State and Local Procedural Injustices in Environmental Regulation: The Experiences of Tallevast, Florida

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ABSTRACT

Government decisions made at the local and state level are those that most often directly affect communities. Participatory and procedural protections under state and local, rather than federal law, therefore, largely control the ability of grassroots environmental justice advocates to shape government decisions important to their communities. Thus, significant disparities in the standards of procedural justice differ not only by which state an environmental justice community happens to be located in, but also by the type of local government with authority over that community. Frequently, this diminishes the empowerment efforts of communities found in unincorporated areas. The community found in Tallevast, Florida, is one such example of a community whose dedication and struggles to achieve environmental justice have often been thwarted by deficient state and local government procedural protections.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the central themes of environmental justice advocacy is the equity of decision-making processes that affect communities.1 According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), environmental justice “will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.”2 While federal environmental laws may have deficiencies in regards to environmental justice, most statutes do contain minimum public participation and informational access requirements. Although the details of these participation processes are frequently within an agency’s discretion, many federal agencies have been improving opportunities for addressing environmental justice concerns in their decision-making processes.3

Many federal environmental statutes, however, require the EPA to delegate to the States the authority to implement national requirements upon a state demonstrating the capability to administer the federal program. While numerous federal agencies have made efforts to incorporate environmental justice into their decision-making processes, states have increasingly been delegated the primary responsibility for national environmental programs. Ninety-six percent of all delegable federal environmental programs, for example, have been delegated to states, which is nearly a thirty percent increase since 2001.4

Although the standards and EPA’s discretion to approve or disapprove delegation to the States vary across federal environmental laws,5 statutes typically require States to demonstrate equivalency with federal public participation requirements, such as public notice of draft permits, public comments and agency responses, and requests for public hearings.6 Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),7 for example, in order to qualify for delegation, “States need not implement provisions identical to” EPA’s regulations, as long as the States “establish requirements at least as stringent as the corresponding [EPA] provisions.”8 In the permitting context, quantitative criteria such as parts per million (“ppm”) provide objective standards for EPA to evaluate the “as stringent as” requirement.9 Assessing procedural protections, however, is typically more subjective.

With States asserting an increased role in hazardous waste site remediation because of this delegable authority,10 as well as the siting and permitting decisions traditionally made at the local level, environmental justice communities often operate within state-established procedural requirements. The differences in procedural rights under state and federal regulation may not be significant for some communities, but state processes can have negative implications for many citizens, particularly

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5 See, e.g., ROBERT ESWORTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS: HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED? 10 (2014) (“In some cases, state primacy is almost automatic.”).
9 Id.
those in states without a commitment to environmental justice or public participation in general. At the substate level, residents of unincorporated areas face even greater procedural inequities compared to those who live in incorporated municipalities. While influences in addition to processes are factors, county governments typically fail to protect of-color and poor unincorporated areas from locally undesirable land uses ("LULUs") and other environmental burdens.\textsuperscript{11} The numbers of citizens who end up falling through these procedural cracks, however, constitute a significant portion of the population. In Florida, for example, this includes more than half of the State’s population.\textsuperscript{12} The struggle of the community of Tallevast, Florida, is one such example.

I. THE COMMUNITY OF TALLEVAST AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

Tallevast is a small, unincorporated community covering about 1.5 square miles in southern Manatee County, Florida. The community extends two to three blocks both north and south of Tallevast Road, from approximately 15th Street East to 19th Street East. The Tallevast community consists of approximately eighty-four households, which are almost entirely African American.\textsuperscript{13} A majority of these households includes descendants of at least one of Tallevast’s five founding families, who settled the area as turpentiners following the Civil War. Tallevast contains two churches—Mt. Tabor Missionary Baptist and Bryant Chapel Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. Many residents have returned to their extended family and community roots after obtaining their education elsewhere—such as Dr. Clifford “Billy” Ward and his daughter, Dr. Tasha Ward, who operate Ward Family Dentistry in Tallevast.

Although the economic welfare of Manatee County exceeds the average for the State of Florida,\textsuperscript{14} Tallevast has often not received the

\textsuperscript{14} Id.
amenities and services provided to other parts of the county. Some streets in the neighborhood remain unpaved, there are no sidewalks in the neighborhood—even along heavily used Tallevast Road—sewer connections were not made until 1985, and many residents did not have access to the public water system before 2004. In 2003, residents held a series of “visioning” sessions and formed the community group Family Oriented Community United Strong (“FOCUS”) in efforts to improve the quality of their neighborhood. Led by President Laura Ward and Vice President Wanda Washington, FOCUS’s mission, and the direction of the entire community, would quickly change.

A. Discovery of Contamination in the Community

In 1996, Lockheed Martin Corporation, the world’s largest defense contractor, acquired the former American Beryllium Company (“ABC”) site located on five acres of land at 1600 Tallevast Road as part of its purchase of Loral’s defense electronics business. From 1961 to 1996, ABC was an ultraprecision beryllium machine parts manufacturing facility, where metals were milled, lathed, and drilled, as well as electroplated, anodized, or ultrasonically cleaned, for various components, including parts for nuclear warheads and the Hubble telescope. While the exact source remains unknown, over a period of time encompassing decades, leaks or discharges apparently occurred at a series of “sumps” associated with ABC’s on-site wastewater treatment system, allowing contaminants, primarily chlorinated solvents, to enter the soil and groundwater beneath the facility. Sometime in 1999 or 2000, Lockheed Martin discovered the groundwater beneath the ABC property was contaminated by a variety

