A Coordinated Approach to Growth Control in Northern Virginia

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# NOTES

A COORDINATED APPROACH TO GROWTH CONTROL IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA

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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1960s, Northern Virginia has been characterized by varying degrees of sprawl. Sprawl poses significant problems for a number of reasons, including inefficiency, negative environmental impacts, and unattractiveness. These problems can be solved, but only through concerted, coordinated efforts at all levels of government and across land-use and transportation policies.

Sprawl is characterized by low-density, leapfrog development that radiates outward from a dense urban core. The growth of road networks accompanies sprawl because suburb residents typically drive to many of their destinations across the metropolitan area. But which comes first, the growth or the roads? Are more roads built in order to accommodate growth as the population simultaneously grows and spreads outward, therefore replicating the same low-density pattern that characterizes previously “outer” suburbs? Or are roads constructed based on growth projections, providing access to previously less-accessible lands? Whatever the answers to these questions, sprawl and road-network growth proceed hand-in-hand.

Sprawl presents high public and private costs. From a public perspective, sprawl burdens infrastructure, creates environmental problems, and strains center cities. It is inefficient, as it costs more than compact development in terms of natural resource consumption, economic costs, and even personal costs. Sprawl causes an estimated $72 billion per year in lost productivity, and often leads to social costs such as environmental damage, a decreased urban tax base, and road rage. The fragmented land-use decisions that

3. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 137-40 (attributing sprawl to zoning laws, which reflect Americans’ “prairie psychology”).
6. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 143.
characterize sprawl also often have the side effect of stripping power from everyone who lives outside of a specific boundary, regardless of the impact that the given locality’s land-use decisions might have on such “outsiders.”

No less important are the high private costs that accompany sprawl, which can increase based on a development’s type, location, and density. Low-density development, because it necessarily entails the purchase of more land and often brings with it the need for more travel, is associated with higher personal costs and a lower quality of life. Businesses also suffer higher costs in the form of productivity losses. In response to these high public and private costs, local governments have attempted to influence growth patterns through traditional growth-control tools, including regulatory and market-based techniques.

Sprawl has afflicted Northern Virginia since the twenty-year period that began in 1960, during which Fairfax County’s population doubled. Although the rate of population growth in this and other suburbs eventually slowed, it remained at high levels for much of the latter half of the twentieth century. This high, sustained rate of growth created the Northern Virginia that exists today, which is characterized by far-flung enclaves of residential homes situated on large lots that are surrounded by strip malls and

(2005).

8. See Poindexter, supra note 5, at 310. Absent a regional approach, such fractured zoning laws have the further effect of hindering growth-control efforts.

9. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 142.

10. See id.

11. See Canuel, supra note 7, at 312. This “lower quality of life” argument presents a paradox. Although many people find sprawl to be ugly and indicate that they would prefer high-density development, these same people aspire to live in single-family homes and are willing to live amongst sprawl in order to do so. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 150.

12. See Canuel, supra note 7, at 312.

13. See infra Part I.B.


busy highways. Pockets of high-density development lie scattered throughout the region, particularly in inner suburbs such as Tysons Corner, Arlington, Alexandria, Reston, McLean, and Falls Church; however, most of these areas are purely commercial centers. The rule for much of the region is low-density residential activity, supported by similarly low-density commercial activity.

During the next twenty years, this pattern of low-density growth is projected to continue, as the region becomes more congested with people, households, and jobs. By 2030, the farthest-flung counties in what is considered the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area of Northern Virginia are expected to generate the type of urban sprawl now seen in counties such as Fairfax and Arlington. However, the urban core of Washington, D.C., and its immediately surrounding areas, including Arlington and Alexandria, are expected to hold steady as the region’s jobs centers, thus continuing—and possibly worsening—the status quo of cross-region commutes.

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17. For example, the population of Tysons Corner during a given business day is estimated to exceed 100,000 people, but the area contains only 5700 homes. John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and Throughout the Nation: Future Housing Supply and Demand Analysis for the Greater Washington Area, 33 U. Balt. L. Rev. 153, 176 (2004).
18. See Van Dyne, supra note 16.
20. For purposes of this Note, “far-flung” counties include Loudoun, Fauquier, Stafford, Spotsylvania, and Prince William. The sizeable portion of the D.C. metropolitan area that lies in Maryland is not considered in this Note, which instead proposes a solution for the Northern Virginia suburbs that complies with the demands of Virginia law. Although Virginia and Maryland have proven their ability to institute cross-state solutions through ventures such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), this Note’s solutions to sprawl require discrete considerations of state law that render an inter-state collaborative approach difficult, at best. Indeed, an inter-state approach may threaten the ultimate success of this Note’s proposals. Maryland’s extensive legislative scheme of growth control would further complicate a collaborative effort. See Canuel, supra note 7, at 341-44. Nonetheless, communication between the two states is imperative, and can occur in regional fora such as the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG). See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
Such outward expansion will require an attendant growth in the region’s transportation network. This growth will primarily take the form of new road construction and improvements, including high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, but it will also include new transit options such as Metro’s Silver Line, which will eventually connect Loudoun County with downtown D.C. via Dulles International Airport.

Because sprawl and transportation networks grow hand-in-hand, neither should be considered without reference to the other: land-use and transportation policies are inherently linked. Governments and organizations across the Washington metropolitan region have recognized this crucial linkage. Their approach, however, is incomplete and unworkable, as no organization or government body currently possesses the power to enact proposals on a regional scale. Individual jurisdictions make land-use decisions, transportation policymaking suffers from a glut of organizations, and no body exists that can both coordinate policies and implement solutions.

In 2007, the Commonwealth of Virginia attempted to solidify this linkage between land use and transportation when Governor Tim Kaine signed Chapter 896. This law simultaneously established new growth-control techniques and empowered the regional Northern Virginia Transportation Authority (NVTA) to impose and collect taxes. However, the Virginia Supreme Court thwarted such efforts in *Marshall v. Northern Virginia Transportation Authority* when it declared that the law’s grant of taxation power to NVTA

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23. HOT lanes are specialized toll lanes that keep traffic flowing at a constant, high speed by employing a variable tolling method that charges more per mile when demand is highest. See Virginia HOT Lanes, FAQs, http://virginiahotlanes.com/faq/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). These lanes are constructed within an existing roadway, and all commuters with a tolling transponder in their vehicles may use the HOT lanes. See id. Such lanes are currently under construction on I-495 between Springfield and the Dulles Toll Road. See Virginia Megaprojects, I-495 HOT Lanes, http://www.vamegaprojects.com/about-megaprojects/i495-hot-lanes/overview (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). In addition, the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) is planning the construction of HOT lanes on I-395 from the Pentagon to Spotsylvania County. See Virginia Megaprojects, I-95/395 HOT Lanes, http://www.vamegaprojects.com/about-megaprojects/i95395-hot-lanes/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).


was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{26} Despite this setback, \textit{Marshall} left untouched certain provisions of Chapter 896 that encouraged higher density land uses, preserving the foundation for the combination of transportation policies with high-density land use.\textsuperscript{27} But because regional bodies lack the power to do anything more than make suggestions, and because \textit{Marshall} invalidated NVTA’s taxation power, no mechanism currently exists by which transportation policies can be combined with high-density land-use elements.

This Note proposes a method by which local governments in Northern Virginia and the Virginia General Assembly can tackle sprawl by coordinating transportation and high-density land-use policies. Part I makes the case for the coordination of land-use and transportation policies by contrasting traditional growth-control tools with more recent approaches. Part II describes the current state of affairs in Northern Virginia with regard to land-use decision making and transportation policy. Finally, Part III proposes methods by which the Northern Virginia region can coordinate transportation and land-use policies in a way that will tackle sprawl.

