Extrajudicial Statements and Prejudice in the Digital Age: Creating Factors to Preserve the Balance Between Attorney and State Interests in Trial Litigation

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EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AND PREJUDICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CREATING FACTORS TO PRESERVE THE BALANCE BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND STATE INTERESTS IN TRIAL LITIGATION

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INTRODUCTION

As social media’s prevalence and usage grows within the United States, people and organizations capitalize on new media to send news to users.1 In 2017, 67 percent of people consumed their news from social media websites, and the rate continues to grow.2 Local and national news sources bring newsworthy stories to active users on social media sites such as Twitter, where users can communicate and interact with one another to promote ideas and spread information.3 These online accounts cover not only mundane, day-to-day news, but also salacious stories relating to civil and criminal lawsuits.4

In April 2018, attorney Neal Katyal used his Twitter account to advocate for his client leading up to oral argument before the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii.5 Katyal posted personal statements voicing his opinion about the case and retweeted posts linking to news articles and amicus briefs that supported his...

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argument. With nearly 284,000 followers, many people could view and perceive the arguments Katyal would make at oral argument. Katyal’s persistent tweeting enabled him to have “extra” argument time in the court of public opinion, as advocates are allowed only a specific number of minutes to argue before the Supreme Court.

Attorneys also post statements on Twitter referring to criminal cases when an alleged offender stands trial for a crime in a local venue. Scholars and practitioners voice additional concerns about an attorney’s extrajudicial statements made during criminal trials in local venues because laypeople serve on juries. The media’s publishing of a lawyer’s out-of-court comment could prejudice jurors


before and during a trial.\footnote{Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489-90, 496.} Because of this concern, the American Bar Association (ABA) enacted Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (Rule 3.6), which attempts to limit the types of speech attorneys can make while involved in litigation.\footnote{MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019). The Model Rules and ABA advisory opinions are not binding on state proceedings. See Cheryl B. Preston, Lawyers’ Abuse of Technology, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 884, 888 (2018). However, most states have ethical codes that are similar or identical to the ABA Model Rules. Id. at 884 & n.10.}

Although a state seeks to protect a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and its own interest in the fair administration of justice,\footnote{See Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975); Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490, 494.} courts and disciplinary boards must balance these interests against an attorney’s First Amendment free speech right when determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 3.6.\footnote{See Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489 (asserting that an attorney’s right to free speech is not absolute, but that the interest must still be acknowledged throughout a proceeding); see also Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250.} Comment 1 to Rule 3.6 notes that a lawyer’s statements have value, as a lawyer is often in the best position to disseminate pertinent case-related information to the public.\footnote{See r. 3.6 cmt. 1.} Attorneys may need to release this information to expose government abuse, ensure that citizens remain safe, or promote discussions about changing public policy.\footnote{See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250; r. 3.6 cmt. 1.} To effectively balance these rights, the standard described in Rule 3.6 requires courts and disciplinary boards\footnote{This Note is primarily focused on a court’s interpretation of Rule 3.6. It is important to note that decision makers of a state bar’s disciplinary board often must interpret the rule to make an initial sanctions determination. These decision makers, too, would benefit from this Note’s proposal.} to consider various factors in determining whether an attorney’s statement results in a “substantial likelihood of prejudice” to the proceeding.\footnote{See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (time of statement); Bauer, 522 F.2d at 256-58 (nature of the proceeding); r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (nature of the proceeding); see also r. 3.6(b)-(c) (listing specific statements an attorney may make during trial).} By requiring courts to consider the factors, the ABA and the adopting states ensure that the rule is narrowly tailored to protect
as much attorney speech as possible while still promoting state and defendant interests.¹⁹

For over thirty years, these factors have enabled decision makers to balance these rights effectively when faced with attorney statements published in traditional media outlets.²⁰ Yet in a new age of Internet communication and social media, the original factors noted in the ABA rule and comments do not sufficiently protect attorney speech posted on online forums.²¹ This Note argues that a new technological-focused comment to Rule 3.6 will remedy this problem.

In today’s online world, scholars and practitioners constantly remind attorneys to take caution when posting statements online, because confidential and inappropriate information will spread across the web and reach large numbers of people at accelerated speeds.²² With this perception prevalent within the legal community, a judge—ruling on a case involving attorney statements made on social media—could find that there is a substantial likelihood that the online statements will prejudice a trial.²³

Although Internet communications and social media outlets give users the opportunity to spread information to more people at faster rates,²⁴ it does not necessarily follow that all attorney statements posted online about litigation will be seen by potential jurors within the court’s jurisdiction. Numerous factors make it less likely that a potential juror will see an online statement, including the attorney’s social media account privacy settings, the attorney’s number of followers, the functions the attorney uses on a specific medium to

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¹⁹. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 83-84, 87-88.
²¹. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. Other authors have made similar arguments about an attorney’s use of social media altering the balance between a lawyer’s speech rights and the state’s interest in the fair administration of justice. See, e.g., Emily Anne Vance, Note, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?: The Need for New Restraints in Light of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 367, 406 (2015). However, other authors noted that the advancement of social media technologies required increased limitations on lawyers’ speech. See id. This Note argues that additional factors must be implemented to better protect a lawyers’ speech rights on social media.
²². See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 67; Preston, supra note 12, at 893, 898-99.
²⁴. Thornburg, supra note 1, at 257-58.
make a statement more searchable, and the ability of a potential juror to be inundated with statements from nonfollowers.25

This Note argues that by creating a new, additional comment to Rule 3.6 that lists the factors to consider when faced with an attorney’s social media statement, judges will be in a better position to determine if an attorney’s statement reaches and prejudices a jury. The inclusion of such factors can aid decision makers who may be unfamiliar with how attorneys can protect information on social media.26 The new considerations, designed for a new age of social media use, can help shift back into place the balancing of rights that judges have achieved when applying the rule to statements presented in traditional media.

In applying Rule 3.6 to social media statements, a judge must first understand how courts have applied Rule 3.6 to traditional media statements and the factors that make traditional media statements different from social media statements.27 Part I discusses Rule 3.6 and explains how courts apply the rule to statements that lawyers make in traditional-media outlets. Part II describes the problems that derive from a judge’s application of Rule 3.6 to statements lawyers make online. Part III lists and describes new factors for a judge to consider when ruling on a case that involves an attorney’s social media statements. Using these factors, a judge achieves a better balance between an attorney’s speech interests and a state’s interest in obtaining fair and just proceedings.28 Lastly, Part IV analyzes counterarguments and assures readers that new factors will not unjustly promote lawyer speech interests at the expense of state interests.

25. See infra Part III.

26. Judges may be unfamiliar with how information spreads on social media, or the precautions users take to prevent dissemination of statements on social media, because many judges do not have social media accounts. See Stephen Dillard, It’s Time for Judges to Tweet, Like, and Share, A.B.A. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://abaforlawstudents.com/2017/10/20/time-for-judges-to-use-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/4HPP-HMPX] (noting that many judges do not have social media accounts because they consider their roles as neutral arbiters to limit their abilities to have a significant presence as public figures). But see Thornburg, supra note 1, at 258-62, 264 (listing prominent judges who have Twitter accounts, and advocating for judges to use social media outlets to promote transparency).

27. See infra Parts I-III.

28. See infra Part III.
I. BACKGROUND: COMPETING INTERESTS, SPEECH RESTRICTIONS, AND THE TRIAL PUBLICITY RULE

Before reviewing the history and legal standards of Rule 3.6, one must understand the purpose of the rule.

A. Purposes and Balancing of Conflicting Rights

Rule 3.6 seeks to balance conflicting interests: an attorney’s right to free speech, a state’s interest in the fair administration of justice, and a defendant’s right to a fair trial in a criminal proceeding. Each interest and right serves an important function for democracy and the American justice system.

1. State Interests

When applying Rule 3.6, judges must consider state interests, such as the fair administration of justice and a defendant’s right to a fair trial. A court must ensure that a judicial proceeding is fair. Additionally, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right requires that a defendant be given a fair trial. A fair trial is “the most fundamental of all freedoms,” and is “particularly acute in the criminal context” in which a defendant’s physical liberty is at stake. Because of the high stakes, a jury must ascertain the truth and reach the correct determination based solely on admissible evidence presented at trial.