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15 See, e.g., Erin Bryce & Debi Springer, A Vision of Tallevast, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE H12 (March 13, 2003); Erin Bryce, Water, Sewer and Paved Roads are on their Way, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE H1, H12 (Nov. 3, 2003). Sidewalks along Tallevast Road, however, are currently scheduled for installation in the summer of 2016. See Bd. CNTY. COMM’RS, MANATEE CNTY., FLA., RES. B-16-033 (Sept. 15, 2015).
17 AUDE FLEURANT & SAM PERLO-FREEMAN, THE SIPRI TOP 100 ARMS-PRODUCING AND MILITARY SERVICES COMPANIES, 2013 3 (Tbl. 1) (2014) (arms sales: $35.5 billion; profits: $2.9 billion; employees: 116,000).
20 Id.
of pollutants.\textsuperscript{21} The full extent of the contamination is not known as the groundwater has only been tested for a handful of the hundreds of chemicals on the ABC’s Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”), but the primary “contaminants of concern” (“COCs”)—i.e., those occurring in concentrations exceeding Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”)—are trichloroethylene (“TCE”), 1,4-dioxane (“dioxane”), tetrachloroethylene (“PCE”), cis-1,2-dichloroethene, 1,1-dichloroethene, 1,1-dichloroethane, vinyl chloride, methylene chloride, bromodichloromethane, dibromochloromethane, and 1,1,1-trichloroethane.\textsuperscript{22}

The concentrations of some of these pollutants were well beyond what is considered safe for human contact, let alone ingestion. Dioxane, for example, which damages the central nervous system, kidneys, and liver and is a probable human carcinogen,\textsuperscript{23} has been found in concentrations of 2,710 parts per billion ("ppb"), while the GCTL is 3.2 ppb.\textsuperscript{24} Even more prevalent is TCE, which also damages the nervous system, kidneys, and liver, as well as the immune system and developing fetuses and is a known human carcinogen,\textsuperscript{25} found in concentrations of up to 35,000 ppb—more than 11,000 times Florida’s GCTL of 3.0 ppb and 7,000 times the Maximum Contaminant Level (“MCL”) under the Safe Drinking Water Act.\textsuperscript{27}

Lockheed Martin maintains that it “immediately notified the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP)”\textsuperscript{28} upon discovering the contamination in 2000, but neither Lockheed Martin nor FDEP

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21}Id. at 5.
\item \textsuperscript{22}Id. at 9.
\item \textsuperscript{26}Tallevast, Florida: Background & Timeline, supra note 24.
\item \textsuperscript{27}42 U.S.C. § 300f–300j (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 141.61(a)(5) (2016) (MCL for TCE is 0.005 mg/l, or 5 ppb). The Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (“MCLG”) for TCE is zero (0). 40 C.F.R. § 141.50(a)(5) (2016).
\end{itemize}
notified the residents in the community. Initially, Lockheed believed the groundwater contamination plume was limited to five acres in size and did not extend beyond its property. At the time Lockheed Martin accepted responsibility for the clean-up by signing a consent order with FDEP in 2004, the plume was then thought to be approximately twelve acres. By 2006, however, when FDEP approved Lockheed Martin’s third attempt at a Site Assessment Report, the plume of groundwater contamination extended laterally over 200 acres and vertically down to three distinct aquifer systems, composed of seven separate layers of aquifers.

Tallevast residents did not find out about the contamination until September 2003, when Laura Ward looked out her window to see a large drilling rig in her yard. Ms. Ward asked a worker what they were doing in her yard, and the worker responded: “You don’t know, but the water is contaminated here.” Ms. Ward and other Tallevast resident started asking a lot of questions of various government agencies and Lockheed Martin officials. They were less than forthcoming at times, which led Ms. Ward and Ms. Washington to do their own review of public records at the Tampa office of FDEP. After these residents realized the extent of the contamination, they were assured by FDEP and the County that the risk of groundwater exposure was limited because the community was on public water. While many Tallevast households were connected to public water supply lines around 1985, the residences along 16th, 18th, and 19th Streets, as well as parts of Tallevast Road, continued to use water from their private wells for household uses and irrigation. When finally tested in 2004, many of these wells were found to be contaminated.

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29 Id.
34 Id. at 6.
B. Litigation and Other Legal Strategies

Although FDEP and Lockheed Martin began to hold informational meetings in the community, the failure to inform the community about the contamination made it difficult for the residents to trust or have confidence in the responsible party or the government agency charged with protecting Florida’s environment and the quality of life of its citizens. Looking for someone to protect their health and other interests, Tallevast residents turned to private attorneys.

Almost from the beginning, litigation began to splinter this close-knit community. Multiple tort suits with different sets of plaintiffs and various claims were filed against Lockheed Martin. In terms of plaintiffs, the largest suit, *Laura Ward v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*, in which 272 residents sought damages for contamination of their respective properties and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the failure to notify the community, was filed in 2005. After five years of litigation, Lockheed Martin announced the confidential settlement of an undisclosed amount of damages in 2010, a month before the scheduled trial. Ultimately, the case was settled and dismissed at the end of 2011.

Litigation concerning health impacts has proved even more difficult for the residents. A group of thirty-one residents, not parties to the *Ward* litigation, also filed suit in 2005. Though the case included claims similar to those of *Ward, Alphonso Bradley v. Lockheed Martin Corp.* focused more on health damages. This case was eventually dismissed in 2011.
In 2007, four community members filed a suit seeking class action status for three groups of plaintiffs—employees, families of employees, and residents of the community—for payment of medical monitoring tests for conditions related to beryllium exposure, including berylliosis, a lung disease, and the more severe chronic beryllium disease (“CBD”).\textsuperscript{43} Class-action status was denied in 2010 and upheld on appeal.\textsuperscript{44} Three family members, the husband who was a janitor, his wife, and brother-in-law who lived with them, each with berylliosis or CBD, also sued Lockheed Martin in 2007 and settled for an undisclosed amount in 2011.\textsuperscript{45}

