iTenant: How the Law Should Treat Rental Relationships in the Sharing Economy

Matthew Rosendahl

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INTRODUCTION

A hotel guest, intent on squatting, overstays his reservation; what does the hotel manager do? The answer is relatively simple: he uses his legal right as an innkeeper to evict the unwelcomed guest. For Airbnb hosts, however, such a right to evict is dubious at best.

Cory Tschogl discovered the hard way how indifferent the law is to her position as an Airbnb host. After listing her San Francisco condominium on Airbnb to help afford rent, Tschogl accepted a guest for a forty-four-day stay. The guest had no reviews from other Airbnb hosts, so Tschogl accepted his reservation blindly (much like a hotelier accepting travelers as they walk in the door or make reservations online). None of this is out of the ordinary for users of the room-sharing website. But, after the guest refused to pay beyond the first thirty days, Tschogl learned that who she thought was simply a guest had actually become her tenant. Thus, Tschogl could not evict the guest without going through the process prescribed in California’s eviction laws: an expensive, months-long legal fight to finally remove the Airbnb squatter in her condominium. In the meantime, the squatter threatened to sue Tschogl for blackmail and medical costs allegedly resulting from unsafe tap water. This unnecessary nightmare could have been avoided had California law differentiated between Airbnb host-guest relationships and those of the traditional landlord and tenant.

California is not alone in this view. Current doctrine in several states treats Airbnb hosts as landlords, particularly when guests

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1. Airbnb is an online marketplace that allows ordinary people to rent out their properties or spare rooms to guests. See About Us, Airbnb, https://press.airbnb.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/N3L4-6CCC]. For a more descriptive background of the company, see infra Part I.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
stay for a length of time exceeding thirty days,8 and even for guests staying under thirty days.9 Additionally, many locales have yet to recognize short-term Airbnb listings as legal, compromising the ability of hosts to evict guests who should not be considered tenants even under traditional law.10 The result for Airbnb hosts is a legal limbo: either they are treated as landlords, subject to burdensome eviction laws, or they are considered black-market hoteliers, hesitant to use local law enforcement to evict guests because regulators have outlawed short-term rentals.11 This limbo has created a quasi-underground marketplace, with unclear legal and regulatory guidelines—an unacceptable approach to a fast-growing sector of the modern economy.

Because the sharing economy presents new challenges and opportunities that are independent of either traditional hospitality law or landlord-tenant doctrine, legislatures and state courts should adopt a uniform regulatory scheme for all Airbnb host-guest relationships that: (1) provides innkeeper tort liability for hosts; (2) relieves hosts of eviction procedures; and (3) treats hosts as micro-hoteliers, not landlords. This Note proposes a model for how the law should treat Airbnb hosts (as the preeminent example of room-sharing entrepreneurs), bringing together existing paradigms from traditional areas of the law to create a new doctrinal treatment focused on promoting the sharing economy and ensuring proper regulation of its users.

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8. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-521 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to evict or attempt to evict an occupant of a dwelling unit who has lawfully occupied the dwelling unit for thirty consecutive days or longer.”); What Are Some Things I Should Consider Before Hosting Long-Term Guests?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/805/what-are-some-things-i-should-consider-before-hosting-long-term-guests [https://perma.cc/D26U-Z26W] (“In most states and localities in the United States, guests who stay in a home or apartment for approximately 30 days ... may establish rights as a tenant.”); Matyszczuk, supra note 2 (“In California, if someone rents for 30 days, they are considered on a month-to-month lease.”).


10. Airbnb hosts for short-term guests must decide between revealing their operations to local authorities that might levy sanctions and using those authorities to remove unruly guests. For examples of the harsh treatment of Airbnb in some localities, see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.

11. For specific attitudes local regulators have had toward Airbnb, see infra Parts I.A.2-3.
This Note will argue that instead of treating Airbnb hosts as landlords, and their guests as tenants, the law should see the platform as establishing a modern take on the innkeeper role. But even then, much of hospitality law places too great a burden on Airbnb hosts, which would threaten to stifle the growth of this new industry. In the interest of promoting the sharing economy as a new opportunity for tax and tourism revenues, governments should instead aim to steer the line between uniformly regulating the established (that is, brick-and-mortar hotels) and unestablished (that is, room-sharing services) sectors of the hospitality industry, on the one hand, and promoting noncommercialized use of room-sharing platforms, on the other. Applying a modern take on innkeeper doctrine would provide tort protections to guests that are greater than those given to tenants, while giving hosts the ability to evict unwelcome squatters. The doctrine would compel hosts providing hospitality services to show greater care for their guests, but would not require the full medley of regulation imposed on professional hoteliers. This Note will explore doctrinal options and propose ways to both regulate room-sharing platforms where the interest in safety and guest enjoyment so requires, and allow hosts the freedom to use these platforms as money-making mechanisms, promoting the overall growth of the sharing economy.

Part I will cover the development of Airbnb as the forerunner of the room-sharing economy, analyzing both its impact on the hospitality industry, rental markets, and community harmony, and the potential for meaningful regulation. Part II will juxtapose and summarize landlord-tenant law and traditional innkeeper doctrine in the context of Airbnb. Given this setup, Part III will make the case for why landlord-tenant law misses the mark when it comes to the room-sharing relationship. Part IV will propose a new treatment for Airbnb hosts that recognizes them as micro-hoteliers with a duty to protect guests from known hazards, while affording hosts the ability to evict destructive squatters at will. Ultimately, this Note proposes a framework that will help bring uniformity and congruence to an industry currently in regulatory flux.
I. THE RISE OF AIRBNB AND THE ROOM-SHARING ECONOMY

Although other room-sharing applications and services exist, Airbnb has undoubtedly experienced the most exponential growth.12 Officially started in 2008, a year after three friends with air mattresses filled a need for more lodging at a design conference in San Francisco,13 Airbnb has grown to have a larger inventory of rooms than the largest hotel chains in the world.14 By 2014, the site had “more lodging than Hilton Worldwide or InterContinental Hotels Group or any other hotel chain in the world.”15 As of 2017, the site reported over 3 million listings in more than 191 countries and over 160 million total guest arrivals.16 More impressive than its sheer size is Airbnb’s rate of growth, with forty-seven thousand guests in 2010 growing to sixteen million in 2015.17 Arguably, one of the primary catalysts of this growth has been the novelty of many

17. See Nathan McAlone, This Chart Shows Exactly How Insane Airbnb’s Growth Has Been over the Past 5 Years, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnbs-summer-reach-has-grown-by-353-times-in-5-years-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/GA84-PLLR] (“That means that Airbnb’s summer reach is 353 times what it was five years ago.”).
Airbnb accommodations, including opportunities to stay in castles, treehouses, and yurts.18

From its tremendous volume of transactions, the company generates revenue by collecting a flat, 3 percent commission on the money hosts receive, and by charging an additional reservation fee (between 6 and 12 percent) to guests.19 In 2015, the company brought in a reported $900 million in revenue (though it still operated at a loss of an estimated $150 million).20 That is compared to 2013, when the company brought in $250 million.21 In 2016, experts valued the company at up to $30 billion,22 and predicted it would bring in $1.7 billion in revenue.23 These numbers show the continued vitality of Airbnb—despite regulatory blockades—although the company still relies on investors to raise critical revenue.24

As such a large, fast-growing company, Airbnb has created concerns and garnered criticisms as an unregulated threat to hotel establishments, rental markets, and community harmony.25 But these concerns and criticisms are not necessarily well founded, nor do they capture the full picture. And the potential benefits of room-sharing to the twenty-first-century city necessitates accommodation

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18. See, e.g., AIRBNB, supra note 1; McAlone, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Id.
24. See Mitra, supra note 19 (“Airbnb has been venture funded so far. [In total, it has raised $3.4 billion from investors.”).
25. See infra Part I.A.
for, and fair regulation of, Airbnb moving forward. The next two subparts will consider the major criticisms of Airbnb, studying the validity of those concerns and the potential for meaningful regulations to target negative externalities while allowing room-sharing to benefit local economies in a significant way.

A. Economic and Societal Impacts and Criticisms

Economically, Airbnb contributes more tourist dollars per guest than comparable hotel lodgings. Much of this economic benefit is attributable to two factors: (1) Airbnb helps guests save money on lodging, allowing them to stay longer, spend more on other expenses, or both; and (2) whereas hotels are often clustered in a particular district, the locations of Airbnb listings are widely dispersed throughout cities, spreading the impact of Airbnb guests’ spending.

In addition, Airbnb accommodations benefit localities that host large, seminal events (for example, festivals and concerts) that price many potential tourists out of a city as hotel rates skyrocket.

26. For more on how Airbnb spurs a reconceptualization of the twenty-first-century city, see infra Part I.A.3.


29. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 105 (“[W]hile the vast majority of New York City hotels are clustered in midtown Manhattan, as of 2013, 82 percent of Airbnb accommodations were spread across the rest of the city.”); Kate Krader, Airbnb: We Generate $4.5 Billion Globally for Local Restaurants, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/airbnb-we-generate-4-5-billion-globally-for-local-restaurants [https://perma.cc/K5GK-AYBU] (noting Airbnb found “42 percent of guests spend money in the neighborhoods where they’re staying”).

