Optimizing Cybersecurity Risk in Medical Cyber-Physical Devices

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OPTIMIZING CYBERSECURITY RISK IN MEDICAL CYBER-PHYSICAL DEVICES

CHRISTOPHER S. YOO* & BETHANY C. LEE**

ABSTRACT

Medical devices are increasingly connected, both to cyber networks and to sensors collecting data from physical stimuli. These cyber-physical systems pose a new host of deadly security risks that traditional notions of cybersecurity struggle to take into account. Previously, we could predict how algorithms would function as they drew on defined inputs. But cyber-physical systems draw on unbounded inputs from the real world. Moreover, with wide networks of cyber-physical medical devices, a single cybersecurity breach could pose lethal dangers to masses of patients.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is tasked with regulating medical devices to ensure safety and effectiveness, but its regulatory approach—designed decades ago to regulate traditional medical hardware—is ill-suited to the unique problems of cybersecurity. Because perfect cybersecurity is impossible and every cybersecurity improvement entails costs to affordability and health, designers need standards that balance costs and benefits to inform the optimal level of risk. The FDA, however, conducts limited cost-benefit analyses, believing that its authorizing statute forbids consideration of economic costs.

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We draw on statutory text and case law to show that this belief is mistaken and that the FDA can and should conduct cost-benefit analyses to ensure safety and effectiveness, especially in the context of cybersecurity. We describe three approaches the FDA could take to implement this analysis as a practical matter. Of these three, we recommend an approach modeled after the Federal Trade Commission’s cost-benefit test. Regardless of the specific approach the FDA chooses, however, the critical point is that the agency must weigh costs and benefits to ensure the right level of cybersecurity. Until then, medical device designers will face continued uncertainty as cybersecurity threats become increasingly dangerous.
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“Yes, terrorists could have hacked Dick Cheney’s heart.” The former vice president’s heart implant, with its wireless functionality, could have resulted in an assassination. Recognizing this possibility, Cheney’s doctor had to order the wireless functionality of the heart implant to be disabled.

Cheney’s story is just one example of the risk of deadly cybersecurity attacks on connected medical devices. Numerous other reports and studies have shown how cybersecurity threats endanger lives. Researchers have shown that a hacker can remotely kill a person by causing an implanted insulin pump to release a deadly dose of insulin or by making a pacemaker release a heart-stopping electric charge.

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2. *Id.*

3. *Id.*


These connected medical devices present special cybersecurity risks because they are part of cyber-physical systems. In cyber-physical systems, devices not only interact with other networked devices but also receive and respond to input from the physical environment. Other prominent examples include autonomous vehicles, smart grid sensors, and robotics systems.

In an increasingly cyber-physical world, traditional notions of cybersecurity fall short. When devices were purely cyber, the pre-defined nature of the inputs they could receive made their behavior easier to predict and different systems’ responses to those inputs easier to validate. The data fed into cyber-physical systems are not so rigidly constrained, as the physical environment involves real-world events that are theoretically unbounded and do not always stay within predictable limits. Body temperature, for example, almost always stays within a certain range, yet unprecedented readings can and do occur. The unbounded nature of the data prevents designers from testing how a cyber-physical device will function in every possible real-world scenario, making it impossible to rule out black swan events with low probability but high impact.

In addition, threats to medical cyber-physical devices often involve deliberate actions by malicious actors whose novel attacks cannot always be anticipated. The fact that cyber-physical systems can be networked across hospitals and third-party institutions raises the stakes still further. The large user base increases the

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7. See id. at 4838.
10. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 1; Hsu, supra note 5.
probability of breaches as well as the potential magnitude of the resulting harm. As malicious actors constantly invent new zero-day attacks, designers must plan for ever-evolving changes to cybersecurity needs.\textsuperscript{13}

The inability to eliminate cybersecurity risks completely means that a designer can always add additional security features to plan for an ever-broader range of scenarios. Each increase in cybersecurity comes at a cost. Besides the obvious monetary cost, the additional processing power, storage, and battery power that new cybersecurity features require may hinder a device’s functionality, posing costs to health.\textsuperscript{14} For example, a security feature that increases the size of a device or increases its power consumption could make the device more dangerous or reduce its effectiveness as a bodily implant.\textsuperscript{15} In a world of limited resources, additional security improvements must end at some point.

Because designers cannot proactively eliminate every cybersecurity flaw, they need a framework for determining what constitutes an acceptable level of risk to determine when they can stop adding security. Cybersecurity thus inevitably requires some type of cost-benefit analysis to inform the optimal level of cybersecurity.

Federal regulators, however, have offered no such solution in defining cybersecurity standards for medical devices. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which regulates medical devices, offers only nonbinding guidance documents recommending certain cybersecurity features.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, these documents do not address the optimal level of security or make any mention of cost considerations.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, the FDA has interpreted its own authority in a limited way, operating on an internal policy that the agency cannot consider financial costs when evaluating products.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{14} See Wellington, supra note 5, at 179.

\textsuperscript{15} See id.


\textsuperscript{17} See id.

\textsuperscript{18} See, e.g., Sarah Duranske, This Article Makes You Smarter! (Or, Regulating Health and Wellness Claims), 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 26 (2017) (“In determining whether to approve
The inadequacy of the FDA’s cybersecurity regulation is just one symptom of its troubling record with software. Commentators have long noted that the FDA’s overarching regulatory approach is ill-fitted for software, creating difficulties for designers of medical device software. Having abandoned multiple attempts to create a separate approach to software, the FDA seems to know that it has a problem with software and cybersecurity regulation. But the agency has yet to address the issue.

A logical solution for the agency would involve some type of cost-benefit analysis to inform the optimal level of cybersecurity risk, but the FDA does not conduct economic cost-benefit analyses. Instead, the FDA has interpreted its authorizing statute as prohibiting consideration of economic costs, inhibiting the agency’s ability to weigh these costs with benefits.

The agency’s resulting approach to cybersecurity means a lack of clarity for medical device designers and potentially unsafe or inefficient devices. This Article tackles this problem by recommending approaches that the FDA can use to define the optimal level of cybersecurity, taking into account the costs and benefits of potential cybersecurity features.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I highlights the unique challenges of medical device cybersecurity and their poor fit within existing regulatory approaches. Part II examines the existing legal

or clear a medical device, the FDA considers evidence of safety and effectiveness. But other potential consumer harms—like economic harms—are not accounted for in FDA regulation."


See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.

See Duranske, supra note 18, at 26.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
constraints on the FDA’s ability to set standards that balance costs and benefits. Drawing from statutory text and case law, we argue that the FDA can, in fact, weigh economic costs when evaluating products and that doing so is particularly important in the context of cybersecurity. Finally, Part III discusses three potential approaches the FDA can implement to determine the optimal level of cybersecurity. We explore the implications of each approach and conclude that the FDA’s best option is to adopt the cost-benefit test used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Regardless of which option the FDA chooses, however, the crucial point is that the FDA must use a balancing test that ensures the optimal level of cybersecurity in medical devices.

I. THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF SOFTWARE AND CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION

Cybersecurity is a far cry from the traditional medical risks that the FDA regulates. As a result, the FDA’s regulatory framework provides an insufficient approach for optimizing medical device cybersecurity.