The community’s litigation concerning the contamination, however, was not limited to Lockheed Martin. Unsatisfied with both the documentation of the extent of pollution and the proposed pump-and-treat methodology, which would take between 50 and 100 years to clean up the groundwater, FOCUS and several individual residents challenged FDEP’s approval of Lockheed Martin’s Site Assessment Report (“SAR”) and Remedial Action Plan (“RAP”) in 2011.\textsuperscript{46} After an eleven-day administrative hearing, the administrative law judge ruled against the Petitioners, a recommendation that was approved by FDEP.\textsuperscript{47} After more than two years, the Court of Appeals upheld this decision in a one-word opinion.\textsuperscript{48} FOCUS’s other challenges to the decisions of FDEP and the water management district allowing Lockheed to proceed with its clean-up plan also proved unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{44} Case Destroyed, Wanda Washington v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 2D10-4298 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App., July 24, 2013); Timothy R. Wolfrum, Judge: No Class Action in Tallevast, BRADENTON HERALD (Sept. 2, 2010).


\textsuperscript{47} Id.


C. Other Environmental Hazards Threatening the Community

The groundwater contamination and resulting litigation have not been the only environmental threats to Tallevast. The County Commission decided that Tallevast should also host the new Manatee County Transit Authority bus depot.\textsuperscript{50} The 116,000-square-foot, $16-million facility is to include a maintenance building, fuel depot, and truck wash station and will host buses, trolleys, ambulances, tractors, bulldozers, sheriff’s vehicles, boats, vans, and mowers.\textsuperscript{51} Residents are most concerned about the increased traffic and fumes. As summarized by Wanda Washington at a County Commission meeting, “This is not the correct project to bring to this community and it seems as though nobody’s hearing us.”\textsuperscript{52} Laura Ward added:

“Our families were in that community when no one else wanted to be out there. . . . Manatee County never gave us lights, they never gave you a phone number,” she said, adding residents still have trouble getting mail unless they use a Sarasota ZIP code. . . . “We don’t want any foolishness like this in our community.”\textsuperscript{53}

In addition to the transit facility, Manatee County approved the demolition of a building on another contaminated site in 2015.\textsuperscript{54} This building was previously part of the ABC facility, “until it became too contaminated for the workers, then they moved them next door” to the current Lockheed Martin property.\textsuperscript{55} Although community members have wanted this vacant, dilapidated eyesore removed for years, they had frequently been told that the property was too contaminated to tear down.\textsuperscript{56} As such, residents were concerned about beryllium dust, asbestos, and other toxins being further distributed in the community. The first any of the Tallevast residents learned of the planned removal, however, was when they saw news stories about Manatee County’s approval.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{51} Id.
\textsuperscript{52} Id.
\textsuperscript{53} Id.
\textsuperscript{54} Id.
\textsuperscript{56} Id.
\textsuperscript{57} See Sara Kennedy, \textit{Part of Abandoned Tallevast Plant to be Demolished}, Manatee
II. PROCEDURAL DEFICITS IN FLORIDA’S ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Florida is one of the most contaminated states in the country, currently ranking sixth in the number of Superfund sites on the National Priorities List (“NPL”).58 Within Florida, these Superfund hazardous waste sites are nearly four times more likely to be located in a community of color than a white community and are unequally distributed by income and education levels as well.59 Other general indicators of environmental burdens in Florida—such as cancer risk from hazardous air pollutants, facilities emitting criteria pollutants, and the release of toxic chemicals—also show disproportionate impacts based on race, class, and education.60 Thus, Florida’s structural decisions concerning the participation of citizens directly impacted by these environmental burdens have powerful procedural justice implications. Florida, unfortunately, has a history of decision-making processes that not only exclude the affected public from effective participation but also from receiving basic information on environmental risks they may face.

A. Notification Rules for Residents When Their Property Has Been Contaminated: The “Tallevast” Bill

When Lockheed Martin began initial clean-up of the ABC site in 2001 with the removal of 538 tons of contaminated soil,61 Florida law did not require notifying residents whose property was contaminated by another party until after FDEP had approved a clean-up plan.62 At that time, FDEP approval was the last step of a process that began with FDEP being made aware of contamination spreading onto adjacent properties followed by a formal assessment of the extent of contamination.63

60 Id.
61 Ronnie Greene, Taking the Law Into Their Own Hands: Fence Line Fighting and Environmental Justice, a Journalist’s Point of View, 2 ENVT’L AND EARTH L. J. 60, 74 (2012).
63 Id.
In Tallevast’s case, FDEP publicly asserted at the time that the agency was unaware that residents in Tallevast continued to use private wells, rather than a public water system, because of poor state record-keeping and inadequate interagency communication. 64 Nearly a decade later, however, an investigative reporter’s review of FDEP records from 2001 and 2002, found the State believed organic compounds “may be migrating offsite” and that government officials “raised concerns about potential impacts to off-site private wells.” 65 The notification delay for Tallevast and the residents’ anger at FDEP created an ally in State Representative Bill Galvano (R-Bradenton), despite Tallevast not being included in his Manatee County district. 66 Representative Galvano called FDEP’s failure “abhorrent” and recognized that “[t]he community had a complete lack of trust at that point, and you could not blame them.” 67

Publicly embarrassed by the situation in Tallevast, FDEP initiated rulemaking to require notification of contamination in 2004 and adopted its first notification rule in April 2005. 68 This rule required a responsible party to notify FDEP within ten days of discovering contamination beyond the boundaries of its property. 69 It further required that the responsible party provide actual notice to “the appropriate County Health Department and all record owners of any real property into which [contamination above CTL[s] extend[ed],” as well as constructive notice to residents by publication in a newspaper and posting warning signs at the site. 70 While these notifications had to be made prior to FDEP authorizing the responsible party’s final remediation plan, specific time frames during which these notifications must be provided were not required. 71 After the rule went into effect, for example, FDEP estimated it would take about one year to notify all the residents living near approximately 2,500 sites where the contamination had spread to adjacent properties. 72

