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Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time Bomb?

Elizabeth Renuart

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PROPERTY TITLE TROUBLE IN NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE STATES: THE IBANEZ TIME BOMB?

ELIZABETH RENUART*

ABSTRACT

The economic crisis gripping the United States began when large numbers of homeowners defaulted on poorly underwritten subprime mortgage loans. Demand from Wall Street seduced mortgage lenders, brokers, and other players to churn out mortgage loans in extraordinary numbers. Securitization, the process of utilizing mortgage loans to back investment instruments, fanned the fire. The resulting volume also caused the parties to these deals to often handle and transfer the legally important documents that secure the resulting investments—the loan notes and mortgages—in a careless and sometimes fraudulent manner.

The consequences of this behavior are now becoming evident. All over the country, courts are scrutinizing whether the parties initiating foreclosures against homeowners have the right to take this action when the authority to enforce the note and mortgage is absent. Without this right, foreclosure sales can be reversed. This concern is most acute in the majority of states, such as Massachusetts, where foreclosures occur with little or no judicial oversight before the sale. Due to the recent decision in U.S. National Bank Association v. Ibanez, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided two foreclosure sales because the foreclosing parties did not hold the mortgage, Massachusetts is the focal jurisdiction where an important conflict is unfolding.

* Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. First, I thank Kathleen Engel, Deanne Loonin, and Geoff Walsh for reviewing this Article and providing invaluable input. The following professors and practicing attorneys knowledgeable of the foreclosure law in the five states highlighted in this Article generously shared their expertise: Professor Frank Alexander (GA), Clinical Instructor Roger Bertling (MA), Maeve Elise Brown (CA), Geoffrey Giles (NV), Elizabeth Letcher (CA), Beverly Parker (AZ), Lori Wilson (AZ), and Noah Zinner (CA). Beth Barton, a title insurance attorney, provided important insights regarding title insurance issues and Massachusetts foreclosure law. My colleagues at Albany Law School offered helpful suggestions and critical feedback, especially James Gathii and Ira Bloom. Finally, I had the pleasure of working with three law students who assisted with the research: Mark Apostolos, Gina Caprotti, and John Forbush. Kathleen Carroll created the informative charts that track the seriously delinquent rates in five states. Any mistakes or errors are my own.
This Article explores the extent to which the Ibanez ruling may influence the jurisprudence in other non-judicial foreclosure states and the likelihood that clear title to foreclosed properties is jeopardized by the shoddy handling of notes and mortgages. This Article focuses on Arizona, California, Georgia, and Nevada because they permit non-judicial foreclosures and they are experiencing high “seriously delinquent” and foreclosure rates. After comparing the law in these states to that of Massachusetts, the Article concludes that Ibanez may have little effect in Arizona and California, unless the state’s highest court intervenes in this latter state, but should be influential in Georgia and Nevada.

This Article also provides a roadmap for others to assess the extent to which title to properties purchased at foreclosure sales or from lenders’ REO inventories might be defective in other states. Finally, the Article addresses the potential consequences of reversing foreclosure sales and responds to the securitization industry’s worry about homeowners getting free houses.
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INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis gripping the United States began when large numbers of homeowners defaulted on poorly underwritten subprime mortgage loans. Demand from Wall Street seduced mortgage lenders, brokers, and other players to churn out mortgage loans in extraordinary numbers. Through securitization, the process of utilizing mortgage loans to back investment instruments, Wall Street funded subprime originations in excess of $480 billion in each of the peak years—2005 and 2006. At the same time, low interest rates, inflated home values, easy credit, toxic loan products, negligible regulation, and corporate risk tolerance led to the downfall of this house of cards: the subprime mortgage market.

Without a ready source of cash and the resulting massive volume of subprime originations, the havoc might have been contained. Securitization not only stoked the fire, but also allowed the parties to these deals to handle and transfer the legally important documents that secure the resulting investments—the loan notes and mortgages—in a careless and, at times, fraudulent manner. The consequences of this behavior are now becoming evident. All over the country, courts are scrutinizing whether the parties initiating foreclosures against homeowners have the right to take this action when authority to enforce the note and mortgage is absent. Without this right, foreclosure sales can be reversed.

The concern about authority to foreclose is most acute in the majority of states, such as Massachusetts, where foreclosures occur with little or no judicial oversight. Due to the decision in United States National Bank Association v. Ibanez, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided two foreclosure sales where the foreclosing parties did not hold the mortgage, Massachusetts is the focal jurisdiction where an important conflict is unfolding. On one side of the contest resides the integrity of the courts, the law, and property recordation systems. This side also defends...
the related public policy in favor of strict compliance with non-judicial foreclosure procedures designed to ensure that only the proper parties oust homeowners from their homes. The securitization industry, including the trustee banks who must answer to the investors and who claim the right to foreclose, present their contrary views that these rules are technical, substantial compliance is sufficient, court rulings unnecessarily endanger clear title, and, most worrisome of all, homeowners might get a free lunch (that is, a free home).

This Article explores the extent to which the *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez* rulings should influence the courts in other non-judicial foreclosure states and the likelihood that clear title to foreclosed properties is jeopardized by shoddy or fraudulent handling of notes and mortgages. In particular, the Article selected Arizona, California, Georgia, and Nevada to compare to Massachusetts because they permit non-judicial foreclosures and are experiencing high “seriously delinquent” rates. The Article concludes that *Ibanez* will have little effect in Arizona and California, unless the state’s supreme court intervenes in this latter state, but should be influential in the other states, to varying degrees. As a result, property title trouble is likely in Georgia and Nevada.

To examine these questions, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I chronicles the nature and scope of the document conveyance problem. Part II provides an overview of securitization, focusing on the parties through whom the mortgage loans travel. The legal rules governing the transfer of loan notes and mortgages are outlined in Part III. That section also discusses when and why potential errors, even in the absence of fraud, can occur. Part IV enumerates relevant distinctions between the foreclosure proceedings in judicial and non-judicial states with an emphasis on the reasons why title to foreclosed properties is more certain in judicial foreclosure states. The *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua* decisions, other related decisions, and the Massachusetts statutory rules permitting non-judicial foreclosure are detailed in Part V. In Part VI, the Article reports upon the relevant foreclosure laws of Arizona, California, Georgia, and Nevada on the issues of: authority to foreclose and the effect of a defective foreclosure on purchasers generally and on bona fide purchasers in particular. At the end of each review, the Article opines upon the likelihood that the *Ibanez* ruling should influence the courts in other states and the potential for challenges to title of property held by purchasers. Finally, the Article addresses the potential consequences of reversing foreclosure sales and responds to the securitization industry’s worry about homeowners getting free houses.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

When signs of a looming foreclosure catastrophe in the subprime mortgage market began to emerge in the beginning of 2007, the percentage of all outstanding residential mortgage loans in the nation ninety days or more delinquent or in foreclosure stood at 2.23% (or almost 980,000 loans).\(^5\) This percentage rose dramatically to its peak of 9.67% (or almost 4.3 million loans) by the end of 2009.\(^6\) As of the second quarter of 2011, those numbers remained shockingly high: 7.85% of all residential mortgage loans were seriously delinquent—that is, almost 3.5 million loans.\(^7\)

As more and more homes went into foreclosure, the effects of this disaster triggered a broader financial crisis.\(^8\) As of the beginning of 2011, over twenty-six million Americans had no job, could not find full-time work, or had given up looking for work.\(^9\) Almost four million families had lost their homes to foreclosure. Nearly $11 trillion in household wealth had vanished, including retirement accounts and life savings.\(^10\)

As the aftermath of and recovery from the financial catastrophe heads into a sixth year, its origins remain popular topics of analysis. Well-documented causes include the collapse of the housing bubble fueled by low interest rates, easy credit, negligible regulation, and toxic mortgages.\(^11\)

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\(^5\) MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q1 (2007).
\(^6\) MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q4 (2009); MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 5, at Q1. This data is derived from the “seriously delinquent” columns. “Seriously delinquent includes mortgage loans that are delinquent by ninety days or more or are in foreclosure.” Id.
\(^7\) MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q2 (2011).
\(^8\) Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps 142–48 (2011) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, The Subprime Virus].
\(^9\) FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xv.
\(^10\) Id.
\(^11\) Id. at xvi. More specifically, the Commission found: widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision by key federal agencies; failures of corporate governance and heightened risk-taking; excessively leveraged financial institutions and high consumer debt loads; deterioration of mortgage-lending standards; loosening of due diligence standards applied in the securitization process; the re-packaging and sale of questionable mortgage-backed securities into collateralized debt obligations and the sale of credit default swaps to hedge against the collapse of the securities; failures of the credit rating agencies; and an unprepared government that responded inconsistently to the crisis. Id. at xvii–xxviii; see also FDIC Oversight: Examining and Evaluating the Role of the Regulator During the Financial Crisis and Today: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 112th Cong. 5–12 (2011) (statement of Sheila C. Bair), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/052611bair.pdf (identifying the roots of the financial crisis—excessive reliance on debt
Securitization stimulated the conditions leading to the collapse due to the enormous volume of money it pumped into the production of subprime mortgage loans, its failure to accurately police the quality of the underlying mortgage loans, and its inability to accurately assess the ensuing heightened risks. 12

The capital to fund most residential mortgages in the United States is created by securitization. The securitization story germane to this Article began in earnest in 1994 when private label securitizations of subprime mortgage loans increased dramatically. 13 In that year, $11.05 billion of these loans were securitized.14 At the height of the subprime mortgage market, $507.65 billion in 2005 and $483.05 billion in 2006 of subprime residential mortgage loans found their way into securitizations.15 For all residential mortgage securitizations, the average rate of private label securitization was just over 64% between 2000 and 2007.16 The dollar volume of the mortgages securitized for the same period exceeded $14.166 trillion.17 This data clearly shows the enormous amount of money flowing into the origination of mortgage loans from investors.

In a typical private mortgage loan securitization, each mortgage loan is sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred to a trust through a series of steps

and financial leverage, misaligned incentives in financial markets, failures and gaps in financial regulation, and erosion of market discipline due to “too big to fail”).


13 In private label securitizations, private parties issue the securities. By contrast, in agency securitizations, Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the Federal Home Loan Banks issue the securities. See INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, supra note 2, at Glossary. When referring to “securitizations,” this Article is referring to private label securitizations. Concerns similar to those discussed in this Article regarding the handling of mortgage loans have arisen in the context of agency securitizations. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, AUDIT REPORT NO. AUD-2011-004, FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE’S DEFAULT-RELATED LEGAL SERVICES12–16 (2011), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2011-004.pdf (discussing complaints related to the handling of mortgage loan documents and the filing of false pleadings and affidavits by law firms representing Fannie Mae).


16 INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, INC., THE 2011 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 2, at 3–4 (2011) (comparing the total dollar volume of securitizations to the total dollar volume of originations). The average rate is much higher for the years following the commencement of the crisis (2008–2010)—83% of virtually all residential mortgages were securitized, likely due to the lack of capital from other sources. Id.

17 Id. (totaling the “MBS issuance” for each year).
and parties, starting with the lender and ending with the trustee. The trustee hires a servicer to collect on the loans, maintains the payment records, and selects foreclosure attorneys in the event of defaults. A document custodian usually stores the notes and mortgages on the trustee’s behalf.

Applicable state law and the terms of the transaction contracts govern the travel route and the documentation necessary to transfer the mortgage loans legally from one party to the next. The sloppiness and outright fraud exhibited by parties to the securitization deals contributed to a breakdown in the transfer of the mortgage loans from one entity to the next along the route, resulting in serious concerns about who possesses the authority to foreclose in the event of a homeowner default. This behavior is documented in federal and state court decisions, the findings of a state’s attorney general and a city recorder office’s investigation, studies by law professors, news reports, Congressional testimony, and shareholder lawsuits.

What follows in Sections A and B of Part I is a sample of that evidence.

A. Inadequate Documentation

The federal courts in Ohio were among the first to question standing in numerous foreclosure actions when plaintiffs could not produce relevant documents demonstrating they possessed the right to enforce the mortgage loans at the time of filing the action. Since then, state courts

18 American Securitization Forum, Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in the Secondary Mortgage Market 7–8 (2010), http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf. Unless otherwise noted, the phrase “mortgage loan” refers to both the loan note and the mortgage. Part III details the legal significance of each of these instruments and their relationship to each other.


20 Part II below describes securitization in more detail. Part III discusses the applicable state law requirements governing the transfer of mortgage loans. Parts V and VI chronicle the similarities and differences in state law conveyance and foreclosure laws.

21 See supra notes 16 and 17 for state and federal court decisions; infra note 22 for shareholder lawsuit; infra note 26 for congressional testimony; infra note 28 for a study by a law professor; infra note 34 for the state attorney general findings; and infra notes 44, 48, and 49 for news reports.

22 E.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing fourteen foreclosure actions without prejudice; noting that the financial institutions involved exhibited the attitude that since they had been following certain practices for so long, unchallenged, that the practice equated with legal compliance); see also In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that the plaintiffs
have highlighted plaintiffs’ failure to transfer notes and mortgages properly in foreclosure cases involving securitized mortgage loans.23

In bankruptcy courts, judges are regularly confronted with consumer challenges to creditor standing to be paid or requests to lift automatic stays, where mortgage documents were not properly transferred.24 For example,

failed to produce the loan notes, mortgages, and applicable assignments in order to show they had standing at the time they filed their lawsuits; affording the plaintiffs additional time to comply). These cases were filed in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

23 E.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011) (describing two different securitization transactions; finding that the trust agreements did not contain attached schedules showing that the specific mortgage loans were part of the deal and mortgages were not assigned to the plaintiff trustee banks); Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing summary judgment against the homeowner seeking to void the sale and holding the sale void as HSBC Bank did not own the indebtedness at the time it foreclosed). Note—that the mortgage loan was securitized is only evident when reviewing the caption of the case in the brief filed in the appeal, see Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (No. 273897), 2006 WL 6364462; Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust v. Mitchell, 27 A.3d 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (vacating the sheriff’s sale and remanding due to lack of evidence that the plaintiff possessed the loan note at the time of filing the foreclosure action); Bank of New York v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2011) (reversing the lower court’s refusal to dismiss the foreclosure complaint where the assignee only obtained the mortgage from MERS and not the note); HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n v. Miller, 889 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432–33 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (dismissing the foreclosure because the plaintiff failed to show that the note was transferred to it before filing the foreclosure action); In re Adams, 693 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling the evidence of transfer of the note to the trustee bank was insufficient); Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919, 921–22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (reversing the trial court’s order denying the homeowner’s petition to strike the default judgment against them and setting aside the sheriff’s sale because the bank offered no evidence to show the mortgage had been assigned to it); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087 (affirming summary judgment to the mortgagor when the bank failed to prove that it was the holder of the note); see also Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Bradbury, 32 A.3d 1014 (Me. 2011) (affirming the trial court’s finding that Fannie Mae submitted an affidavit in support of a foreclosure complaint in bad faith due, in part, to the affiant’s lack of knowledge as to the accuracy of the attached documents and that the affiant had signed thousands of such affidavits each month; affirming the trial court’s award of over $23,000 in attorney fees to the homeowner); Anderson v. Burson, A.3d 452 (Md. 2011) (noting that mortgage transferees often lose or misplace mortgage documents and fail to properly transfer loan notes but affirming the ruling that the substituted trustee may enforce the note because the homeowner conceded the proffered version of the transfer history).

24 E.g., Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (reversing the bankruptcy court and denying the securitization trustee’s motion to lift stay because it could not show that it or its agent had actual possession of the note); In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (describing the lack of evidence demonstrating how the note and deed of trust were conveyed from the lender to the sponsor under the “Flow Interim Servicing Agreement” and then to the depositor under a “Mortgage
a decision from the bankruptcy court in New Jersey recounted the testimony of a Bank of America witness that “it was customary for Countrywide [the lender] to maintain possession of the original note and related loan documents” in loan transactions it originated. This statement cast doubt on the validity of foreclosures of mortgage loans issued by the largest subprime originator in the United States. In response, the rating agency, Moody’s, issued a short report attempting to dispel concern that the failure to indorse loan notes, assign the mortgages, and physically deliver them to the trustee in securitizations was systematic in Countrywide deals. Nevertheless, Bank of America shareholders became alarmed enough to sue the company in New York state court. In their complaint, the shareholders

Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement” and then to the trust under the “Trust Agreement”; noting further that the schedule purporting to list the mortgage loans transferred to the trust was blank; In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (denying motion to lift the stay where the trustee bank commenced foreclosure but could not show it was the assignee of the mortgage or held the note at the time it commenced the foreclosure); see also Memorandum in Support of Sanctions, In re Nuer, No. 08-14106 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/NuerStatement0402.pdf (arguing for sanctions against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank for filing false documents which show that Chase, as mortgagee, assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank, as trustee for a Long Beach securitization trust while claiming in its motion to lift stay that it is only the servicer; no showing of assignments along the securitization chain).