30. See, e.g., John Divine, Is Airbnb a Threat to the Hotel Industry?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 2, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-11-02/is-airbnb-a-threat-to-the-hotel-industry [https://perma.cc/J8V2-P88U] (describing how travelers who used to skip big cities are now considering them because Airbnb provides an affordable
Whereas a locality without Airbnb listings might host an event that fills all of its short-term hotel spaces, localities with Airbnb options can accommodate more guests. More guests means more money for local businesses and more taxes for local governments, increasing the aggregate benefit of an event. The extra income for hosts also injects revenue into local economies. These benefits further compound in localities that, unlike the biggest cities, rely on a few, specialized events—such as strawberry festivals, fairs, and craft shows—to bring in most, if not all, of their tourism revenues.

Airbnb’s economic benefits are only the beginning. The fuller picture shows the room-sharing economy can both benefit local economies and meet the demands of regulators intent on addressing its negative externalities, making meaningful regulation not only a possibility, but an imperative.

1. Hotel Industry Criticisms

As Airbnb has risen in popularity, it has come under attack from institutions that perceive cheaper, short-term rentals as a threat to their business model. Hoteliers have been particularly critical of the sharing economy’s impact on their revenues, and there is some alternative). Within its first year, Airbnb helped provide more than six hundred people attending the Democratic National Convention with housing “when traditional accommodations in Denver were overbooked.” See Interian, supra note 12, at 133. And, as hotel spaces fill up, Canadians are turning to Airbnb for the 2017 Canada Day celebrations in Ottawa. See Vito Pilieci, Likely Hotel Room Shortage for Canada Day 2017 Opens Door for Airbnb, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Nov. 8, 2016, 6:32 PM), http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/likely-hotel-room-shortage-for-canada-day-2017-opens-door-for-airbnb [https://perma.cc/T8P4-CQHG].

31. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 105-06.
33. For the benefits and importance of festivals to small-town communities, see, for example, Jessi Stone, Festival Frenzy Fueling Local Economies, SMOKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Apr. 15, 2015, 1:09 PM), http://www.smokymountainnews.com/news/item/15546-festival-frenzy-fueling-local-economies [https://perma.cc/22YH-P5HU] (“Macon County’s 25,292 households pay $660 less in state and local taxes as a result of tourism spending.”).
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 506 (“Unfortunately ... the hotel industry’s goal is to shut down its competition by rallying for overregulation of ‘sharing economies.’” (quoting Daniel Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Policy: The Future of
reason to worry. At upwards of $30 billion, Airbnb’s market value is greater than several of the largest hotel companies. The room-sharing service also boasts a much larger stock of rooms and lower marginal costs to add additional inventory, allowing for faster growth. A recent study found that Airbnb averages nearly 22 percent more guests per night than Hilton Worldwide. And Airbnb has essentially eliminated the need for hotel and vacation rental brokers—whose job is to help vacationers find places to stay—affecting a wider swath of the hospitality trade than just brick-and-mortar hotels.

But “Airbnb’s growth does not necessarily come at the expense of the hotel industry.” Airbnb can in fact alleviate the strain on hotels during peak seasons and events. Rather than directly competing with hotels, Airbnb provides a low-price alternative to visitors unable to otherwise afford the hotels with which Airbnb supposedly competes. Where Airbnb and hotels do directly compete,

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36. See Mitra, supra note 19; see also Bitran, supra note 14, at 505. But Airbnb’s revenues still fall far short of the largest hotel chains. See Jason Clampet, State of Travel 2016: Airbnb vs. Hotel Rivals in 6 Charts, SKIFT (May 3, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://skift.com/2016/05/03/state-of-travel-2016-airbnb-vs-hotel-rivals-in-6-charts/ (showing $340 million in third quarter revenue for Airbnb in 2015, compared with $3.6 billion for Marriott and $2.9 billion for Hilton for the same quarter).

37. See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 160-61 (2016) (“In other words, the largest hotel chains had fewer rooms, much slower growth rates, and much lower valuations compared to their revenues than Airbnb.”); Divine, supra note 30 (noting that it cost hotel giant Marriott $13 billion to expand its inventory by 375,000 rooms; meanwhile, it cost Airbnb nothing to add one million rooms to its inventory by 2015). But see Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 304-05 (2016) (observing that Airbnb’s growth is limited, though nominally, by the practical difficulties hosts face trying to handle a large number of listings and storage of personal belongings).


39. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 106.
the competition creates favorable outcomes for consumers by decreasing prices and creating better consumer experiences as hotels are forced to adapt.\footnote{For a discussion on how hotels have started to respond to Airbnb as a competitor, see \textcite{Glusac2016} (noting that hotels have responded to Airbnb by creating experiences that cater to local cultures, socialization, shared spaces, and technology).}

A comprehensive study of Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry shows increases in Airbnb listings resulted in only marginal decreases in hotel revenues for the same area.\footnote{See \textcite{Zervas2016}, at 4. Las Vegas illustrates this phenomenon, where casino-hotels have had little trouble competing with Airbnb listings that cannot provide the same all-inclusive amenities. See Bradley Seth McNew, \textit{Why Las Vegas Casino-Hotels Aren’t Worried About Airbnb}, \textit{FOX BUS.} (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2016/11/10/why-las-vegas-casino-hotels-arent-worried-about-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/MUF7-AAEB].} The study looked at the hotel industry in Texas and found Airbnb had the greatest impact on lower-priced, independent hotels providing fewer amenities and not targeted at business travelers (in other words, the hotels most like the average Airbnb listing).\footnote{See Kevin May, \textit{Large Increase in Business Travelers Found Using Airbnb}, \textit{Tnooz} (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.tnooz.com/article/large-increase-seen-in-corporate-travel-use-of-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/5L9J-75A7] (“Concur found that major hotel chains are also experiencing growth, ... [and] total business travel is still 250 times greater than that on Airbnb.”).} Even as business use increases on Airbnb, hotel chains continue to see growth in business travel—albeit at a slower rate—and still outpace Airbnb in pure volume of business guests.\footnote{Georgios Zervas et al., \textit{The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry} 3 (B.U. Sch. Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898## [https://perma.cc/SKG3-SEJ4].} In fact, in 2015, revenue per available room—a significant hotel financial metric—grew by 5 percent at both Marriott and Hilton.\footnote{Divine, supra note 30.} Where Airbnb does directly compete with hotel chains, evidence suggests its impact only slightly decreases occupancy rates but significantly decreases hotel room prices—a benefit to all consumers.\footnote{See Zervas et al., supra note 44, at 3.}
sharing economy presents opportunities for traditional chains to expand. As the short-term rental market gains legal recognition, established hotel chains are already entering the field.49 The same phenomenon has emerged in the analogous ride-sharing economy, where taxi companies have developed applications to compete with Uber and Lyft.50 So hoteliers should not lose hope, but should instead be prepared to adapt and compete, advocating for legal recognition and standardized regulation of Airbnb rather than forcing it further into the underground marketplace. Ultimately, bringing Airbnb under a clear regulatory framework will simultaneously benefit the sharing economy through legitimation and the hotel industry through fairer competition and new opportunities for growth—a win-win for consumers and commerce alike.

2. Airbnb and Housing Shortage Concerns

Hoteliers are not the only group to resist the rapid growth of Airbnb. Landlords and local governments have both criticized the company for allowing hosts to permanently rent out housing space—sometimes entire homes and apartments—thereby depriving cities of much needed living space and increasing rental costs for local tenants.51 Indeed, there are incentives to rent out a location short term instead of long term,52 but the causal link between Airbnb and

49. See Miller, supra note 37, at 164-65 (claiming hotels likely would seek to enter the short-term rental market if major cities took action to legalize home-sharing); see also, e.g., Edelman & Geradin, supra note 37, at 304 (“[S]ome hotels even list rooms on Airbnb.”); Glusac, supra note 42 (“AccorHotels, the French hotel company whose brands include Sofitel and Raffles, has invested directly in the sharing economy, in its acquisition of Onefinestay, a London-based home sharing service that focuses on the high-end market.”).
50. See Miller, supra note 37, at 165.
51. See Office of the N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Airbnb in the City 3, 12 (2014); Dana Palombo, Comment, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate Short-Term Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. Rev. 287, 310-11 (2015) (“In 2014, City Attorney David Herrera filed two lawsuits against landlords in San Francisco because they each used residential properties as illegal hotels, making those spaces unavailable to permanent renters while San Francisco was in a housing shortage.”); Barber, supra note 23. Tenants have even gone so far as to coin the term “Airbnb’d” to describe the practice of landlords kicking them out—often illegally—to make room for Airbnb guests. See Steven Hill, The Unsavory Side of Airbnb, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 19, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/evictions-and-conversions-dark-side-airbnb [https://perma.cc/3ZFE-7BDW].
52. See Barber, supra note 23 (stating that it takes “just 83 nights” of renting on Airbnb in Los Angeles to bring in the same revenue as a year-long lease).
skyrocketing rent is not as definite as critics suggest. 

