MADONNAS AND WHORES IN THE WORKPLACE

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ABSTRACT

Much has been written about “lookism”—the preferential treatment given to those who conform to societal standards of beauty. But in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court, a sex discrimination plaintiff alleged “reverse-lookism,” claiming that her male employer terminated her long-term employment because she was too physically attractive, thus tempting the employer to consider entering into an extramarital affair. To the great surprise of many who followed this case, the Iowa Supreme Court sided with the employer, declining to find him liable for sex discrimination. As one might expect, uproar ensued, with the media, the public, and the academic community eviscerating the court for its failure to recognize and rectify sex discrimination. In story after story, reporters, academics, and pundits framed this decision as one involving an “irresistible woman” and a man’s “uncontrollable lust.” Though such characterizations made for catchy headlines, they were not quite true: The court’s decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender roles, but rather contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plaintiff’s claim.

This Article expounds on the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, exploring the complicated reasons behind this employee’s failure to win her case, and suggesting alternate theories under which a similarly situated employee could successfully challenge this type of termination. The Article also probes the reasons behind the vehement, and often misinformed, public reaction to this case. It explores the ways in which the media systematically misrepresents women, particularly in the context of suits involving workplace sex discrimination, and examines the consequences of these errors, arguing that attempts to force women in the public eye into one of two molds—either pure and pristine with muted sexuality, or sexually promiscuous and vilified—has dramatic consequences for other employees in the workplace, for policymakers, and for the public at large.

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Introduction

Appearance matters. In a variety of settings—social, professional, academic, and even familial—a person’s physical appearance impacts the treatment that he or she receives: conventional wisdom dictates that “the beautiful people” come out on top in these interactions—that those who comport with accepted standards of physical attractiveness generally receive preferential treatment. Yet in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court, Nelson v. Knight, a

1. See infra note 11 and associated text.
2. 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013). Notably, this was the second opinion that the Iowa Supreme Court issued in this case. In December 2012, the Iowa Supreme Court first issued a decision affirming summary judgment to Knight. Nelson v. Knight, 2012 WL 6652747, at *1 (Iowa 2012). As discussed in greater detail below, the Iowa Supreme Court subsequently withdrew this initial decision and issued a second opinion in July 2013, in response to a petition for rehearing, but did so without any oral argument or re-briefing. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65 n.1; see also Jonathan Turley, The Irresistible Woman Meets the Incorrigible Court: Iowa Supreme Court Issues New Opinion Upholding Firing in ‘Irresistible Attraction’ Case, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (July 15, 2013), http://jonathanturley.org/2013/07/15/the-irresistible-woman-meets-the-incorrigible-court-iowa-supreme-court-issues-new-opinion-upholding-firing-in-irresistible-attraction-case [http://perma.cc/2SC9-HS9C].
plaintiff attempted to turn this conventional wisdom on its head, claiming that her married, male employer terminated her long-term employment because she was a woman and too physically attractive, thus tempting the employer to consider entering into an extramarital affair with her. To prove her case, the plaintiff not only cited her former employer’s admission that he fired Nelson because “their relationship had become a detriment to [his] family,” but also provided evidence of numerous graphic and sexual comments that Knight had made to her during her employment—comments that Knight did not deny making. Despite this evidence, however, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, declining to find Knight liable for sex discrimination. According to the court, Nelson was not terminated due to her sex, but rather due to the consensual relationship between herself and Knight—a reason that was not deemed to be “because of a gender-specific characteristic . . . .”

In the wake of this decision, observers from all facets of the legal and social landscape responded with ire: the media, the public, and the academic community all leveled harsh criticism at this—coincidentally, all-male—Iowa Supreme Court for its apparent failure to recognize and rectify sex discrimination. In story after story, reporters, academics and pundits framed this decision as one involving an “irresistible woman” and a man’s “uncontrollable lust.” Though this ire created a convenient story for the press—and a compelling way of framing this case—it ultimately was a misleading account of the court’s decision. The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender roles, but rather contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plaintiff’s claim.

3. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 65–66.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 65.
8. Id.
9. See infra Section III.A. The word “sex” generally refers to an “individual’s biological identity,” whereas the word “gender” generally refers to an “individual’s social identity” (including “culturally traditional masculine and/or feminine characteristics”). See, e.g., Francine Tilewick Bazlake & Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”: The Evolving Legal Riddle of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J. C. & U. L. 361, 362 (2006). Courts, however, have frequently failed to properly distinguish between these two concepts, deeming such distinctions unnecessary under Title VII. See id. at 365 (quoting Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F. 3d 745, 749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996)) (” ‘Because Congress intended that the term ’sex’ in Title VII mean simply ’man’ or ’woman,’ there is no need to distinguish between the terms ’sex’ and ’gender’ in Title VII cases.”). Whereas some academic writers have advocated for maintaining a distinction between these two terms, this Article does not comment on any ambiguity in the use of these terms in the court decisions cited herein. See id.
10. See infra Section III.A.
So why did everyone get this case so wrong? How did so many “experts” in the field and so many members of the media misunderstand, or perhaps willfully misrepresent, the nuanced reasons behind Nelson’s failure to win her case? This Article not only reexamines the facts at issue in Nelson and tries to frame the outcome of this case in a more logical and defensible light, but also endeavors to understand the reasons for the often-flawed coverage of this lawsuit. Part I of this Article provides a more thorough description of the Nelson case, explaining the court’s decision not in the simplistic and divisive terms adopted by the media and others in the wake of this ruling, but rather by citing the legal precedent and factual basis for the result. Part I also places this case in context by discussing other examples of women who have claimed they were penalized for being “too attractive” for their workplaces. Part II builds upon this broader context by examining how plaintiffs, like Nelson, who believe that they have been terminated due to their (attractive) appearance, might prevail in bringing sex discrimination claims, by providing several theories under which such plaintiffs might succeed. Part III examines the media’s role in the Nelson case, looking at the reasons behind the vehement—and often misinformed—public reaction that this lawsuit generated. Part IV explores the ways in which the media systematically misrepresents women, particularly in the context of suits involving workplace sex discrimination. It argues that women in the public eye ultimately are forced into one of two molds—either pure and pristine with muted sexuality, or sexually promiscuous and vilified. This Article argues that creating and perpetuating this false dichotomy has dramatic, negative consequences not only for women in the workplace, but also for other employees, for policymakers, and for the public at large.

I. “Too Hot for the Workplace”: Nelson and Her Counterparts

Most individuals do not complain about suffering harm due to being “too attractive.” Indeed, quite the opposite typically is true: study after study has revealed the advantages—both in and out of the workplace—for individuals who meet society’s definition of beauty.11 For example, studies show that we ascribe a host of positive traits to physically attractive individuals, assuming that such individuals

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“[are] happier, possess more socially desirable personalities, practice more prestigious occupations, and exhibit higher marital competence.”

We view beautiful people “as more competent and more socially graceful” than their less attractive peers. Physically attractive individuals tend to have more friends, more sex, and more money than those who lack such beauty.

This “beauty advantage” often becomes particularly pronounced in the workplace. Employers tend to hire physically attractive job candidates more frequently than their less attractive peers and offer higher starting salaries to these more attractive individuals. Once on the job, attractive employees continue to garner benefits: they generally receive more favorable performance reviews, receive higher pay, and receive promotions at a more frequent rate than their less attractive counterparts. Attractive employees thus seem to climb the corporate ladder more quickly than their peers, placing one (well-manicured) foot in front of the other in a manner that may seem effortless to the casual observer.

This prevailing wisdom makes it easy to dismiss complaints like those lodged by Nelson—complaints that her gender, and by extension, her physical beauty, placed her at a disadvantage in the workplace, and ultimately led to her termination. Yet in both Nelson and in other similar cases, female employees have tried to allege unlawful sex discrimination on precisely this basis, arguing that they received adverse treatment for being too attractive for their jobs.

A. Nelson v. Knight: Fired for Being “Too Hot” for Her Job?

In 1999, Melissa Nelson began working as a dental hygienist for Iowa dentist James Knight. Over the course of the next decade,
Nelson and Knight enjoyed a collegial relationship: Nelson apparently performed her work duties well, and Knight treated Nelson with respect and integrity.\(^{21}\) According to Nelson, however, in or around 2009, her relationship with Knight underwent changes.\(^{22}\) Knight began to complain about the clothing that Nelson wore to work, describing it as “too tight,” “revealing,” and “distracting.”\(^{23}\) He told Nelson that it was not “good for [him] to see [Nelson] wearing things that accentuate her body.”\(^{24}\) Knight and Nelson also began sending text messages to each other regarding “both work and personal matters.”\(^{25}\) Both parties apparently played a role in initiating these text messages, and neither one ever objected to the other’s text messages.\(^{26}\) Though many of these messages involved innocuous issues—such as discussions regarding their children’s activities—the messages eventually took on a more sexual tone.\(^{27}\) Knight told Nelson that “if she saw his pants bulging, she would know her clothing was too revealing,”\(^{28}\) and he texted Nelson to ask how often she experienced orgasms.\(^{29}\) When Nelson once commented about the infrequency of her sex life, Knight told her, “[T]hat’s like having a Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.”\(^{30}\) Though Knight initiated the sexual content in these exchanges, Nelson apparently never asked Knight not to text her nor indicated that she was offended by these conversations.\(^{31}\) Nelson also admitted that she once texted Knight to tell him that “[t]he only reason I stay is because of you,”\(^{32}\) and she admitted that a coworker was jealous of the manner in which Nelson and Knight got along.\(^{33}\) Knight’s wife—who also worked in her husband’s dental practice—eventually discovered that her husband and Nelson had been texting each other.\(^{34}\) Stating that she viewed Nelson as “a big threat to our marriage,” Mrs. Knight demanded that her husband terminate Nelson’s employment.\(^{35}\) After considering his wife’s request and conferring with their pastor, Knight eventually fired Nelson, telling

\(^{21}\) See id.
\(^{22}\) See id.
\(^{23}\) Id. (internal quotations omitted).
\(^{24}\) Id. (internal quotations omitted).
\(^{25}\) Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65.
\(^{26}\) Id.
\(^{27}\) See id. at 65–66.
\(^{28}\) Id. at 66.
\(^{29}\) Id.
\(^{30}\) Id. (internal quotations omitted).
\(^{31}\) See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65–66.
\(^{32}\) Id. at 65–66. (internal quotations omitted).
\(^{33}\) Id. at 65.
\(^{34}\) Id. at 66.
\(^{35}\) Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Nelson that “their relationship had become a detriment to [his] family and that for the best interests of [himself] and his family and Nelson and her family, the two of them should not work together.”

When later pressed by Nelson’s husband, Knight admitted that Nelson was “the best dental assistant he ever had,” and he acknowledged that Nelson “had not done anything wrong or inappropriate . . . .” He also said that “he was worried he was getting too personally attached to [Nelson],” and that “he feared he would try to have an affair with her down the road if he did not fire her.”

Nelson sued Knight under Section 216.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Code, which prohibits an employer from discharging any employee because of that employee’s sex. Just as under the comparable anti-discrimination language found within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the court noted that its inquiry involved determining whether sex was “a motivating factor” in any adverse action taken against the plaintiff.

Knight argued that Nelson’s sex was not a motivating factor in her termination: he said that the nature of his relationship with Nelson and the threat this relationship posed to his marriage, rather than Nelson’s sex, were his motivations for terminating her employment. Nelson, in contrast, adopted the view that neither this relationship “nor the alleged threat” it imposed “would have existed if she had not been a woman.”