Inside Mortgage Finance, supra note 2, at 41–59 (showing Countrywide as the number one residential mortgage loan originator from 2004 through 2007 and either number one or within the top four from 1993 to 2003).

Weekly Credit Outlook, Moody’s Investors Service, Jan. 10, 2011, at 37–38, available at http://www.institutionalinvestorchina.com/ary/f/110127/1_0734402621.pdf (finding that a “majority” of mortgage loans contained in a “sample” of Countrywide securitization deals were properly delivered to the trustee but failing to state whether the sample was random and reviewing only the initial trustee certifications, not the final versions; reporting that the initial certifications in the securitization that included the Kemp loan showed that 9.6% of the loans were not properly delivered to the trustee). But see Abigail Field, At Bank of America, More Incomplete Mortgage Docs Raise More Questions, CNNMoney (June 3, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/03/at-bank-of-america-more-incomplete-mortgage-docs-and-more-questions (reporting that Fortune Magazine studied foreclosures of Countrywide-originated mortgage loans filed in two New York counties between 2006 and 2010; finding that Countrywide failed to indorse all 104 notes, either in blank or to a specific payee). This Article uses the spelling of the words “indorse” and “indorsement” to conform to the spelling used in the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3.
sought damages from the company’s directors due to alleged breaches of their fiduciary duty and for gross mismanagement by concealing information about defects in the recording of mortgages from the public.\footnote{28 Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 1, O’Hare v. Moynihan, No. 11103729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2011).}

The San Francisco Office of the Assessor-Recorder funded an analysis of mortgage loans to determine the nature and extent of documentation problems in transactions that resulted in foreclosure in the city and county between January 2009 and October 2011.\footnote{29 \textsc{City and County of San Francisco Office of the Assessor-Recorder, Foreclosure in California: A Crisis of Compliance} (2012), http://www.sfassessor.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=1018 [hereinafter SF Assessor Report]. The Office randomly selected 382 residential mortgage loan transactions. \textit{Id.} at 18. It hired Aequitas Compliance Solutions, Inc., a mortgage regulatory compliance consulting firm, to conduct the file review and report the findings. \textit{Id.} at 19.} Astonishingly, the Office identified apparent violations of California law in 84% of the loans.\footnote{30 \textit{Id.} at 1.} Related to the careless handling of assignments of deeds of trust, the Office found that in 27% of the subject loans, evidence suggested that the original or prior owner of the mortgage loan may not have signed the assignment and instead it was signed by an employee of another entity; 11% of the time, the assignee signed as the assignor; and, in 6% of the files, two or more conflicting assignments were recorded, making it impossible for either to be legally valid.\footnote{31 \textit{Id.} at 6–7. Deeds of trust are the most common security agreements used in California in residential transactions. They are three-party instruments in which the trustor (borrower) conditionally conveys title to a third party trustee who holds it as security for the debt owed to the beneficiary (lender). \textit{See infra} Part VI.}

Legal scholars provide additional evidence of the slipshod handling of the notes and mortgages. For example, Professor Levitin examined a small sample of foreclosure complaints filed in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, in May 2010 and found that the loan note was not filed with the complaint in over 60% of the cases.\footnote{32 Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Comty. Opportunity of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 105, at 18 (2010) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Levitin Testimony], http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Levitin111810.pdf.} His study found that “[f]ailure to attach the note appears to be routine practice for some of the foreclosure mill law firms, including two that handle all of Bank of America’s foreclosures.”\footnote{33 \textit{Id.}} He concluded that those foreclosure complaints were facially defective.\footnote{34 \textit{Id.}}
A study conducted by Professor Porter into mortgage creditor filings in bankruptcy courts provides additional insight into paperwork handling. She reviewed the proofs of claims filed by the purported mortgage loan holders and their agents when seeking to establish their right to payment under the loan notes in consumer bankruptcies. Mortgage creditors must file a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy if they wish to receive payments from the bankruptcy estate for arrearages. The Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure require such creditors to provide a copy of the writing evidencing the claim (that is, the loan note) and evidence of the creditor’s security interest in property of the debtor if perfected (that is, the mortgage or deed of trust).

These mandates represent two fundamental public policies embodied in the Bankruptcy Code: “ensur[ing] the accuracy and legality of the claim ... that any payments on mortgage claims are made in accord with the Bankruptcy Code.” Despite these obligations, Professor Porter found that 41.1% of the proofs of claims she reviewed did not include the loan note. Moreover, the mortgage or deed of trust was not attached to about 20% of these proofs of claim. This evidence does not conclusively show that the parties filing the defective proofs of claims had no right to payment, nor does it prove that these parties could never produce these documents. At a minimum, though, these findings support claims of sloppiness in the handling of important legal documents by lenders and/or their agents and transferees.

As Professor Whitman posits, “[w]hile delivery of the note might seem a simple matter of compliance, experience during the past several years has shown that, probably in countless thousands of cases, promissory notes were never delivered to secondary market investors or securitizers, and, in many cases, cannot presently be located at all.” He described efforts to

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35 Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 146 (2008). The principal investigators, Professor Porter and Tara Twomey, compiled data from 1733 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed by homeowners in forty-four judicial districts in twenty-three states and the District of Columbia. They drew the sample only from jurisdictions where the applicable state law permits non-judicial foreclosure of homeowners’ principal residences. Id. at 141–42.


37 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e), (d).

38 Porter, supra note 35, at 146.

39 Id. at 146–48.

“fix” these oversights to include the execution of lost note affidavits because those affidavits are perjured in “many cases.”41 This brings us to the more serious problem of fraud.

B. Fraud and “Robo-Signing”

Sloppiness was not the only complication. Fraud and what became known as “robo-signing” were prevalent as foreclosures mounted. An investigation by the Florida Attorney General identified significant fraud and forgery in the handling and transfer of loan notes and mortgages in Florida.42 The proof included documents showing: forged signatures on mortgages and on “indorsements” of notes, falsifications of dates on mortgage assignments, bogus grantees and grantors listed on mortgage assignments, lack of knowledge of bank employees who signed transfers of notes and mortgages, and lack of authority to transfer notes and mortgages.43 Moreover, the investigators discovered that the agents or attorneys for the foreclosing parties recorded many of these defective documents and relied upon them in court.

Similar practices by Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS) became the subject of a lawsuit filed by the Nevada Attorney General in December 2011.44 LPS promoted itself as “the nation’s leading provider of mortgage processing services, settlement services, and default solutions,” with a clientele that included a majority of the country’s fifty largest banks.45 The

41 Whitman, supra note 40, at 761; see also Levitin Testimony, supra note 32, at 14–15 (observing that the large number of lost note affidavits filed in foreclosure cases are not based upon personal knowledge of the affiants and opining that the lack of personal knowledge occurs because the affiants do not know or fail to determine if the trustee bank actually possesses the notes and mortgages).


43 Id. at 27–35 (highlighting the example of Linda Green whose signature appears on “hundreds of thousands” of mortgage assignments and who is listed as an officer of dozens of banks and mortgage companies; presenting documents in which her signature was forged on many documents).


45 Id. ¶ 26. The complaint further alleges that the majority of the top twenty servicers were using LPS’s foreclosure processing computer software. Id. ¶ 29.
crux of the case revolves around the company or its subsidiaries’ alleged practice of forging signatures on mortgage assignments and substitutions of trustees, improperly executing assignments on behalf of defunct entities, and false assertions in affidavits about authority to foreclose.\textsuperscript{46}

The San Francisco Assessor-Recorder’s Office also uncovered evidence of fraud in the previously discussed study. For example, it found reason to suspect that the execution of the substitution of trustee was unauthorized in 28% of the sampled loan files.\textsuperscript{47} In 59\% of the subject loans, one or more of the recorded foreclosure documents were backdated.\textsuperscript{48}

Evidence that documents purporting to transfer mortgage loans and other affidavits filed in foreclosure cases were suspect sparked national attention in the fall of 2010 when the “robo-signing” scandal broke.\textsuperscript{49} One court defined “robo-signing” narrowly: “A ‘robo-signer’ is a person who quickly signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage documents and has not done so.”\textsuperscript{50} In common parlance, the term came to include a

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\textsuperscript{46} Id. ¶¶ 34–65, 98–103. The fraud also extended to the notarization process, assertions about whether the homeowner was delinquent, and statements to the public and investors. Id. ¶¶ 68–84, 104–14. A Reuters reporter noted evidence of forgeries and alterations apparent on documents transferring notes and mortgage offered in court by Wells Fargo & Co. and reported that a federal investigation of Lender Processing Services was ongoing. Scot J. Paltrow, \textit{The Watchdogs That Didn’t Bark}, \textit{REUTERS SPECIAL REPORT} (Dec. 22, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-foreclosures -idUSTRE7BL0MC20111222; Scot J. Paltrow, \textit{Lender Processing Services, Foreclosure Giant, Faces Growing Legal Trouble}, \textit{HUFF POST BUS.} (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:03 PM; updated May 25, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/06/lender-processing -services-legal-woes_n_792663.html; see also Press Release, Bill Schuette, Mich. Att’y Gen., Schuette Files Criminal Charges Against Former Mortgage Processor President for Role in Fraudulent Robo-Signing (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164 -46849-290350--.00.html (stating that the charges against Lorraine Brown, former president of DocX established and orchestrated a “widespread” practice involving employees who forged mortgage assignments). At the time this Article went to print, LPS reached a global settlement with forty-six state attorneys general and agreed to pay a total of $127 million to be split among those states. Kerri Ann Panchuck, \textit{LPS Settles Outstanding Attorneys General Foreclosure Issues for 127 Million}, \textit{HOUSINGWIRE} (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www .housingwire.com/news/2013/01/31/lps-settles-outstanding-attorneys-general-foreclosure -issues-127-million. Notably, Nevada did not participate in this settlement. It is unclear whether harmed homeowners will benefit from this settlement and to what extent allegedly forged mortgage assignments will affect title to the real estate securing those mortgages.\
\textsuperscript{47} SF ASSESSOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 10.\
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 12.\
\textsuperscript{49} See generally Pallavi Gogoi, \textit{Robo-Signing Scandal May Date Back to Late ‘90s}, NBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2011, 8:15 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44365184/ns/business -us_business/t/robo-signing-scandal-may-date-back-late-s/.\
\textsuperscript{50} OneWest Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859–69 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice when the plaintiff could not demonstrate

In response to evidence of fraud and robo-signing, federal banking agencies conducted an evaluation of mortgage servicers.\footnote{FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, \textit{Office of the Comptroller of the Currency \& Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and Practices} (2011), http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf. These agencies focused on fourteen servicers that represented more than two-thirds of the servicing industry and about 36.7 million mortgages of the 54 million first-lien mortgages outstanding on December 31, 2010. \textit{Id.} at 5. Overall, the examiners found: “[M]ost servicers had inadequate staffing levels and training programs throughout the foreclosure-processing function and that a large percentage of the staff lacked sufficient training in their positions.” \textit{Id.} at 7. More specifically, however, examiners generally found that loan notes appeared to be properly indorsed and mortgages properly assigned, with some exceptions, and that the servicers generally had possession and control over these documents. \textit{Id.} at 8–9. However, the bank reviewers did not sample actual foreclosure filings to determine any procedural defects due to the failure in chain of title of the notes and mortgages. Levitin Testimony, supra note 32, at 19. Moreover, the GAO noted that banking agency regulatory officials reported that “examiners did not always verify ... whether documentation included a record of all previous mortgage transfers from loan origination to foreclosure initiation, as may be required by some state law or contracts.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, \textit{GAO-11-433, Mortgage Foreclosures: Documentation Problems Reveal Need for Ongoing Regulatory Oversight} 29 (2011) [hereinafter \textit{GAO Report}], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11433.pdf (observing that the banking agencies reviewed only about 200 files from each servicer).}

A few that its agent had authority to assign the mortgage and note). In this case, Ms. Johnson-Seck claimed in her deposition to be a vice president of two different banks and of MERS at the same time and signed about 750 documents per week, including lost note affidavits, affidavits of debt, assignments, and “anything related to a bankruptcy.” She also testified that she did not read each document. \textit{Id.} 862–63.

...
months later, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, John Walsh, announced
an independent review process to “identify borrowers who suffered finan-
cial injury as a result of errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies in
the foreclosure process.”\textsuperscript{54} Despite these actions, an American Banker ar-
ticle released in August 2011 noted that some of the largest servicers were
still fabricating documents that should have been signed years ago and
submitting them as evidence to support the trustee bank’s authority to
foreclose, even after the banking agency investigation conducted in late
2010 and early 2011.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{C. The Impact of Inadequate Documentation, Fraud, and Robo-Signing}

Sheila Bair, before leaving her post as Chair of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, testified before a Senate Committee and opined
that flawed banking processes, including faulty transfers of loan docu-
mentation, “have potentially infected millions of foreclosures, and the
damages to be assessed against these operations could be significant and
take years to materialize.”\textsuperscript{56} Bair was not alone in her assessment. A bank
analyst told a Washington Post reporter: “[T]here’s a possible nightmare
scenario here that no foreclosure is valid.”\textsuperscript{57} The Wall Street Journal
quoted a former subprime lender: “Am I surprised? Absolutely not. I knew

Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Takes Action to Correct Foreclosure Deficiencies
08.pdf}. Those institutions were the following: Aurora Bank, EverBank, OneWest Bank
and Sovereign Bank. All of these orders required that particular action be taken “to
remedy the widespread and significant deficiencies identified by the review.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{54} John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the American
\textit{Infra Part VII} describes this homeowner review and claim process in more detail.

\textsuperscript{55} Kate Berry, \textit{Robo-Signing Redux: Servicers Still Fabricating Foreclosure Documents},
robo-signing-foreclosure-mortgage-assignments-1041741-1.html}.

\textsuperscript{56} Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation:
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 23 (2011) (Testimony of Sheila C. Bair),
available at \url{http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_i
d=94d50f1a-75eb-4586-b025-76e44870816b}.

\textsuperscript{57} Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, \textit{In Foreclosure Controversy, Problems Run
Deeper than Flawed Paperwork}, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), \url{http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/06/AR2010100607227_pf.html}
(quoting Nancy Bush, a banking analyst with NAB Research, and noting the observation of
Janet Tavakoli, founder and president of Tavakoli Structured Finance, a Chicago-based
consulting firm, that when banks were creating mortgage-backed securities as fast as
possible over the last decade, there was little time to assure the paperwork was in order).
this assignment problem was going to be an issue.” Other reporters focused on the human side of this equation by documenting the plights of homeowners fighting to save their homes.

II. ABCS OF SECURITIZATION

Understanding the foreclosure crisis requires knowledge of the structure of mortgage-backed securitizations. Others have described securitization in great detail. This Article focuses on the goals of the transaction, the players, and the path along which the loan notes and mortgages should travel, highlighting why and how this journey never occurred, was interrupted, or never began.

At its most basic level, securitization is the process of utilizing mortgage loans to back investment instruments. Mortgage securitizations are extremely complex and involve a number of players. Nonetheless, the goals of the parties to any given securitization are relatively straightforward. First, lenders need capital to make mortgage loans and investors want to buy bonds backed by the loans. Second, the deals are designed so that the claims and defenses that homeowners might have against their original lenders will not follow the documents as they travel to the trustees who hold the loans in trust for the investors. Third, the transaction must include a true sale of the mortgage loans to protect investors against claims
that the note and mortgages are assets of the estate of the original lender in a bankruptcy proceeding. Fourth, the tax consequences are limited by the intended creation of real estate investment mortgage conduits.

When mortgage loans are sold, they most often are packaged together in groups (pools), sold, and held in trust for the benefit of the investors according to the terms of the operative trust document. This process begins with a mortgage lender that originates the loans and sells them to an investment bank or other entity, called an arranger, seller, sponsor, or underwriter. Next, the sponsor sells the pool of loans to a special-purpose subsidiary, called the “depositor,” that has no other assets or liabilities in order to separate the loans from the sponsor’s assets and liabilities. Then, the depositor transfers the loans to a specially created, special-purpose vehicle (SPV), usually a trust that holds the loans for the benefit of the investors.

The trustee of the trust (a bank) holds the mortgage loans on behalf of the trust and is entitled to the income from the payments made by the homeowners to pass along to the investors. The pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) normally identifies a document custodian to take physical possession of the loan notes and mortgages on behalf of the trustee and a servicer to collect the monthly payments from the homeowner and transfer those monies to the trustee. As a result of the terms of these deals, the loan notes and mortgages in each pool should travel from the originating lender to the sponsor, thence to the depositor, and finally to the trust.