The rule adopted by FDEP had a number of deficiencies, but the lack of a firm deadline for notifying residents of affected properties led

64 See, e.g., Follick, supra note 35.
65 Greene, supra note 61 (citing Ronnie Greene, Small-town Residents Living on Deadly Ground, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 2008; Ronnie Greene, Tiny Toxic Florida Town Takes on a Corporate Goliath, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2010).
67 Id.
69 Id. r. 62-780.220(2).
70 Id. r. 62-780.220(3), (5).
71 See id. r. 62-780.220(3).
72 Follick, supra note 35.
Representative Galvano to pursue legislation requiring FDEP to provide notices to affected property owners within a specific time frame.\textsuperscript{73} Galvano did not want public notification to be “left to [FDEP] discretion.”\textsuperscript{74} The “Tallevast” bill, as House Bill 937 was known, eventually passed unanimously.\textsuperscript{75} The statute required FDEP, not the responsible party, to notify all owners of property at which contamination had been discovered within thirty days after FDEP became aware of the contamination.\textsuperscript{76}

“The idea that government had knowledge about [residents’] safety that wasn’t being shared, that’s hard for a community to overcome,”\textsuperscript{77} Galvano said. Wanda Washington said she was “happy that Tallevast was instrumental in helping other people, but. . . [n]ow that the pollution is here, we’re focusing on our health.”\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{B. Inadequate Technical Assistance and Patchwork Attempts to Address the Knowledge Gap}

At the federal level, Congress made well-informed citizen participation an important part of hazardous waste site clean-ups under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”).\textsuperscript{79} Under CERCLA, for example, EPA may provide technical assistance grants (“TAGs”) of up to $50,000 to groups of individuals which may be affected by contaminants from a facility on the NPL.\textsuperscript{80} TAGs allow communities to obtain technical assistance for “interpreting information with regard to the nature of the hazard, remedial investigation and feasibility study, record of decision, remedial design, selection and construction of remedial action, operation and maintenance, or removal action.”\textsuperscript{81} The grants may be “renewed to facilitate public participation at all stages of remedial action,” and EPA may waive

\textsuperscript{75} 2005 Fla. Laws 937.
\textsuperscript{76} FLA. STAT. § 376.30702(3) (2005).
\textsuperscript{77} Follick, \textit{supra} note 35.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.} § 9617(e)(1).
the $50,000 limit for sites that are complex or generate a large volume of information.\textsuperscript{82}

Lockheed Martin’s ABC facility, however, was not being cleaned up pursuant to the authority of CERCLA. Instead, it would become the first contaminated site remediated under the State of Florida’s new global risk-based corrective action (“RBCA”) law, which became effective in 2003\textsuperscript{83} and extended RBCA principles established for the petroleum, brownfields, and drycleaning programs “to all contaminated sites” where responsible parties have been identified.\textsuperscript{84} In general, application of RBCA principles has been embraced by the regulated community “as a streamlined approach that offers a more cost-efficient cleanup process.”\textsuperscript{85}

Unlike CERCLA, however, public involvement is not an integral part of the State of Florida’s hazardous waste remediation program. Other than notification of contamination, public participation in Florida is required to include only a 30-day comment period for local governments and owners and residents of property into which contaminants exceeding GCTLs extend.\textsuperscript{86}

1. Insufficient Technical Assistance and the 2004 Consent Order

Although community technical assistance is not required under Florida law, due to the urging of Representative Galvano, the 2004 Consent Order included a provision requiring Lockheed Martin to “fund the oversight and review activities of an independent consulting firm chosen by the Tallevast community group called Family Oriented Community United Strong (FOCUS).”\textsuperscript{87} The Consent Order also required that any data Lockheed Martin presented to the State “must be submitted to FOCUS at the same time they are submitted to [FDEP].”\textsuperscript{88} In addition, FDEP was also to “consider any comments provided by FOCUS concerning any data reviewed by the consulting firm” provided for in the Consent Order.\textsuperscript{89}
While intentions may have been good, the technical assistance provisions for FOCUS in the Consent Order proved problematic to implement. First, it committed Lockheed to funding activities of FOCUS’s consulting firm “up to a maximum of $25,000 per year” for as long as the contamination plume extended beyond the ABC site. This amount was established, however, at the time the plume was believed to be twelve acres in size, and the amount was never adjusted when the size of the plume was found to be more than sixteen times larger. Moreover, the Tallevast site is hydrologically complex and involves multiple pollutants. Thus, Lockheed Martin has produced a staggering volume of data, including quarterly and annual reports from 275 monitoring wells, four SARs, and multiple RAPs.

Second, the Consent Order provides that “FOCUS shall direct activities of the independent consulting firm,” but it does not state who would pay the firm directly. As a result, Lockheed Martin has paid the consultant’s invoices directly, and has never provided FOCUS with an accounting of how much money was spent and on what activities. If FOCUS wanted the consultant to spend time on something specific, Lockheed Martin would frequently inform the organization that the $25,000 had already been expended for the year. Finally, although the Consent Order afforded FDEP, but not Lockheed Martin, the right to approve FOCUS’s choice of a consulting firm, FDEP has allowed Lockheed Martin to veto FOCUS’s requests to use consultants other than the firm initially selected.