29. See In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982); Radu, supra note 10, at 497; Vance, supra note 21, at 372; see also U.S. Const. amends. I, VI.
30. Other interests include preserving public confidence in the judiciary and maintaining the integrity of the profession. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 83-84. However, these interests are protected by other Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.1-8.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
31. See Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489.
32. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490.
34. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490.
35. Id.; Radu, supra note 10, at 513.
Jurors should be impartial and know little about a case before a trial begins.\textsuperscript{36} For these reasons, professional rules limit the amount of influence out-of-court statements have on trial participants to prevent frustrating the functions of the jury and the adversarial system.\textsuperscript{37} An attorney’s extrajudicial statements may potentially influence jurors and other participants who actively contribute to ongoing litigation.\textsuperscript{38} By acquiring knowledge about a case that is not in a public record or presented in the courtroom, the public could be misled by the statements, a juror could become biased, or the jury could find the defendant guilty based on grounds that were not presented at trial.\textsuperscript{39} The information could impair the jury’s ultimate factfinding mission and “wreck the intricate machinery of the criminal justice system.”\textsuperscript{40} Additionally, the risk of harm may increase when an attorney makes statements to the press because an attorney holds great influence that could cause a juror to accept that statement as reliable and true.\textsuperscript{41}

### 2. Attorney Interests

The competing interest Rule 3.6 recognizes is an attorney’s freedom of expression.\textsuperscript{42} Even while participating in the legal profession, attorneys as U.S. citizens “are entitled to the ... protection of the First Amendment.”\textsuperscript{43} The drafters of Rule 3.6 recognized this when writing comment 1, which states that “there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about ... legal proceedings .... [The public] has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern.”\textsuperscript{44} Further, the comment states that “the

\begin{itemize}
  \item 36. See Radu, supra note 10, at 513.
  \item 38. See Hinds, 449 A.2d at 494; see also Vance, supra note 21, at 370.
  \item 39. See Vance, supra note 21, at 370.
  \item 40. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 494.
  \item 41. See id. at 489 (recognizing an attorney’s “special status” as an officer of the court); Radu, supra note 10, at 531 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044, 1074 (1991)).
  \item 42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
  \item 43. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489.
  \item 44. R. 3.6 cmt. 1.
\end{itemize}
subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in
debate and deliberation over questions of public policy."45

By speaking about litigation, lawyers keep government officials
accountable and aid in increasing safety, governmental transpar-
ency, and debate about public policy.46 A lawyer’s statement made
during litigation facilitates these goals, as a lawyer will already
have the public’s attention when the media covers the alleged crime
and trial.47

Additionally, defense attorneys are obligated to zealously
advocate for their clients.48 Lawyers are skilled in giving voice to
their clients’ cases by disputing misconceptions and discouraging
speculation.49 Based on negative information found in public records
or statements made by the prosecution during a press conference,
the public may already presume the accused is guilty of the alleged
crime.50 A defense attorney must be able to counter presumptions of
guilt by portraying the defendant’s innocence to the press and
citizens within the jurisdiction.51

Some scholars contend that attorneys automatically waive their
free speech rights when joining the legal profession, suggesting that
any balancing between a lawyer’s right to free expression and a
defendant’s right to a fair trial will always weigh in favor of
defendant and state interests.52 This simply is not the case.
Although an attorney may be subject to more speech restrictions
than a nonattorney citizen, attorneys still retain rights to free
expression that “cannot be restricted unless certain conditions
apply.”53 Traditionally, when a government regulation directly

45. Id.
46. See id.
48. See Radu, supra note 10, at 531.
49. Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The “Friend”ly Lawyer: Professionalism and Ethical
Considerations of the Use of Social Networking During Litigation, 24 U. Fl.(a. J.L. & PUB. POLY
50. See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250.
51. See id.
52. Preston, supra note 12, at 891-92 (“Attorneys knowingly and willingly enter into a
highly regulated profession, implicitly waiving the right to ... expression.”).
53. Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 83. The Court’s statement in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada that “during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is
extremely circumscribed,” shows that the Court does acknowledge an attorney’s right to free
speech. 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); see also id. at 1082 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“This does
prescribes what a person may and may not say, courts must determine whether the state has a compelling interest in restricting speech and whether the rule regulating the speech is narrowly tailored to achieve the state interest. As described above, the interests implicated when attempting to limit an attorney’s extrajudicial statements are sufficiently important to warrant regulation. The question thus becomes, is “this disciplinary rule ... broader than necessary or essential to protect [the] governmental interest.”

3. Balancing Conflicting Interests

In considering whether state variations of Rule 3.6 are sufficiently tailored, courts must determine whether the regulations are too vague or too broad. The language of Rule 3.6 and the subsequent comments provide great detail so that lawyers may recognize the types of speech they can express in a public forum, the standard of review the court will apply, and the factors a court will consider when determining whether a statement is likely to prejudice a proceeding. The detailed language of the rule suggests that, in traditional media, courts can strike an appropriate balance between conflicting rights because the only speech prohibited is that which is “necessary” or “essential” to protect the fair administration of justice and the right to a fair trial.

However, as discussed below, with the rise of social media technologies, the factors and exceptions listed in Rule 3.6 no longer

not mean, of course, that lawyers forfeit their First Amendment rights.

54. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 75.
55. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
56. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490.
57. See Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249, 251 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting that lawyers must be aware of prohibited areas of speech and stating that a rule cannot prohibit more speech than necessary to protect the other right at stake).
58. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.6(a)-(c) cmts. 3, 5-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
59. See id.
effectively protect a lawyer’s speech rights. Thus, the rule permits
courts to unjustly tip the balance in favor of the state interests and
prohibit more speech than necessary to prevent jury prejudice. Yet
before reviewing the faults of Rule 3.6, one must understand how
courts have traditionally regulated a lawyer’s extrajudicial speech.

B. Rule 3.6 and Extrajudicial Statements

Model Rule 3.6(a) provides:

A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investi-
gation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial
statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will
be disseminated by means of public communication and will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

For this rule to apply, a person must (1) be a lawyer, who (2)
participates in the litigation, and (3) makes a statement that he or
she (4) knows or should know will be released to a public audience,
and (5) the public statement must be substantially likely to
prejudice the outcome of a trial or the jury venire. In past extraju-
dicial statement cases involving traditional media, lawyers have
mostly disputed the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice”
element. As discussed below, with the advancement of social-
media technologies, attorneys may contest additional elements.

The American Bar Association began regulating pretrial pub-
licity in 1908 by enacting Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional

60. See infra Parts II-III.
61. See infra Parts II-III.
62. R. 3.6(a). For more information about presumed prejudicial and nonprejudicial
communications, see r. 3.6(b) cmt. 5.
63. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991); r. 3.6(a); Radu, supra note
10, at 517.
64. See, e.g., Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036; Graham v. Weber, No. CIV13-4100, 2015 WL
5797857, at *8-9 (D.S.D. Oct. 5, 2015). However, some cases have disputed other factors,
including whether an attorney is a participant of the ongoing investigation or litigation. See
In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2016); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496-97 (N.J.
1982).
65. See infra Part II.A.
The ABA intended for the 1908 rule to deter lawyers from speaking to the press; however, such deterrence was minimal because courts rarely enforced the rule. After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent murder of the assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, the Warren Commission analyzed the media's coverage of the J.F.K. assassination and suggested that if Lee Harvey Oswald had never been killed, he likely would not have received a fair trial due to the widespread media coverage following the assassination. After assessing the Warren Commission's concerns, the ABA House of Delegates revised the extrajudicial statement ethical rule and used a "reasonable likelihood of prejudice" standard to determine whether a court could restrict a lawyer's speech. In 1969, the ABA incorporated the rule into its newly formed Model Code of Professional Responsibility.