\textbf{I. THE CASE FOR COORDINATING LAND-USE AND TRANSPORTATION POLICIES}

\textbf{A. Sprawl: A Growth Problem That Must Be Managed}

“Sprawl” eludes a simple definition, and therefore has been framed in many different ways.\textsuperscript{28} Of the countless definitions

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} 657 S.E.2d 71 (Va. 2008).
  \item \textsuperscript{27} See id. at 428, 436.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} See, e.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 137 (“Sprawl is the spread-out, skipped-over development that characterizes the non-central city metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas of the United States. Sprawl is one- or two-story, single-family residential development on lots ranging in size from one-third of one acre to one acre ... accompanied by strip commercial centers and industrial parks, also two stories or less in height and using a similar amount of land.”); see also Eric M. Braun, \textit{Smart Growth in North Carolina: Something Old or Something New?}, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 707, 708 (2000) (“[S]prawl is haphazardly planned, low-density residential development interspersed with strip commercial and retail development linked by a vast street and highway system that overemphasizes automobile use and de-emphasizes mass transit.”); Poindexter, supra note 5, at 298 (“[S]prawl is a description of urban growth pattern characterized by lower density (less intensive) and more fragmented (less contagious) development.”).
\end{itemize}
applied to this term, many contain similar elements. One of the most important of these elements is “leapfrogging,” the idea that sprawl involves a process of perpetual development progressing farther away from an urban core. Leapfrogging results in development with a lower density than both the rest of the region and the nation. Sprawl is also characterized by segregation of land uses, which is accomplished by local zoning ordinances that define which uses are permitted on certain parcels of land.

Sprawl has been attributed to a diverse array of factors. The chief culprit among these is the zoning power, which most states delegated to local governments in the 1920s. After states conferred this power, local governments began to compete with each other in a quest to differentiate themselves. This competition led to the exclusion of certain uses and, finally, to leapfrogging, as users who were excluded from one locality simply chose a more permissive locality that competed for their “business” through less restrictive zoning.

Sprawl also occurs when local governments enact zoning laws that favor residential, single-family uses over most other cate-

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29. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 141.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Officials typically accomplish this segregation by categorizing land into broad types of use, such as “residential,” “commercial,” and “industrial,” with various subcategories of other restrictions such as height and density applied to each parcel. See Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 258-59 (2002) [hereinafter Briffault, Smart Growth]. Such zoning is referred to as “Euclidian” because the Supreme Court permitted its use by the town of Euclid, Ohio. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Euclidian approach includes the creation of a rational, comprehensive zoning plan that is gradually implemented. However, because development does not always proceed rationally, and because no comprehensive zoning plan can adequately predict future needs, local governments have developed tools to add flexibility to the zoning process. These tools include zoning amendments, variances, special use permits, floating zones, planned use developments, and more. See DANIEL P. SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 48-49 (2008); see also infra Part I.B.
33. Underlying all of these factors is the obvious, but often unstated, assumption that growth will occur. Such growth can be in population, in per capita consumption of land, or in a simultaneous occurrence of both. See Poindexter, supra note 5, at 296.
34. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act granted states this power. See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 1 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1926); see also Briffault, Smart Growth, supra note 32, at 255-56.
The sprawl that exists today, which includes not only low-density, single-family residences but also low-density commercial and even industrial uses, grew naturally from this initial favoring of the single-family home: as residential uses took root, demand grew for supporting uses such as shopping centers, restaurants, entertainment, and industrial parks. Today’s sprawl, therefore, is not only an outgrowth of government zoning policies, but also a response to citizens’ desires for low-density, single-family uses and the other uses required to support such development.

Both leapfrogging and the favoring of single-family uses flowed from the devolution of zoning power to local governments. However, federal government policies have also contributed to sprawl. Congress jumpstarted an exponential growth in highway development when it passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, authorizing federal funding for the construction of the Interstate Highway System. Federal support of highways continues to encourage sprawl today, as does Americans’ increasing use of the automobile.

36. See Briffault, Smart Growth, supra note 32, at 259.
37. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138.
38. See id. The observation that sprawl results from consumer preferences for low-density, single-family uses begs the question of why American consumers tend to prefer such uses. One commentator has attributed such preferences to Americans’ “prairie psychology,” as well as to the economic value of land. Id. at 139 (quoting JOHN DELAFONS, LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1962)).
39. See id. at 140. The federal government also contributed to sprawl by making available “federally insured low-cost mortgages.” Id. This policy, working in tandem with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-166 (2006)), meant not only that more people were able to afford homes on low-density sites, they were also able to access them.
40. See Thomas Benton Bare III, Recharacterizing the Debate: A Critique of Environmental Democracy and an Alternative Approach to the Urban Sprawl Dilemma, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 455, 461-62 (2003) (“Not only does TEA-21 [the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st century] fail to provide incentives to shift transportation dollars away from sprawling urban development, but it aggravates the problem by providing the most funding to the worst sprawlers.... In short, the approach taken by TEA-21 and other similar funding mechanisms does nothing but support individual dependence on the automobile by increasing funding for highway travel, while failing to encourage mass transit or compact development.”).
41. Estimates suggest Americans’ use of the automobile is growing twice as fast as the American population itself. Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138; see also Oliver A. Pollard III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There From Here?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1529, 1532-33 (2002).
One commentator argues that land use and transportation are together responsible for sprawl, suggesting that “land use regulations impose automobile-dependent development upon Americans.”42 This Note agrees and therefore argues that, whether zoning powers, transportation policy, or any other factor is ultimately responsible for sprawl, both state and local governments must address land-use and transportation policy in tandem.

B. Traditional Growth-Control Tools

Local governments traditionally have attempted to control growth either by regulating land use or by harnessing market forces to fund infrastructure. Some governments have also taken approaches that employ both of these techniques simultaneously.43

Examples of regulatory, land-use-based techniques include building permits and population caps,44 as well as zoning, subdivision approval, special use permits, planned use developments, and ordinances requiring construction of adequate public facilities.45 For the purposes of this Note, the complex operational differences between these various mechanisms are not important; what matters is that each technique involves the local government’s use of its zoning and police powers to control where and how development proceeds. Fashioning a solution to sprawl requires appreciation of the fact that local governments control land-use decisions through such mechanisms.

Local governments may not exercise these traditional growth control powers with impunity, although their decisions are often met with a great deal of judicial deference for two principal reasons. First, the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution46 requires only that the exercise of state police powers be rationally related to a legitimate public purpose.47 Second, separation of powers doctrine

43. See Ellington, Hoel & Miller, supra note 14, at v.
44. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 145.
45. See Freilich & White, supra note 4, at 935-41.
46. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See Selmi et al., supra note 32, at 56. The Supreme Court has recognized a substantive component in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts
requires courts to respect legislative prerogatives, including local
government zoning decisions.\textsuperscript{48} However, when a local
government deviates from its initial zoning decisions by using its regulatory
powers, courts review the deviation with a higher degree of
scrutiny.\textsuperscript{49}

In contrast to growth-control techniques that concentrate exclu-
sively on the regulation of land use, combination growth-control
tools use aspects of \textit{both} regulatory and market-driven techniques
to allocate the burden between local governments and developers.
Examples of such techniques include proffers and impact fees.\textsuperscript{50}
Both techniques require developers to shoulder the burden of
infrastructure costs, often as a condition for permit approval by the
local government.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the use of these traditional growth-control tools by local
governments, sprawl has continued its march. This trend has led to
new, region-wide approaches and to so-called “smart growth” tech-
niques.