The FDA’s troubling record with cybersecurity is no surprise given the agency’s troubling record with software in general. The FDA’s regulation of medical devices originated in a time when devices included insubstantial software.24 As one expert testified to Congress, FDA staff saw software as “some kind of new bedpan.”25 Since then, software has come to play significant roles in medical devices. But despite radical differences between software and traditional hardware, the FDA continues to regulate both under the same framework, “like forcing a round peg into a square hole.”26 As

a result, the FDA’s regulation of software has often left medical software developers in a state of confusion.\textsuperscript{27}

The current framework for FDA regulation of medical devices traces back to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.\textsuperscript{28} The statute established three classes of devices based on risk.\textsuperscript{29} Class I devices pose the lowest risk, presenting “minimal potential for harm” and often featuring a simple design, such as elastic bandages.\textsuperscript{30} These devices require only general regulatory controls, and most are exempt from the FDA regulatory process.\textsuperscript{31} Class II devices pose more risk and involve more complex designs, such as pregnancy test kits.\textsuperscript{32} Before marketing a Class II device, a manufacturer must show that the device is “substantially equivalent” to—meaning as safe and effective as—a legally marketed device.\textsuperscript{33} Class III devices have life-sustaining functions or “present potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”\textsuperscript{34} Pacemakers and other implantable devices fall into this high-risk class.\textsuperscript{35}

Software, however, was initially not seen as a major element of patient care and did not fit neatly into the FDA’s three-tier device

\textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., Fried & Zuckerman, supra note 19, at 129 ("Since the passage of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ('FFDCA'), the medical software industry has experienced uncertainty and confusion concerning FDA regulation of software products." (footnote omitted)); Schooley, supra note 19, at 744 ("The lack of guidance from the FDA poses a huge problem for those developing such systems, for those manufacturing components of the systems, and for those health care providers purchasing a system—only to later find out it does not comply with newly created FDA regulations.").


\textsuperscript{30} Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/consumers-medical-devices/learn-if-medical-device-has-been-cleared-fda-marketing [https://perma.cc/9JWC-BGS7].

\textsuperscript{31} See id.

\textsuperscript{32} See id.


\textsuperscript{34} Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, supra note 30.

\textsuperscript{35} Id.
classification system. As medical devices increasingly transitioned from consisting only of hardware to incorporating software as critical elements of the device, the FDA began to recognize the challenges of software, noting in 1996 that according to an agency study of software-related recalls from fiscal years 1983 to 1991, “over 90 percent of all software-related device failures were due to design-related errors.”

The FDA’s approach to software regulation presents many problems given the differences between software and hardware. For example, hardware devices tend to have an easily defined purpose, while software can have numerous and interdependent intended uses, both related and unrelated to the medical device. These multiple functionalities fit uneasily within the FDA’s regulatory approach. Furthermore, Class II medical devices must receive a determination of substantial equivalence to an already-approved device, but it is difficult to compare new software products with multiple functionalities to their “equivalent” hardware products.

In addition, many of the quality controls applicable for device hardware—such as packing, storage, or distribution—do not apply to software.

The need for frequent updates is another unique attribute of software that does not fit well within the FDA’s framework. The FDA requires new approval for any device that undergoes “significant changes or modifications” that affect the safety, effectiveness,
or intended uses of the device.\textsuperscript{41} For hardware devices, seeking new approval makes sense for new releases that involve significant bundled developments. But with software, which may be modified quickly and released with incremental updates, the need to seek reapproval for every update is unrealistic. The FDA has issued guidance attempting to clarify when software updates necessitate new approval from the agency,\textsuperscript{42} but the process has remained unwieldy and confusing for software developers.

Beyond the general problems with software regulation, cybersecurity in particular presents unique challenges that are hard to incorporate into the FDA’s general framework. With most FDA-evaluated products, such as food and drugs, safety concerns are merely a function of statistical probability—for example, the likelihood of side effects.\textsuperscript{43} But with cybersecurity, harm can be caused by malicious actors. Because the plans and innovations of malicious actors cannot be reduced to a statistical probability, the FDA cannot enforce its typical standard of “safety” by requiring the likelihood of cyberattacks to be under a certain level.\textsuperscript{44}

Furthermore, because perfect cybersecurity is impossible no matter how much a designer invests in protective measures, a notion of acceptable risk is inevitable.\textsuperscript{45} A workable framework for cybersecurity would thus need to incorporate some type of cost-benefit analysis to inform an acceptable level of risk.


\textsuperscript{42} U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., \textit{Deciding When to Submit a 510(k) for a Software Change to an Existing Device: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff} (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/99785/download [https://perma.cc/CP6P-P77U].


\textsuperscript{44} See id.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE FDA’S CONSIDERATION OF NONTHERAPEUTIC COSTS

The ongoing problems with the FDA’s regulation of cybersecurity call for some type of cost-benefit analysis to inform an acceptable level of cybersecurity risk. Despite this logical need, commentators have long observed that the FDA does not consider economic costs in evaluating devices. The FDA has developed this internal policy based on its interpretation that the agency’s authorizing statute forbids consideration of economic costs.

The FDA receives its authority to regulate medical devices from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The current version of the FDCA gives the FDA the mission and obligation to ensure that there is “reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness” of medical devices. The statute further provides that “the safety and effectiveness of a device are to be determined ... weighing any probable benefit to health from the use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use.”

For medical devices generally, the FDA defines a reasonable assurance of safety as “valid scientific evidence[] that the probable benefits to health from use of the device for its intended uses ... outweigh any probable risks.” Likewise, a reasonable assurance of effectiveness requires “valid scientific evidence, that in a significant portion of the target population, the use of the device for its intended uses ... will provide clinically significant results.”

The FDA has interpreted this authority as requiring it to evaluate the benefit-risk profile of medical devices solely from a scientific perspective by assessing the types, magnitude, probability, and duration of probable health benefits and risks along with the risk of

46. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (B), (C)(i), 393(b)(2)(C).
50. Id. § 360c(a)(2)(C).
52. Id.
false positives and negatives.\textsuperscript{53} The Supreme Court has recognized that the FDCA “generally requires the FDA to prevent the marketing of any drug or device where the ‘potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.’”\textsuperscript{54} The Court has also invoked the benefits of the FDA’s balancing of the health-related risks and benefits of medical devices as a justification supporting the preemption of state tort law because tort law cases would be decided by juries that would not necessarily conduct such cost-benefit analysis.\textsuperscript{55}

The historical context that gave rise to the FDCA helps explain its emphasis on safety and effectiveness. Motivated by high-profile deaths caused by adulterated and improperly formulated drugs, the FDCA as originally enacted in 1938 and its predecessor statutes focused exclusively on the safety of drugs and, to a limited extent, medical devices.\textsuperscript{56} Congress imposed additional safety requirements and new effectiveness requirements in 1962 in response to deaths and birth defects caused by the tranquilizer thalidomide in Europe.\textsuperscript{57} These safety requirements reflected ideas intuitive with traditional drugs: society does not want drugs that will harm people or fail to treat as advertised. Driven by the inadequacy of the existing regime for regulating medical devices, particularly in light of the injuries caused by the Dalkon Shield, the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 created a more comprehensive regime for regulating devices.\textsuperscript{58}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} U.S. \textsc{food \\& drug admin.}, \textit{infra} note 43, at 8-11.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“A state statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA: How many more lives will be saved by a device which, along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm?”).
\item \textsuperscript{56} Elizabeth M. Rutherford, \textit{The FDA and “Privatization”—The Drug Approval Process}, 50 \textsc{food \\& drug l.j.} 203, 212 (1995) (describing how deaths caused by tetanus-infected diphtheria antitoxins led to the enactment of the Biologics Act of 1902 and how the inclusion of diethylene glycol in Elixir Sulfanilamide led to the enactment of the FDCA).
\item \textsuperscript{57} Agata Dabrowska \& Susan Thaul, \textsc{cong. rsch. serv.}, R41983, \textit{How FDA Approves Drugs and Regulates Their Safety and Effectiveness} 1-2 (2018); \textsc{off. of tech. assessment}, \textit{The Implications of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Medical Technology} 85 (1980), \url{https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1980/8011/8011.PDF} [https://perma.cc/LN3L-THSS]; Rutherford, \textit{supra} note 56, at 212.
\item \textsuperscript{58} See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 335-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Uzdavines, \textit{supra} note 28, at 639-41.
\end{itemize}
Although the FDA balances health-related benefits and risks, it has consistently regarded itself as limited to scientific considerations and has thus regarded economic considerations as falling outside its statutory mandate.\(^59\) In the words of a former FDA chief counsel: “If a new drug is shown to be safe, effective, and properly manufactured and labeled, it cannot properly be denied approval on the ground, say, that it will be expensive and cause financial problems for consumers and third-party payers.”\(^60\) From this perspective, the FDA “best serves [its] mission by reviewing product applications and regulating approved products in accordance with the well-understood statutory standards, by making decisions promptly, and by leaving product selection and the culture wars to the free choices of free Americans.”\(^61\) Consistent with this view, “[o]ften the FDA will leave drugs on the market even if they do cause risks because there are no safer product alternatives that produce the same level of benefit.”\(^62\) Once a drug or device passes the statutory thresholds of safety and efficacy, the ultimate decision rests with patients advised by their physicians. And on the rare occasions when the FDA has considered economic information in order to regulate cost-effectiveness claims by pharmaceutical companies, it has held these claims to the clinical standard for effectiveness, which requires two adequate and well-controlled studies, even though economic evidence that meets such a standard can be difficult or impossible to collect.\(^63\)