Many states incorporated this model rule into their own state codes of conduct, and federal and state courts began ruling on whether the "reasonable likelihood" standard passed constitutional muster. Some courts found that the low standard prohibited too much attorney speech and ruled that decision makers use a "clear and present danger" test to determine whether a lawyer's speech prejudiced a jury. As a result of these cases, the ABA Task Force on Fair Trial and Free Press drafted new language codifying an "imminent threat" standard; however, the ABA House of Delegates never approved the change.

Rather, in 1983, the ABA codified the "substantial likelihood of material[ ] prejudice[ ]" standard when it issued its Model Rules of Professional Conduct and implemented Model Rule 3.6. Practitioners and scholars viewed the standard as a middle ground, attempting to split the difference between jurisdictions that were using the

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67. Id. at 499-500 (explaining that judges determined the rule was too vague for enforcement).
68. Id. at 500.
69. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 505.
71. Id. at 505-06.
72. In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 492 (N.J. 1982); Radu, supra note 10, at 506.
73. Radu, supra note 10, at 508-09.
74. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).

C. The Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Formulation in *Gentile*

The Supreme Court found that Nevada’s “substantial likelihood” standard was constitutional in *Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada*. There, the defendant’s lawyer, Dominic Gentile, spoke at a press conference after his client was indicted on criminal charges. Gentile said that his client was innocent of all charges. He then described his strategy for arguing the case at trial, noting specific pieces of evidence that placed guilt on other suspects. The jury acquitted Gentile’s client at trial six months later. The Nevada State Bar filed a complaint against Gentile for violating Nevada’s rule of professional conduct. Gentile was sanctioned, and as a result, he filed a claim stating the rule’s “substantial likelihood of prejudice” standard was unconstitutional. The Court ultimately ruled that Nevada’s substantial likelihood standard was the appropriate standard to use in the case; the Court then found in favor of Gentile by holding that his statements were not substantially likely to prejudice a jury.

In the opinion, the Justices noted that the substantial likelihood standard is an effective standard to use because the rule, if “interpreted in a proper and narrow manner,” can “prevent an attorney ... from releasing information of grave prejudice on the eve

75. *Id.*; see also Hinds, 449 A.2d at 492.
77. See 501 U.S. at 1030.
78. *Id.* at 1036.
79. See *id.* at 1033.
80. *Id.* at 1059 app. a.
81. *Id.* at 1060 app. a.
82. *Id.* at 1033.
83. *Id.* Nevada’s extrajudicial statement rule was “almost identical to” the then-existing ABA Model Rule 3.6. *Id.*
84. *Id.*
85. See *id.* at 1037-38.
of jury selection.”86 The rule, therefore, is meant only to prohibit attorney speech that causes “substantial harm.”87

Courts and practitioners have interpreted the “substantial likelihood of prejudice” standard in different ways. For example, the Oregon State Bar considers prejudice to be substantial when it is “highly probable” and when there is a “likelihood of materiality.”88 The Oregon State Bar further describes substantiality as “denot[ing] a material matter of clear and weighty importance.”89 Some courts note that the state must have clear and convincing evidence that the attorney’s statements truly jeopardized the fairness of a trial.90 In determining whether evidence is clear and convincing, a court cannot sanction an attorney based on a “vague feeling that his statement could possibly, or even foreseeably, have affected the trial.”91 Although some state bar associations and courts appear to protect much attorney speech, other courts consider the substantial likelihood standard to be lower, and do not require a showing of actual prejudice.92

States have interpreted the “substantial likelihood” standard in multiple ways,93 however, the Court in Gentile was not concerned with differentiating between these interpretations, or the three standards that the ABA proposed and courts used throughout the twentieth century.94 Although the Court upheld the “middle ground” standard, the Court noted that “[t]he difference between the requirement of serious and imminent threat ... and the more common formulation of substantial likelihood of material prejudice could prove mere semantics.”95 Rather, courts point to a review of

86. Id. at 1036.
87. Id.
89. Id. at 521 (quoting Or. Rules Prof’l Conduct 1.0(o) (2007)).
91. Id. at 500 (Pashman, J., concurring).
92. See In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. 2012) (noting that a judge must ask whether the statement could cause prejudice, rather than whether the statement actually caused prejudice).
93. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
94. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1037 (1991); see also supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
95. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037; see Hinds, 449 A.2d at 493 (majority opinion) (“The clear and present danger standard is no more self-defining or self-revealing than are any of these alternative formulations.”).
the rule’s factors as the most important determination in deciding whether an attorney has violated Rule 3.6.96

D. Factors Considered in Gentile and Other State Proceedings

In Gentile, the Court noted that certain factors should be considered when determining whether an attorney’s statements substantially prejudiced the jury venire.97 In analyzing Gentile’s intent, the Court stated that Gentile did not intend to sway the jurors’ opinions before trial.98 The Court also noted that time was an important factor to consider when determining prejudicial impact.99 The Court stated that Gentile’s statement was less likely to reach “the attention of the venire on the eve of voir dire” because Gentile spoke to the press six months before trial when his client was first indicted.100

Another factor the Court considered was the size of the community.101 In considering this factor, the Court noted that in a jurisdiction that included over 600,000 potential jurors, the attorney’s statements were less likely to prejudice a jury because the defense attorney and prosecutor likely could find twelve jurors out of 600,000 who had not been exposed to the press release.102 Additionally, the Court stated that television news stations and newspapers only broadcasted and published a small portion of the attorney’s remarks.103 By applying these factors to the case, the Court determined that the attorney’s remarks did not have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the jury or the jury venire.104

Lower courts and state bars have also applied these factors (time and size of community) to their cases and have added factors (frequency, intensity, likelihood of admissibility, and nature of the proceeding) to determine whether an attorney should be sanctioned for his or her speech. One federal district court considered the

96. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 493.
98. See id. at 1042.
99. Id. at 1044.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1045.
104. See id. at 1037-38.
frequency and intensity of the attorney’s statements when determining whether they were substantially likely to be prejudicial. Similarly, the State Bar of Pennsylvania considered the likelihood of admissibility at trial in its determination of prejudice. The nature of a proceeding also plays a role in a decision maker’s determination of prejudice. By applying these factors on a case-by-case basis, decision makers have effectively weighed an attorney’s free speech interest against the state’s interest in the fair administration of justice by only prohibiting speech that is truly likely to prejudice a trial.

E. Modern Application in Traditional Media

In 1991, the Court effectively balanced lawyers’ speech against state interests to ensure both rights were protected. Courts continue to implement the substantial likelihood of prejudice standard and use the Gentile factors. By applying the Gentile rule and factors in Graham v. Weber and United States v. McGregor, courts effectively balanced the rights of the involved parties in instances where lawyers made statements to traditional media sources.

1. Graham v. Weber

In the context of traditional media, courts protect a lawyer’s speech by considering the Gentile factors and applying the substantial likelihood standard. For example, in Graham v. Weber, the court found that the Attorney General’s statements about a murder case were not substantially likely to prejudice the defendant’s criminal proceeding. After a jury convicted John Graham of murder,

107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); see Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 256-58 (7th Cir. 1975).
108. See supra Part I.C.
111. 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
112. 2015 WL 5797857, at *8.
Graham filed numerous habeas corpus petitions. While one habeas corpus action was pending, the Attorney General gave presentations at a university and benefit fundraiser where he talked about the case and the defendant’s suspected involvement in another murder. Due to the continued national interest in the case, newspapers published statements from the Attorney General’s presentations.

The defendant sought a court-issued gag order to prohibit the Attorney General from speaking further about the case during the defendant’s habeas corpus petition. To issue a gag order, the court first had to review Rule 3.6 and Gentile to determine whether the attorney’s statements were substantially likely to prejudice the proceeding. In applying the Gentile factors, the court found that the statements were not likely to prejudice the proceeding. First, in reviewing the nature of the proceeding, the court noted a judge, rather than a jury, would decide the defendant’s habeas corpus claim; this reduced the potential for prejudice because a judge is in a better position to remain impartial. Additionally, the court considered timing when determining whether the statements would likely prejudice a jury venire of a potential new trial. The court noted that since there was no jury or jury venire to be considered at that time (because the habeas corpus petition was still under review), there was no pressing, substantial likelihood of prejudicing that future jury.