FOCUS had no ability to address these deficiencies without the willingness of both FDEP and Lockheed Martin to reopen the Consent Order. On August 3, 2008, however, Lockheed’s Interim RAP groundwater
treatment system failed, spilling 5,000 gallons of contaminated water onto the site and adjacent properties,\textsuperscript{98} including the Tallevast Community Center, a youth development organization providing after-school care for children.\textsuperscript{99} The leak occurred less than two weeks after a community meeting in which Lockheed assured the residents that “state-of-the-art ‘double-redundancy’ safety protocols” would prevent such a problem.\textsuperscript{100}

2. FOCUS’s Technical Consulting Agreement with Lockheed Martin

FOCUS and Lockheed Martin began negotiations to address the worry, anger, and distrust the spill caused in the community.\textsuperscript{101} These discussions included Lockheed providing FOCUS funds to procure independent testing and monitoring data in the community as well as including such a provision in the new Consent Order for the August spill.\textsuperscript{102} When this funding and other issues discussed were not included in the Consent Order, however, FOCUS petitioned for an administrative hearing to challenge FDEP’s approval of said Order.\textsuperscript{103} After FOCUS filed the Petition, however, Lockheed Martin suggested making its relationship with FOCUS more direct without involving FDEP in additional technical consulting funds.\textsuperscript{104} These conversations led to a Technical Consulting Agreement (“TCA”) between Lockheed Martin and FOCUS, which was entered into in January 2009.\textsuperscript{105}

In exchange for FOCUS dismissing the challenge to the spill Consent Order and taking on additional specified duties, Lockheed Martin promised to provide FOCUS with monies to fund independent environmental consulting, environmental, health, and safety monitoring, and


\textsuperscript{99} Gary Taylor, \textit{supra} note 98, ¶ 5.

\textsuperscript{100} First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin, ¶ 32.


\textsuperscript{103} Consent Order, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., at 8; \textit{FLA. STAT. §§} 120.569, 120.57.

\textsuperscript{104} First Amend. Compl., Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin, at 1, 6.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Id.} at 6.
The amount of funds varied based on status of remediation at the site. At the time of the agreement, for example, Lockheed Martin was to provide FOCUS approximately $550,000 per year until RAP construction was completed. After construction, the amount of funds decreased until remediation ended and Lockheed Martin received a “no further action” approval from FDEP. Based on Lockheed Martin’s estimated RAP construction and 48 to 100-year clean-up time frames, the value of the Agreement to FOCUS would have been between $5 and $17 million.

After making the first payment of $275,000 in July 2009, however, Lockheed stopped making payments to FOCUS. Initially, following an audit of FOCUS’s finances, Lockheed Martin claimed FOCUS had breached its duties under the TCA. After FOCUS addressed the issues raised by Lockheed Martin, virtually all of which required actions beyond the terms of the TCA, however, Lockheed Martin ultimately stated that the TCA was a “gift” to FOCUS which Lockheed Martin was no longer interested in continuing.

After sending demand letters, FOCUS filed a breach of contract suit in January 2011. After a 4-day jury trial in November 2012, FOCUS received a directed verdict on formation and breach of contract. The question of damages suffered by FOCUS went to the jury, which awarded $3 million in damages—$1.75 million of the payments Lockheed Martin had not made and $1.25 million for future economic loss. By the end of the trial, however, because RAP construction was nearly complete and the court had been unwilling to enjoin construction activities over a contract dispute, FOCUS had lost the opportunity to collect the most important data for the residents’ long-term health concerns—air monitoring during demolition of beryllium-contaminated buildings, removing

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106 Id. ¶ 44.
107 Id. at 3–4.
108 Id. at 4–8.
109 Id. at 3–4.
existing caps over the groundwater contamination, and soil disturbance from digging trenches and other infrastructure during RAP construction.\footnote{Order, Family Oriented Comm. United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:11-CV-217-T-30AEP, Dkt. No. 30 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2011) (Order denying plaintiff’s TRO).} Nonetheless, because the other residents’ legal challenges ended in undisclosed settlements or were unsuccessful, this has proven to be the only litigation the community has filed where a court actually found that Lockheed Martin violated the law—albeit contract, rather than environmental, law.\footnote{Beth Barrett et al., Lockheed Resolves Toxic Claims, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Aug. 4, 1996, http://chipjacobs.com/articles/environmental/lockheed-resolves-toxic-claims/.

U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ATSDR, PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR FORMER AM. BERYLLIUM CO., TALLEVAST, MANATEE CTY., FLA. 4 (2008).} 

3. Community Health Assessment

In addition to the difficulties Tallevast residents have had gathering technical information, finding a reliable source able to document the health impacts on the community has further been a challenge. In 2005, Lockheed Martin, insisting that the contamination posed no health risks, began their own toxicology study, as did the Florida Department of Health (“DOH”) and the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”).\footnote{Christopher O’Donnell, State Messes Up Tallevast Study, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Mar. 25, 2008, at B1.} Meanwhile, community residents, through FOCUS, took a door-to-door approach, and began compiling information on residents’ health,\footnote{Fran T. Close et al., Community-Based Internships to Address Environmental Issues: A Model for Effective Partnerships, 5 PROG. CMTY. HEALTH P’SHP 77–87 (2011).} with the assistance of graduate student interns from the Florida A&M University Institute of Public Health.\footnote{O’Donnell, supra note 117, at B1.} By 2008, these health studies resulted in another embarrassment for the State government and more frustration for the community.\footnote{Id.}

The Florida DOH’s cancer study, which utilized the Florida Cancer Data System, revealed only four cases of cancer in Tallevast.\footnote{Id.} This result contrasted starkly to the residents’ study—which included tracking cancers and beryllium-related diseases with pushpins on a wall map—that showed more than eighty cancer deaths in the previous twenty years.\footnote{Id.} The ATSDR’s conclusions also contradicted those of the Florida DOH. Regarding the groundwater in Tallevast, the ATSDR declared it
“a public health hazard. Past long-term use of groundwater with the highest measured trichloroethylene concentrations for drinking and showering by Tallevast residents could have resulted in . . . increased theoretical risk of kidney cancer, liver cancer, leukemia, and lymphoma.”