\(^{61}\) Id. at 803.


\(^{63}\) Note, \textit{Will Health Care Economic Information Lead to Therapeutic-Class Warfare or Welfare?}, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2984, 2985 (1998); see also Peter J. Neumann, Darren E. Zinner
The FDA’s refusal to consider economic considerations has come under increasing criticism in recent years. For example, some argue that the refusal to consider cost has contributed to the rise in drug prices, as many insurers reimburse any drug approved by the FDA without assessing whether it is inferior or cost effective.\(^{64}\)

The FDA’s latitude to take purely economic considerations into account is unclear. The Office of Technology Assessment observed in 1980 that the FDCA “neither authorizes nor prohibits the use of economic criteria in FDA’s evaluation of applicant drugs and devices” and that “[t]he legality of using cost effectiveness to help evaluate new drugs and devices has not been tested.”\(^{65}\) Since that time, a broad range of legal doctrines have emerged that shed new light on how to construe statutes in the face of such ambiguity. First, we consider whether other provisions of the FDCA implicitly prohibit consideration of costs. Second, we evaluate whether the FDCA’s requirement of a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness is ambiguous about whether the FDA can consider of costs, justifying *Chevron* deference. Third, we argue that even rejecting the FDA’s general authority to consider costs, the FDA still has authority to consider costs in the context of cybersecurity, which does not fit well within the FDA’s traditional frameworks.

### A. Prohibition of Cost Considerations

The Supreme Court has found implicit statutory prohibition of cost considerations in limited circumstances. In *Whitman v. American Trucking Associations*, the Court interpreted a requirement in the Clean Air Act as implicitly prohibiting consideration of cost.\(^{66}\) The Act instructed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set ambient air quality standards that “are requisite to protect the public health,” “allowing an adequate margin of safety.”\(^{67}\) The Court

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\(^{64}\) Diana M. Zuckerman, *Can the FDA Help Reduce Drug Prices or the Cost of Medical Care?*, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1752, 1753 (2017).

\(^{65}\) OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 88-89.


\(^{67}\) Id. at 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
held that this standard prohibited consideration of costs because the language was “absolute”\textsuperscript{68} and because “[n]owhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation.”\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, “Congress was unquestionably aware” that “the economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in cleaning the air.”\textsuperscript{70} But instead of including a provision requiring consideration of economic costs, Congress included a provision requiring a comprehensive study and provided for a waiver process if necessary.\textsuperscript{71}

The Court drew the opposite conclusion in \textit{Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.} when analyzing language in the Clean Water Act requiring the EPA to set standards “minimizing adverse environmental impact.”\textsuperscript{72} The Court compared this language with other parts of the statute that called for “elimination of discharges of all pollutants.”\textsuperscript{73} Because the “minimizing” language was more relative and ambiguous than the “elimination” language, the Court concluded that the directive to minimize adverse environmental impact did not prohibit the EPA from conducting cost-benefit analyses.\textsuperscript{74}

Although some have suggested that the lack of express authorization implies the contrary,\textsuperscript{75} we argue that the FDA’s consideration

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at 465 (quoting \textsc{David Currie}, \textsc{Air Pollution: Federal Law and Analysis} 4-15 (1981)).
  \item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id.} at 465; \textit{accord} Richard J. Pierce, Jr., \textit{What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?}, 2009 \textsc{Mich. St. L. Rev.} 67, 72 (2009) (agreeing that the statute required the EPA to “ignore the costs of alternative standards and to set a standard that protects the public health even if the costs of the standard exceed its benefits”).
  \item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{Whitman}, 531 U.S. at 466.
  \item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{See id.} at 466-67.
  \item \textsuperscript{72} 556 U.S. 208, 219-20 (2009) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b)).
  \item \textsuperscript{73} \textit{Id.} at 219 (comparing “elimination” language in other parts of the statute with “the less ambitious goal” of minimization).
  \item \textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.} at 219-20 (“[T]he phrase ‘best technology available,’ even with the added specification ‘for minimizing adverse environmental impact,’ does not unambiguously preclude cost-benefit analysis.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Former FDA Chief Counsel Richard Cooper opined:

  The very fact that the legal authorities that govern FDA expressly require consideration of science, ethics, and economics in some circumstances supports an arguable inference that those legal authorities also, by plain implication, exclude consideration of such factors in other circumstances.... If a new drug is shown to be safe, effective, and properly manufactured and labeled, it cannot properly be denied approval on the ground, say, that it will be expensive and cause financial problems for consumers and third-party payers.

\end{itemize}
of costs would be unlike the *Whitman* scenario, in which consideration of costs would have created exceptions to the Clean Air Act’s provision requiring standards “requisite to protect the public” and would have contradicted Congress’s decision to address any cost-related concerns through comprehensive study and a potential waiver process.\(^\text{76}\) Here, the FDA’s consideration of costs would not create any exceptions to the FDCA’s “reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness” standard.\(^\text{77}\) Rather, cost would be one factor in a balancing test to determine the reasonable assurance of safety that the statute calls for. For example, if a feature of a medical device provided a slight contribution to safety but imposed exorbitant costs, the feature would not be necessary for a reasonable assurance of safety.

This conclusion draws further support from an amendment to the FDCA known as the Delaney Clause, which forbids the FDA from approving certain food additives “found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal[s].”\(^\text{78}\) The D.C. Circuit interpreted the Delaney Clause as forbidding the FDA from considering costs or benefits in deciding whether to allow an animal carcinogen as a food additive,\(^\text{79}\) despite the fact that “many substances that induce cancer in animals are safer for human consumption than many substances that are regularly ingested by humans.”\(^\text{80}\) If the FDA were allowed to consider costs, this would create exceptions to the explicit prohibition against cancer-inducing food products.

The inclusion of the Delaney Clause in the FDCA shows that Congress knows how to categorically prohibit the FDA from considering costs when it believes that doing so is important.\(^\text{81}\) Yet, when instructing the FDA to set standards for safety and effectiveness, Congress chose more ambiguous and indefinite language, requiring “reasonable assurance” instead of making categorical

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\(^\text{76}\) 531 U.S. at 468-69.

\(^\text{77}\) See 21 U.S.C. § 360c.


\(^\text{80}\) Pierce, supra note 69, at 71-72.