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63 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 19, at 13.
64 Id. at 32–33.
65 The trust agreement may be included in the pooling and servicing agreement (PSA). See Affidavit and Testimony of Professor Ira Mark Bloom at ¶ 7, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Congress, Case No. CV-2009-901113 (Cir. Ct. of Jefferson Cty., Ala.) [hereinafter Bloom Testimony] (stating that he found the trust agreement in the PSA) (on file with author).
66 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 19, at 13 n.32.
67 Id. at 13 n.33.
68 Id. at 13–14.
70 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 19, at 15. The remainder of the transaction is relevant primarily to the investors and is described by Levitin and Twomey in their article. Id. at 14.
71 Securitization deals can leave the mortgage notes in the hands of the original lender as custodian for the trust. Justin B. McDonnell & John Franklin Hitchcock, Jr., The Sale of
To illustrate, let us review a securitization of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., loans pooled in 2005 into Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-J9.\(^\text{72}\) In this example, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. originated the mortgage loans through its retail offices and acquired additional loans from corresponding lenders using Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards.\(^\text{73}\) The Prospectus identified the seller as either Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., or “to-be-identified” entities established by Countrywide Financial Corporation or one of its subsidiaries which, in turn, acquired those mortgage loans directly from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.\(^\text{74}\) The depositor was CWALT, Inc., a limited purpose subsidiary of Countrywide Financial Corp.\(^\text{75}\) The Bank of New York took the role of the trustee.\(^\text{76}\) The master servicer was listed as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP.\(^\text{77}\) The deal documents did not list a specific document custodian, though the custodian’s role is mentioned throughout.\(^\text{78}\)

According to the Prospectus, the depositor was to purchase the pool of mortgage loans from the sellers pursuant to the PSA.\(^\text{79}\) The depositor should have assigned them to the trustee (or its custodian) for the benefit of the certificate holders (the investors).\(^\text{80}\) In this deal, therefore, the mortgage loans were to move from the corresponding lender to the seller, from the seller to the depositor, and from the depositor to the trustee (and its custodian and/or the servicer). If the loans followed this path, at least four entities handled (or mishandled) them.

As described above, mounting evidence shows that often the mortgage loans were not transferred according to the PSA or as required by state

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\(^{73}\) Id. at S-38.

\(^{74}\) Id. at S-3.

\(^{75}\) Id.

\(^{76}\) Id.

\(^{77}\) Id. at S-3 to -4.

\(^{78}\) Id. at S-3 to -4, S-36.

\(^{79}\) Id. at S-15.

\(^{80}\) Id. at S-15 to -16.
law. In those cases, the trustee would not possess the authority to foreclose in the event of default by a homeowner.

III. THE POTENTIAL FOR ERROR IN THE TRANSFER OF NOTES AND MORTGAGES—LET US COUNT THE WAYS

A. The Legally Operative Documents Constituting a “Mortgage Loan”

A “mortgage loan” consists of two distinct documents: a note and a security agreement.81 The loan note represents the legal obligation to repay money advanced by the lender for use by the borrower.82 In many states, a mortgage or deed of trust creates a security interest in the borrower’s real property and permits the mortgagee or beneficiary to foreclose in the event of non-payment or a breach of other duties listed in the document.83 The transfer of the note is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and, possibly, the contract, whereas, the transfer of the mortgage generally is governed by the state law of conveyance and real property.84

B. Transferring the Note and Potential Problems

This Section describes the legal infrastructure that governs the transfer of loan notes and mortgages and highlights the points at which transfers can fail. Notes can be transferred in one of three ways. First, if the note is a negotiable instrument, it can be “negotiated” according to the rules in Article 3 of the UCC.85 Second, if the note is a negotiable instrument, the holder may transfer it by way of an assignment, rather than by negotiation, but its enforceability is determined by Article 3 rules and, possibly, the contract.86 Alternatively, the note could be sold pursuant to Article 9 of the

81 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.27 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN].
82 The notes used in mortgage loan transactions usually are “promissory notes” as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 9-102(a)(65) (“Promissory note’ means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank received for deposit a sum of money or funds.”).
83 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.03 (Michael Allan Wolfe ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2010) [hereinafter 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY]. In “title” states, the mortgage vests legal title in the mortgagee or beneficiary. Id. In this Section, the Article will use “mortgage” generically to include mortgages, deeds of trust, and security deeds.
84 JOHN RAO ET AL., FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING § 4.4.4.1 (National Consumer Law Center 3d ed. 2010).
85 AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, supra note 18, at 1.
86 Id. at 2, 4.
UCC, regardless of whether it was a negotiable instrument. Since mortgage loan securitizations attempt to transfer the notes in compliance with the UCC, this Article will review those rules and the ways in which non-compliance occurs.

1. Article 3

The transfer of and the right to enforce “negotiable” loan notes are governed by several provisions of Article 3 of the UCC. Under UCC § 3-104, a “negotiable instrument”: (1) contains an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money; (2) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (3) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and (4) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the promisor to do any action in addition to the payment of money. If any one of these conditions is not met, the loan note is not “negotiable” and its transfer does not qualify as a “negotiation.”

Negotiability is important for two reasons. First, Article 3 creates rights to enforce the note only if it is negotiable. Second, a negotiable instrument that is transferred to a third party who takes the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue, or a party that has a defense or claim in recoupment can become a “holder in due course.” Holder-in-due-course status creates a shield against certain claims and defenses that the obligor (the homeowner in the context of mortgage loans)

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87 Levitin Testimony, supra note 32, at 20–21.
88 For example, in the securitization of Countrywide loans discussed supra Part II, the PSA states the following related to the transfer of the notes: “In addition, the depositor will deliver or cause to be delivered to the trustee (or to the custodian) for each mortgage loan the mortgage note endorsed without recourse in blank or to the order of the trustee, except that the depositor may deliver or cause to be delivered a lost note affidavit in lieu of any original mortgage note that has been lost ....” CWALT, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, supra note 72, at 43–44.
90 This element is addressed more fully in UCC § 3-106 (1990).
91 This element is addressed more fully in UCC § 3-108 (1990).
92 The note maker (borrower) and the note payee (lender) could agree that Article 3 governs the transfer of a non-negotiable note. UCC § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1990).
93 UCC §§ 3-203(b), 3-301 (1990).
94 UCC § 3-302(a) (1990).
could raise against the original payee (the lender).\textsuperscript{95} In other words, the transferee of a loan note will be immune from many claims and defenses that the borrower could raise against the lender.\textsuperscript{96}

As discussed in Part II, achieving this status is one of the goals of securitization. Here we explore negotiation as it is relevant to the pivotal question in a foreclosure—does the foreclosing party possess the right to enforce the note?\textsuperscript{97} This issue relates to, but is not the same as, whether the one possessing the right to enforce the note acquired the protections of a holder-in-due-course. For this reason, this Article tables the holder-in-due-course doctrine for its remainder.

Transfer of a negotiable note occurs either by way of “negotiation” or by some other form of transfer, such as assignment or sale. If via negotiation, the transfer must include delivery of the note containing the indorsement of the current holder (if the note is payable to an identified person).\textsuperscript{98} If the instrument is payable to bearer, transfer by possession alone suffices.\textsuperscript{99} By this process, the recipient becomes a “holder.”\textsuperscript{100}

If a negotiable instrument is not “negotiated,” it can, nevertheless, be transferred by delivery for the purpose of giving the recipient the right to enforce it.\textsuperscript{101} This often occurs through purchase and sale agreements in securitizations or written assignments in other contexts. A transfer that complies with § 3-203(a) vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument.\textsuperscript{102} The crucial element common to both negotiation and a mere transfer is possession of the instrument by the transferee.

The relevant consequence of becoming a “holder” or a transferee in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder (that is, a “holder” transferred it to the non-holder) is that Article 3 bestows on that party the

\textsuperscript{95} UCC § 3-305(a) and (b) (1990).
\textsuperscript{96} If the note is not “negotiable,” the assignee acquires all rights and is subject to all liabilities of the assignor upon the transfer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981); Eggert II, supra note 60, at 613. Although the original parties to the note can agree that provisions of Article 3 apply to determine their respective rights, the transferor of the note cannot amend or eliminate the rights of the original parties in an assignment document. See UCC § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1990).
\textsuperscript{97} The relevant question is whether the party relying on the note has the right to enforce it, not which claims and defenses to payment on the note a homeowner could raise against that party.
\textsuperscript{98} UCC § 3-201 (1990); see also UCC § 3-204(a) (1990) (defining indorsement as the signature that is made for the purpose of negotiating the instrument). The UCC uses the word “indorsement,” not “endorsement.”
\textsuperscript{99} UCC § 3-201 (1990).
\textsuperscript{100} UCC § 1-201(b)(21) (2001). All but eight states have adopted this version of Article 1.
\textsuperscript{101} UCC § 3-203(a) (1990).
\textsuperscript{102} UCC § 3-203(b) (1990).
right to enforce the negotiable instrument. In the event of a default, such a person can sue on the mortgage note.

The path to enforcing a loan note is filled with pitfalls. First, the loan note may not qualify as a negotiable instrument. If it does not, the Article 3 transfer rules and their result, the right to enforce the note, do not apply. In that case, the note and assignment documents themselves may create certain rights and Article 9 may apply. Second, if the note is negotiable, the foreclosing party may not have possession of the note at the relevant time and, have no authority to enforce it. Third, if the instrument requires an indorsement and there is a broken chain of indorsements, or the note is not payable to the transferee, the transferee must account for possession of the instrument “by proving the transaction through which the transferee acquired it.” Such evidence may not be available. Fourth, the foreclosing party may not qualify to file a lost note affidavit if it cannot show that it had the right to enforce the note at the time it lost possession.

Professor Mann contends that mortgage notes are often non-negotiable for a variety of reasons. He concludes that there is no useful role for negotiability in the modern financial world. If he is correct regarding notes used in mortgage transactions, the issue becomes one of what law governs the transfer of non-negotiable notes?

2. Article 9

This trail leads us to Article 9 of the UCC. Article 9 typically governs secured transactions. The definition of a security interest appears in Article 1

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103 UCC § 3-301 (1990).
104 A person not in possession of the note may be entitled to enforce it only if the note was lost, stolen, or destroyed when in the person’s possession. UCC § 3-309(a) (1990). In this situation, the person seeking to enforce the note must prove its terms, the person’s right to enforce the note, and provide adequate protection against loss to the borrower if a third party subsequently claims the right to enforce the note.
105 UCC § 3-203 cmt. 2 (1990).
106 UCC § 3-309 (1990). This statement is accurate under the 1990 version. The 2002 version permits enforcement of a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument by a person who “directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instrument from a person who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred.”
107 Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 951, 962–73 (1996); see also Whitman, supra note 40, at 749–51 (observing that, at best, the negotiability of the notes used by the secondary market giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is “uncertain”).
108 Mann, supra note 107, at 1004–05.
109 UCC § 9-101 (1998). The Uniform Law Commission released amendments to Article 9 in 2010. Those changes generally are not relevant to this discussion. To date,
and was expanded in 2001 to include “any interest of ... a buyer of ... a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.”\(^\text{110}\) In forty-nine states, Article 9 covers the sale of promissory notes by relying upon this broader definition of a “security interest.”\(^\text{111}\) To sell promissory notes, the seller and buyer must enter into a signed agreement that provides a description of the promissory notes (or transfer possession of the note), the buyer must give value, and the seller must have rights in the property being transferred.\(^\text{112}\) The result is that the buyer owns the notes and the right to enforce the sale agreement, both against the seller and against any third parties claiming an ownership right in the notes.\(^\text{113}\) If the loan note qualifies as a negotiable instrument, however, the Article 9 buyer can only enforce the note under Article 3 against the note maker (the homeowner).\(^\text{114}\)


\(^\text{110}\) UCC § 1-201(b)(35) (2001).

\(^\text{111}\) South Carolina has not adopted this expanded definition upon which Article 9 relies. **Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes**, 9 n.31 (2011) [hereinafter PEB Report].

\(^\text{112}\) UCC § 9-203(b) (1998).

\(^\text{113}\) Id. (“[A] security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties” if certain requirements are met.). In contrast to Article 3 holder-in-due-course status, an owner under Article 9 achieves no exemption from specified claims and defenses that the homeowner could raise against the lender. Securitization agreements normally require specified parties to “negotiate” the notes (assumed to be “negotiable”), most likely for the purpose of achieving holder-in-due-course status for the trustee. See, e.g., CWALT, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, supra note 72.

\(^\text{114}\) UCC § 9-308 cmt. 6 (1998) (“For example, if the obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note, then Article 3 dictates the person whom the maker must pay to discharge the note and any lien securing it. See Section 3-602.”); UCC § 3-203 cmt. 1 (“[A] person who has an ownership right to an instrument might not be the person entitled to enforce the instrument.”); UCC § 3-602(a) (“[A negotiable] instrument is paid to the extent payment is made by or on behalf of a party obligated to pay the instrument, and to a person entitled to enforce the instrument.”); UCC § 3-301 (defining under what circumstances a person is entitled to enforce an instrument); UCC § 9-607 cmt. 8 (“Of course, the secured party’s rights derive from those of its debtor. Subsection (b) would not entitle the secured party to proceed with a foreclosure unless the mortgagor also were in default or the debtor (mortgagee) otherwise enjoyed the right to foreclose.”). For additional support, see PEB Report, supra note 111, at 4 & n.15, 8, 10 & nn.40–41, 11 & illus. 6, 7 & 8 (“The concept of ‘person entitled to enforce’ a note is not synonymous with ‘owner’ of the note.... The rules that determine whether a person is a person entitled to enforce a note do not require that person to be the owner of the note, and a change in ownership of a note does not necessarily bring about a concomitant change in the identity of the person entitled to enforce the note.”). The Board illustrated these points through fact patterns and concluded that the identity of the person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument is determined by Article 3, not Article 9. See also Nelson & Whitman, supra note 81, § 5.28.
Although the Article 9 process appears to provide smoother sailing for non-negotiable notes, carelessness occurs in the securitization context. For example, the PSA may fail to meet the section 9-203(b) prerequisites to enforceability. The court in *Ibanez* reviewed two PSAs to determine whether they contained effective assignments of the mortgages to the trustee banks. In one of the consolidated cases, the sale agreement did not constitute an actual sale of the notes or assignment of the mortgages. Rather, it represented only a desire to sell. In both cases, the PSAs failed to describe adequately the specific mortgage loans contained in the deal. As a result, the foreclosure sales by the trustee banks were not lawful.

**C. Transferring the Mortgage and Potential Problems**

Historically, the loan note and mortgage traveled together. When mortgage loans were securitized at an increasingly rapid pace, financial firms often deviated from this practice.

“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.” Moreover, the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) states “[a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.” As a general rule, the party who possesses the right to enforce both the note and the mortgage may sue on the debt or foreclose on the security upon default by the borrower. If the note and mortgage are split between different parties, the assignee of only the mortgage holds a worthless piece of paper.

State statutes have diverged from these common law principles. For example, statutes of frauds may mandate that transfers of interests in real property, including mortgages and their assignments, be in writing. States also may require the recordation of a mortgage assignment because it involves an interest in land before a party can foreclose. Moreover, other

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116 Id.
117 Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274–75 (1872); 4 Powell on Real Property, supra note 82, § 37.27[2]. When only the note is transferred, at minimum, an equity interest in the mortgage automatically follows. The transfer of the mortgage typically is completed upon the execution of a formal written assignment. Id. §§ 37.27[2]–[3].
118 Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4(c) (1997).
119 Id. § 5.4 cmt. c; 4 Powell on Real Property §§ 32.27[1]–[2].
120 4 Powell on Real Property § 37.27[1].
121 Id.; Ga. Code Ann. § 44-14-162(b) (2008) (requiring the assignment of the deed of trust to be recorded before the trustee sale); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman,
states mandate that the foreclosing party allege and prove “ownership” of the mortgage note and produce evidence of the note, mortgage, and all assignments of these instruments. As a result, the mortgage may not automatically follow the note until these conditions are met.

A controversial player utilized in many securitizations is the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). Other than a brief description of its role and the issues it has spawned related to mortgage assignments, a full discussion of MERS is beyond the scope of this Article.

Created by Mortgage Banker Association member companies in 1995, MERS operates a computer database on behalf of its members to track servicing and ownership rights in mortgages originated anywhere in the United States. Members of MERS include mortgage loan originators and secondary market players who “pay membership dues and per-transaction fees to MERS in exchange for the right to use and access MERS records.”