The problem with the DOH study, as it turned out, was the result of tracking cancer deaths reported in the wrong ZIP code. Although Tallevast has its own postal ZIP code, very few residents are able to use its ZIP code because the U.S. Postal Service does not deliver mail in the community. Thus, most Tallevast residents have P.O. boxes or are otherwise assigned a ZIP code for the neighboring County. The community was upset that DOH had not worked with them to ensure errors like this did not occur. Wanda Washington was “angry. . . . [N]o one ever came into the community to do a study. If you are doing it from behind a desk, you’re going to miss a lot.”

DOH estimated that conducting an official epidemiological study like the residents’ informal one would cost $125,000. With that estimate, Representative Galvano ensured there was a line item in the state budget for that amount earmarked for a Tallevast health study. Rather than just allow DOH to conduct the study, however, the allocation called for a three-year grant under which DOH would provide FOCUS the funds to hire an independent epidemiologist, with DOH maintaining oversight.

With the initial grant, FOCUS hired Dr. Janvier Gasana, a tenured associate professor at Florida International University Robert Stempel College of Public Health & Social Work, who spent several weekends in the community conducting face-to-face interviews and reviewing medical records of more than 150 residents. Dr. Gasana’s initial reports demonstrated some startling results. For example:

The age-specific incidence of cancers of concern in Tallevast was more than 2 times as high as what is expected if Tallevast residents had experienced the same incidence rate as the Florida African American population for prostate
cancer. The overall cancer incidence among Tallevast residents was 85% higher than among the Florida African Americans. Using the raw numbers, there seems to be an increase of cancers three decades after the start of the chemical plant.130

Upon receiving the draft report, DOH began questioning Dr. Gasana’s methodology.131 FOCUS had an independent expert review Dr. Gasana’s draft report, who found the methodology acceptable.132 Since neither Dr. Gasana nor FOCUS were willing to change the methodology or analysis, DOH refused any further payments to FOCUS, leaving FOCUS unable to pay Dr. Gasana and his team.133 Further, FOCUS was left with a comprehensive health study of the community that, if it were ever to be released, would not have the official stamp of government approval Tallevast had desired.

C. Local Government Procedures

At the federal level, if a government agency undertakes “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,”134 it is required to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).135 Public involvement is an integral part of NEPA, which has the “twin aims” of informed agency decision-making and ensuring an informed public.136 The initial stage of the NEPA process includes scoping, an “early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed action.”137 Since the scoping process requires federal agencies to actively seek the participation of the public, scoping serves as an early notice

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131 See Toni Whitt, Lockheed’s Tallevast cleanup plan on trial, BRADENTON HERALD, June 29, 2011.
132 Sources on file with author.
133 Sources on file with author.
134 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (2012). Agencies may prepare a more concise environmental assessment (“EA”) to determine the impacts of its action are “significant” and thus requiring a full EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2016).
137 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2016).
system for informing the public of the government’s intent to pursue a specific project. 

At least fifteen states have adopted “mini-NEPA” statutes that vary in restraints on state agency action, though “most include similar procedural provisions as NEPA.” In states such as Florida that do not have such a statute, however, public notification of the state or local government’s intent to pursue a project can come well after bureaucratic inertia has set in. In addition, the most proximate tier of government for many is the county. These unincorporated areas have often been overlooked by municipal annexation because the “properties offer[ing] lower tax revenues or residents considered undesirable through the lens of racial prejudice.” Thus, for citizens who want to be involved in government decision-making processes, a “county government may present special limitations.”

1. Land Use Decisions That Encourage Encroaching Industrial Uses

In 1980, the Manatee County Board of County Commissioners adopted The Manatee Plan, the County’s first comprehensive plan required by Florida’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975. The plan designated the future land uses in the Tallevast area as mixed residential containing one-, two-, and multiple-family homes. This designation allowed neighborhood commerce, offices, and agricultural uses as secondary uses that served as support to the primary residential use, but other forms of commerce, light and heavy industrial, and heavy transportation uses were prohibited as inconsistent with Tallevast’s residential characteristics. As such, The Manatee Plan sought to

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140 Anderson, supra note 11, at 1143.
141 Id. at 1145.
142 See MANATEE CNTY., FLA., ORDINANCE 80-4 (Nov. 14, 1980) [hereinafter The Manatee Plan].
144 Id. pt. 4 at 14, 20 (Fig. 4–6) (Tallevast Sector designated as MIX-1).
145 See id. pt. 4 at 6, 23.
protect the Tallevast Community “from industrial encroachment,” a basis which the County used to support their application for a Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) Community Development Block Grant (“CDBG”).\(^\text{146}\)

Awarded in 1983, the County used this $1 million federal grant to install a sewage collection system, connect residences to county water, pave most of the unpaved roads in the community, provide fire hydrants, and help bring substandard residences up to code through grants and low interest loans.\(^\text{147}\) By 1985, concerns about expending the CDBG funds in a timely manner led to the County utilizing “quick-taking” condemnation proceedings to acquire fee simple title and the easements required to widen and pave the roads and provide water and sewer connections.\(^\text{148}\) Nonetheless, while the roads were paved, not all of the residences were connected to the County’s sewer and water systems by the completion of the HUD grant.\(^\text{149}\)

Within a few years of these residential improvements, however, Manatee County began procedures to revise its comprehensive plan.\(^\text{150}\) While the revised comprehensive plan, which was formally adopted in 1989, maintained a residential designation for most of the existing Tallevast community, it allocated all of the areas adjacent to the community to light or heavy industrial uses.\(^\text{151}\) In addition, approximately half of the community was designated as light industrial, despite the fact that it contained only occupied residential homes.\(^\text{152}\) Thus, rather than protecting the area from industrial encroachment, Manatee County began the process of encouraging industrial activity adjacent to this historic African American community. Most of this adjacent land that was designated as industrial remained vacant for twenty-five years.\(^\text{153}\) This revised comprehensive

\(^{146}\) See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Manatee Cnty., Fla., Manatee County Small Cities Community Development Block Grant Application (HUD Form 4124), pt. I, ¶ 7 (Nov. 4, 1982) [hereinafter CDBG Application] (copy on file with author); HUD, CDBG No. B-82-DH-12-0105 (Feb. 15, 1983).