In December 2012 and July 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court issued decisions affirming summary judgment for Knight. In rendering these decisions, the Iowa Supreme Court drew upon cases that previously declined to find gender discrimination when employers had

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36. Id.
37. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67. As discussed in greater detail below, Nelson asserted only a sex discrimination claim related to her termination. See infra notes 64–66, 100–115 and accompanying text. She did not assert any claim of sexual harassment, despite the sexual and often graphic nature of Knight’s texts to her. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67.
41. The Nelson court noted that in evaluating discrimination claims under Iowa Code Chapter 216, the court looks to federal law as guidance, including Title VII. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67.
42. Id. (emphasis added) (“Generally, an employer engages in unlawful sex discrimination when the employer takes adverse employment action against an employee and sex is a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. As described in greater detail above (see supra note 2 and accompanying text), the court initially issued a decision in December 2012, and then issued another opinion in July 2013, which withdrew the court’s first opinion and which was substituted as the opinion of the court. Whereas the differences between the two opinions issued by the court are discussed in greater detail later in this Article, the analysis in this section focuses on the court’s reasoning in its second, July 2013 opinion, as that remains the opinion of record.
fired female employees who were involved in consensual personal relationships that may have triggered some jealousy in others.\textsuperscript{46} According to the court, it did not matter that the relationships—and the jealousy that resulted—likely "would not have existed if the [plaintiffs] had been male."\textsuperscript{47} In one Eighth Circuit case relied upon by the Nelson court, for example, a male business owner had fired a female employee because the owner’s wife saw this employee as a threat to her marriage.\textsuperscript{48} Citing authority that previously had recognized that “sexual favoritism” does not violate Title VII,\textsuperscript{49} the Eighth Circuit opined that if instances “of sexual favoritism” did not violate Title VII (i.e., because such decisions resulted from conduct rather than gender), then “treating an employee unfavorably because of” this type of special relationship likewise would not violate the law.\textsuperscript{50} The Eighth Circuit held that employment decisions that are made based upon consensual sexual relationships should not be seen as flowing from the gender of the parties, but rather as flowing from the relevant employees’ conduct.\textsuperscript{51}

Whereas the district court in Nelson deemed this Eighth Circuit precedent persuasive, Nelson attempted to distinguish her situation: she argued that in the Eighth Circuit case, the plaintiff-employee had played an active role in creating and encouraging the threatening relationship with her employer by pinching his rear end and writing him “notes of a sexual [and] intimate nature.”\textsuperscript{52} Nelson, in contrast, claimed that she had done nothing to create her precarious workplace situation, never flirting with Knight or initiating any sort of sexual or intimate relationship with him.\textsuperscript{53} In Nelson’s eyes, she was guilty of little more than simply "exist[ing] as a female" at work.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{46} Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67–68.
\textsuperscript{47} See id. at 67.
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 67–68 (citing Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2006)).
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 68; see also id. at 79 n.13 (Cady, J., concurring) (citing precedent that held that, “[Romantically motivated] favoritism is not based on a belief that women are better workers, or otherwise deserve to be treated better, than men; indeed, it is entirely consistent with the opposite opinion.”) (parentheticals in original) (internal quotations omitted).
\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 68. This line of cases assumed, however, that the conduct in question did not result “from unwelcome sexual advances or [other aspects of] a hostile work environment.” Id.
\textsuperscript{51} Id.
\textsuperscript{52} See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67–68 (internal quotations omitted).
\textsuperscript{53} Id. at 65.
\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 65 (framing the question for the court as “whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views the relationship between the boss and the employee as a threat to her marriage”) (emphasis added). The court also discussed an Eleventh Circuit opinion, Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., where a male business owner “terminate[d] a female employee who worked on the same crew
The Iowa Supreme Court, however, rejected Nelson’s argument. Upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Knight, the court found a distinction between an “employment decision based on personal relations,” like that between Knight and Nelson (assuming that there was “no coercion or quid pro quo” involved), and “a decision based on gender itself.” According to the court, this distinction would exist even when the personal relationship at issue would not have arisen had “the employee . . . been of the opposite gender . . . .” In other words, even if it was likely that Knight would not have developed a personal relationship with Nelson had she been a male employee—and even if Knight’s wife may not have become jealous of a close relationship between her husband and a male employee—termination based upon this relationship and the jealousy it caused was not the same as termination based upon gender.

The Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, concurring in the result, elaborated on this point, asserting that although “differential treatment based on an employee’s status as a woman constitutes sex discrimination . . . differential treatment on account of conduct resulting from the sexual affiliations of an employee does not form the basis for a sex-discrimination claim.” The Chief Justice thus noted that “an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee because of a voluntary, romantic relationship does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination suit” and emphasized that this rule extended beyond relationships with actual sexual intimacy to include “consensual affiliations involving sexually suggestive conduct.” Applying this analysis to the instant case, the Chief Justice found that whereas “the absence of sexually suggestive behavior on the
part of Nelson, does factually distinguish this case from . . . cases [rejecting sex-discrimination claims] based on a consensual, romantic relationship.” 61 the threat to the Knights’ marriage here still resulted from the consensual personal relationship between Nelson and Knight. 62 Accordingly, he found no evidence indicating that either the relationship between Knight and Nelson or the decision to terminate Nelson flowed from sex-based animus. 63

Significantly, both the majority and concurring justices in Nelson took great pains to emphasize the very limited nature of their decision (particularly in their second, July 2013 opinion). 64 For example, the court repeatedly highlighted Nelson’s failure to assert a sexual harassment claim in this case—a decision that the court seemed to find surprising given the nature of Knight’s graphic communications with Nelson. 65 Indeed, at several points throughout the opinion, the court implied that had Nelson alleged sexual harassment, the court might have reached a different conclusion in this case. 66

Moreover, in finding no gender discrimination related to Nelson’s termination, the court made much of the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson, including within both

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61. Id. at 79 (Cady, J., concurring); see also id. at 80 (Cady, J., concurring) (“[A] critical aspect of the entire analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the personal relationship.”).

62. See id. at 79 (Cady, J., concurring).

63. Id. (Cady, J., concurring).

64. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65 (stating, in the opinion’s opening lines, “[w]e emphasize the limits of our decision.”).

65. See id. at 72 n.7 (observing that although the “record indicates that Dr. Knight made a number of inappropriate comments toward Nelson that are of a type often seen in sexual harassment cases . . . Nelson does not allege . . . that she was a victim of sexual harassment”); see also id. at 65 (“The employee did not bring a sexual harassment or hostile work environment claim; we are not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in this or any other case.”); id. at 67 (“Nelson does not contend that her employer committed sexual harassment.”); id. at 78 (Cady, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Knight’s “comments would commonly be viewed as inappropriate in most any setting and, for sure, beyond the reasonable parameters of workplace interaction,” but noting that “they nevertheless were an undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight”).

66. See id. at 65 (clarifying that the court was not deciding how “a sexual harassment or hostile work environment claim” would be resolved on these facts); see also id. at 72 n.7 (indicating that “inappropriate comments” like those made by Knight in this case frequently support sexual harassment claims). Other observers of this case more explicitly questioned Nelson’s decision not to allege harassment in the wake of the court’s decisions. See Press-Citizen Editorial Board, Firing Just for Being ‘Too Hot’ Is Discrimination, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN (Dec. 29, 2012, 3:20 PM), https://archive.presscitizen.com/article/20130103/OPINION03/301030003/Our-View-Firing-being-too-hot-discrimination [http://perma.cc/7FR5-U6NA] (responding to the initial opinion issued by the Iowa Supreme Court, stating “we can’t understand why Nelson filed suit based on gender discrimination rather than sexual harassment. It seems she could have made a stronger case for Knight having created a hostile work environment.”).
the majority and concurring opinion, reams of references to this consensual relationship and specifically noting that it would have reached a different conclusion had Nelson’s relationship with Knight not been consensual.67 The Chief Justice characterized the consensual nature of this relationship as “a critical aspect of the [court’s] entire analysis,”68 deeming “the consensual aspect of [the] relationship” to be “pivotal to the analysis of the claim of discrimination based on a

67. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65 (“We emphasize the limits of our decision. The employee did not bring a sexual harassment or hostile work environment claim; we are not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in this or any other case.”); see also id. at 65 (observing that “[b]oth parties initiated texting” and that “[n]either objected to the other’s texting”); id. at 66 (relaying Nelson’s admission that she “[d]id not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text her” nor indicated that she found his texts offensive); id. at 67 (citing precedent that “[A]n employer does not engage in unlawful gender discrimination by discharging a female employee who is involved in a consensual relationship that has triggered personal jealousy”) (emphasis added); id. at 70 (finding a distinction between decisions based upon gender and “an isolated employment decision based on personal relations (assuming no coercion or quid pro quo)”) (emphasis added); id. (relying on federal case law to establish that “adverse employment action stemming from a consensual workplace relationship (absent sexual harassment) is not actionable under Title VII”) (emphasis added); see also Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 75 (Cady, J., concurring) (articulating “the general legal principle that an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee because of a voluntary, romantic relationship does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination suit,” whether the relationship involves sexual intimacy or simply sexually suggestive conduct) (emphasis added); id. at 76 (Cady, J., concurring) (“When employees are terminated due to consensual, romantic or sexually suggestive relationships with their supervisors, courts generally conclude the reason does not amount to sex discrimination because the adverse employment consequence is based upon sexual activity rather than gender.”) (emphasis added); id. at 78 (Cady, J., concurring) (“The fact of the matter is Nelson was terminated because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with her employer, not because of her gender.”) (emphasis added); id. (Cady, J., concurring) (referencing the “consensual personal relationship” between Knight and Nelson and observing that this relationship “extended well beyond the workplace”); id. (Cady, J., concurring) (characterizing Knight’s sexual banter as “an undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight.”); id. at 79 (Cady, J., concurring) (“[A] sex discrimination claim predicated on physical appearance accompanied by a consensual personal relationship between the employee and employer requires proof that the physical appearance of the plaintiff was a gender-based reason for the adverse employment action.”) (emphasis added); Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 79–80 (Cady, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he relationship . . . included enough activity and conduct to support a determination . . . that Nelson was terminated as a response to the consensual personal relationship she maintained with Dr. Knight,” and that “there was insufficient evidence tending to show that Nelson’s status as a woman was also a motivating reason”); id. at 80 (Cady, J., concurring) (“It is important to observe that a critical aspect of the entire analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the personal relationship.”); id. (Cady, J., concurring) (“The consensual aspect of a relationship is pivotal to the analysis of the claim of discrimination based on a personal relationship. In this case, it is undisputed the relationship was consensual.”); id. at 80–81 (Cady, J., concurring) (“There was insufficient evidence offered by Nelson in light of the undisputed evidence of a consensual personal relationship that would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude . . . that Dr. Knight terminated Nelson based on her status as a woman.”). 68. Id. at 80 (Cady, J., concurring).
personal relationship.” The court made clear that it was this consensual relationship—conduct on the part of both Knight and Nelson—that formed the basis for Nelson’s termination, and not merely Nelson’s sex or “existence” as a female. Neither Nelson’s appearance nor her sex alone were enough to get her fired; rather, it was the manifestation of her attractive, feminine appearance in a consensual personal relationship with Knight—a relationship that evoked jealousy in Knight’s wife—that led to her termination.

B. Other Employees Who Have Claimed to Be “Too Hot” for Their Jobs

Nelson is not alone in claiming to have suffered adverse treatment at work due to her attractive appearance. Indeed, despite the fact that Nelson’s claim seemed to fly in the face of extensive research that has shown the workplace advantages of physical beauty, other employees similarly have claimed to have experienced adverse treatment due to their good looks: in 2009, for example, a banker named Debrahlee Lorenzana was fired from her position at Citibank, a termination that Lorenzana claimed was due to her “curvaceous figure” and her propensity to dress in a manner that accentuated her body. In the lawsuit that she filed against her former employer—which ultimately was dismissed due to the presence of an arbitration agreement—Lorenzana claimed that her superiors had asked her to refrain from wearing various items of clothing (including turtleneck tops, pencil skirts, fitted business suits, and other tailored clothing) because “as a result of the shape of her figure, such clothes were purportedly ‘too distracting’ for her male colleagues and supervisors.