\textbf{C. Moving Past Traditional Growth-Control Tools: Smart Growth
and Regionalism}

The use of smart growth techniques and regionalism stems from
the failure of traditional growth-control techniques to control sprawl
adequately on a regional level. As discussed, sprawl results from a
confluence of factors, including traditional zoning policies, citizens’
desires, and transportation policies.\textsuperscript{52} But because multiple local
governments across any given region participate in the creation of
the zoning and transportation policies that give rise to sprawl, this
problem must be coordinated on a regional level using nontradi-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{48} See Selmi et al., supra note 32, at 56.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{49} See id. at 49.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{50} See Ellington, Hoel & Miller, supra note 14, at v.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{51} Id. at xvii.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52} See supra Part I.A.}
tional tools.\textsuperscript{53} This regional planning process has been termed “smart growth.”\textsuperscript{54}

A regional approach recognizes the realities of life in a metropolitan area, which is itself regional: people do not typically confine themselves to one locality within a metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, a regional approach to sprawl recognizes the fact that the competitiveness of a given metropolis is measured on a regional level, meaning that some amount of regional coordination is needed even if land-use decisions are made on a local level.\textsuperscript{56} These local decisions impact the entire region’s competitiveness, even though local governments are not obligated to consider this broader impact when making land-use choices.\textsuperscript{57} Absent regional coordination of such policies, regional competitiveness can suffer from localities’ discordant decisions.

1. Smart Growth Models Offer Potential Growth-Control Solutions

By way of contrast with traditional growth-control tools, which typically are aimed at ensuring the rationality of planning,\textsuperscript{58} smart growth aspires to increase economic progress, protect the environment, and improve residents’ quality of life by focusing development around preexisting infrastructure to create compact, accessible, and pedestrian-oriented urban areas.\textsuperscript{59} Examples of techniques that can achieve smart growth goals include mixed-use developments,\textsuperscript{60} infill

\textsuperscript{53} See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 146.
\textsuperscript{54} See generally Canuel, supra note 7 (examining the origins, techniques, and challenges of “smart growth”). For an argument about why conservation and open-space policies are a better way to tackle sprawl than growth controls or regionalism, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, \textit{Trouble Preserving Paradise?}, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 183-84 (2001). Smart growth has also been criticized for distorting the market by driving up land prices, and for being an autocratic power-grab that frequently runs afoul of the Constitution by violating the Takings Clause. See Canuel, supra note 7, at 323-24.
\textsuperscript{55} See Briffault, \textit{Smart Growth}, supra note 32, at 266.
\textsuperscript{56} Id.
\textsuperscript{57} Id.
\textsuperscript{58} See id. at 259.
\textsuperscript{59} See Canuel, supra note 7, at 314.
\textsuperscript{60} Mixed-use developments consist of a parcel that contains zonings that local governments traditionally would segregate, such as residential and commercial. See SELMI \textit{ET AL.}, supra note 32, at 66.
development, growth boundaries, transit-oriented development, and reuse of brownfield sites. Although the goals and techniques of smart growth contrast with the goals and techniques of traditional Euclidian zoning, governments can employ smart growth techniques within the preexisting Euclidian framework by requiring, for example, minimum population densities, maximum building heights, and narrower streets with slower speeds.

Various smart growth attempts have emerged in several states, including Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington. Each state has approached smart growth differently: Washington, for example, takes a bottom-up approach that accomplishes the state’s growth management goals at the local level, whereas Oregon employs a top-down method that centralizes power in the state government and empowers the Oregon Department of Transportation to make quasi-judicial decisions about land use while working with local governments. Similar to Oregon’s treatment of its Department of Transportation, Georgia empowers an entity called the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority to make land-use decisions in the Atlanta area, going so far as to give

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61. Infill development uses vacant sites close to preexisting infrastructure that might not otherwise be used due to zoning restrictions. See Bolen et al., supra note 2, at 148.

62. Growth boundaries draw a circle around an urban area, outside of which the government refuses to subsidize infrastructure construction. See SELMI ET AL., supra note 32, at 561.

63. Transit-oriented development focuses on parcels of land within walking distance of transit, such as buses and trains. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSEMeyer & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 9.12 (2d ed. 2007).

64. Brownfield sites are previously overlooked, lightly contaminated sites that are suitable for development. See SELMI ET AL., supra note 32, at 684-86.

65. Smart growth focuses on integration of uses whereas Euclidian zoning focuses on separation of uses. For an explanation of Euclidian zoning, see supra note 32.

66. See Canuel, supra note 7, at 322-23.


68. See Bolen et al., supra note 2, at 206-08. Adding to the novelty of Oregon’s approach is the fact that Portland has formed a regional government called Metro. See Keith Aoki, All the King’s Horses and All the King’s Men: Hurdles to Putting the Fragmented Metropolis Back Together Again? Statewide Land Use Planning, Portland Metro, and Oregon’s Measure 37, 21 J.L. & POL. 397, 425-26 (2005).

it veto power over developments in areas that are overly congested or lack adequate transportation capacity.\textsuperscript{70} Maryland, in an innovative approach that uses incentives instead of regulations, restricts state growth-related spending to areas within designated boundaries.\textsuperscript{71} Meanwhile, Minneapolis and St. Paul have instituted a Regional Council that sets the direction for the region’s transportation and land-use policies.\textsuperscript{72} These smart growth techniques illustrate the diverse methods that are available to regions facing the need to control growth.

2. Regionalism Is a Necessary Component for a Successful Growth-Control Plan

Smart growth, by itself, is not an imperative element of growth-control efforts; however, some form of a regional approach is required for several reasons. First, and most importantly, the metropolitan area is a unit. Due to the movement that occurs back and forth between localities within a region, markets and resources are based on regions, not localities.\textsuperscript{73} A growth-control effort that recognizes this reality is therefore more likely to be successful.

Second, regionalism addresses problems that localism cannot tackle. Local government action creates externalities that impact the entire region, and those effects require a regional solution.\textsuperscript{74} One commentator has explained this need in terms of the “tyranny of the favored quarter.”\textsuperscript{75} This phenomenon results in one quarter of the population of a given region receiving the majority of the region’s investments and job growth, but avoiding its share of the region’s

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{71} See Bolen et al., supra note 2, at 172-73; Canuel, supra note 7, at 342. But see Rebecca Lewis, Gerrit-Jan Knaap & Jungyl Sohn, \textit{Managing Growth with Priority Funding Areas: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Yet To Come}, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 457 (2009) (arguing that this initiative has been a failure, as growth outside of the so-called Priority Funding Areas has increased at the same rate as it did prior to the institution of the policy).

\textsuperscript{72} See Cashin, supra note 35, at 2035.

\textsuperscript{73} See Richard Briffault, \textit{Localism and Regionalism}, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2000) [hereinafter Briffault, \textit{Localism}]; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{74} See Briffault, \textit{Localism}, supra note 73, at 12, 18.

\textsuperscript{75} Cashin, supra note 35, at 1987-91.
\end{footnotesize}
social burdens, such as the need for low income housing. In a self-perpetuating cycle, the “favored” areas continue to improve, while the less favored ones spiral downward. Coordination of growth control on a regional level instead of a local level mitigates some of these externalities because a regional approach can better coordinate the provision of the region’s most critical needs—a power that local governments lack.

Despite the necessity of a regional approach to growth control and the potential benefits that come with it, its implementation can be threatened by the entrenchment and self-interest that accompany local approaches to governing, as well as by citizens’ desires for local autonomy. In order to address these potential pitfalls, attempts to institute regionalism must aim not at supplanting local governments, but at using localism to bolster regionalism. In other words, governance structures or cooperative agreements should be used to better distribute regional benefits and burdens, but without jettisoning localities. This balance can be accomplished by allowing local governments to retain their niche, while giving regional bodies authority over those areas in which a comprehensive approach is most needed. For example, local governments could be given control over land-use, housing, and economic development decisions, whereas regional bodies could handle the development of regional norms and guidelines. The goal, however, should not be the formation of new governments, but rather regional cooperation through tax-base sharing. It is only through such sharing of powers, and not through a body with merely theoretical or advisory powers, that an actual regional effort can develop. And land use is

76. Only state courts have addressed the issue of “fair share” with regard to housing. In 1975, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that housing is a fundamental right, and that local governments therefore must take on their fair share of the regional housing need. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 732-33 (N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
77. See Cashin, supra note 35, at 2011-12.
78. See Briffault, Localism, supra note 73, at 24.
79. See id. at 27.
80. See Cashin, supra note 35, at 2027.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Briffault, Localism, supra note 73, at 20.
84. See Myron Orfield, American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality 105-08 (2002).
not the only area in which a regional effort is imperative: transportation policy, too, must be coordinated on a regional level.