Ultimately, when the court balanced the defendant’s right to a fair proceeding against the lawyer’s right to free speech, the court held that the lawyer’s speech right must be upheld because the

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113. See id. at *1.
114. See id.
115. Id.
118. Id. at *8.
119. Id. at *9.
120. Id. at *9-10.
121. Id.
lawyer’s statement enabled the public, who had a “legitimate interest in the functioning of its criminal justice system,” to become educated on the topic. By using the factors described above, the court effectively balanced the rights of the parties and allowed the attorney’s nonprejudicial speech to benefit the public.

2. United States v. McGregor

Using the Gentile factors, courts can protect attorney speech in traditional media outlets; likewise, the Gentile factors enable courts to proscribe lawyers’ speech when statements are substantially likely to prejudice a jury. For example, in United States v. McGregor, the court stated that the defense attorney’s statements made during the defendant’s first trial likely prejudiced the proceeding.

In that case, multiple defendants, including state senators and casino owners, were charged with bribing officials to vote for a bill that would enact a referendum on the legalization of electronic bingo. During the first trial, the court granted McGregor a new trial due to a hung jury determination on some of his charges. During the second trial, the prosecution filed a motion to implement a gag order against the parties to prevent them from consistently speaking to the press, as was done in the first trial. Ultimately, the court held that a gag order was unnecessary because both attorneys were subject to Alabama’s Rule 3.6, which “mirrors” Model Rule 3.6.

Yet, in arriving at the ultimate conclusion that a gag order was unnecessary because less restrictive means of limiting attorney speech were possible, the court first had to consider the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard and the Gentile factors to determine whether the attorney’s comments were

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122. Id. at *10.
123. See id. at *9-10.
125. Id. at 1258.
126. Id. at 1259.
127. Id. at 1260.
128. Id. at 1263, 1267.
129. See id. at 1267.
permissible.\textsuperscript{130} Although the court found the defense attorney’s statements nonprejudicial in the second trial, the court found that the defense attorney’s statements made during the first trial were substantially likely to prejudice a jury.\textsuperscript{131} In analyzing the defense’s extrajudicial statements, the court considered the timing, frequency, context, and intensity of the attorney’s statements.\textsuperscript{132} The timing of the defense’s statements increased the likelihood that the statements would prejudice the jury because the defense attorney spoke to the press on multiple days during the trial on the courthouse steps.\textsuperscript{133} There, the attorney speculated about the prosecution’s witnesses and denounced those witnesses’ credibility by stating “God himself” could not rehabilitate them.\textsuperscript{134} The court noted that the context of the comments, arising from opinion rather than fact, combined with the frequency and intensity of the statements, made it far more likely that a jury would become aware of and influenced by the defense attorney’s statements.\textsuperscript{135}

By applying the \textit{Gentile} factors to their gag-order analysis, the court suggested that the defense attorney would be responsible under Rule 3.6 if the government were to file charges against the attorney for the extrajudicial statements made during McGregor’s first trial.\textsuperscript{136} Such a ruling would strike an effective balance between the defense attorney’s First Amendment rights and the government’s interest in a fair and just trial.\textsuperscript{137}

By reviewing these two cases that protect a lawyer’s right to free speech and the fair administration of justice, it becomes more apparent that courts can effectively balance the rights of the parties when applying the \textit{Gentile} standard and factors to extrajudicial statements made in traditional media.

\textsuperscript{130} Id. at 1263-64.
\textsuperscript{131} See id. at 1265.
\textsuperscript{132} Id. at 1259, 1264-66.
\textsuperscript{133} See id. at 1259.
\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 1264-66.
\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 1265-66.
\textsuperscript{136} See id. at 1265 (“[T]he government satisfied the prejudice prong of the \textit{Gentile} test.”).
\textsuperscript{137} See id. at 1267.
II. Application of the Traditional Rule on Social Media

As technologies advance, courts must apply Rule 3.6 and the Gentile factors to online statements. Scholars and practitioners have suggested that courts may continue applying the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as they are currently written, without modification. Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 notes that the ABA Model Rules apply when an attorney posts online. The comment states that a lawyer is responsible for understanding current technologies in order to provide competent counsel to clients and maintain ethical obligations. Further, the ABA has reminded practitioners that Rule 3.6, specifically, applies to blog posts. ABA Opinion 480 suggests that courts can apply Rule 3.6 to online statements in the exact same way that courts apply the rule to statements published in traditional media. Yet there are several differences between statements made on social media and traditional media that suggest new factors must be implemented to gain an effective balance between lawyer and state interests in an online setting. Courts must consider additional factors to keep an effective balance between attorney and state interests.

A. Is a Retweet a Statement?

In traditional media, practitioners and courts mostly analyze the “substantial likelihood of prejudice” element of Rule 3.6. However, as statements are created on online media, new issues may arise. In a world where attorneys “retweet” and “like” content created by

140. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2019).
141. Id.; see, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 5-6 (2014).
143. See id.
144. See infra Part II.B.
145. See infra Part III.C.
146. See supra Part I.D.
other social media users, practitioners must first ask a threshold question to determine if Rule 3.6 even applies: Is the content posted on the lawyer’s account a statement?

1. Retweets as Statements—Modern Examples

For attorneys who use social media sites such as Twitter, retweeting other users’ information is common practice. For example, in the spring of 2018, while posting multiple tweets advocating for his position in *Trump v. Hawaii*, Neal Katyal retweeted links to articles that supported his arguments.

Practitioners and potential decision makers may also view attorney tweets in the context of criminal cases. In *Commonwealth v. Cosby*, District Attorney Kevin Steele retweeted a *Rolling Stone* article about Cosby’s criminal acts only two months before filing criminal charges against him. The article, which emphasized words such as “dozens of women” and “Cosby” in bold, red typeface, focused on Cosby’s criminal conduct, the women he harmed, and Steele’s advocacy for obtaining justice for victims. Determining whether the retweet was the attorney’s speech could have had real implications in the *Cosby* case. The defense counsel presented the court with a motion to disqualify Steele as prosecutor, due to, in part, his retweet. Although the judge dismissed this motion in the *Cosby* case, other cases reveal how displaying third-party content on social media could impact whether a court considers the content to be a lawyer’s own speech.

147. See supra note 6.
148. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
151. See Massoglia, supra note 9.
152. Foti, supra note 9.
2. Expressive Conduct as Speech—Retweeting on Twitter

The U.S. Supreme Court has altered its conception of free speech over time. To decide whether a person’s conduct is significantly expressive, a court must apply the Spence test to determine whether (1) a person intends to convey a message and (2) that message is likely to be understood by others. Using the Court’s Spence test, lower courts have analyzed whether a user’s retweets and likes on social media are considered speech. Circuit courts have held that an individual’s Facebook “like” constitutes speech. Scholars have suggested that “retweeting” a post on Twitter is analogous to “liking” a page on Facebook. Retweeting a post places another user’s words on one’s own Twitter account. In applying the Spence test to retweets, a court could find that the user who retweeted a statement intended to convey a message with which she agrees and accepts, because the message will appear on her account. Additionally, viewers will understand that the user is approving of the message. In applying the test, a court would likely find that these retweeted statements are the

154. See id.
157. See, e.g., Bland, 730 F.3d at 386 (explaining that in liking a political candidate’s Facebook page, “[t]he distribution of the universally understood ‘thumbs up’ symbol ... conveyed that [the individual] supported [the politician’s] candidacy”).
159. Id. at 1277.
160. See id.