\(^\text{81}\) See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3).
prohibitions. This implies that Congress did not intend to prohibit the FDA from considering costs when setting standards for safety and effectiveness. Instead of imposing a categorical prohibition, Congress employed a much more flexible standard requiring the FDA to provide “a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.” Construing this language as prohibiting consideration of cost would not only be inconsistent with the Delaney Clause; it would contradict Congress’s use of the word “reasonable,” which necessarily requires the consideration of multiple factors in some form of balancing. No case law indicates that costs are a prohibited factor when a statute calls for reasonable assurance.

B. Statutory Ambiguity

Statutory silence on economic cost provides leeway for the FDA to consider it. Agencies typically receive Chevron deference when construing ambiguities or statutory gaps in the statutes they administer. An agency “speak[s] with the force of law” when it addresses an ambiguity or gap in a statute, even if Congress had no actual intent as to a particular result. The Court has accorded Chevron deference to FDA constructions of the FDCA. Because the FDCA contains no explicit prohibition on considering cost, the pertinent question is whether construing “reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness” to include consideration of costs would survive scrutiny under Chevron.

82. Id. § 360(c).
83. Id.
84. See id.
86. Id.
The Supreme Court has read similar terms not just to allow but to require consideration of cost. For example, the Court has interpreted the “appropriate and necessary” standard in the Clean Air Act as requiring the EPA to consider cost, and a “reasonable” standard here could carry a similar connotation. Lower courts have also suggested that the word “reasonable” contains ambiguity. For example, when analyzing “[r]easonable costs” as defined in the Social Security Act, courts have concluded that this phrase has ambiguous language, which agencies have broad discretion to interpret.

The FDA could argue that consideration of economic costs is inherent to the FDCA’s reasonableness standard. The word “reasonable” must be construed to include consideration of costs because an assurance of safety and effectiveness that requires impractical costs would not be reasonable. At a minimum, “reasonable assurance” constitutes an ambiguous statutory term, to which any FDA construction would receive deference. “Safety” and “effectiveness” can likewise be read as ambiguous. Safety and effectiveness are always relative because no device is completely safe, and effectiveness can never be 100 percent. The FDA will receive deference for any

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92. See, e.g., Villa View Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 539, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“Congress has given the Secretary considerable discretion to promulgate cost-reimbursement regulations that give meaning to the term ‘reasonable costs.’”); John L. Doyne Hosp. v. Johnson, 603 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (D.D.C. 2009) (recognizing “the ambiguity inherent in [reasonable cost] and the broad delegation of authority to issue regulations developing the ‘reasonable cost’ concept”); Sid Peterson Mem’l Hosp. v. Thompson, 274 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We are not empowered to overrule the Secretary’s interpretation merely because it does not coincide with our own notion of ‘reasonable cost.’”). In each of these cases, the court reached the second Chevron step after concluding that “reasonable cost” was ambiguous.


96. How Safe Are Cosmetics and Personal Care Products?, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR., https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?contenttypeid=1&contentid=4498 [https://perma.cc/5RYV-7GKN] (discussing how there are “risks associated with the[ ] use” of certain products and how “[t]he FDA works to ensure [only] that ... products [are] as safe as possible,” not that they are perfectly safe).
reasonable interpretation, and it is reasonable to consider costs in
the innately relative requirements on safety and effectiveness. 97

Moreover, other agencies have successfully interpreted silence
about economic costs as allowing them to consider such costs in
their cost-benefit analyses. The Federal Trade Commission Act, the
FTC’s authorizing statute, simply empowers the FTC to prevent and
penalize unfair and deceptive practices. 98 Yet, the FTC conducts
cost-benefit analyses in determining whether practices are unfair. 99
The FTC derives this implicit test from the statutory directive that
cost conduct is unfair only if “not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition.” 100 Although the statute merely
specifies “benefits” rather than any mention of financial costs, the
FTC interprets “benefits” to include the decreased cost of a product
because the decreased cost is a benefit to consumers. 101 The FTC
thus has authorization to consider economic costs when evaluating
whether practices are unfair. 102

The FDA can pursue a similar argument. Just as the FTC’s au-
thorizing statute makes no mention of economic costs faced by
regulated parties, so too is the FDA’s authorizing statute silent on
the issue. 103 If the FTC can nonetheless consider costs, so too can the
FDA. Arguably, the standard of “reasonable assurance” applies a
threshold of enforcement that the FDA must minimally adopt, 104 a

97. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
99. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Weigh the Label, Not the Tractor: What Goes on the Scale in an FTC Unfairness Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2015) (“One of the foundations for the agency’s successful use of this authority is the three-part test for unfairness, which includes a de facto cost-benefit analysis. To invoke unfairness successfully, the Commission must show that the conduct at issue causes or is likely to cause substantial harm to a consumer, that the consumer cannot reasonably avoid that harm, and the harm is not outweighed by the conduct’s benefits to consumers or competition.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n))).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). This implicit test is conducted as part of a three-prong
unfairness test, which evaluates (1) whether the practice offended public policy; (2) whether
the practice was unethical, immoral, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) whether it caused
101. See Ohlhausen, supra note 99, at 2019 (describing how the FTC considers cost savings
from an entity’s failure to take a precaution as a benefit to be weighed against the cost of
harm to consumers).
102. See id.
threshold that is not specified for the FTC. Still, economic costs make sense as a part of cost-benefit analyses for both agencies. Lower costs of products are a benefit to both consumers protected by the FTC and patients protected by the FDA. Thus, the FDA can consider the economic cost of devices as part of its cost-benefit analysis.

C. Current Practices

Although the FDA has disavowed considering economic costs as an explicit factor in approving medical devices, in practice the agency has come up with limited and nuanced ways to consider costs, reflecting an underlying understanding that costs are an important consideration. Specifically, the FDA considers costs in four ways: (1) consideration of nonfinancial costs in deciding whether to approve a product, (2) consideration of financial costs in deciding the speed of review, (3) consideration of financial impacts of major regulations and reporting requirements, and (4) implicit consideration of financial costs in decisions to approve products. All these practices represent exceptions to the FDA’s practice of disregarding costs, indicating that the agency recognizes the importance of considering costs and does not see the FDCA as a categorical prohibition on cost considerations.

1. Nonfinancial Costs

The FDA differentiates between financial and nonfinancial costs, believing that its statutory prohibition applies only to financial costs. This is supported by Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., in which the Supreme Court favorably noted that the FDA conducts cost-benefit analysis by balancing risks and benefits. But in describing the cost-benefit analyses that the FDA conducts, the Court described only costs to health, such as the potential for patient harm, not

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106. See supra notes 18, 53-56 and accompanying text.
107. 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“A state statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA: How many more lives will be saved by a device which, along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm?”).
economic costs.\textsuperscript{108} Still, the Court has never explicitly drawn a distinction between economic and health costs when interpreting the FDCA’s reasonable assurance standard. Thus, the FDA’s differentiation between financial and nonfinancial costs is not precluded by case law.

2. Speed of Review

Interestingly, the FDCA implicitly condones the use of cost-benefit considerations when determining the timing of review. The sections of the FDCA authorizing expedited review do not make any mention of economic costs.\textsuperscript{109} Instead, the FDCA simply specifies other criteria for expedited review, such as whether a drug intends to “treat a serious or life-threatening disease or condition.”\textsuperscript{110} Implicitly, however, when deciding which drugs to expedite, the FDA necessarily considers the impact of accelerated approval on decreasing hospitalization and other costs.\textsuperscript{111}

In addition, despite having no clear statutory authorization to do so, FDA officials have openly discussed how financial costs create the need for speedier review.\textsuperscript{112} For example, former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb wrote in an FDA blog post that “[w]e could see even greater cost savings if we helped more safe and effective generic drugs get to market sooner,” discussing a new regulatory plan that aimed to speed generic drug approvals.\textsuperscript{113}

Because the FDCA makes no mention of cost considerations in speed of review, the FDA is simply filling a gap where the statute is silent.\textsuperscript{114} The agency should likewise be able to fill the statutory gap on cost considerations in approval decisions. If the FDA can prioritize faster approval of low-cost drugs, then it can also weigh costs when evaluating the safety and effectiveness of products.