D. Transportation Policy as a Growth-Control Method, and Its Use in Conjunction with Land-Use Policy

At its core, transportation policy\(^\text{85}\) is a regional proposition; its goal is to facilitate the movement of citizens not just within a local government’s jurisdiction, but throughout an entire region and beyond. This fact alone argues for regional cooperation, if only in the transportation realm. As already demonstrated, however, land-use decisions must also be made with an eye toward regional considerations.\(^\text{86}\) Because both land-use and transportation decisions must be made on a regional level, they must also be coordinated with each other, as the manner in which land is used has the power to affect transportation policies, and vice versa.\(^\text{87}\)

A coordinated approach to growth control is necessary because transportation policy alone is imperfect as a growth control tool: it cannot accomplish the same growth-control ends that land-use policy can. Transportation policy functions as a one-way ratchet: although it can stimulate new development, thereby fostering sprawl,\(^\text{88}\) it fails to redistribute growth in the same precise manner that land-use policies can.\(^\text{89}\) Put another way, transportation policy

\(^{85}\) In this Note, the term “transportation policy” refers to government decisions that underlie the use of every mode of local or regional transportation, including automobiles, transit (such as buses, commuter trains, light rail, subways, streetcars, and ferries), bicycling, and walking. Not included in this definition are long-range transportation options such as airplanes or ships. Even though this definition includes many different modes, the realities of life in the United States mean that “transportation policy” mostly refers to automobile usage, which reflects Americans’ automobile dependence. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 148-49. Such dependence is not likely to change, even with progressive transportation and land-use policies. In Portland, Oregon, which is widely regarded as having progressive land-use policies, widespread implementation of transit-oriented development (TOD) has not had a noticeable effect on vehicle miles traveled. See id. This suggests that, even if development occurs in areas that are conducive to alternative forms of transportation, automobiles will still predominate. See id.

\(^{86}\) See supra Part I.C.

\(^{87}\) See Briffault, Smart Growth, supra note 32, at 265.

\(^{88}\) See Freilich & White, supra note 4, at 918-19.

\(^{89}\) See Ellington, Hoel & Miller, supra note 14, at xviii.
can lead growth outward, through the construction of more roads, but cannot lead growth inward or upward.

A study of transportation policy in three areas of Virginia highlighted the inability of transportation policy to control growth in a precise manner. In each of the three areas—Fairfax County, Hampton Roads, and Fredericksburg—transportation policy failed to shape growth as intended.90 Indeed, Fairfax County’s reduction in highway investments failed to affect growth at all.91 The study’s authors concluded that, once market demand exists, transportation policy merely facilitates such demand.92 This conclusion solidifies the idea of transportation policy as a one-way ratchet: it can lead growth outward, but once such outward growth has occurred, it loses its ability to influence growth in any other fashion.

Even though transportation policy alone cannot control growth, its interplay with land-use policy renders it an imperative part of every growth-control effort. Transportation and land-use policies are interwoven to such a degree that disregarding one or the other would doom any growth-control effort. But both policies must also be approached on a regional level—even though the current national pattern is that regional cooperation is common for transportation policies, but rare for land-use policies.93 Professors Freilich and White neatly summed up this conundrum when they wrote:

Roads do not generally stop at municipal borders; therefore, transportation is widely viewed as a regional problem. Effective solutions to the traffic congestion quandary, however, have not emerged from federal or state governments. Despite the rising interest in regional and statewide controls in many regions, little has been done to change the fundamental fact that the regulation of land use resides primarily at the local level.94

90. See id.
91. See id. at 19.
92. See id. at xix.
93. See Cashin, supra note 35, at 2030. Cooperation with regard to transportation policies reflects what Professor Briffault has deemed “things-regionalism,” which refers to regional cooperation on infrastructure or systems, rather than on public concerns. Briffault, Localism, supra note 73, at 5.
94. Freilich & White, supra note 4, at 922.
In other words, many regions fail both to approach land-use and transportation policies together, and to consider them in a regional context. A survey of the state of affairs in Northern Virginia reveals that the professors’ observation largely applies to the region.

II. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA

The region of Northern Virginia consists of fourteen cities, counties, and towns in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Each local government makes land-use decisions independently within a framework that the Commonwealth establishes. No regional government exists, although Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) serves as a forum for the coordination of many types of regional policies. In addition, several quasi-governmental bodies study and coordinate transportation policy within the region. These organizations are distinct from the region’s transportation service providers.

The Northern Virginia region has been attempting to manage the effects of sprawl for decades, and will continue this battle over the next twenty years as sprawl worsens. The region’s population is expected to grow at an average rate of 69,000 people per year through

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97. The most important Commonwealth body is VDOT, which includes the Northern Virginia District of VDOT, the Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB), and the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (VDRPT). Id. The metropolitan D.C.-area bodies that have the most impact are MWCOG (which includes the Transportation Planning Board of the National Capital Region (TPB)), the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA). See id. The primary Northern Virginia-region bodies include NVTA, NVTC, the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC), and the Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission (PRTC). See id.

98. Examples of organizations that merely provide transportation services include Virginia Railway Express (a joint partnership between NVTC and PRTC), Virginia Regional Transit, Alexandria’s DASH, Arlington Transit, City of Fairfax’s CUE, City of Falls Church’s GEORGE, Fairfax Connector, Loudoun County Transit, REX, TAGS, and PikeRide. See id.
Whereas closer, suburban counties such as Fairfax County experienced rapid growth during the period from 1970 to 2000, growth during the 2000-2030 period is expected to occur in more distant counties such as Loudoun, Stafford, and Prince William. The rate of growth in employment in these counties is also expected to increase more rapidly than in other counties. Moreover, although the vast majority of jobs in 2030 are expected to be located in so-called “regional activity clusters,” only about 50 percent of households are expected to be similarly located. This disparity suggests that residents will continue driving to jobs that are located far from their homes.

The region stands at a crossroads, and the Commonwealth has recognized this. VTrans2035, a long-range transportation planning report prepared by the Office of Intermodal Planning and Investment, recognizes that Virginia faces two options over the coming decades. The first scenario envisions “past patterns continuing without change,” which will result in even more “dispersed, sprawling, low-density development across a great deal of its land area, with major corridors overwhelmed by transportation demand generated from scattered residential, commercial, and industrial development.” However, in the second scenario, the Commonwealth will “organize its growth around relatively compact activity centers, each with a balanced and healthy mix of development, connected by free-flowing rail, transit, and highway corridors providing access and mobility.”

Achievement of the latter scenario is unlikely to occur within Virginia’s current framework of transportation and land-use decision making. In order to realize the mixed-use, compact development centers that this scenario envisions, some fundamental changes must occur. As the following survey of land-use and transportation decision making shows, the near certainty of increased sprawl is not the only obstacle to growth control in NorthernVirginia.

\begin{align*}
\text{99. } & \text{MWCOG, Growth Trends, supra note 15, at 5.} \\
\text{100. } & \text{See id. at 10.} \\
\text{101. } & \text{See id. at 11.} \\
\text{102. } & \text{Id. at 14-15.} \\
\text{103. } & \text{Office of Intermodal Planning and Investment, VTrans2035 Report to the Governor and General Assembly, at ii (2009) [hereinafter VTrans2035 Report].} \\
\text{104. } & \text{Id.}
\end{align*}
Virginia; in addition, the patchwork of local governments and quasi-governmental organizations that play a role in shaping transportation policies must somehow be shepherded into concerted action.