53. See Miller, supra note 37, at 182 (noting uncertainty over whether the short-term rental market has had a significant effect on rent or real estate pricing); Jim Edwards, Here’s Exactly What Airbnb Does to Rent in Popular Cities, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/statistics-data-airbnb-rent-prices-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/94RC-PWS3] (“It is not possible to say definitively that Airbnb puts up the prices of rents and properties.”); see also Allie Howell & Jared Meyer, Don’t Blame Airbnb for New York City’s High Rents, REASON.COM (Oct. 15, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/10/15/dont-blame-airbnb-for-new-york-citys-high [https://perma.cc/36RA-NRUM] (arguing that land use regulations, rent controls, and construction costs are the more likely causes of high rent in New York City given Airbnb’s miniscule share of the market).


55. See Edwards, supra note 53.

56. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 510; Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 106-07.


landscape so as to permit short-term rentals while cracking down on abusive landlords who evict long-term tenants in order to charge exorbitant rent to short-term guests. Chicago and San Francisco, for instance, have both required hosts to register with the city, allowing better monitoring of abusive and detrimental renting. Airbnb itself has taken measures to prevent commercialization of the platform in San Francisco. And treating Airbnb hosts as innkeepers is likely to dissuade landlords from leaving the long-term rental market because of the greater liability they must assume for guests on their premises. If landlords want to try and profit from short-term rental schemes to the detriment of long-term tenants, they should assume greater responsibility for guest safety. One thing is clear: the concerns that local governments have about Airbnb’s impact on rent prices can be addressed through precise regulation aimed at limiting commercialization, without the need for abolition en masse.

3. Short-Term Rentals and Community Harmony

Critiques of Airbnb’s disruptive impact do not end with rental markets; community planners have also attacked transient occupancy as a threat to the economic and social stability of neighborhoods. Specifically, public officials and residential constituents have opined that zoning for renters in a neighborhood leads to increased traffic and other community disruptions. Many contend

59. See, e.g., Palombo, supra note 51, at 311-12 (noting that San Francisco’s Ellis Act permits landlords to rent short-term, but does not allow them to evict tenants for those purposes); Said, supra note 58.
60. See Mitra, supra note 19. But enforcement of these requirements has not been easy. See id.
62. For the specific liability imputed to innkeepers, see infra Part II.B.
63. See, e.g., Palombo, supra note 51, at 306 (arguing that altering a zoning district from residential to commercial to accommodate short-term rentals threatens to undermine the stability of residential areas).
64. These concerns have been used by cities in legal arguments. See City of New York v. Smart Apartments LLC, 959 N.Y.S. 2d 890, 892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“The City argues that transient residents] bother the non-transient residents ... because [they] host loud, late night parties; vomit, dump garbage; .... and generally do not conduct themselves in the civilized, genteel manner of the locals.”).
that renters do not have the same incentives as a homeowner to maintain their residence, and therefore rental properties will be poorly kept and cause depreciated home values for everyone else.65 Others worry Airbnb creates transience in communities, causing them to lose a valuable social asset: neighbors.66 But these negative attributes of renters are not necessarily fair,67 and the rise of the sharing economy raises new questions about the desirability of single-use zoning districts in the first place.68

Of course, disruptions to communities are valid concerns for zoning commissions and local governments, but the exclusion of short-term renters, particularly Airbnb users, goes no further to help protect community harmony than other policies that already preserve home values and neighborhood tranquility (for example, home manicure ordinances and nuisance laws).69 In fact, the sharing economy is a cheaper tool cities can use to redevelop and revitalize areas that otherwise cannot compete with more affordable land in the suburbs.70 Sharing economy applications also provide services that assist local governments in giving full-service accommodations to their constituents and consumers, making a locality more attractive to visitors, residents, and businesses.71 Thus, the sharing economy, and Airbnb in particular, may actually help cities get more out of underused and underdeveloped areas, creating multi-use

66. See Barber, supra note 23 (“In popular tourist destinations ... the sound of rolling suitcases and calls for ‘housekeeping’ have replaced neighborly meetups.”).
67. See Pindell, supra note 65, at 46-47 (“Negative impacts on a community commonly ascribed to renters—overcrowding, short-term horizons, increased traffic, limited care of property—can also be attributed to many owners.”).
68. See Miller, supra note 37, at 167 (“The [Short-Term Rental] Market may ... usher in a new era in which extended stays become a part of the hotel districts.”); id. at 158 (pointing out the limited land available to cities from which to gain profit and arguing that “[t]he sharing economy ... offers a second bite at the apple for those jurisdictions that have already built out their land”).
69. See id. at 199.
70. See id. at 159 (“[T]he monetization opportunity of previously non-monetized neighborhoods provide[s] cities a way to reconceptualize the cities’ economies with a much lighter touch than the traditional tools—annexation, redevelopment, infrastructure—have typically required.”).
71. See id. (noting the advantages Airbnb-style accommodations provide to families with small children over the typical hotel accommodations).
neighborhoods that offer revenue to urban dwellers, while maintaining or enhancing the desirable attributes of community.

Notably, Airbnb claims its mission is to develop communities by bringing the purely commercial relationship of guest and innkeeper to a personal level, connecting strangers and exposing communities to diverse perspectives. One could argue this diversification makes communities stronger. Additionally, Airbnb nets higher profits to homeowners, incentivizing reinvestment in Airbnb listings and improving the commercial value of homes in a given area.

So the question is not so much whether Airbnb has ruined the neighborhood as we know it, but whether the neighborhood as we know it is even worth preserving—or if it even exists. The sharing economy likely is not the cause of the vast changes seen in neighborhood communities today. Rather, Airbnb could well be a symptom of a twenty-first-century lifestyle that is less localized and more globalized, and connected via larger webs of online communities. What the urban communities of nineteenth-century America have lost, the sharing economy has the potential to replace and enhance with a new perspective on what it means to live and act in a global community from the comfort of one’s own home.

4. Short-Term Rental Markets and Housing Speculation

There are legitimate concerns, however, that permissively allowing short-term rentals in the residential housing market will encourage speculation in home prices, creating artificial and unstable housing bubbles. Speculative homebuyers purchase residential homes in hopes that housing prices will increase and they can sell the home a short time after purchasing for a quick return on their

72. See Brian Chesky, Belong Anywhere, AIRBNB BLOG (July 16, 2014), http://blog.airbnb.com/belong-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/2EDD-V4PM]; see also Barber, supra note 23 (“They’ve taken something that’s been a purely commercial endeavor—renting a hotel room—and made it personal, too.”).

73. See Miller, supra note 37, at 184 (equating the relationship short-term renters build with their neighbors to those built while backpacking across Europe, redefining what “neighborhood” will mean in the future).

74. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 23 (“[The Airbnb host has] since reinvested much of his revenue back into the property through renovations.”).

75. See Pindell, supra note 65, at 65.
investment. In the meantime, speculators rent out the investment homes to short-term tenants to cushion costs. Speculation results in unnatural increases in housing demand, which in turn increases home prices, requiring lenders to extend greater amounts of credit to other homebuyers with the expectation prices will continue to increase. When the bubble bursts, however, homeowners are left with mortgages they cannot afford and homes that banks refuse to refinance, leading to widespread foreclosures and neighborhood degradation. And the individual homeowners are not the only ones who suffer when the housing bubble collapses. Local educational, social, and governmental institutions are all affected.

Although unproven, in theory Airbnb helps speculators rent out investment homes to short-term guests, which only compounds the harmful effect of speculation on long-term housing prices. Indeed, Airbnb can itself induce speculation by increasing property prices in areas tourists frequently rent via the room-sharing economy, where the expectation of rental revenues artificially increases property values. If and when a catastrophic event (for example, disease, terror attack, or a natural disaster) occurs, tourists are driven away and the realization of additional revenues is undermined, thereby collapsing the Airbnb bubble.