As of 2007, MERS was involved in the origination of about 60% of mortgage loans in the United States. Serious questions about the integrity of MERS’ mortgage records have arisen. For example, Professor White surveyed 396 foreclosure cases in six judicial foreclosure states. He found mismatches between the plaintiff identified in the foreclosure complaint and the proper party listed in MERS about twenty percent of the time.
Beyond its record-keeping role, mortgage lenders often list MERS as either the nominee of the mortgagee or as the actual mortgagee, or both. 130 Under these mantles of purported authority, MERS has foreclosed on properties in its own name and assigned mortgages and notes even though it rarely, if ever, possesses the right to enforce the loan note. 131 Courts are split on whether MERS can foreclose in its own name. 132 These challenges led the government-sponsored secondary mortgage market giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to forbid MERS from initiating foreclosures on their behalf in its own name. 133 More importantly, courts are split on the question of whether MERS can transfer the authority to foreclose to an assignee. 134

130 Id. at 1375.
131 Id. at 1379.
132 Compare Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (ruling that MERS has standing to foreclose in its name), and Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (same as Revoredo), with Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009) (finding no standing to intervene as a necessary party in a foreclosure case where it did not own the note and mortgage), and Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289 (Me. 2010) (deciding that MERS itself cannot foreclose because it is not a mortgagee under Maine law; distinguishing the holding in Jackson on the grounds that authority to foreclose in non-judicial foreclosure states, such as Minnesota, differs from the concept of standing that applies in judicial foreclosure states, such as Maine), and LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (stating that MERS does not have standing to foreclose because it does not own the note and mortgage).
134 Compare In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 644–46 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (holding, under the deed of trust, MERS holds legal title “as nominee for the Lender and the Lender’s successors and assigns,” which creates an agency relationship between MERS and the lender and its successors and permits MERS to assign the mortgage), and Crum v. LaSalle Bank N.A., 55 So. 3d 266 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (deciding that, under the terms of the mortgage, MERS could transfer the rights of the lender to the assignee), with In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 246–53 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (opining that MERS, as nominee, did not have the authority to assign the mortgage); Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that MERS could not transfer the note to Ocwen as it was held by another party at the time MERS assigned the deed of trust to Ocwen, rendering language in the deed of trust purporting to give MERS the authority to transfer the note ineffective), and Bank of New York v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2011) (finding that because MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the note, it could not assign the power to foreclose to the plaintiff); see also Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Nebraska, No. 11-11098-WGY, 2011 WL 5925525, at *14–16 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 2011) (ruling that MERS is only a limited agent of the mortgagee and may
The mere presence of MERS in a mortgage loan transaction increases the likelihood of legal challenges to the authority to foreclose. Delaware Attorney General Biden noted the confusion created by MERS in his suit against MERS, alleging that its practices and lack of oversight of its private registry system amount to deceptive practices.135

IV. JUDICIAL v. NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

This Section provides a short comparison between the judicial and non-judicial foreclosure regimes common throughout the United States. Use of the non-judicial method prevails in slightly more than half of the states, whereas a judicial process occurs in the other states.136 The possibility of uncertainty in title to real property in non-judicial foreclosure states is much more likely for the reasons stated below.

Foreclosures usually occur when real property is sold to satisfy an unpaid debt or when the borrower breaches another obligation specified in the mortgage.137 Almost all mortgages or deeds of trust are foreclosed by judicial or non-judicial process in the United States.138

In the judicial foreclosure states, the mortgage holder must file an action in court and obtain a court decree authorizing a foreclosure sale.139 Generally, the party seeking to foreclose must establish its standing to do so.140 The plaintiff must show that there is a valid mortgage between the parties and that it is the holder of the mortgage or, otherwise, is a proper party assign the mortgage only upon the request of the mortgagee who also is the current holder of the note or its servicer and if this action is necessary to comply with law or custom; Peterson II, supra note 124, at 8–11 (arguing that MERS legally cannot be the mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust because it had no property rights related to the loan).

136 RAO ET AL., supra note 84, § 4.2.3, at 104.
137 Id. § 1.2.2.1, § 6.4.2, at 242–43.
138 Id. § 4.2.1. A form of judicial process called “[s]trict foreclosure is allowed in only two states, Connecticut and Vermont” and will not be discussed in this Article. Id. § 4.2.4, at 105. For a description of this type of foreclosure, see id. § 4.2.4, at 105–06. A fourth procedure, “foreclosure by entry,” is described in the discussion of Massachusetts law below in Part V.
139 Id. § 4.2.3, at 105, § 4.2.4, at 106.
140 Id. § 4.4.2.2.
The homeowner may respond to the lawsuit in a fashion similar to other civil cases and raise defenses to the foreclosure. If the homeowner defaults or the plaintiff otherwise prevails, the court may enter a judgment of foreclosure and order the sale to proceed. Once the judgment is final, the usual doctrines related to finality apply. Because finality doctrines eliminate most or all defenses to the action, they also protect the rights of the purchaser at the sale and stabilize title.

In contrast, in non-judicial foreclosure states, lenders foreclose by exercising the power of sale included in the mortgage. These foreclosures proceed with little or no judicial oversight. Following a default by the homeowner, the holder of the mortgage or the trustee named in a deed of trust must give notice according to the terms of the mortgage or deed of trust and applicable statutes in order to sell the home. Required notices include notification of default, of acceleration, and of the sale. In addition to sending notice of the sale to the homeowner and others who have an interest in the real estate, nearly all states require some form of public advertisement of the sale through a newspaper or posting.

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141 Id. § 4.4.2. Rules of court or statutes may require the plaintiff to produce the note and mortgage and all assignments of them to support its claim of standing. See, e.g., 4 Powell on Real Property, supra note 83, § 37.38[2] (reprinting a complaint form used in Illinois pursuant to Ill. Comp. Stat 5/15-1504 which includes factual allegations that support the plaintiff’s capacity to bring the action and requires the plaintiff to attach a copy of the note and the mortgage).

142 Id. § 37.40.

143 Nelson & Whitman, supra note 81, § 7.18. Not all states treat a standing objection as equivalent to subject matter jurisdiction, a defect that cannot be waived. Compare Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Delphonse, 883 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that standing is waived in a judicial foreclosure case unless raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer), with Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Graham, 247 P.3d 223, 228 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling that standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and can be raised at any time). See generally Rao et al., supra note 84, § 4.4.2.2 (highlighting the differences between the standing doctrine in foreclosure cases filed in federal and state courts). Where standing can be waived, the finality doctrines strongly protect the sanctity of title.

144 Nelson & Whitman, supra note 81, § 7.18.


146 Id. at 11.

147 Id. § 37.42[4].

148 Id. § 37.42[4].

149 Id. § 37.42[4].

150 Id. § 37.42[4].
Once the foreclosing entity has complied with these procedural mandates, it schedules the sale usually with an auctioneer that it hires.\footnote{\text{Jacobson-Greany, \textit{Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness}, 23 \textit{Emory Bankr. Dev. J.} 139, 148–49 (2006).}} The sale may occur at the real estate or some other location permitted by law.\footnote{\text{Id.}} In order to stop this type of foreclosure, the burden is on the homeowner to seek an injunction and raise legal claims and defenses by initiating an affirmative action.\footnote{\text{RAO ET AL., \textit{supra} note 84, § 5.4. In this instance, court rules or state statutes may require the homeowner to post a bond or tender the arrearage or total amount due, a significant hurdle that may discourage or prevent some plaintiffs from pursuing an injunction. \textit{Id.} § 10.5.}} Alternatively, a qualified homeowner may file a petition for bankruptcy and obtain a stay of the foreclosure sale.\footnote{\text{See \textit{id.} §§ 9.1 to 9.11.4 (detailing the steps the debtor must take to file and the possible benefits afforded by the bankruptcy forum); see also \textit{Henry J. Sommer, Consumer Bankruptcy Law \& Practice, Volume One: Chapters, §§ 6.1 to 6.2.1.6} (John Rao ed., 9th ed. 2009) (discussing when and how bankruptcy provides the best solution for consumer debtors).}

The power of sale process benefits lenders because it provides an inexpensive and quick remedy against defaulting homeowners.\footnote{\text{Id. at 150–51.}} Such sales can be completed in 20 to 120 days, depending upon state law.\footnote{\text{Id.}} On the other hand, the non-judicial foreclosure process is harsh in its treatment of homeowners because the homeowners lose their homes without judicial oversight.\footnote{\text{Id.}}

\begin{quote}
[W]ith power of sale foreclosure, the security of judicial finality is simply absent. While the passage of time inevitably will help a defective title derived from a power of sale foreclosure, it is largely by means of variable and unreliable concepts such as statutes of limitation, laches, and related notions.\footnote{\text{NELSON \& WHITMAN, \textit{supra} note 81, § 7.18.}}
\end{quote}

\section*{V. Ibanez and Relevant Massachusetts Foreclosure Law}

The seemingly “routine” decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in \textit{U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez} raises the specter of lingering title issues to real property acquired either by the foreclosing entity or by bona fide purchasers (BFP) following a residential foreclosure in non-judicial foreclosure states.\footnote{\text{U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55–56 (Mass. 2011).}} The remainder of this Article will address
the potential impact of this ruling beyond the borders of Massachusetts by analyzing the *Ibanez* decision and the Massachusetts statutes it interpreted and upon which it relied. In addition, it will describe the foreclosure regimes in four non-judicial foreclosure states facing high rates of delinquency and foreclosure, comparing those legal regimes to that of Massachusetts, and discussing the likelihood that these sister states adopt the *Ibanez* holding and the potential effect on title to foreclosed real estate held in REO or sold to third parties.  

First, we turn to *Ibanez* and the related ruling in *Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez*.  

### A. U.S. Bank National Association. v. Ibanez

*Ibanez* addressed whether the securitization trustees in the two cases on appeal possessed the authority to foreclose at the time they initiated foreclosure.  

The central issue was whether the foreclosures were lawful given that the trustees became holders of the mortgages through assignments made after the foreclosure sales.  

The trustees bought the properties at the foreclosure sales they had arranged under Massachusetts law. Following the sales, the trustees were unable to obtain title insurance because of questions about their right to foreclose. To remedy this problem, the trustees filed actions in land court to quiet title and to establish title in fee simple.  

The court concluded that neither trustee possessed authority to foreclose at the time it provided notices of sale because neither could show it

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160 A foreclosing party who purchases the subject property at its own sale for purposes of re-sale holds it as part of its “REO” (real-estate–owned) inventory. *Rao et al.*, *supra* note 84, § 1.3.3.9.  
162 *Ibanez*, 941 N.E.2d at 44. U.S. Bank was the trustee in the securitization deal that was to include the Ibanez mortgage loan. *Id.* at 46. Rose Mortgage, Inc. originated the loan. *Id.* at 49.  
163 Id. at 44.  
166 *Ibanez*, 941 N.E.2d at 44.
held the mortgage, even though each had possession of the loan note. In Massachusetts, the mortgage transfers legal title to secure the debt, rather than merely creating a lien. The mortgagor-homeowner retains equitable title in the home until the mortgage is retired. Consequently, an assignment deed is required to convey the mortgagee’s interest.

The court applied “the familiar rule that ‘one who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution of the power, and the sale is wholly void.’” In the context of the securitization of a pool of mortgage loans, the court noted that a PSA could suffice as an assignment of the security instrument so long as (1) it actually assigned the mortgage as opposed to expressing only an intent to do so, (2) it included a schedule that “clearly and specifically” identified each mortgage loan covered, and (3) the assignor itself held the mortgage prior to the transfer.

Regarding the Ibanez mortgage loan, U.S. Bank submitted an unsigned “private placement memorandum” that did not constitute an actual assignment, failed to produce the schedule of mortgage loans covered by the agreement, and failed to show that the depositor, Structured Asset Securities Corporation, ever held the mortgage to be assigned to U.S. Bank. In the LaRace case, Wells Fargo did produce a PSA that could be construed as an actual assignment, but the loan schedule failed to identify the LaRace mortgage. Further, Wells Fargo could not show that the depositor, Asset Backed Funding Corporation, held the LaRace mortgage that it purported to assign to Wells Fargo via the PSA.

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167 Id. at 52. The Land Court took as true, for purposes of the motion to vacate the judgment, that each note had been indorsed to Option One who, in turn, indorsed each in blank. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, No. 384283(KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *5–6 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011). The plaintiffs apparently obtained possession of the notes before they initiated the foreclosure process. Id. at *5.

168 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 52.


171 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 49–50 (alteration in original) (quoting Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (1905)).

172 Id. 941 N.E.2d at 53. An assignment need not be in a recordable form nor recorded. Id. “A foreclosing entity may provide a complete chain of assignments linking it to the record holder of the mortgage, or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage.” Id.

173 Id. at 46–47.

174 Id. at 48.

175 Id. at 52.
The trustees advanced three arguments, all of which the court rejected. They are worth noting here because they bear on the issue of the trustees’ authority to foreclose. First, the trustees argued that they had the authority to foreclose because they held the loan note prior to initiating the foreclosures. The court rejected this claim stating, “[i]n the absence of a valid written assignment of a mortgage[,] ... the mortgage holder remains unchanged.” Merely having the status of an equitable beneficiary of a mortgage held by another is not sufficient. Second, the trustees contended that an assignment of a mortgage in blank, that is, no assignee listed, is an effective assignment of the mortgage. This occurred in the LaRace transaction when Option One executed a blank assignment. The trustees later conceded, and the court confirmed, that an assignment that fails to list the assignee’s name “conveys nothing and is void.” Finally, the trustees maintained that their authority to foreclose could arise from post-sale assignments, relying on a Title Standard issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts. The court responded that post-sale assignments could not cure the problem because an assignment of legal title “becomes effective with respect to the power of sale only on the transfer ....”

In its conclusion, the court applied its decision both retroactively and prospectively on the grounds that the ruling did not make any significant changes to the common law. “The legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our statutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to abide by those principles and requirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.”

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176 Id. at 53–54.
177 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53.
178 Id. at 54.
179 Id. Relying upon this part of the Ibanez ruling, two federal judges in Massachusetts agreed that a note holder must first exercise its equitable right to obtain a written assignment or a court order of assignment in order to validly foreclose. See Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 826 F.Supp. 2d 352, 362 (D. Mass 2011); Kiah v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 10-40161-FDS, 2011 WL 841282, at *4 n.6, *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2011) (finding that Aurora Loan Services held the note, had the right to enforce it, and was the assignee of record of the mortgage).
180 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53.
181 Id. at 47.
182 Id. at 53.
183 Id. at 54.
184 Id. at 54–55. However, the court noted that a post-sale confirmatory assignment of an earlier valid assignment made before the publication and sale may be effective. Id. This situation arises when the earlier assignment bears some defect or is not in recordable form. Id. at 55. “A confirmatory assignment, however, cannot confirm an assignment that was not validly made earlier or backdate an assignment being made for the first time.” Id.
185 Id. at 55.
186 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 55.
B. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez

Importantly, Ibanez did not address the effect of an invalid foreclosure upon a BFP—that is, a purchaser who takes title for value and without notice of any defects in the foreclosure—a concern raised by two justices in a concurrence.\(^{187}\) The justices did face this issue in the subsequent case, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez.\(^ {188}\)

Bevilacqua arose in the context of a purchaser of a foreclosed property who sued the mortgagor to clear title.\(^ {189}\) The facts showed that the homeowner mortgaged his property on March 18, 2005; U.S. Bank recorded a foreclosure deed on June 29, 2006 that transferred the property to U.S. Bank as trustee of an identified securitization trust, even though it did not receive the assignment of the mortgage until July 21, 2006 and U.S. Bank as trustee then deeded the property to plaintiff on October 17, 2006.\(^ {190}\) The court addressed whether the plaintiff had standing as the record holder of the deed to pursue a “try title” cause of action and found that he did not.\(^ {191}\) Relying upon its decision in Ibanez, the court reasoned that the foreclosure sale was void because U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the time of the foreclosure.\(^ {192}\) The plaintiff’s title was defective because his grantor, U.S. Bank, could not pass effective title to him.\(^ {193}\)

The plaintiff also argued that he acquired BFP status.\(^ {194}\) Consequently, he acquired good title from U.S. Bank.\(^ {195}\) In rejecting this claim, the court recognized the rule in Massachusetts that the purchaser must have no actual or constructive knowledge of a defect in the exercise of the power of sale.\(^ {196}\) It found that the plaintiff had record notice of the defect because the assignment of the mortgage to U.S. Bank occurred after the foreclosure deed was recorded—the exact situation addressed in Ibanez.\(^ {197}\) Finally, the foreclosure sale was void, not merely voidable, in which case the purchaser cannot acquire good title.\(^ {198}\)

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\(^ {187}\) Id. at 56 (Cordy, J., concurring).


\(^ {189}\) Id. at 888. This particular cause of action was framed under the Massachusetts “try title” statute. Id. at 888. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1–5 (2012). Under this cause of action, the plaintiff must prove that it is in possession of the property and that it holds record title. Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 889.

\(^ {190}\) Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 888.

\(^ {191}\) Id. at 893.

\(^ {192}\) Id. at 894.

\(^ {193}\) Id. at 893.

\(^ {194}\) Id. at 896.

\(^ {195}\) Id.

\(^ {196}\) Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 896.

\(^ {197}\) Id. at 897.

\(^ {198}\) Id.
C. Massachusetts Foreclosure Law Relied Upon by the Court

1. Introduction

Massachusetts is experiencing the foreclosure crisis to a similar degree as the nation as a whole. Figure 1 compares the seriously delinquent rates for all types of residential mortgage loans in Massachusetts to that of the national rates from 2005 to the present, as reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association.199 As of the second quarter of 2011, 6.57% or 52,866 loans were seriously delinquent in Massachusetts.200 Among the non-judicial foreclosure states, it ranked ninth.