69. Id. (Cady, J., concurring).
70. See id. at 78 (Cady, J., concurring).
71. See Brown, supra note 11, at 57 (specifying that attractive individuals have less difficulty securing employment, receive benefits and opportunities because of their attractiveness, and ultimately have a greater earning potential); Corbett, supra note 11, at 625 (indicating a positive correlation between an individual’s level of attractiveness and their earnings); Toledano, supra note 11, at 694 (stating that attractive individuals are perceived as more capable employees, receive better salaries, and are evaluated more favorably than less attractive co-workers); Kimmel, supra note 11 (declaring that studies indicate that attractive individuals receive many workplace benefits, including bonuses whereas less attractive workers receive penalties for their appearances).
Moreover, Lorenzana alleged that, in response to her complaints that other female employees wore these prohibited clothing items, Citigroup management had advised Lorenzana that the other female employees could wear what they wished because “[their] general unattractiveness rendered moot their sartorial choices,” whereas Lorenzana could not allow her “shapeliness” to be “heightened by beautifully tailored clothing.”

Similarly, in Willingham v. Regions Bank, the plaintiff—also an attractive female banker—claimed to have been terminated due to her attractive appearance and argued that her termination constituted sex discrimination. Willingham’s employer, in contrast, claimed that she was terminated for violating the company’s Code of Conduct after she appeared in a publication as “Ms. Cruzin’ South August 2008,” on both the cover and in photos wearing a bikini and sitting on motorcycles and cars, and then distributed copies of this magazine at work. In alleging that her termination resulted from sex discrimination, Willingham argued, inter alia, that the bank treated her in a different, more negative manner than a similarly situated male employee. She specifically pointed to a photograph of a male employee who had not been fired after appearing shirtless and dressed in “skimpy running shorts” on a web site related to a road race. The court, however, rejected her claim, granting summary judgment in favor of the bank.

In 2010, Amy-Erin Blakely, a former assistant executive director at a nonprofit organization called The Devereux Foundation, sued her former employer for sex discrimination after her termination by the nonprofit. Before being terminated, Blakely had filed two internal grievances against her employer alleging adverse treatment due to her attractive physical appearance. Among her allegations, Blakely claimed that, prior to her termination, she had been told that other employees could not concentrate in meetings with

74. Lorenzana Complaint, supra note 72, at 2; Pilkington, supra note 72.
75. Lorenzana Complaint, supra note 72, at 3.
76. Id.
77. 2010 WL 2650727, at *1–3 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
78. Id. at *1–2, *4.
79. See id. at *2.
80. See id. at *5.
81. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. at *5–6.
84. See id.
her “because all they saw were her ‘big breasts’”;85 “that she had been nicknamed ‘Big Tittie Baby’”;86 “that a high level executive [wanted] to play tennis with her so . . . he could [see] her in [a] tennis skirt and ‘see her big titties bouncing around’”,87 and that she was “too sensual” for promotion into the position of executive director, among other comments.88

Notably, these types of claims by female plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance seem not to be limited to the corporate workplace. Even employees who work at job sites where one would expect tolerance (and perhaps even a preference) for physical attractiveness or sensual attire have complained of discrimination based upon their good looks: in 2012, for example, a data entry employee at a wholesale lingerie company claimed to have been fired one week into her employment due to her busty figure and allegedly racy attire.89 The employee claimed that she was asked to “tape her breasts down to make them look smaller” and that she was told that she was “just too hot for this office”90—despite her assertion that her wardrobe was “appropriate for a business that sells ‘thongs with hearts placed in the female genital area and boy shorts for women that say “hot” in the buttocks area.’”91 Similarly, in 2013, a New York yoga teacher claimed that she was fired from a husband-and-wife-owned chiropractic clinic where she worked after the husband told the employee that “his wife might become jealous of her on account of being ‘too cute.’”92

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
90. Lauren Odes Too Hot Appearance, supra note 89 (internal quotations omitted).
91. Francescari, supra note 89.
What is interesting about all of these claims is the double-edged sword that they illustrate: in many cases, these female plaintiffs—like other women in the workplace—may garner a wealth of benefits from their attractive physical appearance, in terms of hiring, promotion, compensation, and other feedback. Yet their attractiveness can also create problems for them at work, placing them “between a rock and a hard place. Insulted and not hired if they aren’t attractive, fired if they are too attractive.” Compounding the problem, once these women are faced with this alleged unfairness at work—purportedly receiving adverse treatment due to their appearance—they may receive less sympathy from their peers and from the general public due to their physical beauty. Observers “may or may not be moved by a claim that can be restated as ‘Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful.’” In this respect, attractive employees may see the negative consequences of their physical appearance as eventually outweighing the benefits produced by their appearance.

II. ANOTHER PATH? HOW NELSON AND OTHER “ATTRACTIVE EMPLOYEES” MIGHT PREVAIL IN SIMILAR CASES

Cases like Nelson thus present quite a puzzle: although countless studies establish that attractive employees enjoy significant advantages at work, Nelson and her counterparts claim that their attractive looks undermined their jobs. Although Nelson’s straightforward theory of sex discrimination—that she “did not do anything to get herself fired except exist as a female”—did not lead to victory, there are other paths that she, and others like her, might successfully pursue if they believe that they were fired as a result of their good looks.

A. The Missing Harassment Claim as One Possible Route to Future Success

One obvious route that was available to Ms. Nelson—yet one that she elected not to pursue—was a sexual harassment claim against

93. See supra note 71.
95. See, e.g., Corbett, *supra* note 11, at 632 (“If Lorenzana were an unattractive person suing for unfair termination, she likely would evoke sympathy, but, ironically, not nearly as much publicity. However, with an attractive woman, this story may have the opposite effect.”).
96. See, e.g., Corbett, *supra* note 11, at 632.
97. See, e.g., Toledano, *supra* note 11, at 683–84; Kimmel, *supra* note 11.
98. Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Iowa 2013) (internal quotations omitted).
Knight. Knight’s behavior seemed to provide ample ammunition for a viable sexual harassment claim. As discussed above, he engaged in explicit, seemingly one-sided sexual banter with Nelson, made suggestive comments regarding her clothing and her sex life, and described to Nelson, in graphic terms, the extent to which she made him feel sexually aroused. Despite this evidence, Nelson’s counsel chose not to pursue a harassment theory, and stuck only to a theory of sex discrimination. This failure to allege harassment allowed the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly to characterize the relationship between Knight and Nelson as “consensual” in nature, and led the court specifically to observe that the lack of a harassment claim limited its decision in this case. From this perspective, Nelson’s loss may appear more as an example of a missed opportunity by her attorney than as a misinterpretation of the law by the court.

To prevail in a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff generally must show that she either was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment, or that she suffered some “tangible employment action” (i.e., a termination, demotion, etc.) as a result of her failure “to submit to a [superior’s] sexual demands . . . .” Here, much of Knight’s undisputed conduct seems to provide an ample basis for both types of sexual harassment: Nelson either could argue that Knight’s sexually explicit texts and comments created a hostile work environment, or she could claim that, regardless of whatever atmosphere his comments created, her termination resulted from her rebuff of his overtures. Yet Nelson never alleged, in either her formal court filings or any press statements, that Knight’s conduct constituted sexual harassment.

So why did Nelson refrain from bringing this claim? As the court repeatedly noted, Nelson never objected to Knight’s overtures, and apparently viewed her close and personal relationship with Knight as consensual in nature. Nelson’s own attorney stated that Nelson

99. Id. at 65–66 (describing Knight’s overtures to Nelson).
100. Id. (describing Knight’s sexually graphic communications with Nelson); see also id. at 72 n.7 (“Dr. Knight made a number of inappropriate comments toward Nelson that are of a type often seen in sexual harassment cases.”).
101. See, e.g., id. at 65, 72 n.7.
102. See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (Cady, J., concurring) (referencing the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson).
103. Id. at 65.
105. See id.; see also Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65–66 (describing Knight’s communications with Nelson).
106. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65, 72 n.7 (referencing Nelson’s failure to assert a sexual harassment claim).
107. See id. at 65–66; see also id. at 78–79 (Cady, J., concurring).
declined to bring a harassment claim “because Knight’s conduct may not have risen to that level and didn’t particularly offend [Nelson].”

Although Nelson felt “shocked” and “betrayed” by Knight’s conduct, she chalked these exchanges up to “social awkwardness” on his part as opposed to harassment. Moreover, whereas Knight adopted the role of the initiator of these sex-fueled communications, with Nelson maintaining a more passive role—receiving his graphic overtures but apparently never responding with any sexual comments of her own—he never took any steps to terminate these communications (including the most obvious one, asking Knight to stop).

Of course, even Nelson’s “consent” to these conversations—or, at a minimum, her failure explicitly to object—should not necessarily have stymied a harassment claim. Where, as here, there is a significant power differential between the parties in a relationship, courts may be skeptical of the “consensual” nature of that relationship. At least one court has recognized that a plaintiff reasonably
may refrain from telling a supervisor that sexual comments are unwelcome if he or she fears that objecting might cost the plaintiff his or her job, citing the “disparity of power between a lower-level . . . employee and the owner of the business.”114 Indeed, in rendering his concurring opinion in Nelson, the Chief Justice acknowledged that a “personal relationship between an employer and subordinate can give rise to subtle issues of power and control that may make the line between consensual and submissive relationships difficult to draw.”115 In this case, however, the Chief Justice noted that “Nelson made no legal or factual claim that a relationship with Dr. Knight was submissive, objectionable, or harassing in any way, and there was no evidence in the record to hint the relationship was not jointly pursued.”116

Whereas Nelson elected not to pursue a sexual harassment claim in this case,116 other plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance perhaps would have a basis for asserting this theory as part of a wrongful termination claim. As the Nelson court observed, the consensual nature of Knight and Nelson’s sexually charged (but unconsummated) relationship was rather unusual.117 In many cases, the comments directed toward a plaintiff who claims to have been “too attractive” for a workplace likely will involve the sort of graphic or sexually charged language

113. Simmons, 2006 WL 1000076 at *2.
114. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 80 (Cady, J., concurring).
115. Id.; see also id. at 65–66 (majority opinion), 79–80 (Cady, J., concurring) (referencing the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson). Notably, despite the wealth of evidence indicating the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson, Nelson did endeavor to distinguish her situation from those in other cases involving consensual workplace relationships between (terminated) employees and their bosses. Id. at 67–68. In at least one other case cited by the court, the terminated plaintiff had played an active role in creating the jealousy-inducing relationship (for example, by pinching her boss’s rear and by writing notes of a sexual nature to the owner and leaving them in locations where others could find them). Id. (discussing plaintiff’s actions in Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2006)). Nelson, in contrast, argued that she never flirted with Knight or encouraged his overtures, arguing that “she ‘did not do anything to get herself fired except exist as a female.’” Id. at 65, 69.
116. See, e.g., id. at 65.
117. Id. at 78 (Cady, J., concurring). At least one local editorial regarding this case commented on the strangeness of Nelson’s failure to bring a sexual harassment claim based upon this set of facts, with the authors stating that they “[c]ouldn’t understand why Nelson filed suit based on gender discrimination rather than sexual harassment . . . . [S]he could have made a stronger case for Knight having created a hostile work environment.” Press-Citizen Editorial Board, supra note 66.
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that can support a claim of sexual harassment. Moreover, most employees receiving such sexually graphic communications from an employer likely would object to such comments—either explicitly at the time they are made or, at least, by later arguing that a subordinate position in the workplace prevented him or her from raising such contemporaneous objections. Thus, even if other plaintiffs similarly situated to Nelson might not prevail in alleging sex discrimination based upon an employer firing them due to their (attractive) physical appearance, they most likely would have a strong basis for characterizing their termination and/or any other adverse action as an example of unlawful sexual harassment.