Because of its potential impact on speculation, local decision makers are understandably hesitant to change zoning ordinances to allow short-term rentals. But these concerns ignore other ways to regulate speculation sales (for example, Vermont’s land gains tax on short-term sales). And the causal connection between short-term rental platforms and speculation is far from concrete. Speculation

76. See id. at 66.
77. Cf. id. at 67-68 (discussing the problems renters face when banks foreclose on speculators’ homes).
78. See id. at 66-67.
79. See id. at 67 (“Foreclosed houses can remain vacant for months or even years, falling into disrepair and becoming susceptible to vandalism or other property crimes.”).
80. See id. (“Foreclosed homeowners’ children can experience significant educational and social disruption. Surrounding homeowners can also suffer.... Cities face falling property tax revenue, as well as increased administrative costs.”).
81. See Barber, supra note 23 (discussing the effects of short-term renting on housing and long-term rental prices).
82. See id.
83. For the options available to localities when regulating speculative sales, and the challenges they face, see Pindell, supra note 65, at 68-71.
existed before the room-sharing economy thrived, so calling it an
Airbnb problem improperly frames the issue, confusing an enabling
factor with the problem’s root causes.84 Localities have several
regulatory options that promote a revenue-generating sharing econ-
omy while also mitigating the risks of speculation. This is not unlike
any other complex community planning issue, with myriad solutions
of varying effectiveness.85

B. The Opportunity for Meaningful Regulation

In recent years, the municipalities most affected by Airbnb have
responded by ratcheting up fines and punishing room-sharing hosts.
Austin, Texas, for example, banned advertising for short-term
rentals in February 2016.86 In March 2016, Miami Beach amended
its city code, providing for fines up to $20,000 for anyone renting for
periods of less than six months.87 And New York State passed one
of the toughest laws to combat the short-term rental economy, fining
anyone who advertises short-term stays in unoccupied apartments.88
Even cities that do not prohibit room-sharing per se have construed
existing codes to punish Airbnb hosts.89 But eliminating short-term
rentals altogether is neither appropriate nor practical.

Despite opposition from hoteliers, landlords, and policymakers,
reality suggests the room-sharing economy fills an underserved
niche in the market that operates to promote the aggregate amount
of tourism revenue in any given locale.90 There are some concerns
the room-sharing economy can be abused to operate illegal hotels
that deprive deserving local tenants of long-term rental space, but
there is little evidence to show that Airbnb has actually impacted

84. See Miller, supra note 37, at 182 (“[T]he [Short-Term Rental] Market has not had an
appreciable difference on real estate purchase prices.”).
85. Notably, one option—exclusion of renters altogether—presents fair housing concerns.
See Pindell, supra note 65, at 71-72.
86. See Barber, supra note 23.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Major, supra note 38, at 472 (“While no San Diego code provision specifically
addresses room-sharing, the court reasoned that room-sharing potentially implicates several
sections.... Because [the Airbnb host] operated an illegal bed and breakfast for at least part
of the time, the court found [her] liable.”).
90. See supra Part I.A.
rental prices by any appreciable measure. 91 And there are means to regulate commercializing the platform without eliminating the sharing economy. The opportunity to regulate the room-sharing economy in a meaningful way, while enabling it to serve local interests, is ripe for the taking. 92 Overregulation threatens to only hurt localities by promoting exclusive industry cartels and monopolies at a cost to consumers and local governments. 93 It also makes practical sense to accept that Airbnb, as a titan of the sharing economy, is here to stay and too big to fail; and trying to force it out of business goes against the tides of modern prosumerism. 94 Although regulation is certainly needed, punishing hosts while taxing their revenue creates a regulatory mismatch—legitimizing the sharing economy on the one hand and pushing it further underground on the other. As this Note will analyze in the next three parts, one way to meaningfully regulate Airbnb is to move hosts outside of the landlord-tenant framework and into the realm of innkeeper regulation.

91. See supra Part I.A.2.

92. For a discussion of how one city (San Francisco) embraced Airbnb and other short-term rental sites, and the opposition that embrace now faces, see Palombo, supra note 51, at 313-17 (“Legislation was passed ... that legalizes short-term rentals in a highly regulated manner, by limiting the rentals to ninety nights per year, and requiring permanent residents to occupy their homes for at least 275 days per year.”).

93. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 512 (“A tax memo estimates that San Francisco will lose approximately $58 million in tax revenue if [a proposed room-sharing regulation] passes, because the legislation would limit homes to seventy-five rental nights annually.”); see also id. at 536 (“If ... hotels want to compete with the technology-created sharing economy ..., then they need to improve their services and efficiency, not ban competition.”); Palombo, supra note 51, at 318.

94. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 528-29; see also Palombo, supra note 51, at 318. “Prosumerism” is a term coined for the sharing economy participants who are both traditional consumers in the economy and producers of their own products and services sold on sharing economy sites. See The New Consumer and the Sharing Economy, HAVAS WORLDWIDE: THE MAG (June 26, 2015), http://mag.havas.com/prosumer-report/the-new-consumer-and-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/9YVA-6C8B]. For recent research on trends toward prosumerism and the collaborative economy, see generally id.
II. A SUMMARY OF LANDLORD-TENANT AND INNKEEPER DOCTRINES

Much commentary exists about Airbnb’s impact on housing and hospitality and ways to tax and regulate its negative externalities, but current literature and law have assumed that it is only natural—or simply an accepted part of the legal landscape—for hosts to be treated as landlords and their guests as tenants. Regulating hosts as landlords is admittedly not the worst circumstance for hosts, who can avoid liability for many injuries guests might incur on their property. But, as Part III will discuss, the advantages to hosts come at a cost to Airbnb guests, and the current legal landscape misunderstands the position Airbnb guests—even those staying over thirty days—are in. This Part will juxtapose the basic legal frameworks for the landlord-tenant and innkeeper doctrines, previewing the particular implications of each for Airbnb hosts.

A. Landlord-Tenant Treatment of Airbnb Hosts

For two main reasons, New York and California have become bellwethers for the doctrinal treatment of Airbnb hosts in other parts of the nation. First, by sheer volume, New York and California are the jurisdictional homes of Airbnb’s largest U.S. markets by active listings (New York City and Los Angeles), and the company itself is headquartered in San Francisco. Second, New York and California have given rise to the most extensive litigation on a relatively new issue. Finally, localities in both states have already taken various regulatory steps to adapt to, prohibit, or accommodate

95. See Loucks, supra note 9, at 334 (“Some jurisdictions treat Airbnb hosts as landlords instead of innkeepers or mere property owners granting gratuitous licenses.”); infra Part II.A.
96. See id. (“[Treating hosts as landlords] seems somewhat counterintuitive because Airbnb guests are more analogous to a hotel guest or a mere licensee, rather than a tenant who holds some interest in the property.”).
98. See Salter, supra note 13.
Airbnb. Looking at these two states, therefore, provides key insights into the current legal framework surrounding Airbnb host-guest relationships.101

In California, state law allocates tenant rights to any guests staying over thirty days.102 To avoid this classification, Airbnb hosts must meet impractical requirements.103 Specifically, in addition to maintaining the right of access and control, California law requires those wishing to avoid landlord classification to provide all of the following services to guests: (1) a fireproof safe; (2) a central telephone service; (3) maid, mail, and room service; and (4) food service by an establishment within the hotel or operated in conjunction therewith.104 For obvious reasons, few—if any—Airbnb listings provide the requisite services and right of entry that allow hosts to escape characterization as a landlord. In a state where tenants are granted considerable rights, Airbnb hosts face significant obstacles if they have unruly or obstinate guests.105

Likewise, in New York State, the courts have characterized Airbnb hosts as landlords when determining whether hosts can rent out property zoned for permanent residences.106 In *City of New York v. Smart Apartments LLC*, for example, the court treated Smart Apartment’s owners, who used a room-sharing method to rent out rooms, as landlords, not innkeepers, even when hosting transient guests for under thirty days.107 Similarly, in *Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman*, the court agreed to allow New York’s Attorney General to


102. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940(a)-(b)(1) (West 2017); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 7280(a) (West 2017).

103. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940(a).

104. See id. § 1940(b)(2).

105. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.

106. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding the Attorney General had a factual basis to find violations of New York’s Multiple Dwelling Law because Airbnb hosts were renting out living space for less than thirty days while not also residing in the same residence, thereby acting as landlords). The court denied the subpoena on other grounds. Id. at 792; see also City of New York v. Smart Apartments LLC, 959 N.Y.S.2d 890, 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (enjoining Smart Apartments from renting to transient occupants of less than 30 days in part because it violated the Multiple Dwelling Law that prohibits landlords from renting to short-term guests without also residing in the residence).