In Massachusetts, the mortgage is the instrument used to secure a debt or other obligation by taking an interest in the obligor’s real property.201 The mortgage constitutes a transfer of legal title in the property.202 Legal

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199 MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 7, at Q1, Q2; MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY (2010); MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 6; MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY (2008); MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 5; MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY (2006); MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY (2005). The Survey defines “seriously delinquent” to include the percent of loans with installments that are ninety days or more past due plus the percent of loans in foreclosure inventory as of the end of the quarter.

200 MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 7, at Q2.

201 ENO ET AL., supra note 170, §§ 9.1, 9.4.

title vests in the mortgagee while the mortgagor retains equitable title.\textsuperscript{203} For this reason, Massachusetts is a title theory state.\textsuperscript{204}

In \textit{Ibanez}, the court relied upon several Massachusetts statutes that address (1) who has authority to foreclose and (2) the effect of a completed foreclosure sale if a party lacks the authority to foreclose.\textsuperscript{205} Below is a short summary of each relevant statute and related court decisions that provide the basis of comparison with the other four states.

2. Authority to Foreclose

The Massachusetts foreclosure statute lists the parties that may perform the acts authorized by the power of sale clause in the mortgage, including the mortgagee and any person acting in the name of the mortgagee.\textsuperscript{206} Another provision requires the following language to be contained in the power of sale provision in the mortgage: “[U]pon any default in the performance or observance of the foregoing or other condition [listed in the mortgage], the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns may sell the mortgaged premises ....”\textsuperscript{207} Read together, these statutes require that the foreclosing party be the mortgagee (or successor, assignee, or a person authorized by the power of sale) who may perform all of the acts permitted or required by the power of sale only upon “breach of a condition and without action.”\textsuperscript{208}

Moreover, the mortgagee also must be entitled to enforce the note. The Supreme Judicial Court recently applied the common and statutory law to interpret the meaning of the word “mortgagee” in the foreclosure context.\textsuperscript{209} The court ruled that the foreclosing mortgagee must possess the loan note, or be acting on behalf of the note holder.\textsuperscript{210} The transfer of only the note

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Id.; see also} Faneuil Investors Grp. v. Bd. of Selectmen of Dennis, 933 N.E.2d 918, 922 (Mass. 2010) (affirming that Massachusetts embraces the title theory of mortgages—that is, legal title to the mortgaged real property “remains in the mortgagee until the mortgage is satisfied or foreclosed,” and citing to older cases establishing and applying this principle).

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Ibanez}, 941 N.E.2d at 51.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Id.} at 50–54.

\textsuperscript{206} \textsc{Mass. Gen. Laws} ch. 244, § 14 (2012) (“[A] person authorized by the power of sale, or the attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal, or the legal guardian or conservator of such mortgagee or person acting in the name of such mortgagee or person, may ... do all the acts authorized or required by the power ....”).

\textsuperscript{207} \textsc{Mass. Gen. Laws} ch. 183, § 21 (2012).

\textsuperscript{208} \textsc{Mass. Gen. Laws} ch. 244, § 14 (2012).


\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id.} at 1133 (applying this ruling prospectively due to the existence of “some” ambiguity in the meaning of “mortgagee”). Ms. Eaton argued that Article 3 of the UCC supports the court’s holding that the mortgagee was not entitled to enforce the note. \textit{Id.} at 1131
vests in the note-holder the right to obtain a conveyance of the mortgage but the mortgagee retains legal title in trust for the purchaser of the debt.\textsuperscript{211} In other words, the mortgage does not automatically follow the note in Massachusetts and the note-holder only possesses a beneficial interest in the mortgage until a written assignment occurs.\textsuperscript{212} Reading \textit{Ibanez} and \textit{Eaton} together, the mortgagee must possess both a written assignment of the mortgage and the right to enforce the note before commencing a foreclosure.

3. Effect of Defective Foreclosure

If the foreclosing party does not possess the authority to foreclose, the sale is void.\textsuperscript{213} Judicial decisions require strict compliance with statutory and power of sale foreclosure mandates.\textsuperscript{214}

Prior to a foreclosure sale or before title is transferred to the purchaser, the mortgagor-homeowner may challenge a foreclosure proceeding by filing an independent action against the foreclosing party and other relevant parties in the superior court or land court, depending upon the relief sought.\textsuperscript{215} The homeowner may request an injunction to prevent the sale pending a resolution of the challenge.\textsuperscript{216}

Following a sale, the mortgagor-homeowner may defend herself against eviction when the purchaser brings a summary action for possession because

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\textsuperscript{211} Id. at 1124.
\textsuperscript{212} Id. at 1125.
\textsuperscript{213} Id. (relying upon \textsc{Mass. Gen. Laws} ch. 244, § 14 (2012), which states: “but no sale under such power shall be effectual to foreclose a mortgage, unless, previous to such sale, notice thereof has been published once in each of three successive weeks ...”). The \textit{Ibanez} court also relied upon several of its previous rulings to support this holding. \textit{See, e.g.}, U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 50 (Mass. 2011) (citing Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967, 968 (1905)) (voiding a sale because it was never valid in law and, hence, title to it never passed to the purchaser; distinguishing a sale that is merely voidable, for example, one in which literal compliance with the legal prerequisites occurred but where equitable reasons exist to set it aside); Roche v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 509 (1871) (voiding a sale due to a defect in the notice).
\textsuperscript{214} \textit{E.g.}, \textit{Ibanez}, 941 N.E.2d at 49–50; Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (requiring strict compliance; holding that if the foreclosing entity does not strictly comply with the terms of the power of sale, the sale is void); \textit{see also} \textsc{Mass. Gen. Laws} ch. 183, § 21 (2012) (requiring compliance before the foreclosing party may convey a proper deed to a purchaser, which then forever bars the mortgagor from claiming any interest in the mortgaged premises).
\textsuperscript{216} 28 ENO ET AL., supra note 210, § 10.2(2).
title to the property is at issue. Outside of the eviction context, the mortgagor-homeowner may file an affirmative action in either land court or superior court challenging the validity of the sale and contesting the resulting cloud on title.

4. Effect of Defective Foreclosure on Bona Fide Purchasers

As discussed above, Bevilacqua confirmed an important principle under Massachusetts law. A purchaser who takes title without actual or constructive notice of a defect in the sale and pays value, nonetheless, may face challenges to title when the foreclosing party cannot grant the purchaser good title. Purchasers cannot acquire BFP status if the public records show the defect.

Foreclosing parties may “correct” defects in their authority to foreclose after a completed sale either by re-foreclosing if they obtain the right to enforce the note and the mortgage or by utilizing Massachusetts’s “foreclosure by entry” procedure.

The relevant laws of Arizona, California, Georgia, and Nevada are described in the next Section. Arizona, California, Georgia, and Nevada all

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217 See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Bailey, 951 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 2011) (ruling that the housing court has jurisdiction to consider the validity of the purchaser’s title); Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Saffran, 948 N.E.2d 917 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that the foreclosing party that bought the property at the sale has the burden to prove that it acquired title in strict accordance with the power of sale).

218 See, e.g., Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1123 (noting that the homeowner filed an action in Superior Court to declare the foreclosure sale void and to seek an injunction to bar Fannie Mae from taking steps to evict Eaton); Lyons v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2011 WL 61186, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 4, 2011) (action may be filed in land court).


220 Id. at 897 (recognizing that the effect of recordation is to put the world on notice).

221 This latter type of foreclosure is accomplished by the mortgagee “peaceably” entering onto the mortgaged premises, following a default, and declaring that entry is being made for the purpose of foreclosing on a mortgage. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 2 (2012). The declaration must be made in the presence of two witnesses who sign a certificate swearing that they witnessed the entry. Alternatively, the mortgagor may sign a memorandum of entry confirming the entry. Once the certificate or memorandum is recorded, a three-year period commences, during which time the mortgagor-homeowner may continue to live on the premises. Singh v. 207-211 Main Street, LLC., 937 N.E.2d 977, 979–80 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). Upon the expiration of three years of uninterrupted peaceable possession, the mortgagee acquires title to the property. Id.; 28 MASS. PRAC., REAL ESTATE LAW § 10.12 (stating: “Commonly, a foreclosure by entry ... is made at the time of a foreclosure sale, with a certificate of entry recorded immediately following the foreclosure deed and affidavit, so that any defect in a foreclosure by sale becomes irrelevant after expiration of the three year right of redemption ....”). However, the foreclosing party must be the mortgagee at the time of “entry.” Bailey, 951 N.E.2d at 335 n.10. Thus, a foreclosing party can resort to foreclosure by entry only after it acquires a valid assignment of the mortgage and possesses the note.
permit non-judicial foreclosures, though their laws vary. Massachusetts law provides the baseline against which this Article compares these other states. The goal is to assess the likelihood that the holdings in *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua* should have traction in other non-judicial foreclosure states where the legal regimes are substantially similar. The Article selected Nevada, California, and Arizona because they were experiencing the highest “seriously delinquent” rates in 2011 among the non-judicial foreclosure states—first, second and third, respectively. The Article selected Georgia because it is ranked fifth by this standard and it, like Massachusetts, is a title theory state.

VI. COMPARISON OF THE FORECLOSURE REGIMES IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, GEORGIA, AND NEVADA TO MASSACHUSETTS

A. Arizona

1. Introduction

Arizona’s seriously delinquent foreclosure rate exceeded that of the nation as a whole leading up to and during the financial crisis. Figure 2 illustrates this comparison. As of the second quarter of 2011, 8.06% or 89,262 loans were seriously delinquent in Arizona. Among the non-judicial foreclosure states, it ranked third.

![Figure 2. Percentage of Mortgage Loans Seriously Delinquent, Arizona vs. National, Q1 2006–Q2 2011](image)

222 MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, *supra* note 7, at Q2.
The instrument predominantly used in Arizona to secure a debt or obligation is the deed of trust.\footnote{223} Unlike a mortgage, a deed of trust is a three-party instrument in which the trustor (borrower) conditionally conveys title to a third party trustee who holds it as security for the debt owed to the beneficiary (lender).\footnote{224} A deed of trust vests in the trustee bare legal title sufficient only to permit it to convey the property at a non-judicial sale.\footnote{225} Nonetheless, under Arizona law, there is no significant difference between a mortgage “lien” and the trustee’s “title.”\footnote{226} For this reason, Arizona is a lien theory state.

2. Authority to Foreclose

A power of sale provision in the deed of trust allows the trustee (or its successor) or the beneficiary to exercise the power of sale clause permitting a private sale of the property upon default.\footnote{227} In the case of a substitution of the trustee by the beneficiary, the substitution must be acknowledged by all beneficiaries named in the deed of trust and recorded at the time of substitution. The beneficiary must give written notice of the substitution to the trustor.\footnote{228} In 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court decided that Arizona’s recording statute does not require recordation of all assignments of deeds of trust before the initiation of a foreclosure.\footnote{229}

The mortgage (or deed of trust) follows the note in Arizona.\footnote{230} In 1938, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that an assignment of the deed of trust without the debt transfers no right upon the assignee.\footnote{231} In 2012, the

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{225} Bisbee v. Security Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 754 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Ariz. 1988).
\item \footnote{226} \textit{Id.}; \textit{Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.} § 33-805 (2012) (“Deeds of trust may be executed as security for the performance of a contract...”).
\item \footnote{229} Vasquez v. Saxon Mortg., Inc. \textit{(In re Vasquez)}, 266 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. 2012) (interpreting and applying \textit{Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.} § 33-411.01 (2012)).
\item \footnote{230} \textit{Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.} § 33-817 (2012) (“The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a deed of trust shall operate as a transfer of the security for the contract or contracts.”).
\item \footnote{231} Hill v. Favour, 84 P.2d 575, 578–79 (Ariz. 1938).
\end{itemize}
}
Supreme Court held that the beneficiary foreclosing under a deed of trust is under no obligation to prove its right to enforce the note or “show” the note before the foreclosure.\textsuperscript{232} The court distinguished this case from one where the homeowner alleged that the beneficiary was not the holder of the note or that it otherwise lacked authority to enforce the note.\textsuperscript{233} This distinction strongly suggests that a homeowner could succeed in a challenge to the validity of a foreclosure where the beneficiary does not possess the authority to enforce the note.

\textbf{3. Effect of Defective Foreclosure}

Certain types of errors in the content of required notices do not invalidate the trustee sale.\textsuperscript{234} Based upon the plain language of the statute, the provision should not bar a challenge to a foreclosure sale on the grounds that the trustee deed could not transfer title to the purchaser or that the beneficiary or trustee had no authority to foreclose because neither of these grounds is listed in that provision.

However, once the trustee issues a deed to the purchaser following a foreclosure sale, a presumption of compliance with the contract provisions in the deed of trust and the statutory sections in “this chapter” relating to the exercise of the power of sale, including recording, mailing, and publishing of the notice of sale and the conduct of the sale, arises.\textsuperscript{235} The trustee’s deed is not conclusive, unless the purchaser is a BFP.\textsuperscript{236} This subsection does not identify other grounds to challenge a sale, such as lack of authority to foreclose.

In addition, § 33-811(C) instructs the trustor and certain specified parties to whom the trustee mailed a notice of the sale to bring an action seeking an injunction before 5:00 p.m. on the last business day before the scheduled sale.\textsuperscript{237} Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of all defenses and objections.

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Id}. at 783. In this case, the homeowner apparently only claimed that the beneficiary failed to show or prove it possessed the right to enforce the note. While this part of the opinion seems clear, the court then observed that the Arizona “deed of trust statutes do not require compliance with the UCC before a trustee commences a non-judicial foreclosure.” \textit{Id}. Still later, the court reiterated its narrow holding, that the beneficiary need not prove its right to enforce the note prior to commencing the foreclosure. \textit{Id}. at 784.
This provision places the trustor-homeowner on an extremely short leash—either raise objections before the sale or potentially lose all rights to attack the sale. Arizona state courts have not applied this provision in the context of an attack on a completed sale based upon lack of authority to foreclose and an allegedly void sale, at least in published decisions.239

4. Effect of Defective Foreclosure on Bona Fide Purchasers

If the purchaser pays value without actual notice of non-compliance with the contract provisions in the deed of trust and the statutory requirements to foreclose, the trustee deed constitutes “conclusive evidence” of validity.240 The trustee deed may not be conclusive where “the notice was insufficient because of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment.”241 According to a federal district court, even if the trustor cannot undo the sale, she

238 Id.

239 In one unpublished memorandum opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals applied § 33-811(C) strictly to affirm summary judgment against the homeowner who filed suit after the foreclosure sale to quiet title because, among other reasons, the trustee was not a successor in interest to the original trustee and did not possess authority to foreclose. Maher v. Bank One, N.A., No. 2 CA-CV 2008-0193, 2009 WL 2580100 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2009) (discussing the enactment of § 33-811(C) in 2002 and its effect on the decision in Patton). Two other unpublished Arizona appellate memorandum opinions applied § 33-811(C) to affirm dismissals of actions brought to challenge completed foreclosure sales, though not on the grounds of lack of authority to foreclose. Lovenberg v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., Am., No. 1 CA-CV 10-0624 A, 2011 WL 2236601, at *2–3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 7, 2011) (dismissing claim that the defendant breached a forbearance and modification agreement; noting that the trustee sale is intended to be final, regardless of any defect, absent actual knowledge by the purchaser); Luciano v. WMC Mortg. Corp., Nos. 1 CA-CV 08-0566, 1 CA-CV 08-0678, 2010 WL 1491952, at *7 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010) (dismissing claim of lack of notice of the sale). It is noteworthy that, according to the Arizona Supreme Court Rules, a memorandum opinion is not regarded as precedent nor to be cited in any court except for limited purposes. ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111 (2011).

240 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-811(B) (2012). As with non-BFPs, this subsection does not mention other grounds to challenge a sale, such as lack of authority to foreclose. The purchaser must be without actual notice, as opposed to constructive notice. Main I Ltd. P’ship v. Venture Capital Const. & Dev. Corp., 741 P.2d 1234, 1237–38 (Ariz. App. 1987) (holding that even the named beneficiary in a deed of trust who purchased at the sale may acquire BFP status where it had no record or actual notice that entities who were not parties to the deed of trust were sent the notice of sale one day late).

241 Main I Ltd., 741 P.2d at 1238 (refusing to void a foreclosure sale on the grounds that the trustee mailed the notice of sale to certain entities that were not parties to the deed of trust one day late because the purchaser paid value and took without actual notice, even though it was the beneficiary; no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment presented).
may seek damages for a wrongful foreclosure in certain circumstances. In another case, a federal judge refused to dismiss a quiet title action against the bank acting as trustee for the securitized trust that purchased the house at the foreclosure sale.