\textsuperscript{108} See id.
\textsuperscript{110} Id.
\textsuperscript{111} See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 89.
\textsuperscript{113} Id.
\textsuperscript{114} See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a).
3. Economic Impact Analyses of Proposed Regulations

The FDA does not issue regulations when assessing the safety and effectiveness of products because approving a specific device constitutes adjudication. When the agency issues major regulations, however, it must conduct economic impact analyses, which include “an assessment of the costs, benefits, and cost-effectiveness of the action, as well as assessments of the costs, benefits and cost-effectiveness of the most promising alternative actions.” Federal statutes and executive orders require all agencies, including the FDA, to conduct economic impact analyses of important regulations. The FDA’s economic impact analyses often focus on the costs of industry having to read and understand a final rule. The analyses also consider how a regulation would increase the cost of medical products or disrupt health care delivery.

The FDCA also requires the FDA to consider the economic impact of reporting requirements imposed on industry actors. The FDA can require manufacturers only to provide information according to the “least burdensome” standard, limited to “the minimum amount of information necessary to adequately address a relevant regulatory question or issue through the most efficient manner at the right time.” Although not explicitly required to do so, the FDA could adopt similar approaches to considering costs related to its adjudications.

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117. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICE DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION PROCESS; FINAL RULE 4-5 (2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/152744/download [https://perma.cc/HPR4-9TYL].
118. See, e.g., OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 91-92 (illustrating “FDA’s use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate one of its regulations” when the agency recognized that its regulation would increase the cost of X-ray equipment and disrupt health care delivery).
120. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 119, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
4. Implicit Consideration in Product Approval Decisions

Implicitly, a variety of the FDA decisions may reflect consideration of economic costs in the approval stage despite the agency’s belief that the statute prohibits such consideration. In our conversations with FDA reviewers, we learned that reviewers will not explicitly name cost as a consideration but may come up with proxy considerations to justify a decision influenced by cost. For example, if a new medical device is substantially less expensive than existing alternatives, the reviewer who wants to approve the product might instead cite the fact that the device is smaller than alternatives and thus takes up less space in a health care facility. This backdoor path for cost considerations reflects that FDA reviewers understand that a realistic approach to product approval must incorporate costs.

D. General Guidance on Software

As was the case with drugs and devices, the FDA’s scrutiny of software arose out of tragedy when the Therac-25, the first radiation machine controlled primarily by software, overradiated six patients in the United States and Canada between 1985 and 1987, causing serious injuries and three deaths. The FDA responded by issuing a draft document in 1987 commonly known as the “Draft Software Policy,” which attempted to formulate a general policy toward software that varied the level of oversight depending on the risk to the patient.

121. See, e.g., OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 57, at 88-92 (explaining several scenarios in which costs are an implicit factor in FDA decision-making); Cooper, supra note 60, at 802 (“When I was at the agency, discretionary application of economic considerations was unproblematic; and I believe it still is.”).
122. Interview with FDA Reviewer (Aug. 2021) (notes on file with authors).
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
125. For a comprehensive account of these incidents, see Nancy G. Leveson & Clark S. Turner, An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents, 26 IEEE COMPUT. 18 (1993).
The FDA attempted to push this process forward, revising the Draft Software Policy in 1989\textsuperscript{127} and holding public workshops on further proposed changes.\textsuperscript{128} It also included some discussion in its 1996 Quality System Regulation, which underscored the importance of augmenting inspection and testing of software with properly validated quality and design control systems.\textsuperscript{129} As a result, it included “software validation and risk analysis” as part of required procedures for validating device design.\textsuperscript{130}

Despite these attempts, the FDA abandoned the effort in 2005.\textsuperscript{131} Although the FDA simply included the Draft Software Policy in a list of withdrawn guidance without offering any further comment, later pronouncements made clear that the agency had come to believe that software was too complex and fast-moving to be governed by a single overarching policy.\textsuperscript{132} Instead of making rules, the FDA

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{128} See Medical Devices; Medical Software Devices; Notice of Public Workshop, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,886 (July 15, 1996) (announcing joint FDA-National Library of Medicine public workshop on medical software devices to be held on September 3-4, 1996); E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and Regulation of Medical Device Software, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 511, 514-16 (1997) (describing the public workshop described above as well as another workshop in 1996 designed to obtain public feedback on its proposed revisions); Fried & Zuckerman, supra note 19, at 133-36 (describing the second 1996 workshop and the FDA’s intent to issue new guidelines in late 2001).
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Medical Devices; Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Final Rule; Quality System Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,602, 52,606 ¶ 7, 52,617 ¶ 68, 52,630 ¶ 136 (Oct. 7, 1996).
  \item \textsuperscript{130} 21 C.F.R. § 820.30(g) (2023).
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{132} See, e.g., Devices: General Hospital and Personal Use Devices; Reclassification of Medical Device Data Systems, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,498, 7,499 (proposed Feb. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 880) (concluding that increase in the number and complexity of software-based medical devices “have created new considerations for elements of risk that did not previously exist” and that “[b]ased on this history and the complexity and diversity of computer software, FDA decided it would be impractical to prepare one ‘software’ or ‘computer’ policy that would be able to address all the issues related to the regulation of computer- and software-based medical devices’’); Medical Devices; Medical Device Data Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 8,637, 8,638 (Feb. 15, 2011) (“[B]ecause of the history, complexity, and diversity of computer systems and controlling software, it would be impractical to adopt one ‘software’ or ‘computer’ policy to address all computer and software medical devices.”); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff: Mobile Medical Applications 5 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FDA Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Apps], https://www.cdc.gov/clic/docs/addenda/clic0811/T_addendum_FDA_Draft_Guidance_for_Mobile_Medical_Devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/99GL-VPDQ], notice provided at 76 Fed. Reg. 43,689 (July 21, 2011) (concluding that “it would be impractical to
began classifying different types of software as Class I, II, or III devices on a case-by-case basis that provided little guidance for future decisions. The FDA supplemented these adjudications with nonbinding guidance documents on a number of various software-related topics.

Commentators have criticized the ad hoc nature of the FDA’s approach for its failure to provide clear guidance to regulated entities. Congress has also appeared to recognize the FDA’s shortcomings. For example, in 2016, Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act, which specified that medical devices regulated by the FDA exclude software functions intended for administrative support, maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle, electronic patient records, or handling clinical laboratory test results.

Legislative exemptions of specific technologies are likely to be proven as unpredictable as ad hoc regulatory decisions.