**A. Land-Use Decision Making Suffers from a Lack of Cooperation**

Fragmented decision making compromises the viability of growth control in Northern Virginia. Pursuant to power granted by the Code of Virginia, land-use decisions are made not on a regional level, but by the individual local governments within a given region, including counties and municipalities.\(^{105}\) These local governments enjoy exclusive control over a wide range of policies that shape how development proceeds in their respective jurisdictions.

More specifically, counties and municipalities harbor the authority to enact zoning ordinances that classify land uses and structure sizes.\(^{106}\) High-growth localities are further empowered to extract proffers of cash for the off-site road improvements needed to accommodate new development,\(^{107}\) and to assess road impact fees\(^{108}\) as a condition for allowing new development.\(^{109}\)

This high degree of local control works against the General Assembly’s stated purpose in granting local governments these powers, which is to “encourage localities to improve the public health, safety, convenience and welfare of its citizens,” and to ensure that infrastructure—including transportation—be well planned and economical.\(^{110}\) Instead, sprawl inconveniences citizens, who suffer from poorly planned and uneconomical infrastructure. The failure to control these negative effects of sprawl is due in part to fragmented decision making.\(^{111}\)

A lack of cooperation, both between local governments and Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) and among local

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105. **VA. CODE ANN.** § 15.2-2280 (2010).
106. *Id.*
107. *Id.* § 15.2-2298.
108. Impact fees in general are “charges levied by local governments on new developments in order to pay a proportionate share of the capital costs of providing public infrastructure to those developments.” JUERGENSMeyer & ROBERTS, *supra* note 63, § 9.9B.
109. **VA. CODE ANN.** § 15.2-2319.
110. *Id.* § 15.2-2200.
111. Fragmented decision making also infects the realm of transportation policy. *See infra Part II.B.*
governments, solidifies this fragmentation: each locality plans only for itself and is rarely compelled to coordinate with VDOT. For example, every locality is required to create a local planning commission, the duties of which include “promot[ing] the orderly development of the locality and its environs” by “serv[ing] primarily in an advisory capacity to the governing bodies,”112 as well as preparing a comprehensive plan.113 Comprehensive plans are intended to “guid[e] and accomplish[ ] a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the territory which will, in accordance with present and probable future needs and resources, best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants.”114 In other words, comprehensive plans must chart a course for future development, but only within a given locality’s jurisdiction.

Because localities are not required to cooperate in creating their respective comprehensive plans, each locality pays attention to only its own needs. For example, Arlington County’s General Land Use Plan (GLUP), which represents a component of the county’s comprehensive plan, focuses only on “the development of Arlington County” and “the future development of the County.”115 The GLUP does mention cooperation in the context of regional demographic forecasting that takes place within MWCOG, but such forecasting merely predicts the county’s share of future regional growth. It does not require the county to cooperate with other localities in making growth decisions as they relate to land-use components such as density and the location of residential and commercial uses. Similarly, Fairfax County notes that its comprehensive plan contains a “general countywide policy on land use” that focuses on “ensur[ing] that Fairfax County’s excellent quality of life will continue.”116 Where the plan does recognize the need for cooperation—it notes that the county’s “planning efforts should be cognizant of the role that the County plays in regional growth and develop-

113. Id. § 15.2-2223.
114. Id.
ment”—its vagueness ensures that no concrete action will be taken.

Arlington County's and Fairfax County's comprehensive plans demonstrate that localities eschew cooperation in their land-use planning. This myopia leads to well-planned localities but an incoherent region, “almost as if there weren't planning at all.” The lack of mandated cooperation between localities in the realm of comprehensive plans represents a lost opportunity to add regional land-use coherence by forcing communication between localities.

Adding to the problem is the fact that VDOT does not cooperate with localities when the localities create their comprehensive plans. Indeed, the department reviews such plans only under certain circumstances. For example, if a locality amends its comprehensive plan or zoning ordinances, VDOT must review only those changes that will “substantially affect transportation on state controlled highways.” VDOT is not required to assist with the actual planning.

A cooperation failure also exists in areas other than comprehensive planning. For instance, the Virginia General Assembly permits cooperative action between localities vis-à-vis land-use powers in two ways, neither of which seems to be utilized. First, planning commissions may cooperate with each other “so as to coordinate planning and development among the localities.” Second, municipalities and counties may create “joint local planning commissions.” Such cooperative action among planning commissions, municipalities, and counties are at the election of the various localities; cooperation is neither encouraged nor discouraged, but merely permitted. In other words, the General Assembly has established mechanisms of cooperation, but the current extent of sprawl indicates that these cooperative mechanisms are either not used or

119. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2222.1(A).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 15.2-2219. This provision also gives planning commissions the option of cooperating with the legislative or administrative bodies of other localities. Id.
122. Id. § 15.2-2219.
are ineffective. The inward-facing attitudes that can be seen in comprehensive plans may provide a clue as to why such cooperative mechanisms in the land-use arena are underutilized.

Localities may also cooperate in realms other than planning and land-use actions. Power, for example, may be shared between political subdivisions, so long as each entity possesses similar powers. Localities are also empowered to enter into agreements for the provision of services or facilities. More generally, two or more political subdivisions may form and maintain an association so as to promote a close relationship between the bodies through “investigation, discussion and cooperative effort.” As with permissive cooperative actions regarding land use, these cooperative actions seem to be permitted merely as methods by which local government bodies can choose to associate; again, the extent of sprawl shows the ineffectiveness of such provisions. As a whole, the reality of land-use decision making in Northern Virginia is not the cooperative process that the General Assembly intended. Instead, the decision-making process has led to sprawl and poor planning.

B. A Number of Stakeholders Create Transportation Policy

In contrast to the cooperation failure that defines land-use decision making, transportation policy faces the logistical problem of managing an excessive number of organizations, most of which lack a mandate to implement recommendations. Transportation policy decisions on a regional level come from a patchwork of state, regional, and local bodies. Understanding the key players in Northern Virginia transportation policymaking therefore requires the mastery of an alphabet soup of acronyms.

1. State Policymakers

At the top of the transportation policy structure sits the Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB), a division of VDOT that builds, maintains, and improves the state highway system.

123. Id. § 15.2-1300.
124. Id. § 15.2-1301.
125. Id. § 15.2-1303.
126. Id. § 33.1-12.
Its other duties include reviewing VDOT policies, coordinating and cooperating with local governments, and creating Six Year Improvement Plans.\(^\text{127}\) The Virginia Secretary of Transportation chairs the CTB,\(^\text{128}\) and its commissioner is the chief executive officer of VDOT, who wields the power to build, maintain, improve, and preserve Virginia’s highways.\(^\text{129}\) CTB receives assistance from the Office of Intermodal Planning and Investment, which “advises ... [CTB] on multimodal and intermodal issues,”\(^\text{130}\) primarily through the creation of long-range multimodal transportation plans such as VTrans2025 and VTrans2035.\(^\text{131}\)

2. Metropolitan D.C. Organizations

Adding to this confusing patchwork are organizations that focus on the metropolitan D.C. region. The two most important of these organizations are the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board (TPB) and MWCOG.

The TPB is a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), the establishment of which Congress required in certain urban areas.\(^\text{132}\) Created in 1965 by state and local governments throughout the region, the TPB associated itself with MWCOG in 1966, and although the TPB remains an independent body, it continues to receive support from MWCOG’s transportation staff.\(^\text{133}\) Virginia law grants MPOs such as the TPB the power to issue contracts for studies and to develop and approve transportation plans and improvements to roads, to the extent allowed under federal law.\(^\text{134}\)

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\(^{127}\) Id.

\(^{128}\) Id. § 33.1-1.

\(^{129}\) Id. § 33.1-13.


\(^{133}\) See MWCOG, Citizens Guide, supra note 132, at 15.