107. See 959 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
subpoena records of 124 Airbnb hosts suspected of operating illegal hotels, implying the hosts were landlords and not hoteliers.108

Legally, classifying Airbnb hosts as landlords means hosts have reduced liability for guest injuries and increased difficulty evicting squatters. Under the laws of a majority of states, landlords are liable for physical injuries to tenants resulting from the landlord’s failure to repair a dangerous condition.109 For liability to impute, furthermore, the dangerous condition must violate either: “(1) an implied warranty of habitability; or (2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.”110 Landlords are subject to liability only for conditions about which they are aware, could have discovered with the exercise of reasonable care, or are given notice by the tenant.111 Thus, the law acts to limit a landlord’s liability for harm to tenants by first requiring the landlord’s reasonable awareness, and, even if the landlord is aware, further requiring the dangerous condition be one that violates the warranty of habitability or other law. In many jurisdictions—even those with more tenant-friendly laws112—the warranty of habitability is a minimal standard, requiring landlords to provide only a basic level of sanitation, heat, and structural integrity.113 In effect, landlords need only repair those conditions that seriously impact the ability of one to live in reasonable comfort and good health.114 Even if a landlord violates

108. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 302-03.
109. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant § 18.3 (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
110. Id.
111. Id. cmt. c.
112. See, e.g., Dealing with Problems, Cal. Dep’t Consumer Aff., http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/problems.shtml [https://perma.cc/SA73-TV58] (outlining the basic habitability requirements and noting “[t]he implied warranty of habitability is not violated merely because the rental unit is not in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition ... [nor] if there are minor housing code violations”).
113. The most basic requirements of the implied warranty are: (1) a structurally sound roof; (2) functioning heat and hot water; (3) access to clean water; (4) adequate lighting; (5) walls and floors not at risk of collapse; (6) the absence of lead, asbestos, and mold; (7) a functioning sewage system; (8) door locks; and (9) functioning smoke alarms throughout the tenancy. Implied Warranty of Habitability, Legal Dictionary, http://legaldictionary.net/implied-warranty-of-habitability/ [https://perma.cc/93XC-8PCL].
114. See Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1444, 1458 (1974) (“[S]ome courts have indicated that the warranty requires defects serious enough to have constituted a constructive eviction.”). Moskovitz also points out that “[d]eprivation of essential residential functions” is a common
the warranty, moreover, some courts afford landlords reasonable time to repair the problem.\textsuperscript{115} In the Airbnb context, guests are unlikely to be familiar enough with the property—or be at a property long enough to become familiar—that either giving notice or granting reasonable time for repair is impractical.\textsuperscript{116} Even if notice and reasonable time were possible, many risks that do not affect the habitability of a listing are nonetheless threatening and undiscoverable to a temporary guest.\textsuperscript{117}

Although enjoying limited liability for guest safety, Airbnb landlord-hosts are constrained by laws proscribing self-help when evicting holdover tenants. As a general rule, if a “speedy” judicial remedy (for example, summary proceeding) exists, a landlord may not evict or exclude a tenant from a leasehold property using their own resources.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, state law prohibits Airbnb hosts classified as landlords from evicting an unruly guest extrajudicially, creating a tremendous burden for the host that exceeds the intentions of the Airbnb relationship.\textsuperscript{119}

For these and many other reasons discussed in Part III, the landlord-tenant approach to the room-sharing economy is incongruent and improper, applying traditional law to an untraditional market.
B. A Summary of Innkeeper Doctrine

In contrast to the duties and rights of landlords, the long-standing innkeeper doctrine better protects guests and allows hosts to evict disruptive lodgers at will. As Part IV will argue, these two characteristics are among the primary reasons why the innkeeper doctrine is a better regulatory approach for Airbnb hosts.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes a long-held duty imputed to innkeepers at common law. An innkeeper is held to have a special relationship with his guests that creates a duty for the innkeeper to protect said guests “against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and ... to give them first aid.” This duty is an exception to the general rule of negligence that recognizing the need to aid others does not itself impose a duty to act. Innkeepers, by way of their relation to a guest, have a duty to obviate any unreasonable risk of harm that might arise out of the guest’s stay on the innkeeper’s premises. In addition, innkeepers have a duty to provide aid to guests for injuries or illnesses arising from natural causes, pure accident, or third parties. The duty to protect and aid guests does not apply when the innkeeper does not know, or has no reason to know or anticipate, a risk to the guest. Thus, the law serves to impute greater liability to innkeepers by expanding the situations in which an innkeeper would have a duty to protect, warn, and cure guests of risks and harms. Although the innkeeper must still have actual knowledge, or reason to know, of risks, the duty imputed to innkeepers naturally requires more consideration of guests’ interests and safety than is required in a landlord-tenant relationship.

Furthermore, treating hosts as innkeepers is not just a benefit to guests. As stressed throughout this Note, innkeeper-hosts generally have a greater right to evict guests using self-help. In particular, innkeepers may evict guests so long as the reasons for the eviction

120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
121. Id. cmt. b.
122. Id. cmt. c.
123. Id. cmt. d.
124. Id. cmt. e.
125. Compare id. § 314A(1)-(2), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 18.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
are valid and the innkeeper does not use excessive force.\textsuperscript{127} Valid reasons include the guest’s failure to pay, violations of the law, or general misconduct.\textsuperscript{128} The law still protects guests conducting themselves “in a proper and peaceful manner,” preventing abuse of the eviction right.\textsuperscript{129} For this and several other reasons, the innkeeper approach better reflects the relationship at play in the room-sharing economy.\textsuperscript{130}

III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LANDLORD-TENANT APPROACH

This Part will outline three primary concerns with the landlord-tenant approach to Airbnb, specifically: (1) the mismatch between the treatment of Airbnb hosts as landlords and the intent of the parties entering the relationship; (2) Airbnb’s own claims of corporate impunity, leaving guests with little redress if hosts also lack a duty to warn and protect; and (3) the incongruence of the exploitative theory behind landlord-tenant law and the collaborative theory reinvigorated by the sharing economy.

A. The Mismatch of Legal Treatment and Actual Practice

A large problem with the landlord-tenant approach to Airbnb is that the doctrinal treatment fails to account for the actual interests of the parties in a room-sharing relationship. Airbnb aims to connect guests with local hosts, bringing guests directly into unfamiliar environments where they can interact with a given destination in an organic way.\textsuperscript{131} Airbnb users are looking for a temporary roof over their heads and the potential insights of a local; they do not seek out permanent living quarters or a legal interest in property.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{127} See id.
\bibitem{128} See id.
\bibitem{129} See id.
\bibitem{130} See infra Part IV.
\bibitem{132} See Loucks, supra note 9, at 334 (noting that Airbnb guests are more analogous to hotel guests than to tenants with a legal interest in a property).
\end{thebibliography}
Yet, the landlord perspective assumes guests desire, or even need, a leasehold interest in a particular listing. Even if the parties did desire to create a landlord-tenant relationship, Airbnb itself implicitly undermines the creation of tenancies. Unlike landlords, who often require extensive background information and references before renting property, Airbnb hosts—even for long-term guests—rely on informal, less thorough means to predict guest behavior. The checks Airbnb does provide, moreover, are unlikely to pick up all red flags concerning past crimes, or a guest’s propensity to be dangerous and destructive. The bulwark of Airbnb’s verification program, for example, is the site’s two-way review system, whereby guests and hosts review each other after a transaction ends, attaching the review to that person’s profile for other users to see. But the veracity and depth of such reviews is vulnerable to the pressures of social norms and business incentives. Granted, truly awful guests are unlikely to escape without

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133. See, e.g., Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 319, 320 (2010) (“In today’s age of online public records and digital transmission, a rental applicant’s complete residential history, credit report, criminal record, civil litigation background, and other information are available within hours or even minutes.”).

134. See I’m a Host. What Are Some Safety Tips I Can Follow?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/2319,i-m-a-host--what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow (discussing various means for hosts to insure guests are who they say they are, namely: (1) interacting only through Airbnb; (2) providing rules; (3) obtaining insurance; and (4) establishing requirements such as security deposits and verified ID through the Airbnb system). Airbnb’s verification of user identities is largely superficial, relying on users to link to social media accounts and contact information, both of which are easily forged, though users have the option to share government issued identification. See What Are Profile Verifications and How Do I Get Them?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/336/what-are-profile-verifications-and-how-do-i-get-them (discussing various means for hosts to insure guests are who they say they are, namely: (1) interacting only through Airbnb; (2) providing rules; (3) obtaining insurance; and (4) establishing requirements such as security deposits and verified ID through the Airbnb system). Airbnb’s verification of user identities is largely superficial, relying on users to link to social media accounts and contact information, both of which are easily forged, though users have the option to share government issued identification. See What Are Profile Verifications and How Do I Get Them?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/336/what-are-profile-verifications-and-how-do-i-get-them (discussing various means for hosts to insure guests are who they say they are, namely: (1) interacting only through Airbnb; (2) providing rules; (3) obtaining insurance; and (4) establishing requirements such as security deposits and verified ID through the Airbnb system).

135. See Does Airbnb Perform Background Checks on Members?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1308/does-airbnb-perform-background-checks-on-members (“Although background checks may help...”)


137. See Molly Mulshine, After a Disappointing Airbnb Stay, I Realized There’s a Major Flaw in the Review System, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.business
a bad review, but such situations are few and far between, as the review system tilts in the guest's favor.\textsuperscript{138} Even badly reviewed guests can use the instant book feature—pushed by Airbnb in recent years—to book a stay without any host approval at all.\textsuperscript{138} The review system also fails to capture what a particular host cannot see.\textsuperscript{140} Whereas a guest might be considerably pleasant while staying with one host, the next stay with a new host could turn out quite differently.\textsuperscript{141}

Beyond the impracticalities of its verification system, Airbnb进一步 undermine the creation of tenancies by means of its payment procedures. Although Airbnb does collect payments for up to the first month of any booking at the time of a reservation, users can cancel cards or close payment accounts so Airbnb can no longer collect payments for nights beyond the first month,\textsuperscript{142} at which point...
the guest likely has obtained tenant rights. This abuse of the payment system is the exact issue described in the Introduction, and leaves hosts vulnerable to squatters and scam artists.