Hidden in these guidance documents is a subtle shift toward greater openness to cost-benefit analysis. The FDA’s 2005 Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software Contained in Medical Devices followed the established path of focusing only on


135. See, e.g., Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, supra note 133, at 193; Price, supra note 133, at 443.

health-related concerns when it based the level of recommended documentation on the likelihood that product failure could lead to injury or death for the patient or operator.\footnote{2005 FDA PREMARKET SOFTWARE GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at 4-10.} The 2021 proposed revisions to this guidance continue to focus on health-related concerns, keying the required level of documentation on whether “[a] failure or latent flaw of the device software function(s) could present a probable risk of death or serious injury” to patients, users, or others in the environment of use.\footnote{U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 7-8 (2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/153781/download [https://perma.cc/5WD3-N8HA] (citing 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(w)). This draft guidance was intended to supersede earlier FDA guidance issued in 2005. Id. at Title Page.} At the same time, the 2021 draft guidance creates more room for risk-benefit analysis in its recommendation that software manufacturers assess risk, as well as the acceptability of residual risk, in developing risk management plans.\footnote{Id. at 9, 15-17.} When residual risks are not considered acceptable according to a manufacturer’s risk management plan, “the manufacturer should provide documented evidence to demonstrate that the benefits of the intended use outweigh the residual risk.”\footnote{Id. at 17.} The FDA does not define how to determine the “acceptability” of a risk.\footnote{See id. at 17.} Instead, the guidance instructs manufacturers to develop their own risk-acceptability criteria and then conduct risk-benefit analyses of any residual risks that do not meet the acceptability criteria.\footnote{Id. at 15, 17.}

E. Specific Guidance on Cybersecurity Management

As part of its suite of guidance documents on software, the FDA has issued specific guidance on the management of cybersecurity. Specifically, the FDA issued guidance in 2014 regarding premarket submissions for management of cybersecurity in medical devices.\footnote{U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 4 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 FDA PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE], https://www.fda.gov/media/86174/download [https://perma.cc/C8C9-PHTQ].} It followed that up in 2016 with guidance regarding postmarket...
management of cybersecurity of those same devices. It also released revised draft guidelines on premarket submissions for cybersecurity in 2018. The FDA regards cybersecurity management as part of the software validation and risk analysis required by the Quality System Regulation.

At first glance, these guidance documents appear to adhere to the FDA’s practice of considering only health-related risks and benefits and to disregard economic costs and benefits. For example, the 2014 premarket cybersecurity guidance called on manufacturers to take a risk-based approach, in which risk is defined in terms of harm as measured by “physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment.” Similarly, the 2014 guidance’s endorsement of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s framework of five core cybersecurity functions that every manufacturer should perform focused on “the probable risk of patient harm due to a cybersecurity breach.” It also recommends that manufacturers strike a “balance between cybersecurity safeguards and the usability of the device,” such as by ensuring that “security controls [do] not unreasonably hinder access to a device intended to be used during an emergency situation.”

The 2016 postmarket cybersecurity guidance bore similar signs. First, it repeatedly framed the issue in terms of “patient harm,” which it defined as “physical injury or damage to the health of...
patients, including death.” The discussion of risk management was similarly framed in terms of patient harm. In particular, the core recommendations on risk management focus on “assessing the severity of patient harm” and “evaluating ... the risk of patient harm.”

The 2018 proposed revisions to the 2014 premarket cybersecurity guidance reflect the same approach, framing its recommendations largely in terms of patient harm. Similar to the 2014 guidance, the 2018 draft also defines patient harm as “physical injury or damage” to patient health. It extends the 2014 guidance by recommending that manufacturers “promote the development of trustworthy devices,” again largely framing trustworthiness in terms of patient harm.

But lurking in these cybersecurity guidance documents’ discussions of risk are tantalizing hints of increased willingness to take economic costs and benefits into account. For example, the 2014 premarket guidance’s emphasis on usability provides an angle for taking cost considerations into account indirectly. More explicitly, calling for an “[a]ssessment of residual risk and risk acceptance criteria” acknowledges that complete remediation of cybersecurity risk is not always possible. The 2014 premarket guidance provides no basis for determining what types of risks are acceptable. The 2014 premarket guidance further recommends that manufacturers provide justifications for the security features they choose to incorporate but again provides no further details on what would constitute a valid justification.

The FDA’s 2016 postmarket cybersecurity guidance provides further hints at cost-benefit balancing when it reiterates the recommendation in the 2014 premarket cybersecurity guidance that manufacturers undertake “[a]ssessment[s] of residual risk and risk

152. Id. at 10.
153. Id. at 15.
154. Id. at 17.
155. 2018 FDA PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 145, at 5, 10, 12.
156. See id. at 8.
157. Id. at 9, 12
158. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
159. 2014 FDA PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 143, at 4.
160. See id.
161. See id.
acceptance criteria."162 After defining cybersecurity risk in terms of exploitability and severity of patient harm, the guidance states that a “controlled risk is present when there is sufficiently low (acceptable) residual risk of patient harm,” whereas “[u]ncontrolled risk is present when there is unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to inadequate compensating controls and risk mitigations.”163

The 2016 postmarket guidance recommends a series of changes and compensating actions that help address both types of risks and lays out examples of both controlled and uncontrolled risks and their management.164

The 2018 draft premarket cybersecurity guidance follows the lead of the earlier guidance in calling for an “assessment of residual risk and risk acceptance criteria,” again without defining what those criteria might be.165 It adds another level to the analysis by using risk levels to divide devices into two tiers, with higher levels of documentation required of devices posing greater cybersecurity risks to patients.166 The 2018 draft guidance also recommends that manufacturers design devices that are “trustworthy,” with the requirements varying by tier of cybersecurity risk.167 According to the draft guidance, trustworthy devices “(1) [are] reasonably secure from cybersecurity intrusion and misuse; (2) provide[ ] a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; (3) [are] reasonably suited to performing [their] intended functions; and (4) adhere[ ] to generally accepted security procedures.”168

In terms of cybersecurity, the 2014 and 2016 guidelines and the 2018 draft guidelines all recognize the need to tolerate an acceptable level of residual risk.169 Although none specifies how that level should be set, together they implicitly acknowledge that some risks cannot be addressed without undue costs.170 Furthermore, the

162. 2016 FDA POSTMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 144, at 13.
163. Id. at 9, 12.
164. Id. at 19-24.
165. See 2018 FDA PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 145, at 9.
166. See id. at 11, 21.
167. Id. at 11.
168. Id. at 8.
169. See id. at 11; 2014 FDA PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 143, at 4; 2016 FDA POSTMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 144, at 19-24.
170. See 2014 FDA PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 143, at 4; 2016 FDA POSTMARKET CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 144, at 19-24; 2018 FDA PREMARKET
repeated references to reasonableness in the 2018 draft guidance also seem to invite consideration of costs.\textsuperscript{171}

The FDA has even hinted its recognition that clearer standards are needed to define an acceptable level of risk in medical software devices. Its 2021 action plan on artificial intelligence and machine learning software acknowledged—but did not answer—“numerous questions” from stakeholders related to the appropriate level of risk management.\textsuperscript{172} The action plan also noted stakeholders’ widespread feedback expressing “the need for clarity and direction in this area,”\textsuperscript{173} an indication that the FDA recognizes the need for a more definite cost-benefit framework.

In any event, existing practices permit the FDA to take economic costs and benefits into account indirectly when determining the appropriate level of cybersecurity. For example, given that any increase in cybersecurity requirements necessarily would require additional processing or storage and would affect battery life, the FDA can fit economic considerations into its practice of considering whether additional measures to improve safety or effectiveness might increase the size of the device.\textsuperscript{174}

III. APPROACHES TO DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF CYBERSECURITY

The foregoing analysis suggests that the FDA possesses the legal authority to take economic costs into account when assessing medical devices in general and software in particular. This Part addresses whether the FDA should exercise that authority and, if so, how.
A. The Case of Cybersecurity

The need to balance economic costs and benefits looms particularly large for cybersecurity. As an initial matter, minimizing the potential health dangers that would result if a medical device were hacked should be an inherent part of the FDA’s statutory obligation to provide a reasonable assurance of safety. However, similar to other software issues, cybersecurity was not the intended object of the regulatory scheme devised for the FDA decades ago. The result is a jarring mismatch between the FDA’s approach to regulation and the unique needs of software and cybersecurity.

Furthermore, cybersecurity harm cannot be reduced to a statistical probability, making perfect cybersecurity impossible. As noted earlier, no matter how much manufacturers spend on cybersecurity, their devices will never be 100 percent secure. Designers cannot predict the innovations of malicious actors, and the unbounded nature of physical inputs means unbounded risks. In cybersecurity, a notion of acceptable risk is inevitable. As a result, a “reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness” in the context of cybersecurity cannot be accomplished without some type of cost-benefit analysis.