\(^{147}\) CDBG Application, supra note 146, at pt. II.

\(^{148}\) MANATEE CNTY., FLA., RESOLUTION 85-73 (Apr. 9, 1985).

\(^{149}\) Bryce & Debi Springer, supra note 15.

\(^{150}\) See, e.g., PLANNING COMM’N, MANATEE CNTY., FLA., RESOLUTION 88–185 (Aug. 22, 1988) (after several public hearings, recommending adoption of revised comprehensive plan for approval by the Board of County Commissioners).

\(^{151}\) MANATEE CNTY., FLA., ORDINANCE 89-01, MANATEE CNTY. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, pt. 2 at 65 (Sheet 19) (May 11, 1989) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN].

\(^{152}\) Id., pt. 2.

\(^{153}\) Id.
plan has been amended more than 290 times since its adoption in 1989.\textsuperscript{154} While some of these amendments did apportion additional lands to residential uses along Tallevast Road, these changes occurred solely on the east side of U.S. 301, the side of the highway where the population is primarily white, and not adjacent to the Tallevast Community.\textsuperscript{155}

From the late 1980s to the present, on the other hand, Manatee County’s vision for the future of the Tallevast Community has continued to be one of an island of low to moderate income, almost entirely African American, residences surrounded by a sea of industrial uses.\textsuperscript{156} The County had proposed various improvement projects for Tallevast over the years, but few came to fruition. For example, a proposal to expand the two-lane road through the Community to three lanes, with turn lanes, landscaped medians, a six-foot-wide sidewalk, and a four-foot-wide bicycle lane along both sides of the road was tabled by the County Commissioners in 1999.\textsuperscript{157} The County Commission did set aside design funds for a similar proposal in 2003 and the community received a $180,000 CDBG toward the design and engineering of road paving and water and sewer connections that were not completed in 1985.\textsuperscript{158} Any construction activity, however, came to a halt once the contamination was discovered.\textsuperscript{159}

2. When Encouragement Was Not Enough, the County Finally Brought Industrial Activity into the Community

On December 11, 2012, the Board of County Commissioners for Manatee County held a vote on purchasing 37.7 acres at the corner of

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\textsuperscript{155} MANATEE CNTY., FLA., ORDINANCE 89-01, MANATEE CNTY. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, pt. 2 at 65 (Sheet 19) (May 11, 1989).

\textsuperscript{156} See COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, COMPLETE AND UP TO DATE THRU SUPPLEMENT #22 A.2, at Future Land Use Map 25 of 29.

\textsuperscript{157} Erin Bryce, \textit{Tallevast Improvements}, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 2003, at H1.

\textsuperscript{158} Id.

\end{footnotesize}
Tallevast Road and U.S. 301 for the location of the county’s new Transit Fleet Facility, or bus depot. The Commission was originally scheduled to vote on the purchase while FOCUS was in court for the TCA, but the Commission agreed to delay the vote for a week to allow the community leaders to attend. Community members spoke out against the bus depot in their community, saying they have already suffered enough from pollution and feared a depot will add more. “You’re talking about diesel fuels, you’re talking about everything that Lockheed brought except beryllium.”

Residents also asked whether the Tallevast site was the only place it could go and questioned why no one had approached neighbors to discuss the plan in advance of placing the vote on the Commission’s agenda.

By the time the community learned of the plans, Manatee County had already secured $15.9 million in funding for the facility from the Federal Transit Authority (“FTA”). Although Manatee County had originally identified a different location in its State of Good Repair Grant approved by the FTA, negotiations on that site quickly broke down and Manatee County decided to move those efforts to the Tallevast site. Under the FTA’s NEPA regulations, any applicant for funds “shall serve as a joint lead agency with the [FTA].” Manatee County completed the NEPA documentation for the transit facility, which it represented to be categorically excluded from NEPA, in May 2012. Since NEPA regulations do not require public participation in categorically excluded actions, the County’s decision not to prepare an environmental assessment or an

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160 Sara Kennedy, Manatee County to Buy Tallevast Land for Bus Depot, BRADENTON HERALD, Dec. 11, 2012.
161 Sara Kennedy, Manatee Commissioners to Consider $4.52 Million Land Buy for Transit Depot, BRADENTON HERALD, Dec. 10, 2012.
163 Kennedy, supra note 160.
166 The FTA has an established categorical exclusion for “[c]onstruction of new bus storage and maintenance facilities in areas used predominantly for industrial or transportation purposes where such construction is not inconsistent with existing zoning and located on or near a street with adequate capacity to handle anticipated bus and support vehicle traffic.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(d)(8).
167 See id.; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Manatee Cty., Fla., State of Good Repair Grant 5309—Information Required for Probable Categorical Exclusion (May 1, 2012).
168 Compare 23 C.F.R. § 771.118 (FTA requirements for categorical exclusions) with 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.119, § 771.121 (FTA requirements for environmental assessments) and 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.123–771.130 (FTA requirements for environmental impact statements).
environmental impact statement meant the agencies completed their assessment of the environmental impacts of the project six months before the residents living less than a half-mile from the property even knew about the County’s plans.