5. Ibanez Traction in Arizona

Based upon this understanding of Arizona law, the courts in Arizona are not likely to adopt Ibanez on the issue of whether the foreclosing party must hold a written assignment of the deed of trust before the sale. The Vasquez v. Saxon Mortgage court said no, relying upon Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-817, which states that the deed of trust automatically follows the transfer of the note. The fact that Massachusetts is a title theory state distinguishes it from Arizona on this point.

The Hogan court, suggesting that the beneficiary must possess the right to enforce the loan note before it can foreclose, aligns itself with the Eaton ruling in Massachusetts. In both states, the consequence of failing to possess the note is significant to the right to foreclose.

Both Massachusetts and Arizona require strict compliance with the power of sale clause and with additional legal requirements. The court in Ibanez voided the sale. In Arizona, the Supreme Court agreed that notice defects, at the very least, void a sale. However, § 33-811(C) waives all defenses the trustor may have to the sale if she fails to file an action challenging the sale by 5:00 p.m. on the day prior to the sale. If this provision cuts off the rights of homeowners to challenge the authority to foreclose following the sale, the finality of title in Arizona is absolute. If this provision does not waive authority-to-foreclose defects that void a sale, other finality provisions in Arizona law, such as the effect of the execution of the trustee’s deed to a BFP, arguably eliminate only objections relating to

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242 Herring v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. CV 06-2622-PHX-PGR, 2007 WL 2051394, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2007) (noting that Arizona state courts have not recognized this tort but, nonetheless, denying summary judgment to the defendant where plaintiff alleged not a notice violation but that she cured the default and complied with a repayment agreement); see also Schrock v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. CV 11-0567-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 3348227, at *6–8 n.7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2011) (discussing in detail the “draconian results” of the legislative foreclosure regime that favors recognizing the tort of wrongful foreclosure and stating the court “would welcome any guidance” from the state courts but, nevertheless, not certifying this question; ruling that the plaintiff pled the elements adequately).


non-compliance with notice provisions in the deed of trust and specific statutory provisions.\textsuperscript{246} Challenging a sale as void on the grounds of lack of authority to foreclose may remain viable.

B. California

1. Introduction

California’s seriously delinquent foreclosure rate exceeded that of the nation as a whole from the first quarter of 2006 until the second quarter of 2011. Figure 3 illustrates this comparison. As of the second quarter of 2011, 8.11% or 462,714 loans were seriously delinquent in California.\textsuperscript{247} Among the non-judicial foreclosure states, it ranked second.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Percentage of Mortgage Loans Seriously Delinquent, California vs. National, Q1 2006–Q2 2011}
\end{figure}

The deed of trust is the preferred real property security device in California.\textsuperscript{248} The California deed of trust involves three parties: the trustor, the trustee, and the beneficiary, who perform the same functions as in Arizona.\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{246} ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-811(B) (2012).
\textsuperscript{247} MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 7, at Q2.
\textsuperscript{248} HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CAL. REAL ESTATE § 10:1 (3d. ed. updated Oct. 2010) [hereinafter MILLER & STARR]. The original distinctions between mortgages and deeds of trust no longer exist and these instruments are identical, for practical purposes. “[D]eeds of trust are not true trusts but are practically and substantially only mortgages with power of sale.” Id. § 10:2.
\textsuperscript{249} Id. § 10:3.
Despite transfer of nominal title to the real estate, California treats the deed of trust as a lien.\footnote{Monterey S. P'ship v. W.L. Bangham, Inc., 49 Cal. 3d 454, 460 (1989).}

2. Authority to Foreclose

California law requires the trustee or the beneficiary or their authorized agents to follow certain procedures in order to enforce a power of sale clause in a deed of trust.\footnote{CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(1) (West 2012).} Normally, however, the trustee conducts the “trustee” sale under its authority in the power of sale.\footnote{Id.} If the beneficiary appoints a new trustee, it must record the substitution.\footnote{CAL. CIV. CODE § 2934a(a)(1) (West 2012).} Prior to any sale, a notice of the sale containing accurate information about the substituted trustee must be provided and recorded or the sale conducted by the substituted trustee is void.\footnote{CAL. CIV. CODE § 2934a(c) (West 2012).} If the beneficiary assigns its interest in the deed of trust, the assignment need not be recorded, although recordation operates as constructive notice to all persons.\footnote{CAL. CIV. CODE § 2934 (West 2012).} If the assignee has reason to exercise the power of sale provision, the assignment must be recorded so that the assignee’s right to instruct the trustee to sell appears in the public record.\footnote{CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2932.5, 2934 (West 2012); MILLER & STARR, supra note 248, § 10:39, text accompanying note 22. This provision applies when “a power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of money ...” (emphasis added). CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2932.5 (West 2012).} Despite the plain language of the statute, three of California’s six District Courts of Appeal recently have held that this provision applies only to mortgages and not to deeds of trust.\footnote{Herrera v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Aug. 8, 2012) (4th district); Haynes v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Aug. 8, 2012) (1st district); Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 815 (2011), review denied (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2012); see also Caballero v. Bank of America, 468 Fed. Appx. 709 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2012) (approving of the decision in Calvo).}
In California, the deed of trust follows the note.\(^{258}\) Hence, an assignment or transfer of the note carries with it the deed of trust without the necessity of a written assignment.\(^{259}\) However, an attempt to assign the deed of trust without the note has no effect.\(^{260}\) Decades ago, the Fourth District Court of Appeals squarely ruled that the deed of trust could only be foreclosed by the owner of the note.\(^{261}\) More recently, the Sixth District decided that California’s non-judicial foreclosure statutory regime is exhaustive and, in effect, trumps the provisions of Article 3 of the UCC that ordinarily govern the transfer and enforcement of negotiable instruments.\(^{262}\) Consequently, the beneficiary under the deed of trust need not possess any right to the loan note prior to commencing a foreclosure. The court noted, however, that even if the UCC applied, the documents assigning the deed of trust also expressly transferred the note.\(^{263}\)

\(^{258}\) Coon v. Shry, 289 P. 815, 816 (Cal. 1930).

\(^{259}\) CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1084, 2936 (West 2012) (addressing mortgages); Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 267 P.2d 16, 20 (Cal. 1954) (applying this rule to deeds of trust); MILLER & STARR, supra note 248, § 10:38, text accompanying note 13.


\(^{261}\) Santens v. L.A. Fin. Co., 204 P.2d 619, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (resolving who had a superior interest in the property at issue—a judgment creditor who executed or the owner of the note and deed of trust—and deciding in favor of the owner of the note and deed of trust because he acquired his rights before the judgment creditor); see also Cockerell, 267 P.2d at 20 (approving the holding in Santens that the deed of trust can only be foreclosed by the owner of the note). Cf. Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467 (Ct. App. 2011) (implicitly agreeing that the beneficiary must own the note to authorize the trustee to proceed with a foreclosure but ruling that MERS had the authority, as agent, to assign the note and the deed of trust). Federal courts sitting in California routinely require neither presentation nor possession of the note by the trustee or beneficiary prior to a foreclosure in cases not involving bankruptcy. E.g., Sicairos v. NDEX West, L.L.C., No. 08cv2014-LAB, 2009 WL 385855 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2009) (relying on Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 and Moeller v. Lien, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (1994) for the proposition that “[t]he foreclosure process is commenced by the recording of a notice of default and election to sell by the trustee.”); Wood v. Aegis Wholesale Corp., No. 1:09-CV-536-AWI-GSA, 2009 WL 1948844 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2009) (relying on Sicairos, Moeller, and § 2924). A few dozen federal district court decisions cite to these cases with little or no analysis. E.g., Geren v. Deutsche Bank Nat., No. CV F 11-0938 LJO GSA, 2011 WL 3568913, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug 12, 2011).


\(^{263}\) In 2012, the California Legislature amended several statutes to enhance homeowner protection, prevent foreclosures, and encouraging loan modifications. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 86, § 10 (A.B. 278) (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). During that process, the Legislature, inter alia, added a provision to CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 that states: “No entity shall record or cause a notice of default to be recorded or otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is the holder of the beneficial interest under the mortgage or
3. Effect of Defective Foreclosure

The state foreclosure scheme “provide[s] a comprehensive framework for the regulation of a non-judicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of trust.”

The purposes of this comprehensive scheme are threefold: (1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a BFP.

Consistent with these principles, the foreclosing party must strictly comply with the statutory rules; otherwise, the sale is invalid. Nonetheless, once the trustee delivers the deed containing recitals of compliance with the requirements related to mailing, posting, and publication of the notice of default and the notice of sale to the purchaser, California law creates a presumption in favor of the purchaser. This presumption is not absolute and can be overcome by the challenger. Significantly, the presumption does not arise when the basis of the challenge relates to non-notice issues, such as lack of authority to foreclose, agreements to postpone or cancel the sale while the parties are negotiating a loan modification, or where the trustor is making payments under a repayment plan.
The trustor-homeowner may file an action to cancel the deed and quiet title and/or allege wrongful foreclosure, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Since this action is equitable in nature, the trustor-homeowner must offer to pay the secured debt, the amount delinquent and costs, or plead the conditions showing that tender is inequitable or the sale will be considered void and not merely voidable.

4. Effect of Defective Foreclosure on Bona Fide Purchasers

If the purchaser qualifies as a BFP, the recitals in the foreclosure deed constitute conclusive evidence of compliance. This presumption does not arise until the trustee’s deed is delivered. In order to achieve bona fide status, a purchaser must pay value in good faith and without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights. The element of constructive notice eliminates purchasers who fail or refuse to check the real property records and review the relevant recorded documents. The conclusive presumption in this context is limited to irregularities related to notice, as arises when the challenge to the sale relates to notice issues but not to other matters; finding, however, that repayment agreement was not orally modified and, consequently, there was no procedural irregularity in the sale process).

270 E.g., Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 698 (Ct. App. 2012) (affirming that the homeowner may file an action for declaratory and injunctive relief based alleging wrongful foreclosure prior to the sale); Melendez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 421 (affirming the judgment that the plaintiffs could not prove their case rather than that the cause of action was not applicable). If the trustor files to enjoin the sale before the sale date, at least one court held that such a case is not appropriate. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 825–27 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (May 18, 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 419 (2011) (citing Ohlendorf v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, 279 F.R.D. 575 (E.D. Cal. 2010)) (affirming dismissal of cause of action filed before the sale based on the authority of the agent of the beneficiary to foreclose but suggesting that there may be a cause of action where the party recording the notice of default was not the beneficiary at that time). The trustor-homeowner may sue for damages rather than a return of title. Munger v. Moore, 89 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1970).

271 Pfeifer, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 697 (recognizing the tender rule and the exceptions to its application where the foreclosure sale has not yet occurred or where the homeowner alleges that the sale would be void); Miller & Starr, supra note 248, § 10:212.

272 Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(c) (West 2012). In another section, the Legislature states that the lack of certain information related to the warning about losing the home, the need for prompt action, and the right to cure in the notice of default found in § 2924c(b)(1) shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a BFP. § 2924c(b)(2).

273 Moeller, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.

274 Melendez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 424–25 (rejecting argument that a purchaser cannot achieve BFP status if the purchaser is a speculator who frequents foreclosure sales and pays substantially less than the value of the property).

275 Id. at 425 (discussing the notice rationale and stating that the purchaser must make “reasonable inquiry”).
with a non-BFP. The California Supreme Court also recognizes fraud, rigging the bidding process, and other misbehavior as reasons to set aside a sale, even if the trustee deed to a BFP is recorded.

5. Ibanez Traction in California

Based upon this understanding of California law, the courts there may align themselves with Ibanez regarding one of two issues. First, if Calvo, Haynes, and Herrera remain controlling precedent, deeds of trust automatically follow the note and need not be written (or recorded) in California, in contrast to Massachusetts. A beneficiary in California who possesses the right to enforce the note may enforce both instruments. If the California Supreme Court reverses these rulings, merely transferring the note will not be enough to grant the beneficiary or its assignee the right to foreclose unless the assignment is recorded. In this event, the law in California should produce a result akin to that in Ibanez.

The second issue addresses the consequences of failing to possess the right to foreclose. Both Massachusetts and California require strict compliance with the power of sale clause and with additional requirements set forth in law. The court in Ibanez voided the sale. In California, certain defects also will void a sale even as to a BFP.

If the trial and other intermediate appellate courts apply the ruling in Debrunner and ignore Santens, authority to foreclose challenges will die. Title defects would be eliminated even where the foreclosing party did not possess the right to enforce the note. If this is the result, the UCC Articles 3 and 9 become meaningless in the non-judicial foreclosure context.

C. Georgia

1. Introduction

Georgia’s seriously delinquent foreclosure rate essentially has tracked the national average since 2005, as shown in Figure 4. As of the second quarter of 2011, 7.70% or 124,125 loans were seriously delinquent in Georgia. Among the non-judicial foreclosure states, it ranked fifth.
In Georgia, the most commonly used instrument to secure a real estate loan is the security deed.281 Like the Massachusetts mortgage instrument, the security deed conveys title of the real property to secure the debt and requires the creditor to re-convey the property upon payment of the debt.282 The uniform security deed used in Georgia by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac labels the homeowner-grantor as the “borrower.” The grantee is referred to as the “lender.”283

2. Authority to Foreclose

Unless the instrument creating the power of sale specifies otherwise, only the grantee in a security deed or its assignee or successor may exercise the power of sale.284 The security deed or the final assignment must be

281 FRANK S. ALEXANDER, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE LAW § 8:1 (2011–2012 ed.) [hereinafter ALEXANDER]. Although Georgia had a legal history (pre–Civil War) and statutory framework that treated mortgages as liens, the dominant statutory framework and practice for almost 150 years has been that of a title theory state through the use of the security deed. Id. § 1:5.

282 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-60 (2012) (permitting the use of “security deeds” and stating: “[s]uch conveyance shall be held by the courts to be an absolute conveyance, with the right reserved by the grantor to have the property reconveyed to him upon the payment of the debt or debts intended to be secured agreeably to the terms of the contract, and shall not be held to be a mortgage”). For a discussion of the historical reasons that spawned the birth of security deeds, see ALEXANDER, supra note 281, § 1:5.


284 GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-114 (2012). A personal representative, heir, legatee, or devisee of the grantee may also exercise the power of sale. Id.
recorded before the foreclosure sale.\(^{285}\) Transfers of security deeds must be in writing and may be “endorsed” on the original deed or by a separate document and shall be witnessed as required by deeds.\(^{286}\)

Where a debt evidenced in a note is secured by a security deed, the secured creditor may sue on the debt or exercise the power of sale upon a default.\(^{287}\) In this latter situation, Georgia’s highest court unequivocally held that the holder of the security deed must establish that it also holds the note in order to foreclose.\(^{288}\) On the issue of whether the security deed follows the note, Professor Alexander states in his treatise: “[s]ince a security instrument is of little value without evidence of the obligation that it secures, security deeds are usually, but not invariably, transferred and assigned in tandem with transfer of the promissory notes which are secured.”\(^{289}\) It appears that Georgia courts have not expressly adopted the rule that the security instrument inevitably follows the note, likely because Georgia is a title theory state and assignments of security deeds must be in writing and, as of 2008, recorded before the foreclosure sale.

\(^{285}\) GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162(b) (2012). The Georgia Legislature added this subsection in 2008 to ensure that a foreclosure be conducted by the current owner or holder of the mortgage, as reflected by public records. 2008 Ga. Laws 576 (S.B. 531). Stubbs v. Bank of Am., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (discussing the history of the recording mandate and ruling that the homeowner’s complaint, removed to federal court, adequately pled facts showing that the servicer inaccurately identified itself as the secured creditor in the sale notice and an assignment to actual secured creditor, Fannie Mae, was not recorded before the sale); ALEXANDER, supra note 281, § 5:3.

\(^{286}\) GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-64 (West 2012) (using the word “endorsed” in this context).


\(^{288}\) Weems v. Coker, 70 Ga. 746, 748–49 (1883); Alexander, supra note 281, at 87–88; see also Morgan v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (relying upon Weems v. Coker to deny dismissal of claims for injunctive relief and wrongful foreclosure, among others); Reese v. Provident Funding Assoc., LLP, 730 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that the foreclosure notice was deficient and the foreclosure invalid because the party sending the notice was not the holder of the note and, hence, not the secured creditor). But see Final Report and Recommendation at 19, Smith v. Saxon Mortg., No. 1:09-CV-3375-WCO-JFK (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2011) (relying upon GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-64(b) and ruling that a transfer of the security deed also transfers the note), adopted by No. 1:09-CV-3375-WCO-JFK (N.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2011), aff’d per curiam, 2011 WL 5375063 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011); Jackman v. Hasty, No. 1:10-CV-2485-RWS, 2011 WL 854878, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2011) (relying on the fact that the homeowner provided no Georgia authority on this issue and holding that a foreclosure may proceed even if the holder of the security deed is unable to demonstrate possession of the note).