B. Possible Approaches to Taking Economic Cost into Account

Although the FDA would be taking an important step in construing the FDCA as permitting consideration of costs in medical device cybersecurity, doing so would still leave many questions unresolved. Simply put, many approaches exist to taking costs into consideration. In this Section, we consider three approaches: the FTC’s cost-benefit test, the risk-utility calculus from tort law, and Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratios (ICERs) that have become increasingly popular in some health care circles.

175. Cf. Wellington, supra note 5, at 190-91.
176. See supra Part I.
177. See Pot, supra note 45.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
1. The FTC’s Cost-Benefit Test

As discussed in Part II, the FTC uses a de facto cost-benefit analysis to assess whether conduct is unfair.\(^\text{182}\) The test assesses whether the injury caused by a particular practice outweighs the benefits of that practice.\(^\text{183}\) Benefits include economic costs because lower costs create a benefit to consumers.

The FDA could adopt the FTC’s de facto cost-benefit analysis. In this case, the FDA would assess each decision by a designer to include or omit a cybersecurity feature, asking whether the harm is outweighed by the benefits of that decision. The cost savings from omitting a feature would factor into the benefits, as would any positive impact on functionality. Thus, this cost-benefit analysis would require designers to show that the benefits—the reduced cost and increased functionality—associated with omitting a cybersecurity feature exceed the increased risk of cybersecurity harm.

Just as the FTC has discretion in enforcing unfair and deceptive practices, this approach would provide discretion to the FDA in evaluating cybersecurity practices. Discretionary enforcement could be used to target offenders in a way that balances security precautions with promoting innovation.\(^\text{184}\)

This approach provides a clear cost-benefit test while emphasizing flexibility because of the discretion available to the enforcing agency. Furthermore, the approach has strong legal justification because the FTC’s authorizing statute matches the FDA’s in its statutory silence on the consideration of financial costs.\(^\text{185}\)

2. Tort Standards

Tort law has, over the years, involved a variety of standards for product liability. At one point, many courts applied strict liability, imposing liability regardless of the seller’s fault.\(^\text{186}\) But pushback

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182. See supra Part II.B.
185. See supra Part II.B.
occurred as observers noted that “[n]o one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is to cause injury.”\textsuperscript{187} Since then, courts, legislatures, and regulators have sought to reform product liability standards.\textsuperscript{188} Today, states primarily apply one of two tests, or some combination of the two, for product liability: the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test.\textsuperscript{189} Although most states have yet to fully adopt the Third Restatement’s approach to product liability, the risk-utility test has become the dominant standard for design defects.\textsuperscript{190}

These tests have resulted from different iterations of the Restatement of Torts as policymakers debated how far the optimal standard should depart from strict liability. The Second Restatement of Torts established the consumer expectations test.\textsuperscript{191} It asks whether a product is defective because the product is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner.\textsuperscript{192}

Some states apply a consumer expectations test to tort liability claims for medical devices.\textsuperscript{193} This test, however, turned out to pose multiple problems in practice.\textsuperscript{194} Critics, for example, have noted that it can reward designers who fail to adopt cost-effective measures that could solve obvious threats to safety.\textsuperscript{195} Furthermore, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Id. at 288.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{189} See id. at 298 (“Although the consumer expectations test is withering as the true, sole test for strict products liability in tort, ... it remains the principal, or only, test of liability in a number (if dwindling) of states.”); id. at 299 (“Most courts, dissatisfied with the consumer expectations test and recognizing the advantages of the calculus-of-risk principles of negligence law, use some form of ‘risk-utility’ ... test.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 515 (“More recently, however, reflecting the combined warranty-tort heritage of products liability law, and because of inadequacies in consumer expectations as an exclusive standard, many courts have begun to blend the two tests in one way or another.” (footnote omitted)).
  \item \textsuperscript{190} Id. at 490-91.
  \item \textsuperscript{191} See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1965).
  \item \textsuperscript{192} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{194} Owen, supra note 186, at 294-97 (discussing the practical problems that arise when courts try to implement the consumer expectations test).
  \item \textsuperscript{195} Id. at 488 “[A] dire consequence of the consumer expectations test, unless its plain consequences are baldly ignored, is that it perversely rewards manufacturers for failing to adopt cost-effective measures to remedy glaring dangers to human life and limb. The failure of the consumer expectations test to deal adequately with the obvious danger problem profoundly weakens the usefulness of this test and effectively disqualifies it for principled use
\end{itemize}
consumer expectations test is ill-suited for complex medical devices that do not parallel normal consumer products purchased at a store.196 A Florida court held that “the consumer expectations test cannot be logically applied here, where the product in question is a complex medical device available to an ordinary consumer only as an incident to a medical procedure. After all, medical device manufacturers generally do not market their products to ‘ordinary consumers.’”197 In practice, the consumer expectations test is so complex that even when courts officially use the consumer expectations test, they actually apply some form of cost-benefit analysis to determine design defects.198

In response, the Third Restatement represented a full shift away from strict liability and toward the standard of negligence by replacing the consumer expectations test with the risk-utility test.199 This test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable alternative design.200 Under the risk-utility test, courts must “assess[] design defectiveness according to whether the safety benefits of remedying a design danger [a]re worth the costs.”201 This analysis, by itself, resembles the standard currently applied by the FDA, which evaluates whether safety risks outweigh the benefits of a product’s effectiveness.202 But the reasonable alternative design requirement adds another layer that the FDA could adopt. Under the reasonable alternative design requirement, courts

as the sole basis for determining defects in design.” (footnotes omitted)).


197. Cavanaugh, 308 So. 3d at 155 (footnote omitted).

198. See OWEN, supra note 186, at 489 (“[S]ome courts that use the consumer expectations test limit the applicability of the test to cases involving simple, rather than complex, product designs and accident mechanisms.... Some courts and legislatures are more generally blending the consumer expectations test with the risk-utility standard.”).

199. See id. at 298-99 (discussing the decline of the consumer expectations test and the shift to the risk-utility test).

200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. L. INST. 1997); see also, e.g., Cavanaugh, 308 So. 3d at 153.

201. OWEN, supra note 186, at 490.

202. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1) (2023) (“There is reasonable assurance that a device is safe when ... the probable benefits to health from use of the device ... outweigh any probable risks.”).
assess “whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design by the seller ... rendered the product not reasonably safe.” This is somewhat analogous to the Hand Test, which requires cost-justified precautions where marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost. The “reasonable cost” requirement, if adopted by the FDA, would enable the agency to require only a standard of safety that is justified by costs.

Given the impractical application of the consumer expectations test to medical device cybersecurity, only the risk-utility test would make sense as an option for the FDA. This approach would be one already familiar to designers, but it leaves unclear the specific level of risk that is “reasonable.” Although preemption of state tort law by the FDA is a contested issue, we need not address this issue here. If tort law is preempted, the FDA would simply adopt versions of the tort standards as regulatory standards. Although adopting tort standards that have been preempted carries some irony, embodiment in federal law would provide a uniform standard that would replace the myriad approaches taken by different states.

That said, the alternative design approach makes a poor fit with software. This is because the standard approach of comparing the cost of the alternative design with its benefit is inapt for products such as software because differences in the cost of the actual products are negligible and the real differences lie in development costs.

203. Restatement (Third) of Torts, supra note 200, § 2 cmt. d.
204. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
205. 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
3. Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratios (ICERs)

Health economists commonly use Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratios (ICERs) to measure cost effectiveness, and the FDA could adopt this framework to determine the optimal level of risk. Under this approach, the FDA would set a clear standard requiring any cybersecurity improvement that is cost-effective.

An ICER compares the marginal cost of a proposed intervention to its marginal effectiveness. The lower the value of an ICER, the more cost-effective an intervention. If an ICER for an intervention is lower than a predefined threshold of cost-effectiveness, then the intervention is considered cost-effective.