In \textit{Yassin}, the court analogized a Facebook “like” with a Twitter “retweet” in holding that a jury could find that a retweet constituted the defendant’s endorsement of a true threat. \footnote{163}{No. 16-03024-01-CR-S-MDH, 2017 WL 1324141, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017).}

\footnote{164}{Id.}

\footnote{165}{Id. at *2.}

\footnote{166}{See id. at *5.}

\footnote{167}{There was a discrepancy over whether Yassin retweeted the statement from another person’s account or wrote the words herself. \textit{Id.} This is because Yassin used the “old fashioned way” to retweet, by simply posting “RT” at the beginning of her tweet, copying and pasting the shared words to her account, and using the “@” symbol to link to the original poster’s account. See Ray Beckerman, \textit{Retweet the Old Fashioned Way, Using ‘Classic’ or ‘Traditional’ Retweets Only}, RAY’S 2.0 BLOG (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://rays20.blogspot.com/2010/06/traditional-retweet-tr-key-to.html [https://perma.cc/SN6V-XSM8]. Twitter does not endorse this type of retweeting, suggesting instead that people use the “Retweet Icon.” \textit{Retweet FAQs}, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/retweet-faqs [https://perma.cc/PGP5-VWG2].}

\footnote{168}{See \textit{Yassin}, 2017 WL 1324141, at *5.}

\footnote{169}{Id.}

\footnote{170}{Id.}
statement to be the defendant’s speech, subject to a true threats analysis.\footnote{See id. at *4-5.}

Courts have determined that likes and retweets are statements for the purposes of analyzing a person’s free speech claim.\footnote{See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2013); Yassin, 2017 WL 1324141, at *5.} Because courts have viewed retweets as a user’s own statements in this context, a court likely would consider that a retweet is a statement for the purpose of Rule 3.6 as well. Yet as technology advances, courts will likely have to continue to consider whether an attorney’s conduct on social media counts as a “statement” when analyzing a lawyer’s online speech.

\section*{B. Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Analysis in the Online World}

As more attorneys create social media statements, courts must consider whether the statements will substantially prejudice juries or jury venires. A court’s application of Rule 3.6 and the \textit{Gentile} factors is not exhaustive enough to protect an attorney who makes extrajudicial statements on social media.

\subsection*{1. Modern Examples of Rule 3.6 Applied to Online Statements}

In some cases, challenges to an attorney’s online statements will fail because the traditional \textit{Gentile} analysis effectively balances lawyer and state interests.\footnote{See Vance, supra note 21, at 387.} For example, in \textit{State v. Polk}, the attorney’s tweets were not considered to substantially prejudice the jury.\footnote{415 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).} There, the court considered the timing and content of the statement to find that, although the attorney’s statements were made directly before and during the trial, the tweets stated public, factual information that was unlikely to substantially prejudice the jury.\footnote{Id. at 695-96.}

Similarly, in \textit{United States v. Silver}, the prosecutor’s statements on the U.S. Attorney’s Office Twitter account did not satisfy the
substantial likelihood of prejudice test. There, the court consid-
ered the content and the timing of the statements in making its
final determination. Ultimately, the court heavily relied on the
“nature of the proceedings” factor and concluded that because grand
jurors are allowed to have access to more information than a trial
juror, there was less likelihood that the attorney’s statements would
have substantially prejudiced the proceeding.

The courts’ holdings in these cases suggest that judges can apply
the traditional Gentile analysis to online statements. However,
courts have not always protected attorney speech on the Internet.
In United States v. Bowen, the Department of Justice prosecuted
murder crimes that occurred in New Orleans following Hurricane
Katrina. In an attempt to excite the public about the case, two
prosecutors within the U.S. Attorney’s Office anonymously posted
comments about the murders on an online news article. The court
considered the totality of the evidence—the quantity, content, and
timing of the comments—in making its determination that the
statements were substantially likely to prejudice a jury venire.

Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the defendant in the case
and granted him a new trial, basing part of its decision on the
prosecution’s comments’ ability to substantially influence the jury
venire. The court analogized the online environment to a “carni-
val” and stated that the online statements were ferocious and
egregious attacks that created a “poisonous atmosphere” that could
taint the potential jury pool, even if the statements were not as
“overt” as statements released directly to the press.

The Bowen court crossed the line by infringing on too much
attorney speech. Although the court noted that the online news
source was popular in the jurisdiction, the court did not consider
the effects of anonymity or the quantity of other comments in

177. See id. at 378-79.
178. Id. at 376, 380.
179. 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D. La. 2013), aff’d, 799 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g
denied 813 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2016).
180. Id. at 552.
181. Id. at 551.
182. Id. at 621-22, 627.
183. Id. at 575, 578, 617, 620.
184. Id. at 621.
determining whether a juror would likely see and be influenced by the attorneys’ statements.\textsuperscript{185}

First, if multiple users commented on the articles, it is less likely that a potential juror would even see the few comments left by the anonymous attorneys. Additionally, it is important for courts to consider anonymity in determining the substantial likelihood for prejudice. One reason to limit an attorney’s speech during litigation is to prevent attorneys, or skilled professionals who jurors perceive as having expertise in the case, from influencing jurors.\textsuperscript{186} If a potential juror does not know that an attorney made a comment, then this concern is not raised, and there is less reason to restrict an attorney’s speech. The fear that was settled in \textit{Gentile} arises again—that “totally innocuous statement[s] could be a violation” of Rule 3.6.\textsuperscript{187} Although the lawyers in \textit{Bowen} are not the most sympathetic parties, one could see how the \textit{Gentile} analysis fails to adequately balance lawyer and defendant rights in the online world by preventing more attorney speech than is justified by the rule.

\subsection*{2. Different Outcomes Based on the Perceptions of Access to Information Online}

The court’s ultimate conclusion in \textit{Bowen} might have been influenced by the fact that judges are skeptical of the “online carnival type atmosphere” where attorneys are posting statements.\textsuperscript{188} Judges may not thoroughly consider the technological functions and capabilities of Internet sites that affect a juror’s ability to perceive a lawyer’s online statement because judges are likely to think that potential jurors can easily view attorney statements online.

This perception is understandable, as scholars and practitioners frequently warn attorneys of social media dangers. In recent years,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[185.] The court did consider the defendant’s anonymity to be a factor that damaged the integrity of the judicial proceedings and the profession. \textit{Id.} at 626. However, the court did not consider anonymity when determining whether such statements would substantially influence a juror. \textit{Id.} Although the Government in an opposition memorandum requested that the court consider the defendant’s anonymity as a fact that mitigated the likelihood of substantial prejudice to a jury, the court refused to consider the fact for this purpose. \textit{Id.}
\item[186.] \textit{See supra} note 41 and accompanying text.
\item[187.] Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975).
\item[188.] \textit{See Bowen}, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
scholars have warned practitioners to be cautious when posting online or engaging in discussions. Legal professionals tell law students to use caution with regard to their social media presence when applying for jobs and registering for the Bar. Even the ABA has commented on social media interaction when addressing judges specifically; one formal opinion noted that judges must not assume that statements will stay private online.

The ABA has warned that comments can be “disseminated to thousands of people.” Other scholars have noted that one message can be “broadcast ... to untold millions” in a “matter of seconds.” The ability to communicate quickly, without edits from a reputable publisher, also creates the fear that more prejudicial information may reach jurors’ eyes. A lawyer’s use of the vast, expansive Internet is seen as an amplified way to influence and prejudice jurors who are browsing through content on their social media accounts.

One blogger describes how one statement can gain great notoriety on Twitter. Patrick Antinozzi notes that “at any moment” one tweet can be seen “by thousands ... even millions” with a few simple tricks of the trade. By using a hashtag, powerful imagery, and engaging with other users who had more followers than him, his tweet went “viral,” and was seen by many people who normally would not have seen his statement. A judge who is aware of the rhetoric surrounding online communications likely perceives a

189. Awsumb & Roby, supra note 139, at 34 (“Because any information posted using social media ... can be easily spread to a large number of people, lawyers should be careful in their social networking and online habits.”).
192. Id. at 2.
193. Preston, supra note 12, at 932.
194. Vance, supra note 21, at 361.
195. See id. at 379-80.
196. See id. at 383-84.
198. Id.
199. Id.
lawyer’s online statement as being more influential, and therefore more dangerous to a proceeding.