B. The Attractive Employee as a Victim of Gender Stereotyping: Applying Price Waterhouse to the “Too Hot” Employee

Whereas some plaintiffs similarly situated to Nelson might find success simply by adding an allegation of sexual harassment to their complaints, others may wish to pursue sex discrimination claims separate from any allegations of harassment. Success also might be possible for this group of plaintiffs, under an interpretation of anti-discrimination law that deals with “sex stereotyping” at work.

Until the late 1980s, the courts interpreted “sex discrimination,” under Title VII, in a fairly straightforward manner by construing the term “sex” in Title VII to apply only to anatomical sex, and not to gender (i.e., whether someone demonstrates qualities that society deems masculine or feminine). In 1989, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, finding for the very first time that sex stereotyping in the workplace was a prohibited form of sex discrimination.

118. See, e.g., Mandell, supra note 83 (discussing sexually graphic comments made to former nonprofit executive Amy- Erin Blakely).

119. See, e.g., Simmons, 2006 WL 1000076 at *5 (finding that plaintiff did not tell her supervisor that his comments were unwelcome because she feared losing her job); Hernandez v. Miranda Velez, 1994 WL 394855, *1 (D.P.R. 1994) (alleging that she told her supervisor about unwelcome conduct but no action was taken); Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 80 (Cady, J., concurring) (noting issues of power and control that arise in such situations); cf. Dziuch et al., supra note 112, at 85 (explaining that consent cannot exist with the unequal distribution of authority in a superior/subordinate relationship).

120. Title VII bars employers from depriving individuals of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely impacting an individual’s employment because of that individual’s sex, among other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).


The circumstances under which *Price Waterhouse* arose present an interesting contrast to *Nelson*. Ann Hopkins was serving as a Senior Manager in an office of the accounting firm Price Waterhouse “when she was proposed for partnership in 1982.”123 During the firm’s consideration of her partnership, Hopkins’s colleagues praised her character and her many professional accomplishments,124 although they simultaneously criticized some of her personality traits.125 For example, some partners expressed concern about Hopkins’s “aggressiveness” and “abrasiveness” when dealing with staff.126 “One partner described [Hopkins] as ‘macho,’ . . . [and] another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a woman.’”127 Hopkins was told that she should “take ‘a course at charm school,’”128 and she was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”129 Hopkins was ultimately denied partnership,130 and thereafter sued for sex discrimination under Title VII.131

In finding Price Waterhouse liable for violating Title VII in this case, the Supreme Court emphasized that, although employers retain broad latitude in making their employment decisions, such decisions cannot be made on the basis of gender.132 In cases where gender seems to play some role in a decision—perhaps in conjunction with other characteristics, unrelated to gender—an employer must be able to show that gender was not a motivating factor (i.e., that it would have made the same decision anyway, even if it had not taken gender into account).133 More importantly, the Court held that employers who make employment decisions on the basis of sex-based stereotypes are inherently engaging in sex discrimination.134 The Court stated,

123. *Id.* at 231.
124. *Id.* at 234.
125. *Id.* at 234–35.
126. *Id.* at 234.
127. *Id.* at 235.
130. *Id.* at 231–32 (noting that Hopkins initially “was neither offered nor denied” partnership, but rather had her candidacy held for reconsideration the following year, and that partners “in her office later refused to repropose her for partnership”).
131. *Id.* at 232.
132. *Id.* at 239–40.
133. *Id.* at 244–45. “We conclude that the preservation of [the employer’s] freedom means that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person.” *Id.* at 242.
“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group,” and noted that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” In other words, by basing its decisions regarding Hopkins’s potential partnership on assumptions about how a woman should behave at work—and by denying Hopkins partnership for not complying with these assumptions—Price Waterhouse had engaged in gender discrimination.

This theory of “sex stereotyping” gender discrimination has direct application to cases like Nelson and could provide a possible route to success for other plaintiffs who claim to have received adverse treatment due to their attractive appearance. Just as Hopkins claimed to have suffered adverse treatment for not matching her colleagues’ expectations of a woman, Nelson could have argued that she suffered from a similar failure to meet expectations as to how a female should look and behave, in that she claimed that she was too sexy and feminine for her workplace—at least according to her employer. From the way that she dressed to her willingness to tolerate (or perhaps engage in) sexual discussions with Knight, Nelson could argue that she fell outside of the expected norm for a woman at work.

Tellingly, even the Iowa Supreme Court seemed to recognize the potential for this type of claim in Nelson: the court explicitly discussed the gender stereotyping framework established by Price Waterhouse and stated, “[i]f Nelson could show that she had been terminated because she did not conform to a particular stereotype, this might be a different case.” Whereas Nelson failed to provide evidence to support this theory, others who claim to have suffered adverse action due to their attractive physical appearance might be

L. Rev. 657, 660 (2007) (“Sex stereotyping involves generalizing from the characteristics of a group to those of an individual and making assumptions, which may or may not be true, about an individual because of that person’s gender.”).

136. Id. at 250.
137. See id. at 256–58.
138. Others have discussed using a “gender stereotyping” theory of gender discrimination to address “appearance discrimination.” See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 11, at 635–37; Wiles, supra note 134, at 660.
139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236–37 (citing the district court judge’s view that “some of the partners’ remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women”).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 71.
143. See id.
able to gather sufficient evidence to show that by violating gender norms regarding how female employees should dress and act at work, they ventured outside of the “cabined view of the proper behavior [for] women” that their employers imposed in the workplace.\footnote{Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237; cf. Kimmel, supra note 11 (“Discrimination based on beauty is rooted in the same sexist principle as discrimination against the ugly. Both rest on the power of the male gaze—the fact that men’s estimation of beauty is the defining feature of the category.”).}

Moreover, even under the theory that Nelson was terminated not for her appearance, but rather due to the jealousy-inducing relationship that she had with her boss,\footnote{Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.} Nelson still arguably could have supported a stereotyping theory of gender discrimination. Perhaps the “norm” that Nelson failed to satisfy was not simply a failure to dress in the manner in which the Knights believed a working woman should dress or to appear in the manner in which the Knights believed a working woman should appear. Rather, perhaps the norm at issue involved Nelson’s behavior—her failure to behave in the manner in which Mrs. Knight thought a working woman should behave. To the extent that one might not expect a married woman to form a close, personal relationship with a male coworker or boss,\footnote{See, e.g., Kristi Gustafson Barlette, Can Men and Women Be Friends (At Work)?, TIMES UNION (Sept. 4, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://blog.timesunion.com/ontheedge/can-men-and-women-be-friends-at-work/65781 [http://perma.cc/TT6U-NJ7X]; Bethany Ramos, Your Work Husband Is Ruining Your Marriage, MOMMYISH.COM (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.mommyish.com/2014/03/17/work-husband [http://perma.cc/D6SB-E22P]; Leslie Rasmussen, Can Married Women Have Straight Male Friends?, ROLE REBOOT (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www ролереобут.орг/sex-and-relationships/details/2013-01-can-married-women-have-single-male-friends[http://perma.cc/P8NU-E7ZD]; cf. Jana Kasperkevic, Why Women Can’t Have Business Dinners with Men, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-blog/2013/dec/18/women-business-dinners-men [http://perma.cc/3LJ7-52WX].} the jealousy-inducing “relationship” that formed the basis for Nelson’s termination could be seen as its own violation of gender expectations. Although the court largely ignored this theory in its opinion, there is at least some evidence to support this analysis: the court noted that Mrs. Knight had deemed it “strange that after being at work all day and away from her kids and husband that [Nelson] would not be anxious to get home \textit{like the other [women] in the office.}”\footnote{Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66( emphasis added) ; \textit{id}. at 71 n.5.} Although the court acknowledged that “[v]iewed in isolation, this statement could be an example of a gender-based stereotype,”\footnote{Id. at 71 n.5.} it gave this argument only cursory attention and quickly concluded that, in the broader context of other statements made by Mrs. Knight, this
statement instead simply evidenced Mrs. Knight’s (non-stereotype-based) concerns about Nelson’s relationship with Knight. 149

Whereas Nelson did not succeed in providing support for this type of gender stereotyping sex discrimination claim, other plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance might have more success with this theory. Indeed, even a cursory examination of the facts in other situations where employees have alleged adverse treatment due to their beauty indicates that this theory could play out differently in other cases: in the Willingham case, for example—where the plaintiff was terminated after she appeared as “Ms. Cruzin’ South August 2008,” as well as in sexually suggestive photos in another publication 150—Willingham specifically alleged that “her physical appearance in a non-work related magazine did not comport with [the employer’s] preferred feminine stereotype which . . . required her to dress or appear “conservatively” at all times.” 151 The court, however, rejected this argument, finding that the out-of-work nature of the conduct rendered a Price Waterhouse argument inapplicable here. 152 Concerns about gender stereotypes, likewise, could be seen underlying the claims of Debrahlee Lorenzana, the Citibank banker who claimed to have been fired because her figure and clothes were “too distracting” to her male colleagues. 153 Presumably, had Lorenzana fit the mold of the typical banker—conservatively and expensively but modestly attired 154—her male colleagues would not have noticed and/or been distracted by her appearance. 155

149. See id.; see also id. at 77 n.11 (Cady, J., concurring) (“As to the discriminatory stereotype that attractive women who work closely with married men are a threat to the man’s marriage . . . a threat derived from an actual, ongoing, personal relationship is not a stereotype.”).


151. Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (ellipses in original) (internal quotations omitted).

152. See id. at *3 (stating that Willingham’s sex stereotyping claim “fails because [she] has failed to allege that [she] did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in any observable way at work”) (emphasis and parentheticals in original) (internal quotations omitted).

153. Pilkington, supra note 72.


155. In some circumstances, other types of stereotypes beyond those associated with gender (such as religious stereotypes) also arguably might play a role in adverse action. See, e.g., Francescini, supra note 89 (quoting a female data entry employee fired from her position at a lingerie warehouse owned by Orthodox Jews as stating, “I understand that there are Orthodox Jewish men who may have their views about how a woman should dress . . . but I do not feel that any employer has the right to impose their religious beliefs on me”) (emphasis added).
Notably, to bring this type of sex stereotyping claim, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the defendant harbored hostility toward the protected group. In other words, neither Nelson nor any other plaintiff would have to show that their employer demonstrated ill will toward women in general. Rather, these employees only would have to show that men and women were “intentionally treated differently” in the workplace, even if the stereotypes underlying this treatment were benign.

At the same time, however, these cases involving gender stereotyping expose the “double bind” that many women face in the workplace. They must be feminine enough to satisfy their employers’ expectations regarding how a woman should appear and behave at work, but not so overtly sexual and overly feminine so as to distract their fellow employees. For Hopkins, this created an obvious catch twenty-two: she needed to be aggressive and forceful to excel in her job, but she was denied the pinnacle of recognition for workplace success (i.e., partnership) precisely because she exhibited these traits.

Admittedly, for other female employees, this argument plays out somewhat differently than it would have in Hopkins. Unlike Hopkins—who was required to be assertive in order to make partner, then penalized for meeting this expectation—the female plaintiffs in cases like Nelson, Willingham, or Lorenzana are not being asked to mute characteristics that are essential to performing or excelling in their job duties. These women did not hold positions (dental assistant, bankers) in which the attribute for which they purportedly were penalized—physical attractiveness—enhanced

156. See Wiles, supra note 134, at 670.
157. In this respect, the court’s observations that Knight employed many women in his practice, and that all of his dental hygienists (including the one who ultimately replaced Nelson) had been women, might have limited relevance. Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013). Although Knight may have harbored positive feelings toward women in general, this would not excuse his decision to take action against Nelson based on a stereotype regarding how females should behave in the workplace.
158. See Wiles, supra note 134, at 670.
161. See Yuracko, supra note 159, at 762; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (describing the dilemma that exists when an employer objects to aggressiveness, but the position requires that specific trait).
162. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; Yuracko, supra note 159, at 762.
their performance in any obvious way. Yet despite this distinction, even plaintiffs in these “too hot” cases may be able to draw upon the underlying tenets of Price Waterhouse to argue that they suffered gender discrimination due to the application of sex stereotypes.\footnote{164}{See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.}

\section*{III. The Role of the Media in Misrepresenting These Cases: The Quest to Maintain the “Madonna-Whore” Paradigm}

Despite the possible routes to success that may have existed for Nelson—from her neglected sexual harassment claim to a possible “gender stereotyping” claim—Nelson ultimately failed to prevail in her claim against Knight.\footnote{165}{See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65.} Given the salacious facts in this case,\footnote{166}{See id. at 65–66.} some amount of media attention—and, perhaps, some critiquing of the result—was to be expected. In the wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson, however, the media unleashed an onslaught of condemnation toward this decision, eviscerating the court’s conclusion in this case. From small, local outlets to national news organizations, the media almost uniformly described this case in simple (and often inaccurate) terms—as one involving a woman who had been fired solely based upon her appearance, and involving an all-male court with no concept of women’s rights, without addressing the complicated relational circumstances that underlay this case or the precedent that actually controlled the court’s decision.