Using this approach, the FDA would set a threshold ICER to delineate which cybersecurity features are cost effective. The FDA would need to collect data on the costs and effectiveness of cybersecurity features to establish the ICER for each possible security feature. Designers would then be responsible for including any cybersecurity intervention that falls within that threshold. As part of this standard, designers would need to account for updates. If an update would be cost effective, then it would be required.

A major challenge would be defining “effectiveness.” Common metrics of effectiveness, such as Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), and Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), pose multiple challenges and can be controversial. They attempt to monetize the value of benefits by

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208. See Peter Muenning & Mark Bounthavong, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health 9-10 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing the primary use of ICER in comparing pharmaceuticals and other medical products).
209. Cf. id.
210. Id. (stating that the equation is: ICER = (Cost of Alternative 2 - Cost of Alternative 1) / (Effectiveness of Alternative 2 - Effectiveness of Alternative 1).
211. See id.
estimating the value of life, but such issues tend to be highly controversial.\textsuperscript{214} For example, one scholar, arguing against the use of QALYs in drug reviews, criticized the QALY methodology for incorporating subjective values that are “at [their] root, random.”\textsuperscript{215} He further noted that reliance on the QALY could discourage research on rare diseases, which minimally improve societal QALYs.\textsuperscript{216} More viscerally, the commentator derided the question of what a year of life is worth, saying, “[i]f I was asked that question about one of my children, my answer would be ‘limitless,’ and no one could persuade me otherwise. But others are putting a discrete price tag on it.”\textsuperscript{217}

Even accepting the usefulness of such metrics, these metrics are particularly complex to estimate in the context of cybersecurity.\textsuperscript{218} Effectiveness would need to be defined by the estimated reduction in risk of harm related to cybersecurity. Change in risk of harm would be measured in terms of lives saved or improved. An intervention could be effective either by reducing the likelihood of a cybersecurity event or by mitigating the harm that such an event would have if it occurred. The baseline level of risk, too, would be difficult to estimate.\textsuperscript{219} For future black swan events, probability and magnitude of harm may involve considerable speculation, especially for emerging technologies for which we have not had a chance to collect extensive data.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{215} Smith, \textit{supra} note 213.
\textsuperscript{216} Id.
\textsuperscript{217} Id.
\textsuperscript{218} Dan Geer, \textit{For Good Measure: Security Measurement in the Present Tense}, 45; LOGIN: 72, 73 (2020), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/login_fall20_16_geer.pdf [https://perma.cc/C32R-M75N] (“Is something like DALY more like what we should be measuring in cybersecurity? Or is measurement of either the QALY and DALY sorts built on assumptions that don’t actually obtain in cybersecurity? For that matter, where are the tails of distributions getting heavier—the prodromes of black swan events?”).
\textsuperscript{219} Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, \textit{Risk Perception, Tort Liability, and Emerging Technologies}, BROOKINGS (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/risk-perception-tort-liability-and-emerging-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/W7BU-55TQ] (“[M]any risk factors—related to the ways in which humans interact with machines, the ways in which different components and different products interact with each other, and the ways in which consumers are harmed—may be difficult to predict ex-ante.”).
\textsuperscript{220} See id.
Effectiveness should also take into account external benefits—benefits not directly affecting patients. Such benefits may affect, for example, hospital systems or providers. External benefits, however, may be vague and difficult to quantify. Reliance on such measures could draw criticism that overestimation of benefits leads to unduly burdensome requirements.

Once effectiveness has been defined, regulators must decide on the threshold of cost-effectiveness. Doing so essentially requires putting a dollar amount on life. This can be determined, for example, using willingness-to-pay data measuring consumers’ valuation of life, but the reliability and applicability of such data have been criticized.

Once ICER calculations are complete, the standard would provide the clearest guidance for designers. However, this approach is the most granular and thus the most difficult to implement. Furthermore, the FDA has been reluctant to rely on QALYs or DALYs in the past, reflecting a wariness of societal aversion to putting a price tag on life.


C. Choosing the Best Approach

Ultimately, the FDA needs to choose a method of balancing costs and benefits. The exact flavor of cost-benefit analysis is less important. But of the three options, we suggest that the FTC’s cost-benefit analysis is the best fit because it provides a clear test, enables agency discretion, and has the best statutory justification.

First, this approach defines a clear test: a cybersecurity feature must be included if its benefits outweigh its costs. Granted, calculating benefits and costs is not always straightforward.\textsuperscript{226} Nonetheless, these can be estimated. The analysis would provide a clearer standard than the risk utility test that ambiguously requires “reasonable cost.”\textsuperscript{227} Although ICER calculations could also provide a clear test, the FDA would save resources using the FTC approach because it need not calculate the costs and benefits of every potential cybersecurity feature for every medical device, as would be required by the ICER option.

Second, the FTC’s cost-benefit approach permits the FDA discretion in what to enforce. The FDA can thus save resources by conducting analyses only when choosing to take enforcement action for a particular device. In addition, the FDA can strategically employ its discretion to target offenders in a way that balances security precautions with promoting innovation. Additionally, unlike with the reasonable alternative test under tort law, the FTC approach does not require the FDA to reject anything for which a reasonable alternative exists. Rather, the FDA need simply require that the device’s features provide greater benefit than harm, and doctors and patients will remain free to choose from multiple reasonable alternatives.

Third, the FTC’s cost-benefit approach has the most defensible statutory basis. As discussed in Part II, the authorizing statutes for


\textsuperscript{227} See \textit{RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS}, supra note 200, § 2 cmt. d.
both the FTC and the FDA make no mention of cost-benefit analysis or consideration of economic costs, yet the FTC has a well-established practice of applying these analyses. The FDA’s adoption of this practice should be analogously defensible.

Even if the FDA prefers a different method of weighing costs and benefits, however, we make no strong objections. Good-faith arguments may exist for a variety of approaches. Moreover, a cost-benefit analysis need not be the sole factor in cybersecurity decisions. But the FDA must use some manner of cost-benefit analysis to remedy the current inadequacies in cybersecurity regulation.

CONCLUSION

Until the FDA steps up, cybersecurity standards for medical devices will remain problematically unclear. In this Article, we explained the pressing need for defining an optimal level of cybersecurity in medical cyber-physical devices, for which perfect security is unfeasible. Some form of cost-benefit analysis is the logical solution to informing the right standard for security. We examined the statutory constraints on the FDA’s ability to conduct cost-benefit analyses, and we argued that the FDA does have justification to consider economic costs in evaluating devices, especially in the context of cybersecurity. We then assessed three approaches that the FDA could adopt to weigh costs and benefits of cybersecurity features. We concluded that adoption of the FTC’s implicit cost-benefit analysis would be most practical and statutorily justifiable.

But even if there is disagreement over which cost-benefit approach the FDA should adopt, the critical point is that at least one approach should be adopted. The FDA cannot go on ignoring economic costs and failing to set a clear standard for cybersecurity. The impossibility of eliminating cybersecurity risks, the unbounded

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228. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Michael Mattioli, Steve Myers, Austin Brady, Yvette Wang & Stephanie Wong, Securing the Internet of Healthcare, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 405, 414 (2018) (noting “the growing sentiment with regards to the utility of treating cybersecurity not just as an exercise in cost-benefit analysis, but as a social responsibility”).
possibilities of inputs for cyber-physical devices, and the indeterminable probability of deliberate cyberattacks make it impossible to determine optimal cybersecurity unless costs are weighed against benefits.

This Article has been an exercise in the FDA-regulated medical device space. But cyber-physical systems exist across fields, from autonomous vehicles to smart grid sensors. The continuing expansion of cyber-physical systems and their unique cybersecurity concerns calls for a great deal of further research.