\(^{134}\) VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-23.03:01.
To accomplish these objectives, the TPB coordinates transportation policy throughout the region in three main ways. First, it ensures that transportation decision making complies with federal law.\textsuperscript{135} Second, it provides a regional policy framework and a forum in which regional governments can coordinate transportation policy.\textsuperscript{136} The TPB Vision, a document that lists eight goals and strategies, guides this policy framework in several ways, including encouraging greater concentrations of development within the urban core and near transit through the creation of “an interconnected transportation system.”\textsuperscript{137} The Vision also lists as a goal the achievement of “better inter-jurisdictional coordination of transportation and land use planning,” but mostly encourages the utilization of noncoercive means such as the creation of model zoning and land-use guidelines.\textsuperscript{138} Third, the TPB coordinates transportation policy throughout the region by providing technical resources for decision making.\textsuperscript{139}

The TPB’s inability to require action hampers its capacity to influence transportation policy in a concrete manner. As with land-use policy, individual jurisdictions exert control over their own spheres; this control is sufficient to weaken the benefits that the TPB brings.\textsuperscript{140} As David Alpert, founder of the influential Greater Greater Washington blog, has explained, local control over transportation policy is “the Achilles heel of the TPB: because individual jurisdictions have so much control over their own elements, each jurisdiction essentially gets what they want for themselves, almost as if there weren’t planning at all. Meanwhile, the overall region and environment suffers.”\textsuperscript{141}

MWCOG also has a major impact on the region’s transportation policy. Although MWCOG works closely with the TPB, it also creates comprehensive regional plans and serves as a policy forum for the entire metropolitan D.C. area on issues such as transporta-

\textsuperscript{135} See MWCOG, CITIZENS GUIDE, supra note 132, at 16.
\textsuperscript{136} See id. at 17.
\textsuperscript{138} Id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{139} See MWCOG, CITIZENS GUIDE, supra note 132, at 18.
\textsuperscript{140} See Alpert, supra note 118.
\textsuperscript{141} Id.
tion and air quality.\textsuperscript{142} MWCOG straddles the line between transportation and land-use policies, as it also provides land-use forecasting for the region\textsuperscript{143} and has created a regional clearinghouse dedicated to promoting the coordination of land-use and transportation planning called the Transportation/Land-Use Connections Program.\textsuperscript{144} MWCOG, however, focuses on the entire metropolitan D.C. region, not just Northern Virginia and, similar to the TPB, serves as a forum with merely precatory powers. It therefore lacks the authority to implement the policies it espouses.

3. Local Governments

Local governments further complicate transportation policy by adding to the patchwork of organizations. These bodies have implementation powers,\textsuperscript{145} but in many instances fail to cooperate effectively. Although Virginia law establishes methods for cooperation between local governments, these primarily allow for cooperation with regard to only the operation and maintenance of roads, not policy. One provision in the Code of Virginia, for example, allows localities to enter into agreements regarding their roads, but only for their construction, operation, and tolling.\textsuperscript{146} Localities are also permitted to establish local transportation districts, but only for industrial and commercial purposes, not for the purpose of coordinating policy.\textsuperscript{147} In short, among the organizations that comprise the patchwork, local governments alone possess implementation power, but they cannot effectively cooperate across their borders on matters of policy.

\textsuperscript{142} See MWCOG, \textit{How Public Transportation Is Organized}, supra note 96, at 38.
\textsuperscript{143} See generally MWCOG, \textit{Growth Trends}, supra note 15.
\textsuperscript{145} Local governments have control over roads, but not necessarily over the policy behind them. The state automatically gives control over secondary roads to municipalities whose population exceeds 3500 people. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-224 (2010). Localities, however, can request that the state take its streets into the secondary system for maintenance purposes. \textit{Id.} § 33.1-70.3.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.} § 33.1-228.1.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.} § 33.1-410.
4. Additional Policymakers

In addition to state, metropolitan-area, and local bodies, two additional bodies exist that impact regional transportation policy in Northern Virginia: the NVTC and the NVTA. Together, these two organizations coordinate transit and transportation planning within the Northern Virginia region, but lack the power of implementation.

NVTC primarily coordinates transit policy. This organization takes chief responsibility for managing and collecting the gasoline tax from which the Metro transit system receives its funding, for co-owning Virginia Railway Express, and for appointing Virginia’s representatives on Metro’s board. NVTC also serves as a forum for coordination between the regional Metro system and the local transit systems. Each year, it allocates approximately $200 million in federal, state, and regional funds to its member jurisdictions, which include ten agencies that provide transit services and seven state and regional agencies that provide transit planning. NVTC’s work, which it completes without a staff and with little funding, allows providers of transit in Northern Virginia to deliver high levels of service in a cooperative atmosphere.

In contrast to NVTC’s focus on transit, NVTA concentrates on broad transportation planning, although it also lacks the power to implement its recommendations. Its primary responsibilities include creating Northern Virginia’s unconstrained multimodal transpor-

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149. The Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission (PRTC) is the other owner. See NVTC, HOW PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS ORGANIZED, supra note 96, at 16.
150. See id. at 15.
151. Examples of these include Arlington Transit, Falls Church GEORGE, Alexandria DASH, and City of Fairfax CUE. Such local systems are distinguishable from systems that are designed to serve the region, such as WMATA and VRE. See id. at 16.
152. NVTC HANDBOOK, supra note 148, at 3.
153. NVTC, HOW PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS ORGANIZED, supra note 96, at 13. These agencies were responsible for 142 million transit trips in the metropolitan D.C. area in fiscal year 2008. NVTC HANDBOOK, supra note 148, at 22.
154. See NVTC, HOW PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS ORGANIZED, supra note 96, at 25. Most of the seventeen member jurisdictions contribute to funding. See id. at 13. Those members that contribute the most funding are given the most control. See id. at 17.
155. See id. at 30.
tation plan, defining funding priorities, and implementing projects; NVTA also allocates federal funds and carries out policies and programs. NVTA’s funding comes from its members, proportionate to the population of each.

One of NVTA’s most important functions lies in its creation of a Regional Transportation Plan for Northern Virginia, as required by organization bylaws. The plan is comprised of two components: the Six-Year Program and the Long Range Transportation Plan. Whereas the Six-Year Program consists of short-term improvements of regional significance, the Long Range Transportation Plan is aimed at reducing delays and increasing regional interconnectivity, and therefore must be based on regional consensus and include regional policies and priorities. Aiding in the creation of both of these components is the Planning Coordination Advisory Committee, which is charged with giving “special consideration to regional transportation, land use and growth issues.” Through the process of creating the Regional Transportation Plan, therefore, NVTA must consider the overlap between transportation, land-use, and growth policies.

Despite the patchwork of organizations that contribute to regional transportation policy, concerns such as cooperation and coordination of land-use and transportation policies are not entirely overlooked. NVTA’s Long Range Transportation Plan, TransAction 2030, recognizes the overlap between growth, transportation, and land-use policies. The plan stresses the need to anticipate both transporta-

156. “Unconstrained” refers to a type of transportation plan that includes projects that may be necessary but that do not yet have guaranteed funding. By contrast, “constrained” plans can include only projects whose funding has already been secured. MWCOG, CITIZENS GUIDE, supra note 132, at 23. “Multimodal” means that the transportation plan includes all types of transportation, such as rail and road.
157. See NVTC, HOW PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS ORGANIZED, supra note 96, at 15.
158. NVTC HANDBOOK, supra note 148, at 8.
159. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-4830 (2010).
161. Id. at 10.
162. Id. The current Long Range Transportation Plan is called “TransAction 2030.” Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 9.
tion and land-use needs due to the impending explosion of growth expected to occur by 2030. In addition, it recognizes that the successes of both of these policies depend on each other and that a regional solution will be necessary. The plan urges multimodal choices, “compatibility with local plans,” “land use support,” and “cost sharing.” Most of the plan’s solutions, however, are merely advisory and fail to provide concrete, implementable solutions that have a real chance of curbing sprawl. Accordingly, this plan, like the patchwork of organizations involved in creating transportation policy in Northern Virginia, fails to create implementable coordination and cooperation efforts. Although such topics are acknowledged and studied, no body exists that can implement them.