Thus, if hosts want to create a tenancy, Airbnb is an impractical forum for doing so, implicitly disincentivizing such behavior by inhibiting a host’s ability to predict guest behavior and to receive timely payments. For these practical reasons, and the purpose of the site generally, one can assume most hosts do not intend to give guests a legal interest in their property, and most guests do not intend to seek out such an interest, yet the law currently leaves Airbnb users with no practical workaround. The mismatch of party intent and landlord-tenant doctrine is further compounded when considering the difficulty with which an injured guest can seek legal remedies against either Airbnb or its hosts under the current framework.

B. Airbnb’s Corporate Impunity

The lack of liability imputed to Airbnb hosts under landlord-tenant doctrine is particularly problematic because of the corresponding lack of liability imputed to Airbnb as a company. Fearing that internet startups would be stifled by litigation and liability concerns, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in 1996. The CDA essentially immunizes Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from liability for the information and content posted by an “information content provider.” The broad definition of ISPs protected by the law includes Airbnb because hosts serve as separate information content providers on the Airbnb platform. The law protects Airbnb from liability for the content posted by hosts that it does not have a hand in creating, although courts have limited the scope of this protection to free speech issues

143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B.
147. Interian, supra note 12, at 138.
149. Interian, supra note 12, at 138.
and not to other claims. In recent litigation, for example, the District Court for the Northern District of California rejected Airbnb’s argument that a San Francisco ordinance, which made Airbnb liable for collecting fees from unregistered hosts, violated the CDA. The court found the ordinance did not punish Airbnb for the actual content hosts posted, so Airbnb was not immune from sanctions. Nonetheless, the court accepted that the law would protect Airbnb from liability if, say, a host omitted to mention the poor conditions of a particular location or otherwise lied about the quality of the accommodations provided.

The CDA is not the end of Airbnb’s legal immunity arguments, either. The company can also argue it should not be liable for its hosts’ torts because each host is an independent contractor and not an employee—an argument made by the ride-sharing application Uber with mixed results. Although no Airbnb-specific case law yet exists, Airbnb places fewer restrictions on its hosts and could therefore argue it should not be liable for its hosts’ negligence. If

150. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2008).
151. Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 3:16-cv-03615-JD, 2016 WL 6599821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). For a discussion of the ruling’s implications, see Kerr, supra note 101 (“The home-rental company ... has used similar arguments in its battles with other cities, including New York. Additionally, lawmakers throughout the US are looking to San Francisco to set an example of how to regulate the eight-year-old startup.”).
153. See id. at *5 (refusing to preempt the San Francisco ordinance because it “did not turn on holding an Internet service liable for posting or failing to remove content provided by a third party,” implying that if the ordinance had held Airbnb liable for what its hosts post then the CDA would protect it).
154. Compare McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (holding Uber drivers were not employees for the purposes of unemployment compensation because they provided their own vehicles and controlled “when, where, with whom, and how to accept and perform trip requests”), with Interian, supra note 12, at 142 (“[Uber] has struggled to cast off responsibility for its drivers by claiming that they are independent contractors or simply ‘App-users,’ rather than traditional service employees.”).
155. See Interian, supra note 12, at 152-53; see also Palombo, supra note 51, at 299 (“Airbnb contends that it is just a matchmaker, similar to an online dating platform. A dating site connects two parties ... but what happens from there is not the dating site’s responsibility.”). But Airbnb has started to exert more control over its hosts. See Interian, supra note 12, at 154-56 (noting several measures Airbnb has taken to exert control over hosts, including remittance of taxes, and finding that these controls “bring[] Airbnb’s practices closer to those of Uber”).
successful, the independent contractor argument would severely restrict guests’ redress for injuries at Airbnb listings.

The company is further insulated from liability through contract. Specifically, Airbnb provides its own, one-million-dollar insurance only after hosts exhaust all their personal coverage. The company’s terms and conditions, which all users agree to, also clarify Airbnb’s position as a third-party platform. The terms explicitly state: “Airbnb is not a party to any agreements entered into between hosts and guests, nor is Airbnb a real estate broker, agent or insurer.” These provisions provide legal grounds for Airbnb to separate itself from contractual and tort claims that might arise between hosts and guests, and leave hosts with little backup except as far as Airbnb is willing to avoid a public relations faux pas. The result for guests is a legal in-between, where neither hosts nor the corporate “matchmaker” can be held responsible for many injuries at Airbnb locations. These difficulties highlight the tremendous disparity between the treatment of Airbnb hosts as landlords in the courts and the reality of the situation on the ground. A disparity that extends to the very legal philosophy underpinning landlord-tenant law.

C. A Mismatch of Legal Philosophies

Traditional landlord-tenant law developed on the idea that the relationships between landlords and their tenants were becoming “increasingly polarized or exploitive,” and that the law was a means “to regulate relationships in a competitive economy, not a collabora-

156. Palombo, supra note 51, at 300.
158. Id.
159. In the case of Cory Tschogl, for example, Airbnb agreed to help pay some of the costs of evicting the squatter in her condominium because it failed to adequately respond to her initial request for help. See Matyszczczyk, supra note 2.
160. Of course, many hosts would be judgement-proof and unable to pay damages if found liable, but presumably innkeeper-hosts would pressure Airbnb to cover costs, and Airbnb, in turn, could incentivize hosts to mitigate liability (perhaps through a fee system). See infra Part IV.D.
tive one.”\textsuperscript{161} But the sharing economy, including Airbnb, is about primarily horizontal, not vertical, power relationships.\textsuperscript{162} An Airbnb host typically is not a sophisticated businessperson with exploitive interests.\textsuperscript{163} Rather, hosts are looking to share extra space with short-term guests who are equally uninterested in bargaining for property rights.\textsuperscript{164} Yet, the law does not recognize the difference.\textsuperscript{165} Landlord-tenant law is built on the idea of capitalist competition and exploitation and, as such, fails to adapt to the rejuvenation of collaborative parity—once a hallmark of agrarian societies—in the sharing economy.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, the legal theory under which landlord-tenant law has developed is inappropriate for room-sharing relationships. The answer, addressed in Part IV, is to regulate hosts as what they are: amateur innkeepers operating micro-businesses that service guests with limited rental interests, even for stays over thirty days.

IV. REGULATING HOSTS AS INNKEEPERS

Given the shortfalls of the landlord-tenant approach, innkeeper liability and a hospitality perspective better encompass the relationship Airbnb creates. First, innkeeper liability more directly remedies the asymmetry at play in an Airbnb transaction, based not on power but knowledge.\textsuperscript{167} The innkeeper treatment of hosts is also consistent with Airbnb’s treatment in other areas of the law (namely, taxation).\textsuperscript{168} And treating hosts as innkeepers will allow for at-will eviction of unruly guests—a key issue this Note seeks to remedy.\textsuperscript{169} Finally, the hospitality perspective provides a framework for local regulators to bring Airbnb listings into compliance with

\textsuperscript{162}. See id. at 14.
\textsuperscript{163}. Cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{164}. See AIRBNB, supra note 116 (noting the average length of stay in New York and San Francisco is less than a week).
\textsuperscript{165}. See supra Part II.A.
\textsuperscript{166}. See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 161, at 14.
\textsuperscript{167}. See infra Part IV.A.
\textsuperscript{168}. See infra Part IV.B.
\textsuperscript{169}. See infra Part IV.C.
consumer-focused safety standards; a framework that landlord-tenant law fails to adequately provide.

A. The Innkeeper Framework Better Reflects the Asymmetries of the Airbnb Host-Guest Relationship

As with innkeeper-guest relationships, the Airbnb host-guest relationship is not so much a power asymmetry as an informational one. Although landlords have a basic understanding of the property they lease, they do not know the day-to-day, moment-by-moment circumstantial risks that arise, because the landlord, in many instances, is not frequently present. Airbnb hosts, on the other hand, frequently either live on the property being rented or, by the nature of the amenities the host is providing, must frequently visit the property in person or through an agent. The personal relationship a host has with a listed property establishes a familiarity with the property’s inherent risks, giving hosts more reasonable control of those risks. The Airbnb host, therefore, likely has more awareness—or should have more awareness—of the risks on his or her property than a landlord who manages a leasehold at arm’s length.