Despite the local opposition, the Commission voted unanimously to purchase the Tallevast property for $4.52 million. The Commission assured the community “the facility would be ‘green’ and would not be a nuisance to its Tallevast neighbors.” Commissioner Carol Whitmore seemed to believe she was acting in the community’s best interest, stating that the bus depot would be less disruptive than other possible developments. “We were protecting [the property] from becoming a more heavy industrial site,” she said. “They’re not facing the prospect of having a cement plant in the future,” despite the existing zoning for the land not allowing such a heavy industrial use. The County’s project manager said, “It’s going to be a nice-looking facility. . . . [t]he county’s going to be very proud of it.”

When the final vote for construction approval arrived in October 2014, Manatee County officials held the public meeting not in Tallevast, but the neighboring county. The public input portion of the meeting was limited to residents writing down their concerns on comment forms that were distributed at the beginning of the meeting. As Laura Ward stated: “This is the wrong project for this community and we’ve expressed that from the very beginning . . . and it seems as though nobody’s hearing us.”

3. Contaminated Building Demolition

In addition to the ABC facility and the Transit Facility on the eastern edge of the community, Tallevast residents sought for years to

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169 Kennedy, supra note 160.
170 Id.
171 O’Donnell, supra note 162.
172 Id.
173 In 2010, the County Commission rezoned the parcel located at 2411 Tallevast Road from A-1 (Suburban Agriculture) and LM (Light Manufacturing) to the PDC (Planned Development Commercial) zoning district, which does not permit such heavy industrial uses. MANATEE CTY., FLA., ZONING ORDINANCE PDC-04-16(Z)(P) (Oct. 12, 2010); MANATEE CTY., FLA., LAND DEV. CODE § 402.11.
174 Kennedy, supra note 50.
176 Id.
177 Id.
have an abandoned building remaining on the Spindrift-Whogas property on the western border of the community to be removed.178 Due to the building’s former role in beryllium operations, however, residents were concerned that demolition would spread additional toxins into the community.179 The property’s soil is contaminated with beryllium, as well as arsenic, copper, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbon (“TRPH”), and its groundwater is contaminated with heavy metals.180 FDEP, which has assumed clean-up responsibility for the site, expects the SAR will be completed in June 2015,181 with preparation of the RAP to follow.

Thus, the community was caught by surprise upon reading about the permit approval in the newspaper, in which the director of the Manatee County Building and Services Department stated demolition could begin “within a day or two.”182

We had no idea, we were told some time ago that in order to demolish the building, they would have to take special precautions. . . . DEP has been in charge of evaluations over the past year—they’ve been very private. . . . [T]hat’s what we’ve asked, that it be taken down, it’s an eyesore for the community, but I’m truly surprised.183

Beverly Bradley, who lives across the street from the building, summarized the community’s feelings.

I would like to see it torn down but I would also like to see it be torn down in the proper way. . . . [O]ur concern is

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180 SHAW ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., SAR FOR SPINDRIFT-WHO GAS, INC. § 7, p. 1–3 (Draft Aug. 2013). TRPH is found above industrial soil contamination target levels (SCTLs), the others exceed residential SCTLs. Id.
181 Sara Kennedy, Part of Abandoned Tallevast Plant to be Demolished, BRADENTON HERALD, Feb. 10, 2015.
182 Id.
183 Sara Kennedy, Decrepit Tallevast Building Slated for Demolition, BRADENTON HERALD, Feb. 11, 2015.
that whatever we have already been exposed, to that we
would be exposed to more of it . . . [T]hey have no idea the
extent of what is in that building, other than it’s contami-
nated and I’m sure they know that.  

While FOCUS sought assurance that proper procedures for the
demolition of contaminated buildings were followed, representatives from
Manatee County, which issued the permit, and FDEP, who has responsi-
bility for the contaminated soil clean-up, were not forthcoming and dis-
regarded requests for a community meeting.  Instead of relying on the
County or State agencies to provide assurances for potential health risks,
FOCUS funded air monitoring activities during the days on which demoli-
tion activities occurred.  

CONCLUSION  

The community of Tallevast and the frustrations it has encoun-
tered in its pursuit for environmental justice are not unique. Regardless
of their location, all communities seeking just environmental outcomes
are confronted with obstacles. Some environmental justice communities,
however, face additional impediments if they happen to be located in
states that adhere to only the minimum requirements for delegation of
authority to administer federal environmental laws. The most obvious of
these differences may be substantive—setting pollution standards or
implementation plans, for example—or disparate levels of enforcement
by the state. Often, however, the possibility of success for an environ-
mental justice community may be determined by the less conspicuous
inequities in environmental and administrative procedures between the
States. Furthermore, within a state, unincorporated communities whose
most proximate level of government is a county, tend to have fewer
procedural protections than those located in a municipality.

As one former U.S. Congressman who played an influential role
in crafting many of the federal environmental laws enacted in the 1970s
stated, “The procedure is of exquisite importance . . . I’ll let you write the

184 See Brantley, supra note 178.
185 See E-mail from Ana Gibbs, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., to Sally Tibbetts, Dist. Dir., U.S.
Rep. Vern Buchanan (Feb. 25, 2015) (copy on file with author); E-mail from John Barnott,
186 Christopher O’Donnell, Beryllium spike raises fear in Tallevast area, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 9, 2011.
substance on a statute, and you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.” Procedural fairness and justice may be even more important in the context of environmental justice, with community empowerment being one of the most important strategies for achieving environmental justice. Residents of Tallevast and those similarly situated understand the impacts procedural injustices have on their communities as much as the direct, physical health effects from contamination and other environmental harms.

The difficulties associated with procedural due process and other constitutional claims to remedy environmental injustices often mean litigation is an ineffective tool of last resort; however, two major avenues for addressing procedural injustices could be: (1) EPA utilizing its discretion to more closely scrutinize procedural requirements in the delegation of authority under federal environmental laws, and (2) States recognizing that “a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration...will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government,” and change the laws accordingly. With the latter, unfortunately, those type of changes come only after a major tragedy, too late for at least one community.

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190 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.