\subsection*{A. Snapshot of a Hyperbolic Media}

The reporting in the wake of the Nelson decision—following both the initial, December 2012 decision and the subsequent July 2013 decision—abounded with examples of the media presenting this decision in simplistic, hyperbolic, and often flatly incorrect terms: shortly following the court’s initial decision in this case, Business Insider headlined its coverage, “‘Irresistible’ Iowa Woman Fired for Being Too Sexy,”\footnote{167}{Agence France Presse, supra note 108.} and reported that “[a]n ‘irresistible’ Iowa dental assistant [who was] fired for threatening her boss’s marriage—even though she turned away his advances—has lost her discrimination lawsuit.”\footnote{168}{Id. This conclusion was reached even though nothing in the record indicates that Nelson ever rejected Knight’s advances and even though Nelson’s failure to bring a harassment claim seems to contradict such a characterization of her stance toward her boss. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65, 72 n.7.}
A CNN story following the court’s second decision described this case as one in which a woman was “[f]ired because a man can’t control himself.” The story blasted the “all-male Iowa Supreme Court” for allegedly holding “that men are so controlled by their gonads that they can fire an employee at will for being able to incite attraction, sex, love, whatever,” and for finding that “[n]o matter that she is going about her job or being a stellar employee; if she’s got a cute butt or a nicely turned nose, her job is history.” According to the CNN commentator, “the Iowa Supreme Court guys . . . saw the issue, at least in part, as protecting the institution of marriage rather than an infringement on a woman’s right to work.” Nowhere did this story mention that the Iowa Supreme Court was relying upon Eighth Circuit precedent, which previously had held that “an employer does not engage in [sex] discrimination by discharging a female employee who is involved in a consensual [personal] relationship that has triggered personal jealousy.” Nowhere did the story mention the extent to which the Iowa court’s decision rested on the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson. Nowhere did this reporter explain the limited nature of the court’s decision—the fact that the court repeatedly had noted Nelson’s failure to bring a sexual harassment claim or otherwise to characterize Knight’s conduct as “unwelcome.”

Additionally, there was the New York Times editorial that seemed to set the bar for sensationalizing the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision: in a piece entitled Fired for Being Beautiful, the writer joined the media chorus in slamming the court’s holding. The author compared the Iowa Justices to Islamic fundamentalists, observing, “[y]es, like some Midwestern Taliban tribunal, the Iowa Supreme Court permitted a male boss to fire anyone who might conceivably tempt him. Mullah Omar would approve.” The writer went on to suggest that “[m]aybe . . . the Iowa Supreme Court should require all beautiful women to wear burquas” and opined that “[w]ith Ms. Nelson completely covered, Mr. Knight could pay full attention to his patients’ dental concerns—while ignoring the ethical cavity that

169. Schwartz, supra note 94.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
174. See id. at 65–66 (referencing the consensual nature of Knight and Nelson’s relationship).
175. See id. at 72 n.7.
176. See Kimmel, supra note 11.
177. Id.
mara's discrimination law in Iowa. Once again, nowhere in the article did the author mention the unusual factual circumstances under which this case arose. Nowhere in his evisceration of Knight—with "his willpower so limp, his commitment to his wife so weak, that he must be shielded from the hot and the beautiful"—did the writer note the apparently consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson or the significant role that this relationship played in the court's decision.\footnote{Local outlets likewise played a role in simplifying and hyperbolizing the results in this case, particularly in editorials and other opinion pieces: in the wake of the Iowa Supreme Court's initial decision, one local editorial identified Knight's attraction to Nelson and fear that he might act unprofessionally toward her as "the lone reason" for Nelson's termination.\footnote{Although the editorial mentioned prior precedent that "upheld an employer's right to fire for relationships that cause jealousy and tension within a business owner's family,"\footnote{Another editorial more explicitly argued both sides of the issue: although the piece acknowledged that finding in Nelson's favor would "force[] an employer in [Knight's] situation to keep an employee whose continued employment could lead to a sexual-harassment lawsuit, a divorce or both,"\footnote{Yet another editorial instructed its readers, "[t]hat's right, ladies. If the boss finds you too hot, you can be fired,"\footnote{This local criticism continued in the wake of the court's second opinion in this case: a piece tellingly titled in part Court Backs the Lusty Boss Over the Innocent Employee described}}Iowa law allows men to be jerks."\footnote{Neglecting to inform readers of the full, nuanced scope of the court's decision—that if your boss "finds you too hot," and you engage in a consensual relationship with him that causes jealousy, and you fail ever to allege that his comments about your "hotness" were unwelcome or harassing, then you can be fired.\footnote{This local criticism continued in the wake of the court's second opinion in this case: a piece tellingly titled in part Court Backs the Lusty Boss Over the Innocent Employee described}}}}
this case in similarly simplistic terms, electing simply to blast the court’s “adolescent rationale” and “idiotic conclusion” instead of explaining the nuances of the decision to its readers.188

To be sure, in all of these articles, there was a sizable kernel of truth in the media’s reporting: to the extent that the stories portrayed the Nelson case as one where an employer was permitted to terminate an employee because her physical attractiveness led to a consensual relationship between them and such relationship rendered her a threat to the employer’s marriage (at least, in the employer’s wife’s view),189 these reporters correctly portrayed at least part of the story. Virtually none of the stories reporting this decision provided the proper context for the case—explaining the Iowa precedent that exempts from discrimination liability terminations resulting from consensual personal relationships that cause jealousy,190 or noting the extent to which the outcome here rested upon a very narrow set of facts, in which the terminated employee specifically declined to allege that her employer’s conduct and comments were unwelcome or harassing.191 Whereas it may have made for better news to portray the justices of the Iowa Supreme Court as a rogue group of misogynistic bigots, a more accurate report regarding this case would have included these less sensationalistic, but legally significant, facts.

Interestingly, even the Iowa Supreme Court itself may have sensed the potential for the media and the public to misunderstand the nature of the Nelson case: as noted above, the Iowa Supreme

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188. What Others Are Saying: Court Backs the Lusty Boss Over the Innocent Employee, Des Moines Register, July 18, 2013, 2013WLNR 17496269. Notably, at least one Iowa paper reported this decision in what appeared to be a fair, accurate and non-sensationalized manner (despite a headline foreshadowing to the contrary). In Top Iowa Court’s Do-Over: ‘Irresistible Employee’ Fired Legally for Personal Reasons, Jeff Eckhoff of the Des Moines Register accurately noted that in the Iowa Supreme Court’s first decision in this case, it had “cit[ed] prior legal precedent” to rule that “Knight’s conduct was legal because it was based on specific emotions tied to a specific relationship and not based on his attitude toward an entire gender.” Eckhoff, supra note 108. Describing the court’s follow-up decision on reconsideration, the article reported that “Nelson was terminated because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with her employer, not because of her gender.” Eckhoff, supra note 108 (quoting Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 78 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). Eckhoff cited the Justices’ view that “Nelson was fired because of her behavior, not her gender.” Eckhoff, supra note 108. To be sure, the greater depth of analysis, thoroughness, and balanced nature of this article as compared to others cited herein might be due to the fact that it was a news article, and not an editorial or opinion piece. Nonetheless, the contrast between this article and others appearing in reputable media outlets is notable.
189. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
190. Id. at 67–68.
191. Id. at 65.
Court issued two decisions in this case—first issuing a unanimous opinion granting summary judgment to Knight on December 21, 2012, and later substituting a second opinion in July 2013 (doing so without having any new evidence presented to the court or any additional oral argument). Although this second opinion again affirmed summary judgment for Knight, it differed from the court’s initial opinion in some significant respects: first, though all of the Justices had signed onto the court’s December 2012 opinion, the July 2013 opinion included a lengthy concurrence authored by the Chief Justice of the court. This concurring opinion contained a more extensive explanation of the “basis and rationale” for the court’s decision than that which had been issued previously. Among other points, the Chief Justice emphasized that Nelson had stated a claim for sex discrimination (or, perhaps, several possible claims for sex discrimination) under Iowa law, arguing that she simply had failed to articulate sufficient facts to support her claim, particularly in light of the consensual nature of her relationship with Dr. Knight. Withdrawing a unanimous opinion only to substitute another that reaches the same result (only with somewhat more extensive analysis), is not a common action for an already overburdened court. Indeed, issuing such an opinion without seeking additional briefing from the parties or additional oral argument seems even more unusual. Perhaps, faced with such tremendous—and possibly unexpected—media backlash in the wake of the court’s initial decision, the Justices felt compelled to clarify their reasoning.

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193. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 64, 65 n.1; see also Eckhoff, supra note 108 (characterizing the justices’ decision to reconsider the case without any new evidence being presented as a “rare move”).
194. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 64, 73.
196. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 73–81 (Cady, J., concurring).
197. Id. (Cady, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 76–77 (Cady, J., concurring); see also id. at 76 n.11, 78 (Cady, J., concurring).
199. Id.
200. Id. (Cady, J., concurring).
202. Id. (questioning whether Chief Justice Cady’s motivation for drafting a special concurrence in the second opinion was related to the extensive criticism that the initial decision had received, including from various late-night comedians); see also Eckhoff, supra note 108 (quoting Ryan Koopmans, a Des Moines attorney, who speculated that “some of the justices were concerned that the public misunderstood their original decision . . . [s]o they clarified it.” (internal quotations omitted)); What Others Are Saying: Court Backs the Lusty Boss Over the Innocent Employee, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 18, 2013, 2013 WLNR 17496269 (noting that the court had agreed “to reconsider its much-mocked ruling”).
The court’s second opinion also framed the key question in this case in a manner that differed from the first opinion in a significant way: in its initial, December 2012 opinion, the court framed the question that it faced as “whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss views the employee as an irresistible attraction.” In its July 2013 opinion, the court framed the question somewhat differently by asking “whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views the relationship between the boss and the employee as a threat to her marriage.” In this way, the court shifted its focus from looking at Knight’s conduct—his potential inability to resist a sexual relationship with Nelson—to a focus on the relationship between Knight and Nelson. The former framing of the question opened the door to the type of subjective analysis and gender warfare characterizations that emerged in many of the media stories regarding this case, making it easy for reporters and other commentators to blast Knight for his uncontrollable lust and weak will-power. Indeed, many of the articles that came out in the wake of the court’s initial decision seized on the “irresistible” language in the opinion as a way of framing this case.