3. Limiting Lawyer Speech Online Because of Perceptions About the Spread of Information Across the Internet

This ideology affected attorneys’ speech interests in other cases where judges appeared skeptical about granting lawyers more speech rights when they posted their statements online. In United States v. Koubriti, the court placed a gag order on the parties after indicting defendants who had been on the terrorist watchlist after 9/11. Despite the order, the prosecution continued to make statements to the press and post statements online. While the jurors were subject to extensive voir dire that ensured they had not been subjected to the attorney’s statements, the court held that the attorney’s statements were likely to prejudice the jury, in part, because electronic statements “could very easily have been inadvertently discovered by one of the jurors in the case” and “jurors’ families and friends [could] happen upon the improper comments and mention them to a juror in [the] case.”

Without further analysis to determine where the attorney posted the statement and how available those statements were to public eyes, the court seemed to presume that online statements could easily reach potential jurors and influence proceedings. By functioning under this presumption, courts limit more attorney speech than is necessary to protect the states’ interest of a fair and just proceeding.

Another example that affected a lawyer’s online speech is Jackson v. Deen. There, the defense attorney for Paula Deen filed a motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s attorney because the attorney posted opinionated Twitter comments calling the defendant a racist and sexist during the litigation. While the court refused to disqualify

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201. Id. at 729-30, 738.
202. Id. at 738.
203. See id. at 738, 744.
205. Id. at *1, *3, & n.11.
the attorney from the case, the court ruled that the tweets prejudiced the proceeding.\footnote{Id. at *3.}

Analyzing the content of the tweets, the court found that the rude opinions could cause potential jurors to treat the defendant in a negative manner.\footnote{See id. at *1, *3.} However, the court failed to analyze this information in light of the attorney’s Twitter account details.\footnote{See id. at n.11.} The attorney raised the issue that he had a limited number of Twitter followers.\footnote{Id.} Because he had so few Twitter followers, it was likely that only a few people saw his tweet.\footnote{See infra Part III.C.2.} Therefore, the probability of a potential juror “inadvertently discover[ing]” the tweet while on social media was low.\footnote{United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2003).}

In \textit{Jackson} too, the court presumed that a lawyer’s online statement was more likely to reach potential jurors than a statement made to the traditional media.\footnote{See 2013 WL 1911445 at *3 & n.11; Vance, supra note 21, at 383-84.} Ultimately, these perceptions make it less likely that a lawyer’s online statements will be protected because judges will think that a lawyer’s online statement will spread more rapidly and reach more people. However, this is almost never the case.\footnote{See infra Parts II.B.4-III.}

\section*{4. The Reality of Online Access and Distribution}

It is extremely difficult for information to spread on certain online media. Cumulatively, Twitter users tweet over 500 million tweets per day.\footnote{Robert Wynne, \textit{Why It’s So Hard to Go Viral}, FORBES (July 31, 2017, 4:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwynne/2017/07/31/why-its-so-hard-to-go-viral/[https://perma.cc/2U9N-H67M].} The chance of having one tweet noticed out of 500 million is very small.\footnote{See id.} There are certain ways users of this particular medium spread information.\footnote{See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 299.} To spread a tweet, a user can increase his number of followers, post tweets that are emotional, tweet often, use a distinctive voice, post at busy times, use popular

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \footnote{Id. at *3.}
\item \footnote{See id. at *1, *3.}
\item \footnote{See id. at n.11.}
\item \footnote{Id.}
\item \footnote{See infra Part III.C.2.}
\item \footnote{United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2003).}
\item \footnote{See 2013 WL 1911445 at *3 & n.11; Vance, supra note 21, at 383-84.}
\item \footnote{See infra Parts II.B.4-III.}
\item \footnote{See id.}
\item \footnote{See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 299.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
hashtags, interact with other users via mentions and retweets, and promote his Twitter account on other platforms.\textsuperscript{217} Scholars and users of the medium have noted that it is particularly difficult for a statement to spread across the medium—as “[e]ven prolific judicial tweeters may not get much [of a] visible reaction.”\textsuperscript{218}

Patrick Antinozzi admits that he had to work hard so that his tweet could reach multiple audiences across Twitter.\textsuperscript{219} While his hashtag and the content of the tweet itself resulted in the distribution to a handful of his nonfollowers, it was not until Antinozzi took an additional assertive step and “mentioned” influential users (by asking them to retweet his tweet) that his statement went viral.\textsuperscript{220} Even with his relative success in distributing his idea on Twitter, Antinozzi admits that he was lucky and could never predict whether a tweet would go viral.\textsuperscript{221}

Although a lawyer’s statement does not need to go viral for it to influence a jury venire, it seems that the statement must spread beyond a lawyer’s direct “friends” or “followers” because a potential juror probably is not interested in the lawyer’s day-to-day activities, and therefore likely does not follow the lawyer on social media.\textsuperscript{222} Thus, using Twitter as an example, a statement would have to gain enough popularity from followers to be retweeted to people who did not directly follow the lawyer.\textsuperscript{223} As noted, it takes a concerted effort for one statement to gain notoriety on social media.\textsuperscript{224} A court should consider a social medium’s functions and a lawyer’s affirmative actions, which can help limit a potential juror’s access to the statement, when determining which online statements are likely to substantially prejudice a trial.

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\item \textsuperscript{217} Id. at 299-301.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Id. at 301; see also Antinozzi, supra note 197.
\item \textsuperscript{219} See Antinozzi, supra note 197.
\item \textsuperscript{220} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{222} The ABA prohibits attorneys and judges involved in litigation from “friending” or “following” potential jurors. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 4 & n.6 (2014). Lawyers may research jurors’ social media presences during the voir dire process. Id. at 5. Judges can prohibit jurors from using social media during a trial, which limits the likelihood that a juror will “follow” an attorney on social media. Id. at 6.
\item \textsuperscript{223} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{224} See supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
III. ANALYZING NEW TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

To determine whether an online statement is likely to substantially prejudice a proceeding, courts must consider additional factors that pertain to a medium’s technological abilities that could limit the dispersal of an attorney’s message. This Part begins with an analysis of the differences between online statements and statements made in traditional media. Then, this Part analyzes factors that will help guide judges to properly balance attorney and state interests for statements made in the online forum. Finally, the Part explains why these factors should be codified in a new comment to Rule 3.6.

A. The Old Factors Are Still Relevant

Before detailing the additional factors that courts should consider when deciding a case that involves online statements, it is important to note that the traditional Gentile factors should still be used in a court’s determination. For example, in both United States v. Silver and State v. Polk, the use of these factors in the online cases helped the courts efficiently balance the attorney’s rights and the states’ interests. However, the factors of intensity and frequency must be reevaluated in the wake of online communication technologies.

225. See infra Part III.A-B.
226. See infra Part III.C.
227. See infra Part III.D.
228. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (noting that the attorney’s statement was less likely to influence a jury that was impaneled six months after the attorney’s press release); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
B. Perceptions of Intensity and Frequency of Statements Must Change

In Gentile, the Court referred to the intensity and frequency factors when describing the size of the community where the trial would take place. The Court noted that with 600,000 potential jurors residing within the trial court’s jurisdiction, it was unlikely that all 600,000 would have been exposed to the attorney’s statements in the newspaper and on television. Because of this, the Court reasoned that “only the most damaging” statements would have likely influenced the jury and the jury venire. Applying this concept to an online social medium such as Twitter, the population of potential jurors who have Twitter accounts will affect the likelihood of jury prejudice, because if the number of people in the jury venire who do not use Twitter is large, then the likelihood that all people in the jury venire will see a lawyer’s Twitter statement is small.

However, it is also important to note that the more prevalent a statement’s publicity, the more likely it is that a potential juror will see the statement and be influenced by it. Therefore, a court must also consider how easy it is for a potential juror—who does not have direct access to an online medium—to be inundated with an attorney’s statement.