C. Virginia’s Attempts To Combine Land-Use and Transportation Policies

Virginia has demonstrated its desire to coordinate land-use and transportation policies in at least three instances. First, the Code of Virginia declares that one of its intentions in granting planning, subdivision, and zoning powers to local governments is “to plan for the future development of communities to the end that transportation systems be carefully planned.” Virginia acknowledges, therefore, the linkage between land-use decisions and transportation policies, and grants land-use powers to localities with the intent that local governments use them in conjunction with transportation planning.

More to the point, however, the Commonwealth has indicated its desire to coordinate land-use and transportation policies in VTrans2025 and VTrans2035. VTrans2025, for example, “recommended ... [s]trengthened planning processes, especially integration of transportation and land use.” VTrans2035 continues this trend, going so far as to designate such coordination as one of its seven goals. The latter plan also proposes the establishment of an

165. See TRANSACTION 2030, supra note 95, at 2.
166. Id. at 5.
168. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
169. VTRANS2035 REPORT, supra note 103, at i.
170. See id. at ii.
Integrated Transportation/Land Use Grant program that would connect land use and transportation on the local level by granting additional transportation funding to localities that encourage compact development.\textsuperscript{171} Such a program would also incentivize use of compact development on the regional level by providing similar transportation funding incentives.\textsuperscript{172}

Finally, Virginia also indicated its desire that land-use and transportation policies be coordinated by enacting Chapter 896,\textsuperscript{173} which ostensibly flowed from recommendations made in VTrans2025.\textsuperscript{174} This legislation established procedures through which local governments could implement smart growth policies, for example, by creating urban development areas and implementing New Urbanism principles.\textsuperscript{175} It also mandated that NVTA record transportation and land-use measures,\textsuperscript{176} and granted that body the power to tax in order to fund regional transportation policies.\textsuperscript{177}

Although the state government has demonstrated a desire to coordinate transportation and land-use policies, such coordination has been slow to take root due to a lack of concrete conduits for implementation. As discussed in Part II.B, an enormous number of bodies are involved with coordinating and implementing regional transportation policies. This high number of actors in the transportation realm can provide the benefit of more resources devoted to problem solving, but may also create problems with mission overlap and duplication of efforts. At the same time, the land-use side has fewer bodies devoted to coordinating policy, and none that actually

\textsuperscript{171.} See id. at v.
\textsuperscript{172.} See id.
\textsuperscript{173.} See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{174.} VTrans2035 recognizes that, as a result of VTrans2025’s recommendation to integrate transportation and land use, “local governments were authorized to impose road impact fees and required to designate urban development areas as well as regional transportation and land use performance measures.” VTRANS2035 REPORT, supra note 103, at i. These provisions are similar to those contained in Chapter 896. See Ann K. Crenshaw, Be Alert to the Legal and Practical Considerations of Annexation and the Impact of the 2007 Transportation Act on Land Use Matters, in LAND USE LAW: CURRENT ISSUES IN SUBDIVISION ANNEXATION AND ZONING 55, 59-60 (National Business Institute, CLE Series No. 40484, 2007).
\textsuperscript{175.} See Crenshaw, supra note 174, at 55, 60.
implement such policies; implementation is left solely to local
governments.\textsuperscript{178} The result is a well coordinated and highly func-
tional regional system of transportation \textit{provision},\textsuperscript{179} coupled with
a land-use system that lacks both intergovernmental cooperation
and coordination with transportation policy.\textsuperscript{180} Because of the extent
to which land-use and transportation policies impact each other,
this lack of coordination represents a lost opportunity to control
sprawl by linking policy choices made in both realms.

Coordination has also been slow to occur because of the Supreme
Court of Virginia’s gutting of legislative efforts to coordinate land-
use and transportation policies. In \textit{Marshall v. Northern Virginia
Transportation Authority}, the court struck down portions of Chapter
896, the legislation by which the General Assembly attempted to
encourage a coordinated approach to land-use and transportation
policies.\textsuperscript{181} In particular, the court refused to allow NVTA to levy
taxes permitted under Chapter 896.\textsuperscript{182} The court held that the
taxation power that Chapter 896 granted to NVTA, which would
have allowed NVTA to fund regional projects, unconstitutionally
degraded the General Assembly’s legislative power to an unelected
body.\textsuperscript{183} Such delegation was unconstitutional, reasoned the court,
because a regional body such as NVTA lacks the political account-
ability that constrains a legislative body.\textsuperscript{184} This ruling did not
strike portions of Chapter 896 that specifically addressed the
coordination of land-use and transportation policies,\textsuperscript{185} but it did
dictate the shape of future growth-control efforts by removing from
the table certain potentially effective solutions. Post-\textit{Marshall}, if
growth control is to be spearheaded by any unelected body—for
example, a cooperative effort between NVTA and representatives
appointed by each locality—such a body cannot raise revenue
through taxation and therefore must depend on other entities for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{178} See supra Part II.A.
\item \textsuperscript{179} See NVTC, \textit{How Public Transportation Is Organized}, supra note 96, at 3.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Although MWCOG has begun a pilot project that links land-use and transportation
policies, its precatory nature means that its recommendations can be ignored. See
Transportation/Land-Use Connections Program, supra note 144.
\item \textsuperscript{181} See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{183} See id. at 80; see also McSweeney & Russell, supra note 177, at 58-59.
\item \textsuperscript{184} See McSweeney & Russell, supra note 177, at 58-59.
\item \textsuperscript{185} See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
funding. In short, Marshall made clear that any smart growth solution will need to be funded by the elected bodies that establish it, imposed by an elected regional body, or instituted by the state itself.

III. TOWARD BETTER COORDINATION: WORKING AROUND MARSHALL AND CHANGING THE STATUS QUO IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA

The stage is set in Northern Virginia for the establishment of an effective, regional effort to curb sprawl through the implementation of a smart growth strategy and the coordination of land-use and transportation policies. Both the expertise and framework exist, so the next step must involve coordination among the various moving parts and conferral of authority upon a body that has real powers of implementation.

In particular, the TPB is headed in the right direction with its Vision policy statement. In this statement, the TPB aims for a coordination of transportation and land-use policies by focusing on the utilization of existing infrastructure in both the regional core and regional activity centers, which shows that it has realistic goals, and by encouraging transit and transit-oriented developments. MWCOC is also showing progress with its Transportation/Land-Use Connections Program, which offers technical planning assistance to member jurisdictions with the goal of improving transportation and land-use coordination. However, both of these bodies lack powers of taxation and compulsion, which will be necessary components of any successful effort to rein in sprawl. Because the Commonwealth alone possesses both of these powers, it must take the lead.

Virginia’s government has shown interest in implementing smart growth and in coordinating land-use and transportation policies. In VTrans2025 and VTrans2035, the Office of Intermodal Planning

186. See, e.g., supra note 67 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., supra note 72 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
189. See MWCOC, TPB VISION, supra note 137.
190. Id. at 1.
191. See Transportation/Land-Use Connections Program, supra note 144.
192. See Cashin, supra note 35, at 2041 (citing two approaches to regionalism, “[n]either [of which] ... would have been successful ... had the regional majority lacked a supra-local forum that could impose mandates on recalcitrant or dissenting localities”.

and Investment recognized the threats posed by sprawl as well as the need to combat it by coordinating land-use and transportation policies. Chapter 896 codified several of these recommendations. Marshall, however, represented a setback to this progress: the ruling stalled current efforts by preventing NVTA from imposing taxes to fund regional projects, and it constrained future growth-control efforts by requiring that revenue be raised only by elected bodies.

Nonetheless, Virginia must again move past mere calls for regional cooperation and toward a phase of implementation. VTrans2035 recognized the need for regional cooperation, calling for both “continued multi-agency involvement for effective transportation planning” and “a dynamic partnership with regional planning organizations and local jurisdictions that control development patterns.” Recommendations such as these are useful only insofar as they can be implemented.