More importantly, Airbnb guests, relative to tenants, have less awareness of the property where they are staying. Tenants, by virtue of the legal interest in the property they seek, have incentives to inspect the property and research its habitability, risks, and deficiencies. Tenants also develop an intimate familiarity with the property they rent, and have at least limited flexibility to customize the property to suit their living needs. Airbnb guests, on the other hand, lack the same incentives and are practically limited in their

170. See infra Part IV.D.
171. In fact, many jurisdictions hold landlords liable for accessing a tenant’s property without consent or a good faith reason (for example, seeking payment of overdue rent). See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 385 (2017).
172. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 303 (“Eighty-seven percent of hosts rent the property where they permanently reside and are not transforming residential buildings into illegal hotels.”). Airbnb has also removed around 2,000 listings suspected of abusing the platform. Id. But see Barber, supra note 23 (“According to Inside Airbnb, the majority of Airbnb listings are not shared rooms rented out while the host is present. Rather, 58.6 percent of Los Angeles listings, 72.3 percent of New Orleans listings, and 66.6 percent of Seattle listings are for entire homes.”).
ability to physically inspect a location before reserving it. While staying on the property, an Airbnb guest, even for greater than thirty days, has little need or right to customize the property to suit his needs and therefore must take the Airbnb rental as is. Thus, Airbnb hosts and guests have a larger informational asymmetry than a landlord and tenant: the hosts are more familiar with the property they rent than a landlord, while guests are more unaware of the properties they are staying at than the average tenant. This asymmetry is better reflected through the innkeeper framework.

Treatment of hosts as innkeepers—at least as far as their duty to guests—better protects consumers in the sharing economy, who often stay on premises more unfamiliar and risk-inherent than most modern-day hotels. The current law simply mismatches the illness (the asymmetry at play) with the treatment, failing to remedy what is actually occurring in the sharing economy. Beyond a theoretical match, innkeeper doctrine is consistent with the treatment of Airbnb in other areas of law, providing practical, as well as theoretical, consistency.

B. Innkeeper Treatment Is Consistent with the Tax Treatment of Airbnb

Treating Airbnb hosts as innkeepers is congruent with the prevailing trend in many localities to tax Airbnb transactions under a hospitality/occupancy framework. Airbnb is already taxed like a hotel in at least six major cities. Elsewhere, Airbnb has sought taxation as a means to legitimize its business, promising at least
$65 million in revenue per year for New York City, alone.\textsuperscript{175} In San Francisco, Airbnb collects a 14 percent tax on hosts’ profits.\textsuperscript{176} And, in Los Angeles, Airbnb agreed to pay the city at least $5 million in back taxes on unregulated rentals.\textsuperscript{177} In total, Airbnb claims to have paid $110 million in lodging taxes since 2014.\textsuperscript{178} Localities willingly accept the tax revenue as if it were any other hotel tax—to the mutual benefit of Airbnb, hosts, and local governments.\textsuperscript{179}

To collect from room-sharing services as if they were hotels on one hand, but treat hosts as landlords on the other, is a dysfunctional practice. Instead, hosts should be viewed as micro-entrepreneurs, running micro-hotels that are taxed for the occupancy income they produce. Treatment of hosts as innkeepers, therefore, is consistent with taxation of the room-sharing economy and creates uniformity in the regulation of this new marketplace. Ultimately, if hosts are taxed like hoteliers, they should possess the rights and responsibilities of hoteliers, including the right to evict guests at will.

C. Innkeeper-Hosts Could Evict Unruly Guests at Will

Treating Airbnb hosts as micro-innkeepers would remove the problem highlighted in the introduction: the inability of hosts to evict unruly visitors without difficulty.\textsuperscript{180} Under the law of many states, landlords must go through judicial processes to evict guests who squat on their property or otherwise violate a lease agree-

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{175} See Ryan Lawler, As It Seeks New Regulations in NY, Airbnb Estimates It Would Collect $65 Million in Taxes There, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 16, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/16/airbnb-65-million-in-ny/ [https://perma.cc/2EL9-WPB3] (arguing that the amount of tax revenue would only increase). Interestingly, the New York hotel industry originally requested taxation of Airbnb, but when Airbnb tried to accept it, hoteliers opposed the move. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 304.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Palombo, supra note 51, at 312.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Barber, supra note 23.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{180} See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. For examples of the damage guests can cause, see, for example, John Annese, Airbnb Guest Steals $5G in Valuables from Manhattan Apartment, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:02 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/airbnb-guest-steals-5g-valuables-manhattan-apartment-article-1.2743622 [https://perma.cc/BKS7-E8UD] (“Two more Airbnb guests stole tens of thousands in valuables from two homes in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, in July, taking TVs, electronics and designer handbags, police said.”).
\end{itemize}
ment.\textsuperscript{181} These summary proceedings can be particularly burdensome and expensive.\textsuperscript{182} Innkeepers, on the other hand, have a general right to evict guests without resorting to court proceedings so long as there is a valid reason and excessive force is not used.\textsuperscript{183}

For several reasons discussed in this Note, the eviction protections afforded to Airbnb guests are unnecessary. First, most guests do not seek a legal interest in the property where they stay, and, if they do, Airbnb does not create that relationship.\textsuperscript{184} Second, guests—even those who stay over thirty days—are unlikely to settle at an Airbnb location, and those who do settle create a relationship outside of the Airbnb rental period, which rightfully would remove hosts from the role of innkeeper. Third, the sharing economy benefits from hosts’ freedom to evict unruly guests. After all, it is the host’s furniture and personal belongings the guests use and potentially threaten. Finally, hosts will be hesitant to evict guests without cause for fear of a bad review that will harm business, so hosts are unlikely to abuse the system.\textsuperscript{185} If hosts do abuse the eviction right, it likely will not be long before Airbnb removes them from the platform.\textsuperscript{186} In fact, the longstanding law of most jurisdictions proscribes innkeepers from “interfer[ing] with the peace and quiet

\textsuperscript{181} Airbnb hosts (as landlords) who resort to self-help instead of judicial summary eviction may be held liable to their guests (as tenants). See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 837 (2017).

\textsuperscript{182} See, e.g., Matyszczek, supra note 2 (“In order to get him out of her condo, [an Airbnb host] has to go through a full eviction process, which might take three to six months and cost ... up to $5,000.”).


\textsuperscript{184} See supra Part III.A.

\textsuperscript{185} For example, hosts have incentives to be certified as a “Superhost” by meeting certain criteria, and will therefore likely avoid confrontational relationships with guests. See How Do I Become a Superhost?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/829/how-do-i-become-a-superhost [https://perma.cc/DA9Q-TDNQ] (noting, among other things, that Superhosts must receive a 5-star rating on at least 80 percent of their reviews); see also supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.

enjoyment of the guests,” and requires hosts to have a valid reason to evict.\textsuperscript{188}

It is worth noting that even hotels may, in specific situations, establish tenancies with guests.\textsuperscript{188} However, although some guests at a hotel may obtain tenant rights in unique circumstances, it is unlikely those circumstances will arise in the Airbnb context.\textsuperscript{190}

Even so, pragmatic considerations warrant greater leniency in allowing Airbnb hosts to evict guests in most circumstances.\textsuperscript{191}

Ultimately, although treating hosts as innkeepers imputes greater liability for the hosts’ negligence, such treatment has the added benefit of allowing at-will contracting. This permits hosts to end risky or unsatisfactory guest relationships without resorting to months-long judicial procedures. By providing guest protections where necessary and removing them where they are not needed, the innkeeper framework better accounts for the interests of guests and hosts alike.

\textbf{D. Regulating Airbnb Safety from the Hotel Perspective}

The above reasons notwithstanding, regulating hosts as innkeepers is not completely ideal. Some hoteliers, for example, have lobbied for overregulation of Airbnb hosts as a means to stifle what

\textsuperscript{187} L.W.B., Annotation, \textit{Liability of Innkeeper for Interference with Guest}, 17 A.L.R. 139 (1922).

\textsuperscript{188} See supra note 183 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.

\textsuperscript{189} Specifically, some courts have considered hotel guests tenants if they were non-transient, furnished or repaired their living space, paid monthly, did not use a maid service, and maintained the right to exclusive possession. See, e.g., Hundley v. Milner Hotel Mgmt. Co., 114 F. Supp. 206, 208 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Bourque v. Morris, 460 A.2d 1251, 1253 (Conn. 1983) (stressing the transience requirement to obtain tenant rights); Ortner v. Linch, 128 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (requiring exclusive right of possession to become a tenant); Neely v. Lott Hotels Co., 78 N.E.2d 659, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948) (holding use of maid and linen services precluded creation of tenancy).

\textsuperscript{190} See supra Part III.A.

\textsuperscript{191} Because Airbnb inhibits the creation of tenancies and hosts lack the sophistication of hoteliers or landlords, it is incumbent upon regulators to allow more lenient eviction laws for hosts. And, unlike hoteliers, who do not share living space with guests, many Airbnb hosts are offering portions of their own homes. Prohibiting at-will eviction, therefore, threatens to disturb the privacy and property rights of hosts. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
they perceive as a threat to their profits. They have encouraged enforcement of health and safety laws that would require Airbnb hosts to provide clean towels, sprinklers, and emergency exits, making operating an Airbnb cost inhibitive or simply impractical for many hosts. Instead, states and localities should avoid overregulating hosts in the interest of the revenue and community benefits that room-sharing markets can bring, while tailoring policies to Airbnb that promote consumer safety and mirror the established hotel industry.