1. Frequency and Intensity in Old Media

When a statement is broadcast on local television channels and radio stations, or published in local newspapers, an attorney’s statement has the potential to reach multiple people in that jurisdiction who are eligible for jury duty. By reading a local

231. See 501 U.S. at 1044.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id.
newspaper, watching the nighttime news, or listening to the radio on the way to work, a juror could “inadvertently come upon” an attorney’s statements about impending litigation without intending to research the case.237

2. Frequency and Intensity in New Media

Yet a potential juror is less likely to be inadvertently inundated with information found on social media.238 As the ABA has stated, “many blogs, websites, and other electronic media are readily accessible by anyone who chooses to access them.”239 Therefore, turning on one’s television is not analogous to searching the web because a potential juror must actively choose to search for an attorney’s information.240 A story found in a “small local paper” is “more prejudicial than a lot of publicity in a major market outside ... the venire pool.”241 The World Wide Web, with its wide reach,242 is more analogous to a market outside the court’s jurisdiction than a local newspaper.

It is true that on social media, a potential juror’s connections with other users may form an online community that looks more local in nature. A person can view all posts and statements on their “friends’” and “followers’” profiles, and many friends and followers may be known by the user from his local community.243 However, since it is unlikely that a potential juror “follows” or is “friends” with an attorney before a case’s litigation, the likelihood of seeing the attorney’s statement, even in a more localized social media setting, is small.244

238. See supra Part II.B.
240. See id. at 1-2.
242. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
243. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 49, at 134.
244. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
C. New Factors in a New Comment

If a potential juror does not follow an attorney, the likelihood of that juror seeing the attorney’s statement is low, but not impossible. This is why a judge must consider the following factors to effectively determine whether an online statement will substantially influence a jury or the jury venire. The ABA has recognized some of these technological functions that control the public’s access to a user’s online information; however, the factors have not been applied to Rule 3.6. The following factors are presented in a manner that is broad enough to apply to both current and future online communication technologies. These factors include: an attorney’s social-media account privacy settings; an attorney’s number of followers; the functions an attorney uses on a specific medium to make a statement more searchable; and the ability of a potential juror to be inundated with statements from nonfollowers.

1. Privacy Mode

A court should consider a lawyer’s privacy setting when determining whether his statements are likely to substantially prejudice a proceeding. On Twitter, if a lawyer’s tweets are public, then the attorney’s statements are visible to any Twitter user (if the user searches for the attorney, or the statement is shared by someone who the user follows), and to any researcher using a search engine such as Google. A lawyer whose account is private only displays his statements to “fellow subscriber[s],” or people who follow his account on that social medium. If an attorney’s statements are private, only people with whom he chooses to connect may view his statements. Further, these “followers” cannot retweet, or share,

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245. See infra notes 248-68 and accompanying text.
250. See About Public and Protected Tweets, supra note 248.
the statements with their connections. This makes it significantly less likely that a statement will spread across the online medium. If an attorney’s account is private, this factor weighs against the statement’s substantial likelihood of prejudicing a proceeding.

2. Number of Followers

If a lawyer’s Twitter account is open for public viewing, a court should consider how many people are following the lawyer’s account. The more followers a lawyer has, the more likely that statement will spread to other users as the lawyer’s followers retweet the lawyer’s statement with their connections. Further, Twitter’s algorithm influences which statements a follower sees and subsequently shares. The more followers a lawyer has, the more likely his or her statement will appear at the top of that follower’s newsfeed. The higher the lawyer’s statement appears on a follower’s newsfeed, the more likely that follower will engage with the post and share it with his followers who may not directly follow the lawyer’s account. In summary, a low number of followers weighs against a substantial likelihood of prejudice, while a high number of followers weighs in favor of there being a substantial likelihood of prejudice.

3. Unsolicited Inundation

A court should review the online medium where the lawyer posted his or her statement to determine how easy it is for a nonfollower to view the lawyer’s statement. There are many ways to communicate and spread information on social media. On Twitter, a user may

251. Id.
252. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 255.
253. See id. at 298-99.
254. See id. at 300.
255. See Will Oremus, Twitter’s New Order: Inside the Changes that Could Save Its Business—and Reshape Civil Discourse, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2017, 8:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2017/03/twitter_s_timeline_algorithm_and_its_effect_on_us_explained.html [https://perma.cc/C6D6-LCSE].
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. For a review of Twitter’s communication functions and capabilities, see Thornburg, supra note 1, at 254.
see statements that are retweeted, or shared, even if the user is not friends with the person who posted the original statement.  

Additionally, users enter into public debate more easily by posting their statements with hashtags, which allow other users to easily search Twitter and look at multiple users’ statements that refer to the same, specific subject. A court should analyze these functions, which are particular to the online medium, when determining whether or not a statement is likely to influence a judicial proceeding. The more sharing capabilities that are available on a medium, the more likely it is that the statement could substantially prejudice a proceeding.

4. A Lawyer’s Use of Technology in an Attempt to Inundate Nonfollowers

A court must look not only to the sharing capabilities of a particular online medium, but also to whether a lawyer uses the available functions. For example, if a lawyer’s statement has been retweeted multiple times and the lawyer uses a hashtag, there is an increased likelihood that this statement will reach more people, including potential jurors.

The ability for a nonfollower to see a lawyer’s statements increases with the use of Twitter’s algorithm. Twitter’s algorithm no longer posts tweets chronologically on a user’s newsfeed. Certain statements appear at the top of a follower’s newsfeed, making it more likely that a statement will be seen and shared across the medium. The algorithm ranks multiple conditions to determine which statements appear at the top of a follower’s newsfeed. A lawyer who has numerous followers, uses inflammatory rhetoric, tweets often, uses a distinctive voice, posts at busy times, uses popular hashtags, and has multiple followers interacting with his

259. Id. at 300.
260. See id. at 255.
261. See supra Part III.C.3.
262. See Oremus, supra note 255.
263. Id. Before Twitter’s algorithm, statements were posted in reverse chronological order.
264. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
265. See Oremus, supra note 255.
tweet, is more likely to be featured on a follower’s newsfeed. If a follower sees the attorney’s statement, then that follower can easily retweet and share the post with that follower’s network (i.e., a lawyer’s nonfollowers). Therefore, a lawyer’s use of these features weighs in favor of a substantial likelihood of prejudice.

It is important to note that a social media site’s use of an algorithm does not always weigh in favor of increasing the likelihood of prejudice. An algorithm that incorporates a user’s preferences may actually keep a lawyer’s statement away from a potential juror’s eyes if that potential juror expresses no interest in the law or the criminal justice system on Twitter. The Twitter algorithm gives each individual user a personal news-viewing experience by showcasing posts that the user will be interested in at the top of the user’s newsfeed. This “filter bubble” results in a user seeing only what the user wants to see, rather than posts from users who have differing viewpoints. Because the algorithm takes the user’s preferences into account, the user may or may not see a lawyer’s statement on Twitter. Any weighing of the factors must be considered in light of this information.

D. How the New Factors Help

Other scholars have proposed additional comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct to resolve issues lawyers may face when using the Internet and social media. While some courts may already be using this Note’s proposed factors in determining whether or not a lawyer’s online statement is likely to prejudice a proceeding, codifying these factors in a new comment to Rule 3.6 could be beneficial for the following reasons.

266. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 299-301; Oremus, supra note 255.
267. See Oremus, supra note 255.
268. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 302; Oremus, supra note 255.
269. Oremus, supra note 255.
270. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 49, at 153 (analyzing Rule 1.6); Angela O’Brien, Comment, Are Attorneys and Judges One Tweet, Blog or Friend Request Away from Facing a Disciplinary Committee?, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 511, 534 (2010) (analyzing Rule 3.5).
First, implementing a comment to Rule 3.6 can help guide judges across all jurisdictions. With codification, judges can look to one place instead of sifting through persuasive case law from various jurisdictions to determine whether a factor applied to a traditional-media case can be effectively applied in the same way to an online-media case.

Second, a more unified approach to considering extrajudicial statements in an online world can give much needed guidance to attorneys who seek to advocate for clients and express opinions without violating their ethical obligations. By knowing which factors the court will consider when determining whether a lawyer’s statement has gone too far, a lawyer can preemptively take the needed precautions to ensure his or her statement will not prejudice a proceeding. Clearly defined factors have helped courts effectively balance lawyer and state interests in the past. In the wake of technological advancement, the addition of these new factors will lead to the same result.