\(^{289}\) ALEXANDER, supra note 281, at 114; see also id. at 87–88 (discussing the relevance of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.4 (1997) on the issue of the note and security deed travelling together but citing no Georgia cases that have adopted the Restatement).
3. Effect of Defective Foreclosure

The power of sale provision in a security deed “shall be strictly construed and ... fairly exercised.”290 Where a foreclosing grantee or assignee under the security deed fails to comply with the statutory duty to provide notice of sale to the grantor-homeowner, the grantor-homeowner “may either seek to set aside the foreclosure or sue for damages for the tort of wrongful foreclosure.”291 A claim of wrongful exercise of power of sale can arise when the grantee has no legal right to foreclose.292 For example, if the purported assignment of a security deed is not a valid assignment, the purported assignee has no right to foreclose and the sale is null and void.293 Similarly, as ruled by a federal court applying Georgia law, a homeowner may request an injunction to stop a foreclosure sale where the assignee of the security deed does not also hold the promissory note.294

In specific contexts, some cases hold that the sale will be treated as voidable, rather than void. For example, the foreclosure is voidable where the party conducting the sale purchases the property in contravention of the power of sale.295 On the other hand, a foreclosure is void where the underlying debt obligation is tainted by usury or where foreclosure notices did not contain the correct information.296

293 Cummings v. Anderson (In re Cummings), 173 B.R. 959, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that the person conducting the sale obtained the assignment of the security deed after its assignor gave notice to the grantor-homeowner and advertised the sale and finding that the purported assignment contained merely an intent to assign rather than language of conveyance, aff’d, 112 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Morgan, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 (denying motion to dismiss wrongful foreclosure claim and a request for an injunction to stop the sale where the secured creditor was not the holder of the note).
294 Morgan, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1376–77 (relying on Weems v. Coker, 70 Ga. 746 (1883)).
295 See, e.g., Fraser v. Rummel, 25 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Ga. 1943) (“If the sale was unauthorized as contended, the deed was still not void but was merely voidable, and hence should be treated as valid until set aside in a proper proceeding.”); Burgess v. Simmons, 61 S.E.2d 410, 426 (Ga. 1950).
296 Clyde v. Liberty Loan Corp., 287 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. 1982) (usury and voiding the foreclosure deed issued to the lender who purchased at its own sale); Reese, 730 S.E.2d at 554.
In an equitable action to cancel a security deed, the “one who seeks equity must do equity.” Applying this principle, the Georgia Supreme Court has required the homeowner to pay off the promissory note. Laches may bar an equitable action to set aside the sale.

4. Effect of Defective Foreclosure on Bona Fide Purchasers

The general rule in an equitable action to void a foreclosure is as follows: “A bona fide purchaser for value without notice of an equity will not be interfered with by equity.” Nonetheless, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that a BFP may not prevail when: (1) the grantee fraudulently obtains the deed being held by an escrow agent and conveys it to a BFP, (2) the grantee’s deed is forged and vests no title in the grantee or those holding under the grantee even though the purchaser paid value and had no notice the forgery, or (3) the purchaser at a foreclosure sale had actual or constructive notice of a defect.

No Georgia appellate court has squarely addressed the rights of a BFP at a foreclosure sale where the foreclosing entity did not possess the authority to foreclose. Likewise, no Georgia court has considered whether the mortgagor can undo such a sale. Georgia does recognize the tort of wrongful foreclosure, a claim that provides for damages but not equitable relief.

(ruling a foreclosure invalid in a wrongful foreclosure action where the party sending the notice was not the holder of the note and, hence, not the secured creditor).


Taylor, 583 S.E.2d at 846. But where the homeowner is seeking to void a sale that occurred due to the homeowner’s default in mortgage loan payments, a court should require the homeowner to tender only the actual amount past due. See ALEXANDER, supra note 281, at 188.


GA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-20 (2012); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-19 (2012) (“If one with notice sells to one without notice, the latter shall be protected. If one without notice sells to one with notice, the latter shall be protected, as otherwise a bona fide purchaser might be deprived of selling his property for full value.”); Mathis v. Blanks, 91 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 1956) (applying a predecessor statute); Farris v. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp., 493 S.E.2d 143, 145 (Ga. 1997) (affirming this principle).

Brown v. Christian, 576 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ga. 2003) (holding that the purchaser who filed an ejectment action to oust the grantor cannot prevail because the deed subject to the security deed was void).

Aurora Loan Servs., LLC. v. Veatch, 710 S.E.2d 744, 745 (Ga. 2011) (ruling that whether the bona fide purchaser had notice of the forgery is irrelevant because the security deed held by the lender or any assignee was a nullity).

MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 707 S.E.2d 485, 490 (Ga. 2011) (finding the purchaser had actual and constructive notice of challenges to title; also ruling that failure to send notice of right to cure pursuant to the power of sale renders the foreclosure proceeding “invalid”).

5. Ibanez Traction in Georgia

Based upon this understanding of Georgia law, the courts there may align themselves with Ibanez regarding three issues. First, the foreclosing party must be acting on behalf of the original grantee or an assignee that derives its rights from a written assignment before the sale. Georgia is stricter than Massachusetts because it also mandates recordation of the assignment prior to the sale. Moreover, both states are title theory states. In Georgia, this should mean that the security deed does not automatically follow the note. Second, both Massachusetts and Georgia require strict compliance with the power of sale clause and with additional requirements set forth in law. Third, the Ibanez court reversed the sale. In Georgia, certain defects will void a sale even to a BFP. The serious impediment of lack of authority to proceed ought to rank among such defects. The potential for challenges to title of property held by purchasers and BFPs in Georgia could be significant if the foreclosing party does not possess the right to enforce the note and security deed at the relevant time.

D. Nevada

1. Introduction

Nevada’s seriously delinquent foreclosure rate has dramatically exceeded the national average since late 2006, as illustrated in Figure 5. As of the second quarter of 2011, 14.34% or 72,099 loans were seriously delinquent in Nevada.305 Nevada’s rate (14.34%) is second only to Florida’s rate (18.68%) among all states. Nevada ranked first among the non-judicial foreclosure states.

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305 MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 7, at Q2.
Nevada allows the use of mortgages or deeds of trust. However, lenders typically utilize deeds of trust because they permit non-judicial foreclosure. The parties to the contract, the beneficiary (lender), the trustor (homeowner-borrower), and the trustee, play the same roles in Nevada as they do in Arizona and California. Nevada is a lien theory state.

2. Authority to Foreclose

Under a deed of trust, the beneficiary, successor in interest of the beneficiary, or the trustee may foreclose. An assignment of the beneficial interest under a deed of trust must be in writing. Until recently, the assignment need not be recorded. Effective July 1, 2011, such assignments are not enforceable until they are recorded. If the deed of trust so provides, the beneficiary may substitute the trustee but there is no statute that governs this process.

In two recent decisions, the Nevada Supreme Court tackled the issue of authority to foreclose. In the first of two unanimous en banc opinions, the court held that “[a]bsent a proper [written] assignment of a deed of trust, Wells Fargo lacks standing to pursue foreclosure proceedings …” Further, the court discussed the applicability of Article 3 of the UCC to mortgage notes and described the methods to transfer them. It concluded that the assignee of the beneficiary must be entitled to enforce the loan note.

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307 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.050 (2011) (codifying this principle in relation to mortgages); NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.240 (2011) (applying this principal in the context of the extinguishment of liens created by deeds of trust).


310 NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.210(1) (2011). Moreover, recordation operates “as constructive notice of the contents thereof to all persons.” Id.

311 Foust v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 55520, 2011 WL 3298915 at *2 n.5 (Nev. July 29, 2011) (observing that there is no state statute governing the substitution of the trustee and applying a provision in the deed of trust).


313 Leyva, 255 P.3d at 1279. In this case, the homeowner appealed the denial of the homeowner’s petition to sanction the purported assignee of the beneficiary due to its failure to produce required documents to a mediator (that is, assignments of the deed of trust and note). The mediation rules require their production “to ensure that whoever is foreclosing ‘actually owns the note’ and has authority to modify the loan.” Id.

314 Id. at 1281. The precise issue was whether the party appearing at a mediation following the initiation of non-judicial foreclosure had demonstrated authority to mediate.
In the second case, the court confirmed that “to have standing to foreclose, the current beneficiary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory note must be the same.”315 Applying the UCC Article 3 to the transfers of the note, the court observed that the Bank of New York had the right to enforce both instruments, at the relevant time.316 In Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 doctrine that a promissory note and a deed of trust are automatically transferred together unless the parties agree or the UCC provides otherwise.317 While noting that the Nevada Legislature amended its recordation law in 2011 to require recordation of assignments of the beneficial interest under a deed of trust as a prerequisite to enforceability, the court did not address how this statute and the Restatement work together. In other words, how can a deed of trust automatically follow the transfer of the note and be enforceable when assignment of the deed of trust first must be in writing and recorded?

3. Effect of Defective Foreclosure

A court shall declare a sale void if: (1) the trustee or other person authorized to make the sale did not “substantially comply” with statutory provisions governing notice, recordation, and mediation; and (2) an action is commenced within ninety days after the date of the sale and a lis pendens is noted within thirty days after commencement of the case.318 The Nevada

316 Id. at 262; see also Foust, 2011 WL 3298915 at *1–2 (reversing the dismissal of the homeowners’ complaint alleging that the purported assignee of the beneficiary lacked the authority to foreclose on the note; noting that possessing only the deed of trust or an assignment does not create any right to enforce the underlying note. “To enforce a debt secured by a deed of trust and mortgage note, a person must be entitled to enforce the note pursuant to Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
317 Id. at 257–58.
318 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(5) (2011). The period to file is extended when proper notice is not provided to the grantor. NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(6) (2011). The Nevada Legislature amended this provision, effective October 1, 2011, to require that a court declare the sale void, if the plaintiff can prove the other statutory elements (that is, compliance was not substantial). A.B. 284, 2011 Leg., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011). In addition to the remedy of voiding the sale, the Legislature added a mandatory damage award for violations of subsections 2, 3, or 4 of § 107.080. NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(7), effective October 1, 2011. Finally, the Legislature beefed up the criminal and civil consequences for the filing of a forged or groundless document or one that contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise invalid. NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.395 (2011),
state courts have not fleshed out what “substantially complies” means in the context of voiding a foreclosure sale, at least not in published opinions. Where the issue is authority to foreclose, either the foreclosing party possesses that right or it does not. Arguably, then, “substantial compliance” in this context means fully possessing this right. In addition, the Nevada courts have not addressed whether a claim of lack of authority to foreclose is restricted to an action under § 107.080(5) since it does not involve a violation of the enumerated statutes.

A trustor-mortgagor may sue for the tort of wrongful foreclosure for damages. In such a case, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in Collins v. Union Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, required the trustor-mortgagor to show that she had not breached any condition under the deed of trust that could trigger a default and authorize the foreclosure. Although the rule seems harsh, the court created some latitude on the issue of whether the trustor-mortgagor’s claims against the foreclosing party can offset an alleged delinquency. Nonetheless, federal district courts apply Collins literally and often without discussion. Lower state court opinions interpreting

effective October 1, 2011; see also Shields v. First Magnus Fin. Corp., No. 3:10-cv-00641-RCJ-RAM, 2011 WL 1304734, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2011) (refusing to dismiss cause of action under this statute in a case removed to federal court but dismissing the claims for declaratory relief and quiet title as redundant).

319 See Leyva, 255 P.3d at 1278–79 (deciding that strict compliance is required with the pre-foreclosure mediation rule mandating production of the note and deed of trust and all assignments); Einhorn v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 290 P.3d 249, 254 (Nev. 2012) (discussing the necessity of strict compliance with “time and manner” requirements in contrast to substantial compliance with “form and content” rules; finding that the relevant documents will be considered regardless of who produces them in conjunction with mediation).


321 Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983) (reversing dismissal and providing the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that he was not in default when the power of sale was exercised by the defendants because they charged interest in excess of the contractual rate).

and applying Collins are non-existent. The most likely reason is that trustor-mortgagor cases filed in state court are often removed to federal court.323

4. Effect of Defective Foreclosure on Bona Fide Purchasers

“Every sale made under the provisions of [§ 107.080] and other sections of this chapter vests in the purchaser the title of grantor and any successors in interest without equity or the right of redemption.”324 Unlike other non-judicial foreclosure states, Nevada does not expressly create an absolute rule in favor of BFPs. As discussed immediately above, the Legislature granted the trustor-mortgagor the opportunity to challenge a completed sale.325 On the other hand, the Legislature opened the courthouse door for only a short period of time, thereby creating certainty for purchasers upon the expiration of a mere ninety days following the sale.326

5. Nevada’s Pre-Sale Mediation Program

Nevada’s Legislature created a Foreclosure Mediation Program for owner-occupied residential properties subject to foreclosure notices filed on or after July 1, 2009.327 Its purpose is to address the foreclosure crisis head-on with the hope of keeping Nevada families in their homes.328

Upon notice that a homeowner has elected to participate in the program, lenders must participate in good faith and provide certain documentation to the mediator and homeowner, including the following: the original or certified copy of the deed of trust, the mortgage note, and each assignment of the deed of trust and mortgage note.329

The data released by the Nevada Judiciary shows that when homeowners elect mediation, the program often prevents foreclosures and keeps homeowners in their homes, at least for some period of time. From September 14, 2009, through June 3, 2010 (approximately the first nine months of the

323 Email from Geoffrey Giles, Attorney in Nevada, to author (Nov. 1, 2011, 15:16 EST) (on file with author).
325 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
program’s operation), 4,212 mediations were held and of these, 3,767 did not proceed to foreclosure (89% of cases) because the mediator did not issue a certification for foreclosure. Of the 3,767 cases with no foreclosure certification, the parties reached an agreement in 61%; in the remainder, a certification for foreclosure was not issued because of non-compliance with rules or the case was withdrawn. The data does not reflect whether the homes stay out of foreclosure temporarily or permanently and how often the foreclosures are restarted.

The program has the potential of motivating all lenders and their assignees to get their documents in order before proceeding with residential foreclosures, regardless of whether the homeowner requests mediation. The possibility of having to document the authority to foreclose in a mediation process should induce lenders and assignees to put the time into meeting these requirements. Those who cannot legitimately present these documents may be less likely to foreclose. This is especially true after the Nevada Supreme Court’s recent decision in which it required strict compliance with the mediation production of documents rule.

6. Ibanez Traction in Nevada

Based upon this understanding of Nevada law, the courts there may align themselves with Ibanez on two issues. The first is whether the foreclosing party must be the original beneficiary or an assignee via a written assignment before the sale. Like Massachusetts, Nevada requires the assignment of the deed of trust to be written. The Nevada Legislature went further in 2011, requiring the assignment to be recorded. Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that the assignee of the beneficiary lacks authority to foreclose absent a proper assignment of the deed of trust.

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333 Leyva, 255 P.3d at 1279.
The fact that Nevada is a lien theory state and Massachusetts is a title theory state appears irrelevant. The second is whether the failure to possess the authority to foreclose renders the sale void. These states differ on the issue of the type of compliance necessary to void a sale: Massachusetts requires strict compliance, whereas Nevada requires only substantial compliance.\footnote{334} Nonetheless lacking the right to foreclose should void the sale, in light of the \textit{Leyva v. National Default Servicing Corp.} decision. Moreover, by statute, Nevada courts must void sales if a challenge relating to notice, recordation, and mediation requirements is filed within ninety days following the sale. As previously noted, it is not clear whether this limited right applies to contests on the ground of lack of authority to foreclose or whether this issue can be raised at any time, subject to laches or another statute of limitations. Finally, Nevada’s mediation program should reduce the number of foreclosures that proceed where the foreclosing entity does not possess the requisite documentation evidencing its right to foreclose. Concerns about defective title of property in the hands of purchasers will, likewise, abate.

\section*{VII. Potential Consequences and Moral Hazards}

\subsection*{A. Positive Consequences}

The \textit{Ibanez} and \textit{Bevilacqua} rulings should trigger positive results for the legal and property title systems and homeowners for several reasons. First, the decisions foster diligent compliance with foreclosure requirements in states without readily available judicial oversight.\footnote{335} Typically, non-judicial foreclosure is a quicker, easier, and less costly method to repossess a borrower’s home than accomplishing the same result through the judicial procedure.\footnote{336} In effect, non-judicial foreclosure is a form of self-help repossession of one of the most important assets a person can own—her home. The bottom line is that the borrower who mortgages her property can lose it without easy access to the courts.\footnote{337}

Contrast that situation with that of tenants and of borrowers who owe unsecured debt. In the first scenario, the landlord normally must file a lawsuit in the appropriate court to terminate the tenancy based upon non-payment

\footnote{334} U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d, 40, 49–50 (Mass. 2011). Interestingly, the Nevada Supreme Court recently applied a “strict compliance” standard to the mandates of the pre-foreclosure mediation program. \textit{Leyva}, 255 P.3d at 1275 (rejecting a “substantial compliance” standard).