There are genuine concerns about the safety of Airbnb guests, and accidents—sometimes fatal—do occur on Airbnb properties. However, imputing innkeeper liability to hosts already creates incentives for them to provide safe, habitable accommodations. The current alternative, landlord-tenant law, obligates hosts to make inherent dangers known to guests in relatively limited circumstances. Hosts, as landlords, are liable only for violations of the warranty of habitability, which has relatively high thresholds before landlords must act; innkeeper-hosts, on the other hand, would have a duty to inform their guests of risks and provide safety protections to cure the inherent dangers at an Airbnb listing.

Indeed, the threat of personal liability is often used to enforce regulations, and is an effective way to help protect the safety of Airbnb guests. By allowing guests to sue hosts for negligence, regulators create incentives (1) for hosts to provide safe accommoda-


193. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 510-11; Major, supra note 38, at 481-82 (“While hotels are generally financially secure enough to spread losses, a private person renting out an apartment will likely be unable to afford any damages.”).

194. For examples of accidents occurring at Airbnb locations, see Palombo, supra note 51, at 298 (“On one occasion, a hot water heater could have led to severe injuries had a guest bumped into it.”); and Christina Bonnington, The Tragic Airbnb Problem You’ve Probably Never Thought About, REFINERY29 (Nov. 9, 2015, 5:20 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/97263 [https://perma.cc/ID9H-AG4S] (“The [Airbnb] property had a rope swing attached to a tree. [The guest’s] father got on the swing, and was then killed.”).

195. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 306; supra Part II.A.

196. See supra Part II.A.

197. See supra Part II.B.
tions, and (2) for Airbnb to offer more effective and encompassing insurance coverage to hosts, who would likely feel pressured to leave the company if it did not step up to help them.\textsuperscript{198} Imputing liability to hosts will encourage, if not coerce, Airbnb to bear at least some of the financial costs for violations of the law, much like a hotel chain—something a company as large and unbridled as Airbnb should do.

Beyond imposing innkeeper liability, localities also have flexibility to require or incentivize Airbnb hosts to provide some of the common-sense safety features found in hotels. Airbnb has already encouraged hosts to place carbon monoxide and smoke detectors in every listing.\textsuperscript{199} Portland, Oregon, has gone as far as requiring all listings to pass inspection, which includes checking that each unit has certain detectors.\textsuperscript{200}

As governments consider what to compel Airbnb listings to provide, they must contemplate the practical difficulties that come with enforcing regulations on discrete and dispersed micro-businesses. Most localities likely do not have the time or infrastructure to enforce a hands-on regulatory scheme. An obvious alternative will be self-enforcement provisions, which would allow guests to sue hosts who violate local safety regulations. By requiring applicable regulations to be posted at each listing and informing guests of their rights, localities can effectuate a self-enforced system. Coupled with random inspections and licensing requirements, self-enforcement provisions are a low-cost means to achieve uniform regulation of Airbnb listings. And localities should not forget that Airbnb, as a company, can and should be a willing partner in helping to enforce safer accommodations for transient occupants.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{198} See Major, supra note 38, at 482 (noting that Airbnb’s claim that it is merely a “facilitator” would place financial liability solely on hosts, thereby creating pressure on Airbnb to voluntarily assume liability or risk losing inventory).


\textsuperscript{200} Miller, supra note 37, at 191 (citing PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE §§ 33.207.040, .050 (2015)).

\textsuperscript{201} For a discussion on how Airbnb can provide more support for enforcing laws and regulations on hosts, see Palombo, supra note 51, at 320 (arguing, for example, that “[t]he legal information on Airbnb’s website needs to be comprehensive for users because hosts are still responsible for Airbnb-related infractions”). San Francisco already requires Airbnb to inform hosts of laws applicable to their operations, or face a penalty. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE
online tracking of user behavior provides better information for regulators to use than more traditional hospitality businesses.202

In the end, unlike hotels equipped for hundreds of guests, the vast majority of Airbnb hosts are renting one room or location to no more than a family-sized group of visitors. To require a residential location that presumably meets state and local standards of habitability to provide advanced, hotel-like safety features for small numbers of guests amounts to a stifling abuse of the law that threatens to hinder competition.203 Compelling Airbnb hosts to meet all the standards of a hotel in hopes it will discourage short-term rentals rejects what is already a reality: the sharing economy is too cheap and convenient for consumers to abandon, even if that economy is forced to operate outside the law.204 Nonetheless, the hospitality perspective is a good starting point from which localities can achieve uniformly safer accommodations in the short-term rental market.


202. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 37, at 325-26 (noting that platforms like Airbnb “create a virtual roadmap of users’ activities ... [that are] both granular and well-organized,” with the ability to better control users’ behavior); Major, supra note 38, at 501 (“Municipalities can require room-sharing platforms ... to release lists of all available rooms within the city limits, either to verify self-reporting or to avoid relying on hosts to self-report.”).

203. For a complete argument of why traditional business regulation is not suited for micro-businesses and the sharing economy, see Miller, supra note 37, at 167-68 (discussing the impracticalities of total bans, de minimis exceptions, and command-and-control regulations, and noting a “city[’s] response will likely require alternative approaches that rely on markets, information, and perhaps even regulatory structures that model the sharing economy more directly”).

204. See Miller, supra note 37, at 168 (“Attempts to crack down on a particular site would likely simply lead to other sites emerging to perform the same service.”); Barber, supra note 23 ("[A]lmost all urban areas, at some point, have had laws or zoning provisions prohibiting short-term rentals of less than 30 days without a special permit. And yet, that hasn’t stopped the incredible boom in the number of listings on Airbnb."). Airbnb’s popularity also has the potential to wield considerable political clout at higher levels of government. Cf. Miller, supra note 37, at 156-57 (describing how Uber lobbied Idaho’s conservative state legislature when Boise banned the company, usurping the local government’s authority to regulate transportation networks). Airbnb is not just a millennial trend, either. Co-founder Brian Chesky told a reporter, “We’ve got more people aged 55 and over on the site than those aged 18-25, who only make up seven per cent of the site.” Salter, supra note 13.
CONCLUSION

As state, local, and national governments grapple with the challenge of regulating sharing economy platforms, a varied patchwork of liberal and restrictive policies has emerged. In the case of Airbnb, some locales have embraced the company as a stimulus to the economy, while others, such as New York, have condemned the service. Airbnb’s rapid rise and potential for commercial abuse do create genuine concerns for communities nationwide, and it is undeniable that some regulation, which Airbnb should welcome as a means to legitimacy, is necessary to mitigate this impact. But Airbnb’s potential to reach new tourists, create competition with hospitality cartels, and generate considerable tax revenue should serve as word to the wise as policymakers consider on which end of the regulatory spectrum their locality will fall.

Regardless of the other factors regulators consider, it will be necessary for courts, legislatures, and city councils to revisit how room-sharing hosts fit within the traditional doctrinal framework. As this Note points out, landlord-tenant law simply fails to understand the relationship created in the prosumerist economy.\(^{205}\) Landlord-tenant law assumes a relationship of economic exploitation and the creation of a legal interest in property, but room-sharing—even when the host is absent—is grounded on the concept of just that: sharing. Airbnb guests do not seek to protect their legal property interests against sophisticated landlords; instead, Airbnb users are unfamiliar, disinterested renters looking for a place to stay in a foreign destination.\(^{206}\) The informational asymmetry between Airbnb hosts and their guests is best remedied not by landlord-tenant law, which imputes little responsibility to hosts to serve guests’ interests, but by traditional innkeeper liability, which creates a responsibility for hosts to mitigate risks and warn guests of potential dangers.\(^{207}\) Other regulations of Airbnb have already assumed the company’s place in the hotel industry, and innkeeper liability for hosts would be consistent with this trend.

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\(^{205}\) See supra Part III.
\(^{206}\) See supra Part III.C.
\(^{207}\) See supra Part IV.
Innkeeper liability for all Airbnb transactions—even those over thirty days—also helps to avoid abuse by landlords seeking to make a quick buck at the expense of long-term tenants. If landlords want to abuse the Airbnb platform, they should have to assume greater liability for the guests staying on their property. Ultimately, innkeeper liability would be one tool to help mitigate some of the primary negative externalities of short-term rentals (for example, speculation and housing shortages).

Moving forward, Airbnb is approaching a new era of regulation that likely will reduce its value and slow its tremendous growth. Airbnb may fight some of this regulation, but consistent, predictable laws will be better for the company—and the sharing economy—in the long run. Airbnb is here to stay, and it is time for the law to catchup. It is time to recognize Airbnb’s place in traditional legal doctrines, and to adjust doctrine where it does not address the sharing economy’s unique characteristics. Treating hosts as micro-hoteliers is just one way the law can promote a safer, consumer-focused room-sharing economy while encouraging its potential.

Matthew Rosendahl*