The question is how one finds a legal or factual basis for determining whether an employee is sufficiently “irresistible” to justify her termination (assuming that such “irresistible-ness” ever can serve as a justification for termination). In contrast, by framing the question before the court in terms of the consensual relationship between Nelson and Knight, the court not only could provide a stronger factual basis for its decision given the wealth of evidence regarding this relationship, but it also could tie its decision to relevant precedent—precedent that previously had held that terminations related to consensual relationships that cause jealousy do not violate Title VII. This revised framing of the question thus may have allowed the court to provide a stronger legal and factual basis

204. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69 (emphasis added).
205. See, e.g., The Register Editorial: Unfortunately, Iowa Law Allows Men to Be Jerks, supra note 184 (“Nelson suffered because Knight couldn’t control his libido . . . .”); Press-Citizen Editorial Board, supra note 66 (arguing that the lone reason Nelson was terminated was because Knight found Nelson sexually attractive and worried that he might act unprofessionally toward her).
206. See, e.g., Agence France Presse, supra note 108; Eckhoff, supra note 108; Press-Citizen Editorial Board, supra note 66; Schwartz, supra note 94; Turley, supra note 2 (titling blog post “The Irresistible Woman Meets the Incorrigible Court: Iowa Supreme Court Issues New Opinion Upholding Firing in ‘Irresistible Attraction’ Case”).
207. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65–66.
208. Id. at 67.
for its decision—and perhaps one that would seem more palatable to the public.\textsuperscript{209}

\textit{B. Sexiness Sells: The Media’s Sensationalism Bias}

Given the legal and factual basis for the ultimate result in \textit{Nelson}, many in the media still got the \textit{Nelson} case wrong, even after the court issued its second decision. The media ignored the complicated and nuanced background of this case and instead reported the dispute as one simply involving a woman allegedly fired for being “too hot” for her employer. This result stemmed from fundamental flaws in the media’s method of reporting issues—and particularly in reporting on legal issues.

Whereas inaccurate or otherwise skewed reporting by the media inevitably provides some cause for concern, the notion that the media gets things wrong likely is not shocking to the average observer of the news. Indeed, the media seems to make errors all the time—oversimplifying complex issues, exaggerating events, and sensationalizing stories at every opportunity.\textsuperscript{210} As one commentator observed, “[m]ass media will oversimplify and dumb down discussions of public issues, substitute sensationalism and amusement for deliberation about public questions, and transform news and politics into forms of entertainment and spectacle.”\textsuperscript{211} Far from the ideal of serious reporting on important issues, the media has evolved into an amalgamation of “newszak, bonk journalism, infotainment, or simply tabloid news.”\textsuperscript{212}

Although it may be accepted wisdom that the media generally prioritizes entertainment over information, this misplacement of reporting priorities seems particularly problematic in the context of legal reporting—in stories focusing on the criminal or civil liability

\textsuperscript{209}At least one major media outlet—the New York Times—picked up on and accurately reported about this change in the framing of the question before the court. \textit{See Iowa: Court Reaffirms Dentist’s Firing of Woman He Found Too Attractive}, \textit{N. Y. Times} (July 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/us/iowa-court-reaffirms-dentists-firing-of-woman-he-found-too-attractive.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/JY3G-HEJE] (reporting that the court’s second opinion had eliminated references to Knight’s alleged “irresistible attraction” to Nelson, instead asking whether Nelson was fired “because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship” (quoting \textit{Nelson}, 834 N.W.2d at 77 (Cady, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted))).

\textsuperscript{210}See Jack Balkin, \textit{Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society}, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2004) (citing as one worry associated with the potential conflict between mass media and democratic self-governance the fear that the mass media “reduce[s] the quality of public discourse in the drive for higher ratings and the advertising revenues and other profits that come with them.”).

\textsuperscript{211}Id.

\textsuperscript{212}Rosalind Gill, \textit{Gender and the Media} 132 (1st ed. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
of individuals or corporations. In an empirical project that surveyed the views of general counsels working at S&P 500 companies, law firm partners, and public relations executives, the media’s failure to accurately report on legal issues represented one significant concern (among many others) of those responding. Many lawyer interviewees complained that the media “tends to oversimplify complex issues and gets the facts and details wrong.” As one participant noted, “[the media] want[s] me to get down to the sound bite, and I wanna push back and say, ‘It’s not a sound bite.’”

The U.S. Supreme Court has decried the extent to which the media misrepresents and distorts outcomes in matters of law. For example, shortly after Justice Alito joined the Court, he noted in a speech that “news media typically oversimplifies and sensationalizes.” Justice Ginsburg has expressed similar concerns, arguing that the press often “overinterprets unimportant actions,” inappropriately forecasts outcomes, and overstates the significance of certiorari denials. The headlines chosen by the press, according to Justice Ginsburg, are “more eye-catching than significant.”

Such complaints about the media may seem mundane—even when lobbed by the highest judicial officers in the land. Yet the public is

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214. See, e.g., id. at 1268–69, 1280–81.
215. Id. at 1281 (internal quotations omitted).
216. Id.
219. Id. (quoting Justice Ginsburg) (internal quotations omitted).
so complacent about a media that exaggerates, spins, flattens and misleads. Particularly when the media reports on stories of legal significance, perhaps this failure to “get it right” should be greater cause for alarm.

C. Bias on Steroids: The Need for a Script in Stories Involving Women

Whereas the media’s tendency simultaneously to hyperbolize and oversimplify legal stories hardly comes as a surprise, this inability to present the news in an accurate and unbiased manner is especially pronounced in stories involving female protagonists: news stories about women invariably focus on their physical appearance to a far greater degree than stories about their male counterparts.221 According to one scholar, “many newspaper editors seem incapable of printing a story featuring a woman without some evaluation of her attractiveness, or at least a description of her age and her hair colour.”222 Men, in contrast, rarely are described in terms of their physical appearance. On those rare occasions when a man’s appearance does make its way into a news story, it is generally reported in a more objective, “meta-level” manner, such as by discussing the phenomenon of a male star’s sex symbol status, as opposed to the star’s physical appearance itself.223

More disturbing is the manner in which female appearance makes its way into these stories: regardless of her identity or status, a woman in the news tends to be represented “in one of two ways—in terms of her domestic role or her sexual attractiveness.”224 In this vein, women who fail to conform to the media’s physical expectations find themselves subject to vilification and scorn.225 From the media’s reporting on President Clinton’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky (“a chorus of ‘ugh—how could he,’ rather than any political or ethical debate about [the President’s behavior]”),226 to the British press’s vicious attacking of Duchess Sarah Ferguson’s ("Fergie’s") appearance (including a telephone poll inviting male participants to rate whether they would rather “date . . . Fergie or a goat”),227 to attacks on actress Kate Winslet following her appearance in the movie Titanic

221. See GILL, supra note 212, at 115–16.
222. Id. at 115.
223. Id. at 116.
224. Id. at 115-16.
225. See id. at 116 ("The viciousness with which women are attacked if they do not meet the normative modes of attractiveness demanded by the press is chilling.").
226. Id.
227. GILL, supra note 212, at 116.
this focus on female physical appearance over substance seems to apply across subject matters.

Surprisingly, even well established women, whose place in the public eye seemingly has no link to their appearance, find themselves judged by these same beauty standards: a study of female parliamentarians in Britain, South Africa, and Australia revealed numerous examples of a media fixated on the appearance of these female politicians, with at least one respondent commenting:

[W]omen are never the right age. We are too young, we’re too old. We are too thin, we’re too fat. We wear too much makeup, we don’t wear enough. We are too flashy in our dress, we don’t take enough care. There isn’t a thing we can do that is right.

Closer to home, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received similar, appearance-focused coverage both during and after her run for the White House: on the presidential campaign trail, Clinton’s appearance was “a common topic of conversation” in coverage of her campaign, with observers commenting on everything “[f]rom the color of her suit to her latest . . . hairstyle.” Even one of Clinton’s male rivals on the campaign trail, former Senator Fred Thompson, noted the different standard to which Clinton was held and sympathized that “Clinton has to look matronly without looking beautiful, tough without looking harsh.” During her tenure as Secretary of State, Clinton’s decision to appear wearing glasses (as opposed to contact lenses) and with “no cosmetics other than lipstick” drew national attention, along with a front-and-center place on the well-known Drudge Report. Whereas some in the media expressed outrage that Clinton’s appearance without makeup might qualify as

228. Id.
229. Id. at 117 (citing study).
230. Id. at 117–18.
232. Id.
233. Id.
“news,” others defended Clinton’s appearance in these same gendered terms—arguing that she looked “fresh-faced” in the pictures and that she looked “good” in the photos. Rather than focus on the content of the visit during which these photos were taken—a diplomatic stop in Bangladesh—these stories continued the pattern of characterizing a woman in the news according to her appearance.

Despite working in a profession in which physical appearance seems to lack any relevance, even women in the military find themselves confronted by a “beauty bias”—albeit, perhaps in a manner somewhat different from that faced by other women in the news: one female soldier recently found herself receiving the brunt of a female superior’s ire after her photo appeared in a military publication showing her “wearing carefully applied eyeliner and lip gloss.” According to the superior officer, the photo “undermine[d] the rest of the message [about gender parity in combat] (and may even make people ask if breaking a nail is considered hazardous duty).” In this officer’s view—and contrary to the conventional wisdom (in which those who satisfy societal standards of physical beauty find themselves with many advantages as compared to other “less attractive” peers)—“ugly women are perceived as competent while pretty women are perceived as having used their looks to get ahead.”

Thus, to a great degree, the women portrayed in these stories find themselves in a no-win situation: women who are not sufficiently physically attractive face an onslaught of criticism and belittlement, but those who seem “too beautiful” may find themselves stereotyped and written off in other ways. In the words of one

235. Ryan, supra note 234 (internal quotations omitted).
237. Meltzer, supra note 92.
238. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
239. Toledano, supra note 11, at 283–84; see also Kimmel, supra note 11 (defining “lookism” as “the preferential treatment given to those who conform to social standards of beauty”).
240. Meltzer, supra note 92 (internal quotations omitted); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 58 (“Attractive women are more likely to be subjected to stereotypes, harassment, and scrutiny, and are often pigeonholed in jobs that encourage them to use their looks for gain without regard to any other skills they possess.”).
241. See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
242. See Brown, supra note 11, at 58 (“People generally have higher expectations of beautiful people, and when [they] fail to measure up, they face greater consequences for their failure. [Attractive people] may also face adversity in hiring and promoting because their intelligence is often doubted, and people have less desire for future interactions with attractive people of their own sex.”).
commentator, “[y]ou have to be beautiful to matter, but beauty can and will be used against you.”

These no-win restrictions that women face with respect to their appearance actually extend much further than skin deep. In creating a dichotomy for portraying women in the news, the media seems focused not only on their subjects’ physical beauty, but also often amplifies appearance into behavior: women not only must fit into a particular “box” with respect to the way that they look, but they also must fall into a predetermined role related to their sexuality (or lack thereof). Here too, women fall into one of two roles—either that of the Madonna (pure, pristine, and sexually muted), or that of the whore (sexually promiscuous and often vilified). From popular music, to literature, to movies, to children’s animated films, women are portrayed as either virtuous and pure or as desire-driven and cunning, with virtually no room for any grey area in between.

This crabbed view regarding how women are portrayed in public extends beyond fictional depictions in books, movies, and the like. Indeed, “real” women portrayed in the news may find themselves shoved into this same storyline. Few events in recent media history illustrate the Madonna/whore dichotomy faced by women in the news more than the late 1980s sex scandal involving televangelist Jim Bakker and former church secretary Jessica Hahn.

In December 1980, renowned televangelist Jim Bakker, head of the Praise the Lord (PTL) Ministries, had a sexual encounter with former church secretary Jessica Hahn.

See Joshua Gamson, Jessica Hahn, Media Whore: Sex Scandals and Female Publicity, 18 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM’N 157, 157 (June 2001) (discussing, inter alia, Hahn’s portrayal in the media in the wake of her sex scandal with Bakker).