In short, the Northern Virginia region is at an impasse: at the very least, the will exists throughout the region to have a conversation about the benefits of curbing sprawl through coordination of transportation and land-use policies. Many organizations stand ready to provide space and technical assistance for this discussion. Even the General Assembly has shown signs of support. Yet little exists beyond good will and good ideas. The region must move beyond rhetoric about smart growth and policy coordination and into a phase of concrete action that includes either ceding actual power to one entity, as both Oregon and Georgia have done, or establishing growth boundaries, as Oregon has done. The Commonwealth’s foray into this realm by implementing Chapter 896 was rebuffed in Marshall, so the state and region must now regroup.

193. See VTRANS 2035 REPORT, supra note 103, at i-ii, v; see also supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 25, 173-77 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
196. VTRANS2035 REPORT, supra note 103, at iv.
197. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
A. Higher Density Zoning Mandates Are Needed in Urban Clusters

Countering sprawl necessarily requires higher density development. The question, though, is how best to achieve this end. Mandatory urban growth boundaries such as those in Oregon have had a poor track record, as “a considerable amount of development still takes place outside them;” in fact, “more development takes place outside some small town boundaries than within them.” 198 Urban growth boundaries seem to work on a conceptual level, much like booms placed around an oil spill so as to contain it. The boundaries may fail, however, to contain growth completely because land outside the boundary becomes more attractive than ever, beckoning developers to build precisely the type of “leapfrogging” projects that the boundary was supposed to discourage. 199 Even Maryland’s system, which incentivizes developers to build within urban boundaries, was recently declared a failure. 200 One commentator suggests that urban growth boundaries fail because they are not accompanied by necessary policies that encourage dense development within the boundaries, such as zoning reform. 201

Zoning policy changes are a necessary component of any type of solution to sprawl, even if an urban growth boundary is not instituted. Such changes, which would occur on a statewide level and apply to local governments, would solve problems concerning coordination and lack of a concrete mandate, both of which have handicapped previous efforts to control sprawl. 202 The first necessary change in zoning policy would entail the statutory recognition of “clusters” throughout Northern Virginia, similar to the regional activity centers that have been recognized by MWCOG. 203 Throughout the region, these clusters contain 72 percent of the region’s jobs, but only 40 percent of the region’s households. 204

199. See id. at 566.
200. See Lewis, Knaap & Sohn, supra note 71, at 473.
202. See supra Part II.C.
203. See MWCOG, GROWTH TRENDS, supra note 15, at 15.
204. See id.
General Assembly must, therefore, enact legislation that mandates higher density, mixed-use zoning in these specific clusters, particularly in Tysons Corner. In making the choice regarding which clusters to designate for such high-density, mixed-use zoning, it must also pay attention to the surrounding transportation network, giving areas with current or planned Metro access the highest priority.

B. Localities Must Forge a Consensus Within the New Zoning Framework

Such zoning policy changes would be only the first step in the solution, however, as they would merely establish a common framework of “density principles” to govern localities’ land use. The next crucial step must include the coordination of each locality’s land-use and transportation policy decisions. Coordination of zoning policies among localities is an especially important step, because differing attempts to control growth in neighboring localities can lead to a “hodge-podge of potentially contradictory attempts to control development,” and can actually work against growth-control goals.

This coordination should occur within preexisting regional bodies such as MWCOG, NVTA, and NVTC. This framework of regional organizations, which is already devoted to studying transportation and land-use policies and to providing space for planning and debate by localities within the region, is a valuable resource that Virginia must harness. Organizations such as MWCOG, TPB, NVTA, and NVTC must continue to conduct studies and provide space for debate. They must also begin to play a new role: that of a clearinghouse. In this capacity, MWCOG and TPB in particular would provide recommendations to a designated statewide body with the power to enact and enforce such recommendations.

205. The General Assembly has already taken some steps in this direction. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. However, work remains to be done in encouraging high-density and mixed uses of land.
206. See Poindexter, supra note 5, at 315.
207. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
C. VDOT Must Capitalize on Regional Consensus in Coordinating Regional Land Use and Transportation

A statewide body that has the authority to mandate action by localities must carry out the recommendations of MWCOG and TPB because these entities have only recommendatory powers and thus can have only a limited affect on localities’ decision making. The natural candidate for filling this role is VDOT. Following the Georgia model,208 VDOT should be empowered to oversee both land-use and transportation policymaking, and to veto any development project that lacks the requisite density or access to preexisting transportation. It would be incumbent upon VDOT to respect the recommendations it receives from the regional bodies. This deference would also be in VDOT’s best interest, as the recommendations of such bodies would represent regional agreement, thus rendering VDOT’s implementation of such recommendations less difficult.

Coordination by VDOT would have the added advantage of plugging the gap in transportation policy that Marshall left: because VDOT is state-funded, it would not need to assess taxes in order to finance its efforts. The General Assembly, of course, would be required to allocate funds to VDOT’s new activities, which would be no easy feat. But the total cost of such activities might be lower than it would be if an entirely new entity were created to oversee growth control in Northern Virginia, due to efficiencies that would be gained from using VDOT’s existing expertise and operations.

Vesting such power in VDOT would ultimately foster coordination of land use and transportation policies. VDOT would necessarily face the task of reconciling the two policies in the event of a clash, which would ideally provide more coherence between the two priorities than currently exists. At the very least, the agency would possess a bird’s eye view of both transportation and land-use policies on a regional level.

The process set forth within this Note would also comply with the restrictions set forth under Marshall, which prohibited the funding of growth-control efforts by the imposition of taxes by any unelected body.209 Although no stage of this proposal relies on the implementa-

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208. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
tion of new taxes, it would pass muster even in the event that new
taxes were required. Two of the stages—the passage of new zoning
laws and coordination by VDOT—require action by the General
Assembly, which unquestionably harbors the power to levy new
taxes. The remaining stage, consisting of coordination by localities,
also complies with Marshall because localities would coordinate
within preexisting entities that do not impose taxes in order to fund
themselves.210 Although work would be undertaken by unelected
individuals within MWCOG, TPB, NVTA, or NVTC, the unelected
entity in question would not be imposing taxes to fund the work.
Instead, funding would come from the entity’s budget, which the
General Assembly would provide. Because Marshall only prohibits
unelected bodies from imposing taxes, such coordination efforts
would fall safely within the constitutional boundaries established by
the ruling. Each stage of this proposal, therefore, meets the re-
strictions imposed by Marshall.

CONCLUSION

Currently, growth control efforts in Northern Virginia run the
risk of failure due to lack of cooperation among localities and lack
of coordination across transportation and land-use policies. Even
where coordination exists, such as within MWCOG and TPB, the
absence of a mandate means that localities are free to proceed in
contravention of such consensus.

The three-tier process outlined in this Note approaches these
coordination and cooperation problems by recognizing that growth
control must be both bottom-up and top-down. First, the state must
guide local decision makers to adopt higher density, mixed-use
zoning policies. Next, working within this framework, some degree
of consensus must emerge from localities. Finally, the General
Assembly must grant VDOT the power to utilize this consensus.

210. None of the entities discussed supports itself by imposing taxes. MWCOG’s funding
comes from a variety of sources, including local governments, federal and state grants, and
mwco.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). The TPB’s staff is provided by MWCOG, based
on the TPB’s association with MWCOG. See Metropolitan Washington Council of
(last visited Feb. 18, 2011). Funding for both NVTA and NVTC comes from each locality that
is a member. See supra notes 154, 160 and accompanying text.
This power would include the ability both to enforce and to coordinate with an eye toward regional issues. Ceding final power to VDOT carries the added benefit of easier coordination of land-use and transportation policies.

This process coordinates localities and policies, and grants the power of oversight to VDOT, which would be encouraged to work within the framework of recommendations that MWCOG and TPB present. Although such a process is neither simple nor elegant, it does offer the combination of mandate and coordination within the limitations posed by Marshall and the current framework of organizations.

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