Two examples demonstrate why these factors can help courts strike an appropriate balance between a lawyer’s speech interest and a state’s interest in fair and just proceedings. First, assume, for example, that Neal Katyal is a criminal defense attorney preparing for trial in a local venue. Mr. Katyal decides to post tweets about the ongoing litigation, referring to the arguments he will make during trial. Using the proposed factors, a judge can easily rule that this attorney’s statements are substantially likely to prejudice the jury. The attorney’s tweets are not private. Therefore, his statements may be shared with his followers and nonfollowers. Further, Twitter’s algorithm is likely to feature Mr. Katyal—who posts often and uses passionate language and hashtags in his tweets—on followers’ newsfeeds. Lastly, because Mr. Katyal has over 200,000 followers, there is an increased likelihood that more followers will like, comment on, and retweet his statement to their followers (i.e.,

273. Cf. Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Apr. 9, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com/neal_katyal/status/983517554508468224 [https://perma.cc/9JHJ-SGRF] (“I’ll be arguing the travel ban case .... An impt [sic] facet is the huge number of amicus ... briefs.... I’ll highlight 1 brief every day until then.”).
274. See supra Part III.C.1.
275. See supra Part III.C.1.
276. See supra Part III.C.3-4.
Mr. Katyal’s nonfollowers). Mr. Katyal’s travel ban tweet that promoted his upcoming argument received 236 retweets and 768 likes from Twitter users, making it more likely that the tweet would be featured on the platform and spread to others. Such factors weigh in favor of this attorney’s statement prejudicing potential jurors who may be inundated with popular tweets on their own social media accounts.

On the other hand, using these same factors, a judge could easily rule that District Attorney (DA) Kevin Steele’s statements do not substantially prejudice Bill Cosby’s jury trial. Assuming that Mr. Steele retweeted the Rolling Stone article after litigation had commenced, a judge could hold that DA Steele did not prejudice the jury because the DA has few Twitter followers and only two people reacted to his tweet. Steele did not use any inflammatory language or hashtags in retweeting the article. For these reasons, Twitter’s algorithm likely would not feature this tweet on followers’ newsfeeds, and few people within the jury venue would have the opportunity to see the statement. These factors weigh in favor of allowing the attorney to speak on the issue because his speech will not likely prejudice the jury venire.

IV. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS

There are several counterarguments that suggest an additional comment regarding technological factors protects too much attorney speech at the expense of the state’s interests.

A. A Juror May Still See a Lawyer’s Online Statement

One counterargument could be that, despite analyzing a lawyer’s followers, privacy settings, and use of sharing functions, a lawyer’s

277. See supra Part III.C.2.
278. See Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), Twitter (Apr. 9, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com/neal_katyal/status/983517554508468224 [https://perma.cc/9JHJ-SGRF].
279. See supra Part III.C.4.
280. See Steele, supra note 149.
281. See supra Part III.C.2.
282. See Steele, supra note 149; supra Part III.C.3-4.
283. See Steele, supra note 149; supra Part III.C.4.
284. See supra Part III.C.4.
statements may still reach a potential juror. However, as the court stated in In re Brizzi, a “court determines the likelihood that a particular statement will cause prejudice at the time made, not whether, in hindsight, it actually worked to the detriment of [the adverse party].” 285

Additionally, other procedural elements can aid in preventing an extrajudicial statement from prejudicing a judicial proceeding. A strong voir dire process enables lawyers to eliminate jurors who are likely to research litigation online. 286 Attorneys may ask potential jurors specific questions about Internet usage, and attorneys are encouraged to use the Internet to research jurors’ social media presences prior to trial. 287

Further, judges can issue jury instructions limiting or prohibiting a jury member’s social media use throughout a trial. 288 Lastly, in extremely notorious cases with high publicity, judges can sequester juries or transfer the cases to other venues to ensure that defendants receive fair trials. 289 These procedural protections further ensure that a lawyer’s statements will not prejudice a jury.

B. A Lawyer’s Bad Speech May Not Be Sanctioned

One might also argue that these factors protect inflammatory attorney speech. 290 Even if a lawyer’s online statements are only accessible to his followers and not likely to prejudice a jury, the statements may still prejudice the state’s interests in protecting the integrity of the court system. Although this is surely a legitimate

288. Amy J. St. Eve et al., More from the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 14 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 64, 66 (2014) (“[J]ury instructions are the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media.”).
290. See United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 621, 626 (E.D. La. 2013) (stating that the misconduct is so “egregious” that a court should not consider prejudice).
interest, this interest is not the main interest protected by Rule 3.6.\footnote{291}

Other Model Rules of Professional Conduct account for a lawyer’s indiscretions. For example, Model Rule 8 describes a lawyer’s ethical obligation to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.\footnote{292} Furthermore, jurisdiction rules and firm policies may sanction an attorney for statements made on social media.\footnote{293} Although Rule 3.6 might not prevent all inflammatory or inappropriate online statements from reaching community members, other rules effectively proscribe such conduct.

\textit{C. The Rule May Limit a Judge’s Discretion}

The last main counterargument related to the implementation of a new technology-focused comment to Rule 3.6 is that implementing this comment will limit a court’s discretion in determining whether an attorney’s statement is likely to prejudice a jury. However, as can be seen from the rule itself, the ABA has created and added comments to the rule in the past to incorporate important factors a court should consider in its determination.\footnote{294}

Courts have always considered multiple factors in weighing attorney and state interests, using the totality of the evidence to make their final determinations.\footnote{295} Because courts already consider different factors and weigh them against one another in making a decision, the implementation of a few more factors will not likely increase a court’s administrative burden.\footnote{296} In an already fact-specific, evidentiary inquiry, the consideration of additional factors will help, not harm, the court’s ability to effectively assess an attorney’s statements made in an online setting.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{291} See \textit{supra} Part I.A.1.
\item \textsuperscript{292} See \textit{MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)}; Preston, \textit{supra} note 12, at 961-74.
\item \textsuperscript{293} See, e.g., Preston, \textit{supra} note 12, at 966-67 (describing Reed Smith’s social media policy after an attorney posted offensive, inappropriate commentary online).
\item \textsuperscript{294} See \textit{MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmts. 1-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)}.
\item \textsuperscript{296} See \textit{supra} Parts I.C-D (discussing cases that perform the multifactor prejudice analysis).
\end{itemize}
CONCLUSION

The ABA has provided only limited guidance on how attorneys can fulfill their ethical obligations when using the Internet. Although the Ethics Committee has met to address technological changes, the Committee has done little to resolve attorneys’ impending concerns. Without proper guidance, attorneys must continue “to bridge the gap between the existing rules of professional conduct and the ethical use of social media in the legal profession.” The rising number of reported ethical violations relating to social media use suggests that something more must be done to protect both attorney and state interests.

Rule 3.6 enables courts to effectively balance state and attorney interests. However, the rule, in its current state, does not protect a lawyer’s statements in an online setting. Rather, the rule leaves open the potential for a lawyer to be sanctioned—merely because the statement is posted in an online forum—even if the statement is not substantially likely to prejudice a judicial proceeding.

Attorneys need clearer guidance than the generalized cautionary message provided in Comment 8 of Rule 1.1 to advocate for clients while still fulfilling their ethical obligations. By considering new technology-specific factors, such as an attorney’s online privacy settings and number of followers, the functions the attorney uses on a specific medium to make a statement more searchable, and the ability of a potential juror to be inundated with statements from nonfollowers, the court can better determine whether a statement is truly substantially likely to negatively impact a proceeding.

By using these new factors, courts can better tailor their decisions to promote the expression of ideas relevant to the public while still limiting the most salacious speech to protect the state’s interest in a fair trial. With the additional guidance, courts can implement...

297. Boothe-Perry, supra note 49, at 145.
298. Preston, supra note 12, at 881-82.
300. See Awsumb & Roby, supra note 139, at 33.
301. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“[A] lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”); Preston, supra note 12, at 886, 905.
more uniform decisions that appropriately balance attorney and state interests in an online setting.

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