See id.; see also Leslie Berkman & Peter H. King, Felt Like Discarded ‘Hamburger’;

243. Meltzer, supra note 92 (internal quotations omitted).
244. Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 461, 461 n.19, 462 (1996) (“Mythic generalizations often reduce women to one of two archetypes: madonna or whore.”).
246. See id. (citing such classics as PORTRAIT OF AN ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN, A TALE OF TWO CITIES, AND TESS OF THE D’URBERVILLES).
247. See id. For example, when the topic of sex is brought up in THE BREAKFAST CLUB, Claire narrates, “Well, if you say you haven’t, you’re a prude. If you say you have you’re a slut. It’s a trap. You want to but you can’t, and when you do you wish you didn’t, right?” Id. (noting similar examples from AMERICAN PIE, CRUEL INTENTIONS, and SATURDAY NIGHT FEVER).
248. See id. (finding examples of the Madonna-Whore complex presented, inter alia, in both SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS and SLEEPING BEAUTY, “where the ‘good’ princess is pure and virginal and the ‘evil’ villainess is an older woman with more sexuality”).
When news of their encounter became public in 1987, Bakker and Hahn each told different stories about what had happened during this encounter: according to the original version of the story (the version told both by Hahn and by the national press), Hahn had been a modest, 20-year-old woman who initially cleaned toilets at the church, eventually became the church’s secretary, and exhibited total devotion to her job, including praying by phone with those in need. Despite her physical attractiveness, Hahn had only been on a handful of dates. Her sex education had come from library books as opposed to life experience, and she had vowed to “remain a virgin until marriage.”

In the immediate wake of the scandal, when Hahn’s relationship with Bakker first became public, Hahn’s portrayal in the media epitomized the innocent Madonna: she was depicted as the “ruined-innocent, good-girl character: weeping after a phone call to her parents . . . reading the Bible . . . demure and unprepossessing.” She claimed never to have wanted money from Bakker as a result of this encounter (despite eventually collecting a settlement of $265,000 from his church), but rather claimed only to have wanted an opportunity to vent her grievances and perhaps receive an apology from Bakker.

Hahn’s reprieve in the media limelight, however, proved to be short lived. The media soon was reporting on the large financial settlement that Hahn had received and implied that “good girls, even if they do actually have sex, and even if they’re forced to, don’t get paid for it . . . .” The press mentioned her “shiny lipstick and Porsche sunglasses, her ‘boots, tight jeans and tight sweaters.’” Eventually, after the million-dollar payout for her appearance in Playboy became public, the media and its consumers quickly abandoned any allegiance with or sympathy for Hahn. In the eyes of both the media and the public at large, Hahn became just another “loose’ woman,” a seductress, willing to sell her chastity to the highest bidder. Indeed, in the words of one observer, “it[] [was] as
though Hahn reached behind her head and slowly peeled off the face of the virginal church secretary to reveal—gasp!—her evil, nymphomaniacal, come-and-get-it twin.”

In many ways, Hahn’s transformation was typical. This need to force Hahn into a particular persona, victim or vamp, falls squarely within the media’s usual modus operandi. As one commentator has observed, this dichotomy—this “axis of sexually ‘pure’ or sexually ‘ruined,’ of virgin or whore, of loose woman or bad girl . . . continues to be[] one of the central axes along which women’s positioning in the public sphere has run,” Hahn’s ability to straddle both stereotypes, to act as both “[g]ood girl and her evil twin, trusting, naïve ruined woman and calculating, sex-drenched gold digger, victim and vamp,” has cast her as what some have called “the best summary we have of the sex-scandal icon.”

Whereas the media’s desire to characterize Hahn as fitting into one of two boxes might not come as a surprise given the media’s tendency to oversimplify and typecast, the speed and fierceness with which the media and the public turned on Hahn—rejecting her claims of innocence and virginity and chastising her as a loose woman and media whore—does raise questions. Almost from the moment that Hahn’s encounter with Bakker became public, one sensed the media struggling with how to characterize her tale: even the earliest descriptions of Hahn “swing between the dog-loving, Bible-reading, small-town virgin and her alter ego, the big-haired, gum-chomping, knowing tease.” From this perspective, it would not take much—merely the slightest push in one direction or the other, toward Madonna or whore—to vault Hahn more permanently into one of these two camps.

Admittedly, Hahn made it easy for members of the media to describe her in hyperbolic terms. She provided ample fodder for the press to cast her as either the “[p]ower-hungry temptress of powerful man (busty, licking her lips)” or the “chaste beauty ruined by powerful man (young, smooth skinned, eyes cast down but glancing up with hints of desire) . . . .” Yet, it is possible that Hahn, like most women, was a woman with a complex personality and nuanced

261. See id. (“[A]fter brief press time as a good girl, Hahn rapidly shape-shifted to a self-promoting sexual object.”).
262. See id. at 158 (“On its own, while certainly appalling, the persistence of sexual objectification, sexual double standards, and a virgin-whore dichotomy is not surprising news.”).
263. Gamson, supra note 249, at 158 (quotations in original).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 164.
266. Id. at 158.
267. Id.
sexuality and was not simply a one-dimensional cartoon character. By shoving Hahn consecutively into these two boxes, first that of virgin, then that of whore, the media oversimplified what was likely a much more complex tale.

In this way, the media’s portrayal of Hahn can provide insight into the flawed coverage of Knight v. Nelson. Perhaps, just as the media seemed so eager to cement Hahn into a particular mold, so too did they desire similarly to define Nelson—to characterize Nelson as either “Madonna” or “whore.” Yet Nelson also did not fit cleanly into either of these categories. As a (mostly) passive target of Knight’s amorous proclamations—the mere recipient of his explicit communications—Nelson hardly could be characterized as a whore. Knight, not Nelson, seemed to initiate and foster their inappropriate relationship. At the same time, however, Nelson’s behavior seemed not quite virginal. As the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly noted in its opinion, not only did Nelson never object to Knight’s overtures, but she also apparently did not even deem them harassing in nature. Perhaps the court believed that a “true” virgin would have responded less passively to such graphic statements from a man other than her husband or partner.

Thus, faced with a protagonist who could not fit squarely into a predetermined role, the media found itself faced with a choice regarding how it wanted to characterize Nelson in this story—and it chose the Madonna persona: whether driven by an inherent sympathy for the underdog plaintiff, or by a desire to tell a more sensational story, or by other forces altogether, the media by and

269. See id. at 66.
270. See id. at 65, 67, 72 n.7.
271. See id.; see also Simmons v. Miami Valley Trotting, Inc., 2006 WL 1000076, *5 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“[P]laintiff Singleton did not tell Nixon his comments were unwelcome . . . .”). Of course, the inherent power differential between Knight as employer and Nelson as employee may well have inhibited Nelson’s response to Knight’s comments. Yet the court made much of the fact that even after Knight terminated her employment, Nelson never alleged that she had felt bothered by Knight’s statements and simply was frightened to speak out. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 72. To the contrary, even in the context of pursuing her gender discrimination suit, Nelson never claimed that she was offended by Knight’s communications or that she viewed such statements as harassing or unwelcome. Id.
272. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 243 (2004) (“By portraying employment discrimination lawsuits as those in which plaintiffs consistently and uniformly prevail, the media may be contributing to its readership’s formation of an expectation of a certain outcome that is rarely met.”).
273. See Balkin, supra note 210, at 30 (“Mass media will oversimplify and dumb down discussions of public issues [and] substitute sensationalism and amusement for deliberation about public questions . . . .”); see also Heilprin, supra note 217 (“People understand the courts through a news media that typically oversimplifies and sensationalizes.”).
large opted to portray the Nelson case as one in which a (largely) innocent employee “suffered because Knight couldn’t control his libido . . . .” 274 Yet by forcing Nelson into a cloak that didn’t quite fit, the media inevitably skewed its coverage of her story. It could not report on Nelson’s passivity in the face of Knight’s graphic overtures without tarnishing Nelson’s pure and pristine appearance. It could not describe the legal nuance in the Iowa court’s decision—the precedent permitting terminations based on relationships that create jealousy, 275 or the court’s surprise at Nelson’s failure to allege sexual harassment, 276 or the limited scope of the opinion itself 277—without weakening the power of the broader narrative. Better to portray a simple tale of a female employee twice wronged—first by her lust-ridden employer and then by an out-of-touch, misogynistic court—than to convey the true complexities that underlie this case.

D. A Perfect Storm: Media Sensationalism & Gender Stereotyping Leads to Skewed Reporting in Sex Discrimination Cases

Whereas the Nelson case provides one insight into how the media need to oversimplify and stereotype female protagonists leads to skewed reporting and misinformation, this case sadly represents but one example of a much broader trend. In fact, as already discussed, the media’s need to place female protagonists in a particular box (either pure and pristine or sexually promiscuous), combined with the media’s general tendency to sensationalize and oversimplify, may lead to skewed reporting in a whole class of stories—those involving sex discrimination claims brought by female plaintiffs.

In their 2004 study of print media accounts of employment discrimination cases from 1990 to 2000, Laura Beth Nielsen and Aaron Beim found that the print media depicts employment discrimination plaintiffs in a significantly more favorable light than reality warrants. 278 Their research indicated that the manner in which the media portrays outcomes in sex discrimination cases vastly misrepresents reality in a manner highly favorable to discrimination plaintiffs. 279 Specifically, among other misrepresentations, the media depicts higher

274. The Register Editorial: Unfortunately, Iowa Law Allows Men to Be Jerks, supra note 184. Indeed, as previously mentioned, at least one editorial framed this case in precisely those terms. What Others Are Saying: Court Backs the Lusty Boss over the Innocent Employee, supra note 188.
275. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 68–69.
276. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
277. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65.
278. See Nielsen & Beim, supra note 272, at 239.
279. See id. at 239, 257.
“win rates and higher award amounts” for plaintiffs in these suits than is actually the case in federal court outcomes.280

Nielsen and Beim found that during the period relevant to their study, plaintiffs were portrayed in the media as prevailing “in [eighty-five percent] of all adjudicated cases” (meaning that in those media stories that specified a winner, plaintiffs prevailed eighty-five percent of the time).281 The actual “win rate” for plaintiffs in district courts during this period, however, was thirty-two percent, less than half of the plaintiff win rate reflected in media accounts.282 When the study focused specifically on media coverage of jury trials (a sample which itself is skewed with respect to outcomes, given the large number of cases that settle), the media reported plaintiff victories in almost ninety-eight percent of the trials covered, as compared to an “actual” win rate of almost forty-one percent for jury trial plaintiffs.283 Media reports of discrimination cases tried as bench trials similarly depicted prevailing plaintiffs in sixty-eight percent of all reports of concluded cases, as compared to an actual win rate of twenty percent for discrimination plaintiffs who opted for a bench trial.284

Nielsen and Beim also found that the media inflated the size of awards in employment discrimination cases during this period. In stories regarding jury trials, “the median jury award reported . . . [was] $1,100,000.”285 The actual median jury award in discrimination cases during this period was $150,000, less than seven times the reported amount.286 As the authors of this study concluded, “[t]hese data demonstrate dramatic differences between media accounts of employment discrimination cases and the actual dynamics and outcomes of litigation.”287 The authors worried that “[b]y portraying employment discrimination lawsuits as those in which plaintiffs consistently and uniformly prevail, the media may be contributing to its readership’s formation of an expectation of an outcome that is rarely met.”288

Admittedly, Nielsen and Beim’s focus was on discrimination cases generally, as opposed to solely on cases involving sex discrimination.289 Yet statistics indicate that sex discrimination claims consistently

280. See id. at 251.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 252.
284. See Nielsen & Beim, supra note 272, at 253.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 257.
288. Id. at 243.
289. See id. at 239.
have made up a significant portion of all charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), comprising roughly one-third of all charges filed with the agency between 1992 and 2014.\footnote{290. See Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, \textsc{Equal Emp’t Oppor-tunity Comm’n}, \url{http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm} \[\text{http://perma.cc/X2E4-L4GV}\]; Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, \textsc{Equal Emp’t Oppor-tunity Comm’n}, \url{http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm} \[\text{http://perma.cc/E2ZL-D76Y}\].} Whereas there is admittedly a difference between charges merely filed with the EEOC and cases that eventually make their way into district court (i.e., the latter being the basis of Nielsen and Beim’s analysis), there is no reason to believe that sex discrimination cases settle or are otherwise resolved at any greater or lesser rate than other types of charges. Thus, one can assume that Nielsen and Beim’s findings regarding misrepresentations with respect to discrimination claims will generally be similarly reflected in any data with respect to sex claims specifically.