\footnote{335} See discussion \textit{supra} Part VI, related to the strict compliance standards applicable in Arizona, California, Georgia, and Massachusetts.

\footnote{336} \textit{See id.}

\footnote{337} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 136–37.
of the rent and seek an order of eviction. Essentially, the landlord must prove its right to possession of the premises. Likewise, in the second situation, the unsecured creditor must pursue collection through the judicial system if its borrower defaults on the debt and fails to repay the arrears. Like the landlord, the creditor must prove its right to collect on the debt. Only after the court enters a judgment against the borrower may the creditor execute on the judgment by obtaining writs to attach the borrower’s property to satisfy the judgment.

The integrity of our legal system depends upon all parties following the rules. This interest is vital to all. The non-judicial foreclosure rules favor the foreclosing party, but that party should possess the authority to sell the home by following the state law governing the ownership and transfer of the notes and mortgages—just like landlords and unsecured creditors must prove their right to evict or to a money judgment. To permit otherwise opens the door to the abuses chronicled in the opening Sections of this Article.

339 Id. § 6:17, at 421.
341 Id.; see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (reversing the issuance of an injunction prohibiting the debtor from transferring its assets before the creditor obtained a money judgment).
342 In discussing the lawsuit that Delaware recently filed against MERS, Attorney General Biden stated: “A man or woman’s home is not just his or her largest investment, it’s their castle. Rules matter. A homeowner has the obligation to pay the mortgage on time, and lenders must follow the rules if they are seeking to take away someone’s house through foreclosure.” Press Release, supra note 135. In the context of discussing Nevada’s lawsuit against Lender Processing Services for, inter alia, document execution fraud, the Attorney General, Catherine Mastro, stated: “If you are going to allow banks to skate around the integrity of the system, ... what kind of justice is that?” Gretchen Morgenson, From East and West, Foreclosure Horror Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, at B1. Moreover, as one federal judge recently put it: “It is clear ... that [the homeowner] is substantially behind in her payments and appears unable to remediate her default. This, however, does not render her an outlaw, subject to having her home seized by whatever bank or loan servicer may first lay claim to it. She still has legal rights.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 359 (D. Mass. 2011).
343 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 330 (raising the issue of abuse in the context of refusing to freeze assets in the hands of the debtor before first obtaining a judgment and quoting WAIT, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES § 73, at 110–11); Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 639, 685 (1997) (commenting that the potential for abuse in non-judicial foreclosures is “particularly high” due to the speed at which they occur and the lack of court oversight).
Second, the Massachusetts rulings support the public policy that only the party having the right to foreclose may do so and, thereby, reduce the possibility that homeowners will lose their homes to the wrong party. Foreclosing parties and their agents should carefully verify ownership of the notes and mortgages before commencing foreclosures or risk the consequences. At least two outcomes should occur: (1) the integrity of the legal and property title recordation systems will be enhanced; and (2) the extra time it takes to verify will afford some homeowners the opportunity to find another solution, such as a loan modification or short sale.

Finally, Ibanez and Bevilacqua open the door to homeowners to legitimately challenge defective sales and defend against the foreclosure, eviction, and the underlying debt, an opportunity that some homeowners may pursue.

B. Resulting Headaches

There are several challenges facing trustee banks and foreclosure sale purchasers due to the sloppy or fraudulent paperwork occurring in the securitization context. First, clear title may be uncertain on foreclosed properties. Those who purchase at such sales, investors and non-investors alike, must concern themselves with questions such as: Do I really own this property? How do I research possible title defects? Will I be able to refinance or resell this property in the future?

Second, trustee banks cannot resell their REO properties until the title question for each is resolved, at least in Massachusetts. These banks must either re-foreclose, if they can obtain the proper paperwork, or obtain

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344 See GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 38 (noting that the completed foreclosure rate has slowed due to foreclosure documentation missteps but stating that many foreclosures will be completed eventually); Paul McMorrow, A New Act in Foreclosure Circus, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 13, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2011/01/14/a_new_act_in_foreclosure_circus/.

345 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 41 (noting that the additional time may also allow homeowners to obtain employment and to cure their arrearages but discussing that fees and interest continue to accrue, making it more difficult for homeowners to catch up).

346 Paul McMorrow reported in the Boston Globe that his random sample of thirty foreclosure deeds from Chelsea, one of the cities hit hardest by foreclosures, recorded since the beginning of 2006 revealed ten cases in which paperwork on file with the Registry of Deeds “raised the sort of chain-of-custody concerns at the heart of the Ibanez decision.” McMorrow, supra note 344; see also Patricia Hanratty, Impact of Faulty Loan Documentation on Borrowers and Communities, Presentation at Suffolk University Law School Symposium: Foreclosure Fiasco: Documentation Challenges and Policy Solutions (Oct. 14, 2011) (on file with author) (observing that poor documentation and loan administration in combination with unethical and sometimes fraudulent originations, exacerbate the foreclosure crisis by creating thousands of clouded titles and by making the resale of foreclosed property more difficult and time-consuming).
insurance to cover any title defects. A major title insurer, First American Financial Corporation, will write title insurance in limited circumstances in Massachusetts where there was no recorded title to the mortgage at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, a void title in the chain creates headaches for the subsequent owners of record.

Delayed foreclosures and backlogged REO inventory can drag down communities. Homeowners may vacate their homes to find other housing when a foreclosure appears imminent. Increased vacancies create problems in communities, including crime, blight, and declining property values. Local governments share in the pain due to the increased costs in policing and securing vacant homes. These outcomes may negatively affect the national economy if foreclosure delays and title uncertainty stalls the recovery of the U.S. housing prices in the long run.

How likely is title to foreclosed properties in serious jeopardy? As a practical matter, former homeowners are unlikely to challenge defects in the sales in great numbers because they simply do not have the resources to do so. Necessary resources include the money to hire attorneys, the money to become current on the mortgage loan if they are in default, a sufficiently large pool of knowledgeable attorneys to bring the cases, and the desire and energy to fight for a home in which the former homeowner no longer lives.

Even if the former homeowner can marshal these assets, the legal obstacles in state law are daunting. The five states highlighted in this Article present some of these obstacles. For example, Nevada limits the filing of some types of post-sale challenges to ninety days following the sale. Arizona’s statutory scheme appears to require challengers to file the day before any sale. Delivery of the foreclosure deed creates a presumption

347 First American Bulletin, Re: The Ibanez Decision (on file with author). First American will insure title in a post-foreclosure transfer if the sale was valid in all other respects and there exists a valid assignment of the mortgage in favor of the foreclosing party executed prior to the date of the first publication of notice of sale, and the assignment is recorded after the sale; if there exists a valid assignment of the mortgage executed before the recording of the certificate of entry for in the case of a foreclosure by entry and three years have passed since the recording of the certificate; or if fifteen years have passed from the date of the recording of the foreclosure deed when the certificate of entry is recorded prior to the date of the mortgage assignment.

348 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 42.

349 Id.


351 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-811(C) (2012) (limiting the filing of a challenge to 5:00 p.m. on the day before the sale).
of compliance in favor of the purchaser related to some types of challenges in Arizona and California.\textsuperscript{352} Moreover, California requires the homeowner to tender the arrearage in an action to cancel the foreclosure deed or plead the conditions showing that tender is inequitable particularly where the sale is void.\textsuperscript{353} Rather than attempting to navigate the legal system, former homeowners may request a review of their foreclosure by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and file a claim for damages.\textsuperscript{354} The OCC created this procedure after conducting examinations of the largest mortgage servicers and uncovering significant paperwork problems related to foreclosures.\textsuperscript{355} The fact that the agency established this remedy is significant because it recognizes that not all foreclosed homeowners were in default and not all foreclosures were lawful. However, it is unclear whether the 495,000 homeowners who filed for review by the end of December 2012 will recover significant damages because it appears that the agency is finalizing a settlement and abandoning the review process.\textsuperscript{356}

Two other interventions, one at the federal level and one at the state level, and a major new settlement should lessen the likelihood of title problems by reducing the number of foreclosure sales. At the federal level, President Obama launched the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) in 2009 as a part of a broad, comprehensive strategy to get the economy and the housing market back on track.\textsuperscript{357} This program allows homeowners to modify their monthly payments.

\textsuperscript{352} See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-811(B) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(c) (West 2011).
\textsuperscript{353} Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen, 205 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Ct. App. 1984); MILLER & STARR, supra note 248, § 10:212.
\textsuperscript{355} See Levitin Testimony, supra note 32.
far fewer homeowners than intended. Nonetheless, based on data obtained by the author from the Department of Treasury, the program resulted in the following number of active permanent loan modifications in the five states highlighted in this Article as of May 31, 2011: Arizona—29,439; California—152,500; Georgia—22,153; Massachusetts—15,920; Nevada—16,263. To the extent that the homeowners remain current on their payments under these modification agreements, title concerns in these states will ease.

State and local governments and judiciaries have created about thirty pre-foreclosure mediation or conference programs throughout the country. Some of these regimes, such as Nevada’s, require the production of the note and mortgage and all assignments, indorsements, and related documents. If the party initiating the foreclosure can produce these documents at the front end of the process, post-sale title concerns should diminish.

After a protracted negotiation, the state Attorneys General and several federal agencies reached a landmark settlement with the nation’s largest loan servicers, including major banks. The agreement focuses upon robo-signing and other servicing abuses, including shoddy foreclosure-related documentation and deceptive behavior during loan modification negotiations with homeowners. Specifically, the five banks must allocate a total

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362 PHILIP A. LEHMAN, ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MULTISTATE/ FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS, N.C. DEP’T JUSTICE,
of $17 billion in assistance to borrowers who have the intent and ability to stay in their homes while making reasonable payments on their mortgage loans. At least 60% of the $17 billion must be allocated to reduce the principal balance of mortgage loans for borrowers who are in default or at risk of default on their loan payments.

Principal reductions should assist homeowners in states like Florida, Arizona, Nevada, and California, who are saddled with negative equity in their homes and have no realistic ability of refinancing or selling their homes. Principal reductions will result in lower payments and offer homeowners a fair opportunity to preserve their homes. The banks must also offer to refinance the loans of homeowners who are not delinquent on their payments but who cannot refinance to lower rates because of negative equity.

C. The Moral Hazard

“Moral hazard” refers to the situation where a party is insulated from the consequences of its actions and has little or no incentive to behave differently. Related to the subprime mortgage crisis, some criticized giving bailout money to large investment firms because their risky activities brought them to the brink of financial collapse. In the context of defective foreclosures, others fear that so-called “deadbeat” homeowners might get a free lunch (home) due to legal technicalities. There are at least two responses to this concern. First, wrongful foreclosures do occur to homeowners who are current on their payments as evidenced by the fact that the OCC set up a procedure to review such cases and compensate harmed former homeowners. The number of foreclosed homeowners who were not available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_Settlement/National_Settlement_Executive_Summary.pdf.

363 Id.
364 Id. As of September 30, 2012, approximately “21,833 borrowers successfully completed a first lien modification and received $2.55 billion in loan principal forgiveness, averaging approximately $116,929 per borrower.” These borrowers retained their homes. On the other hand, “113,534 borrowers had either a short sale completed during this period, or the lender accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure, waiving any unpaid principal balance in either case. The total amount of this type of relief was approximately $13.13 billion, or about $115,672 per borrower.” These borrowers gave up their homes. OFFICE OF MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, CONTINUED PROGRESS: A REPORT FROM THE MONITOR OF THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 3 (Nov. 19, 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Continued-Progress_11.19.12.pdf.
365 Id. at 2.
367 Id.
in default or who were wrongfully denied a loan modification is unclear, though news reports have described the havoc these homeowners are experiencing.\textsuperscript{368} Second, actual cases where the courts granted borrowers a “free house” are unusual.\textsuperscript{369} Professor Porter argues this is an “urban myth” which serves the banks’ political agenda in two ways: by encouraging legislators to complain about the moral hazards of holding the foreclosing party to the law, and by pitting homeowners who are paying on their mortgages against those who cannot.\textsuperscript{370} In dissecting the “free house” claim, she notes that halting a foreclosure or reversing a defective sale does not equate to a free house for the homeowner because there is still a valid loan note and a mortgage encumbering the property. “The free house is political handwringing, not legal reality.”\textsuperscript{371}


\textsuperscript{369} In one reported case, the legal issue that led to the free house was unrelated to a defective foreclosure sale. Adam Belz, \textit{Iowa Loophole Voids Mortgage, Gives Couple a ‘Free House’}, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar. 17, 2011, at A1 (reporting that Iowa law resulted in a void mortgage where both spouses did not sign the mortgage and legislative efforts to make sure this does not happen again). A second case presented an extreme situation. Greg Cergol, \textit{Homeowner Handed ‘Free’ House}, NBC NEW YORK, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Homeowner-Handed-Free-House-93167629.html (reporting that a judge stripped the mortgage after a homeowner’s ten-year ordeal involving the lender’s refusal to accept her payments, the lender going out of business, and the disappearance of the account and supporting records and mortgage; ruling occurred in the context of a suit filed by the homeowner to clear title to which the defendants defaulted). Finally, where a trial court canceled the note and stripped the mortgage because the foreclosing lender engaged in “inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious and opprobrious” conduct in the context of a foreclosure settlement conference, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that the trial court lacked authority to order this drastic remedy. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yono-Horoski, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (App. Div. 2010) (reversing the decision reported in Kieran Crowley, \textit{et al., Judge Blasts Bad Bank, Erases 525K Debt}, N.Y. POST, Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/judge_kos_mortgage_to_slap_bank_28Z51oW8Y58z6gu1AQbWMI (quoting the trial judge)). In one case in Florida where the court dismissed the foreclosure due to faulty paperwork, the bank’s attorney stated: “I don’t expect the banks to give them a free house. I expect the bank to refile the case. Even if the foreclosure was invalid, I can file under a different equitable theory and still take the property.” Suevon Lee, \textit{Judge Rules Bank Failed to Prove Ownership of Couples Mortgage}, OACA.COM (Jan. 17, 2011, 10:21 PM), http://www.ocala.com/article/20110116/ARTICLES/110119770.


\textsuperscript{371} Id. (“Just because a party lacked standing or statutory authority does not mean that there is not some party out there that does have the authority to foreclose. Nor does a win on standing mean that there cannot be action taken to give the initial foreclosing party the authority they need .... Unless other problems exist, there is still a valid note that
CONCLUSION

This Article spotlights one facet of the evolving foreclosure crisis that has received less attention than others: authority to foreclose in non-judicial foreclosure states and the momentous repercussions when this authority is lacking. The sloppiness and hubris of parties to the securitization deals created and, in some cases, covered up the documentation problems chronicled in this Article.372

To assess the likelihood of resulting property title troubles, this Article compared Massachusetts foreclosure law to that of four other non-judicial foreclosure states and opined as to the potential applicability of *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua* in those states. The Article concludes that *Ibanez* may have little effect in Arizona and California but could be influential in Georgia and Nevada.

This methodology can be applied to the law in other non-judicial foreclosure states. For that reason, the Article provides a roadmap for academics, practitioners, the financial services industry, title insurers, and others to assess the extent to which title to properties purchased at foreclosure sales or from lenders’ REO inventories might be defective in other states. It should be clear from this Article, though, that the legal landscape is not static. Cases are percolating through the courts. The Article’s assessment of the status of the *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua* issues in the states highlighted here is based upon a snapshot of a moment in time. Moreover, courts are beginning to focus on the issue of whether the foreclosing party must possess the right to enforce the loan note, not just the mortgage. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed this subject recently in the *Eaton* case.

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372 Judge Boyko recognized one form of this hubris when he stated: Plaintiff’s, “Judge, you just don’t understand how things work,” argument reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-monopolistic system where financial institutions have traditionally controlled, and still control, the foreclosure process .... [U]nchallenged by underfinanced opponents, the institutions worry less about jurisdictional requirements and more about maximizing returns .... The institutions seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally, put to the test, their weak legal arguments compel the Court to stop them at the gate.

Nonetheless, this guide should be helpful to evaluate how legal developments fit into the current state of the law.

The decisions in Ibanez and Bevilacqua are not remarkable in the sense that the court applied well-established law to the facts before it and ruled in conformity with that law. Justice Cordy underscored this point in his concurrence in Ibanez: “[W]hat is surprising about these cases is not the statement of principles articulated by the Court regarding title law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, but rather the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented title to their assets.”

373 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011). Indeed, other courts, both state and federal, have ruled that notes and mortgages were not properly transferred through the securitization players, rendering the trustee impotent to foreclose at the time it took that action. See discussion supra notes 22–24. The Ibanez opinion appears to be one of the most well-known decisions, however. Peter Pitegoff & Laura Underkuller, Am. Const. Soc’y L. & Policy, An Evolving Foreclosure Landscape: The Ibanez Case and Beyond 1 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Pitegoff_Underkuller_-_An_Evolving_Foreclosure_Landscape.pdf.