricism is a doctrine of unfreedom, for freedom consists precisely in the fact that I have no absolute other over and against me, but depend upon a content which I myself am.’).

15 To be sure, Hegel rejected as ‘subjective idealism’ Fichte’s deduction of the not-self from the self and its activities. Fichte’s approach, by denying the coequal status of self and not-self, failed to show how the self is indeed limited by the not-self at all. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, op. cit., p. 56. How Hegel manages to assert the identity of thought and reality while preserving their difference is one of the great mysteries and attractions of his philosophy.


17 Ibid., p. A506/B534.


19 I will cite Nietzsche’s works in the text using the following abbreviations: BGE (Beyond Good and Evil); GM (On the Genealogy of Morals); GS (The Gay Science); PTG (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks); TI (Twilight of the Idols); WP (The Will to Power); WS (The Wanderer and His Shadow). I follow the Kaufmann and/or Hollingdale translations. For those passages from Nietzsche’s notebooks not contained in the Will to Power, I will cite to Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin: DeGruyter 1980), abbreviated as KSA. References take the form KSA 9:11[329], where the volume appears first, followed by the notebook number and, within brackets, the passage number.

20 Afrikan Alexandrovich Spir was born in Ukraine, but after the age of thirty lived in Germany and Switzerland. He wrote primarily in German. His most important work was the two-volume Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie (Leipzig: J. G. Findel, 2nd edn. 1877). All evidence points to this book’s importance for

21 ‘It therefore follows that individual representations do not actually exist at all, rather only individual content, and that the representations differ from each other only in this content and receive the semblance of individuality.’ Spir, *Denken und Wirklichkeit*, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 73.


26 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 132.

27 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 214. See also Ibid., vol. 1, p. 213: ‘What will one actually say, if one asserts that change, succession, alteration are the actual unconditioned character of things or of reality? Above all clearly this: That things arise, not simply as appearance, but really, that is out of nothing, and that they really disappear, that is fade into nothing. Thus they also have no relationship among one another. …Generally considered, absolute Becoming or change [ein absolutes Werden oder Geschehen] is nothing more or less than a change without a cause.’


29 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 132.


31 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 292.


35 Ibid. 57–64.

36 Ibid., p. 93.

37 Ibid., p. 50.

38 Indeed, the goal of complete self-awareness is, for Nietzsche, a sign of sickness – a feeling of discomfort in one’s own skin. See WP §§423, 430, 439.

39 Once again, on this point, Houlgate is spot on: ‘Since Nietzsche does not see his “forces” as essentially reflected into themselves in the other, he does not construe their character as mediated by, and united with, the other.” Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 20.

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