By carrying over this unrealistic expectation specifically into lawsuits involving sex discrimination—cases in which women most frequently serve as plaintiffs\footnote{291. Rachel H. Yarkon, \textit{Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Negotiated Settlement of Gender Discrimination Claims Arising from Termination of Employment}, 2 \textsc{Harv. Negot. L. Rev.} 165, 167 (1997) (citing attorney’s assertion that a majority of plaintiffs in gender discrimination cases are female employees). \textit{But see} Martha Chamallas, \textit{Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature}, 4 \textsc{UCLA Women’s L.J.} 37, 38 (1993) (noting that women serve as plaintiffs in the majority of sexual harassment cases, but that men frequently bring gender discrimination claims).}—the media not only may be skewing the public’s understanding of these types of claims, but also, as discussed below, may be altering expectations regarding the role of women in the workplace more generally. Indeed, by portraying the vast majority of female plaintiffs in these cases as “innocent victims” to an extent that belies reality, the media continues to exacerbate the stratification that women already face in the workplace and beyond: “true” victims of sex discrimination must comport with the image of the Madonna, pure and pristine, whereas those women who happen to fall outside of this box may be treated more harshly and vilified.

\section{IV. High Stakes Errors: The Ramifications of Media Bias in Stories Involving Workplace Sex Discrimination}

As already noted, there is nothing shocking about the proposition that the media misrepresents, hyperbolizes, sensationalizes and oversimplifies. Although many may wish that the media would do a better job—particularly when reporting on legal matters—the fact that
these general problems carry over into the legal context likely comes as no surprise to the average consumer of the news. Indeed, the media’s very ability to skew the public’s understanding of women in the workplace, particularly when it comes to claims of sex discrimination, flows from the fact that most lay individuals have quite limited knowledge of employment law. For example, most individuals fail to appreciate the meaning of the “employment at will” doctrine, which permits an employer to terminate a worker’s employment at any time, “for any reason.” When members of the public hear stories about employees being treated unfairly, many automatically assume that such conduct is illegal.

It is equally unsurprising to discover that the media often portrays female protagonists in a manner that favors stereotype and caricature over complexity and precision. The “Madonna”/“whore” labels encompass roles that have long been associated with women both inside and outside of the workplace. Whether the subject is a celebrity, a political figure, or any ordinary citizen, the media defaults to descriptions grounded in a woman’s physical appearance or sexuality.

When the media not only glosses over details or otherwise skews the facts in legal stories involving female plaintiffs, but also adheres to this Madonna/whore dichotomy, the errors have a broad impact on women, both within the workplace and beyond. By telling the “stories” about discrimination cases in a way that is inaccurate, and that further perpetuates stereotypes regarding the role of women, the media may unwittingly be altering how the broader public views women both in and out of work. Moreover, this change in how the broader public understands the roles of women may have several significant ramifications.

First, inaccuracies in the media regarding how women are portrayed (i.e., as Madonna or whore, as physically desirable or useless), may impact the public’s priorities with respect to policy and legislation. The media has a direct impact on how lay individuals understand the law. As one legal scholar has observed, “[m]uch of

292. Corbett, supra note 11, at 659.
293. Id. (noting that people who hear stories about appearance-based discrimination often assume that such conduct is illegal, even when the conduct does not violate Title VII or any other statute); cf. Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he issue before [the court] is not whether a jury could find that Dr. Knight treated Nelson badly . . . but rather] only if a genuine fact issue exists as to whether Dr. Knight engaged in unlawful gender discrimination . . . .”).
294. See supra Section III.C.
295. See supra Section III.C.
296. Nielsen & Beim, supra note 272, at 257.
what Americans know, or only think they know, about legal issues comes from media portrayals.\textsuperscript{297} The media impacts which issues their audiences take seriously: by ignoring some problems and paying attention to others, the media helps to shape the legal and policy priorities of the general public.\textsuperscript{298} When the media consistently repeats certain stories and frameworks, individuals come to understand the law primarily through these frameworks—especially if the individuals are starting from a point of relative naïveté and thus are less capable of challenging what is reported.\textsuperscript{299} If the story that media consumers see again and again is one where female plaintiffs almost always prevail in employment discrimination lawsuits and receive enormous damage awards, and one in which female plaintiffs must fit into a particular template with respect to their appearance and sexuality, this may alter the lens through which employers, human resource professionals, employees, judges, and other policy makers view the workplace.\textsuperscript{300} Rather than being viewed as an arena where discrimination claims are rare and where such claims are evaluated objectively according to the facts, the workplace becomes akin to a battlefield, where employers must remain on guard against unfounded claims by scheming vixens (as well as perhaps some legitimate claims brought by truly victimized females), both of which will cost the employer dearly.\textsuperscript{301} An employer focused on maintaining this defensive crouch may prioritize guarding against discrimination liability in an unnecessarily high position and overlook other important tasks that are key to running a successful business.\textsuperscript{302}

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\item \textsuperscript{297} Id. at 258 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, \textit{Legal Scholarship}, \textit{115} \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} \textit{1327}, \textit{1347} (2002) (internal quotations omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{298} Id. at 258.
\item \textsuperscript{299} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{300} Id. at 260.
In addition to impacting the priorities that are set with respect to the relative importance of “women’s issues,” these misrepresentations of women in the public eye can also have a concrete impact on policies and practices in the business world: when the media paints a picture in which discrimination plaintiffs overwhelmingly prevail, and then characterizes the female plaintiffs who may initiate these cases as either innocent victims or conniving vamps, it fuels an excessive fear among employers regarding employment discrimination lawsuits. This excessive fear, in turn, may have a direct impact on personnel decisions—who to hire and who to fire. Indeed, research has shown that human resource professionals often over-estimate—and thus overcompensate for—the risk of liability from employment-related litigation. In some cases, these perceived threats of liability might discourage employers from hiring women (or members of other protected groups) out of fear of potential liability if adverse action must be taken against such individuals down the road. In other words, employers may be less likely to hire women if they fear that a female employee who later is fired, or denied a raise, or misses out on a promotion is likely not only to sue for sex discrimination, but also to win (and to receive a significant award). In this way, the skewed image of women presented by the media may have an impact on the composition of the workforce.

This increased fear of liability that many employers may have regarding having women in the workplace may also create a market for certain types of liability insurance. “Employment Practices Liability Insurance’ (EPLI) insures employers against liability for employee claims of “wrongful employment practices,” including wrongful termination. Thus, media accounts that tout victories by discrimination plaintiffs beyond those reflected in reality or that publicize improbable substantial awards, may create an artificial market for this expensive product. This fear of liability also likely promotes job

reductions). Indeed, employers may even retain underperforming employees to avoid a potential claim of discrimination. See Hyman, supra note 301 (“Most employers, if acting rationally, will chose [sic] to retain an employee instead of assuming the risk of a $250,000 legal bill with an uncertain outcome.”).

303. Nielsen & Beim, supra note 272, at 258.
304. See id. at 261.
305. See id.
306. See id.; see also Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. REV. 333, 345–46 (2008) (describing the extent to which Title VII litigation may create disincentive for employers to hire workers from protected classes).
308. Id. at 262.
309. Id. Although outside the scope of this Article, one area for future inquiry might
security for the human resources staff within a company: employers who believe that they are merely one employment decision away from the receiving end of a risky and high-stakes discrimination lawsuit are perhaps likely to feel a greater need to retain the human resources professionals charged with guiding these decisions.\textsuperscript{310}

Finally, media distortions regarding both the role of women in the workplace and their potential to prevail in discrimination lawsuits may have a substantial negative impact on workplace morale.\textsuperscript{311} Research indicates that workers who claim to have experienced discrimination in the workplace often are viewed by colleagues as “troublemakers.”\textsuperscript{312} In the context of race discrimination complaints, for example, workers who claim to have experienced adverse treatment due to their race frequently are viewed as “making excuses” for their own workplace deficiencies or as trying to use the legal system to grab an unearned cash award.\textsuperscript{313} Notably, this type of negative response toward complaining individuals has been found to occur even when clear evidence indicates that the complaining individuals, in fact, had experienced discrimination.\textsuperscript{314}

A female employee who complains that she has experienced sex discrimination due to her appearance may not only find herself shoved into a particular box—labeled as the innocent victim or the conniving temptress—but also may be seen as creating this problem, perhaps by dressing in a certain manner or devoting excessive time to honing her feminine appearance. Indeed, Nelson and similar “too hot” cases support this “blame the victim” mentality: the Nelson court noted a factual dispute regarding whether Nelson’s attire was actually “too tight and revealing” or whether it was appropriate, as Nelson alleged.\textsuperscript{315} Media stories regarding Lauren Odes, terminated wholesale lingerie employee, raised similar concerns, discussing whether her “simple tee-shirt and jeggings” had been deemed “too distracting” for her employer.\textsuperscript{316} In neither of these discussions did the court, or the media, assert that Nelson or Odes’s choice of clothing was irrelevant to the discussion—that no matter what attire

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\item A female employee who complains that she has experienced sex discrimination due to her appearance may not only find herself shoved into a particular box—labeled as the innocent victim or the conniving temptress—but also may be seen as creating this problem, perhaps by dressing in a certain manner or devoting excessive time to honing her feminine appearance. Indeed, Nelson and similar “too hot” cases support this “blame the victim” mentality: the Nelson court noted a factual dispute regarding whether Nelson’s attire was actually “too tight and revealing” or whether it was appropriate, as Nelson alleged. Media stories regarding Lauren Odes, terminated wholesale lingerie employee, raised similar concerns, discussing whether her “simple tee-shirt and jeggings” had been deemed “too distracting” for her employer.
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either woman chose to wear, it would not justify adverse treatment from her employer. As other employees (particularly female employees) observe this dynamic, in which a colleague claims to have been penalized due to her gender, and then is herself characterized as possibly creating her own problems, they not only may hesitate before voicing their own concerns about adverse treatment at work, but also may question whether their physical appearance is undermining their ability to succeed in their jobs.

**Conclusion**

Although it is easy to downplay the role of the media in shaping public views—to write the media off as no more than an infotainment-providing distraction—the media in fact plays a substantial role in setting the agenda for public discourse, informing citizens of facts that will shape their beliefs, and promoting the policies and practices that employers, judges, and legislators may adopt. Significant negative ramifications may arise when women in the public eye are portrayed in a misleading or otherwise inaccurate manner—when evaluations of their physical attractiveness imbues articles in which appearance otherwise should play no role, or when their sexuality is generalized into one of two roles: Madonna or whore. The *Nelson* case presents a prime example of how easy it is for the media, through even minimal skewing of its coverage, to drastically alter the way in which a story is portrayed, which often results in misdirected ire from the public at large.

To be sure, the actual decision in *Nelson* provided much to critique: one could understandably and reasonably lament a decision that allows the jealousy of an employer’s spouse to justify an employee’s termination (particularly when the employee played a lesser, more passive role in fostering the relationship that led to the jealousy). One could also question whether the court’s attempt to limit this case by placing so much emphasis on the “consensual” nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson accurately reflects the realities of most worksites, where subordinate employees might hesitate before objecting to or deterring the advances of a boss or other superior. Indeed, if carefully and accurately reported, a case like *Nelson* could open the door to important, broader discussions: discussions about gender dynamics in the office and the role of women in the workplace; discussions about how employers and employees properly should navigate relationships that extend beyond the workplace; and discussions about the stereotypes and standards that society unwittingly imposes on employees based on their sex.
Yet, by oversimplifying this case—by portraying it as one simply about a lust-filled male employer and his blameless, pure female employee—the media obscured the relevance of these other points. Whereas many portrayed Nelson as an example of an out-of-touch court gone awry, perhaps the case could better be understood as a missed opportunity for engaging in these important conversations.