Mr. Ritchie proposes a plan of operations to be adapted by the Southern States, and advertises for a better—if any one has a better to offer. Under this invitation I take the liberty to suggest one to Mr. R's consideration, which I respectfully request him to lay before his readers.

I will first endeavor to correct an error into which, I apprehend, Mr. R has fallen. It is a frequent, and sometimes a fatal, error, to mistake a falling back to a stronger position for a retreat. The acceptance of Mr. Clay's bill of compromise by the South Carolina delegation is thus misunderstood. It is nothing more than a surrender of the untenable position of nullification, and a demolition of an ill-judged outwork which did but cover the approach of the enemy, and embarrass the defense of the citadel of State rights.

This is now beleaguered, and its defence must all force be turned. Let us then lay aside the tariff for the present, on the same principle on which a general brings up his rear guard to win the victory. If he loses the day he cannot hope to save his baggage. If he gains the battle, the baggage can take care of itself.

The fixed majority, identified with the manufacturing interest, can outvote us, and will outvote whenever they dare. The fear of secession is the only thing that ever has restrained them. At the commencement of the late session that fear was at its height, and they came to Congress prepared to yield as much as they could without present ruin. The proclamation gave them new hope. The stupickness, servility, and cowardice, of the South and West ripened that hope into something approaching to assurance, and they then determined to reject Verplanek's bill. It has been said, the President could have had that bill passed if he would. He could as soon lift up Olympus. Could he carry his measures against the Bank? No. Could he prevent the passage of a bill asserting the jurisdiction of the Federal Government over the soil of a turnpike in Virginia? No. Could he have Blair elected printer to the House, or prevent the election of Green to the Senate? No. Could he prevent the passage of Clay's land bill? No. Could he interrupt Clay's bill of compromise on the tariff, which was intended to embarrass his operations in that quarter? No. He found it would pass in spite of him, and then tried to make it his own. But even this was not permitted. The bill has been puffed into a momentary popularity, and Mr. Clay has all the credit of it. Much good may it do him.

Not a measure has the President carried or
prevented besides his force bill. And what is that? Not at all to his mind, as will be seen whenever the Cherokees can lug the State of Georgia into court again. Mr. Forsyth saw that, and tried to change that feature. He might as well have tried to stop Niagra. The President wanted leave to use force, or not, at his pleasure. Has he got it? No. He is made the high bailiff of the courts, and at their bidding he must act, and without their bidding he can do nothing. Were Messrs. Worcester and Butler now in the penitentiary, he would be obliged to turn them out. By signing that law, he is estopped to deny the right of the Supreme Court to command their discharge, and his duty to enforce it against all resistance. It was to draw him into this snare that these holy men agreed to hush up that matter.

No. The President is a prisoner in his palace, surrounded by spies and traitors, and unable to prevail on Congress to do anything but to arm his hands with an instrument which he cannot use without cutting his own throat.

This is the true amount of the matter. The moneied aristocracy have a decided mastery in Congress, and his is their enemy, and they his. What weapon had he to fight them with? The tax-paying landed interest of the South. In what was their strength? Number? No. They were sure to be outvoted as they have been. Their strength was the same which carried the Missouri question. A fear, on the part of their oppressors, that they might be provoked beyond endurance, even to the dissolution of a partnership, in which, as in the alliance between the giant and the dwarf, the one got all the blows, the other all the honor, and all the profit. This fear the proclamation calmed; and, therefore, they rallied to the support of that, and to the enforcement of it; and, while they baffled the President on every other point, cockered him up against South Carolina, and, by bluster and noise, endeavored to put down forever the advocates of State Rights.

Here, then, is the point of their attack, and here must be our defense. Yield here, and they carry everything—the tariff, the bank, internal improvement, and, finally, the Presidency. Thank you, that some of these people would have voted for Andrew Jackson as President, had they not seen that, in so doing, they put a ring in the nose of Tennessee, and, indeed, the whole South, to prevent them from resorting to the only efficient remedy against the tariff? He could do the manufacturers no harm. They could not pass a law without him, but he could hold fast the present law in spite of him. They did so, and even tricked him into the surrender of the most valuable concession of the tariff of 1832; and, in return,
they have the advantage of his popularity to
hold together the South and West, while their
work plunder goes on. He has unexpectedly,
y done more than this, and given them an
assurance that he will piece out his popularity
with force, and hold by strong hand those who
cannot be restrained by influence. Very well!
WHILE HE HOLDS THEY WILL SKIN.

Yes! WHILE HE HOLDS THEY WILL SKIN.
How can we help ourselves? MAKE LET
GO HIS HOLD. MAKE HIM LET GO!

Call a Southern Convention to take into con-
sideration the State of the Union, with a dis-
tinct understanding that in that Convention
the following propositions will be advanced
and advocated:

1. That the faculty of secession resides in
   the States.
2. That they have the right to secede for good
   cause.
3. That they have the right to judge of the
   sufficiency of the cause.
4. That the authoritative denial of these
   rights, is such good cause, if persisted in to the
   length of enforcement against a seceding State.
5. That the permanent establishment of a
tariff, predicatied upon any basis but the neces-
sities of the Treasury, is such good cause:
6. That the practical assertion of a super-
tending and controlling jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts over the State Courts, backed
by the bayonet, is such good cause.
7. That the existence of the law of the late
session of Congress, for enforcing the collec-
tion of the revenue, is such good cause.
8. That any exercise, even of the acknow-
ledged powers of the Government, for the pal-
pable advancement of the interest of one sec-
tion of the Union, to the palpable prejudice of
another, is such good cause.
9. That any State will be false to itself if it
shall continue in the Union, after it shall have
been convinced that the benefits of Union are
far exceeded by its evils, and that the hap-
iness of the people will be essentially promoted
by secession.
10. That the constituted authorities of any
State will be false to their constituents, if they
shall fail to summon a convention of such State
whenever they shall believe that the benefits of
Union are far exceeded by its evils.

The assertion of these propositions by the
authorized delegates of half a dozen States,
will secure the repeal of this preposterous law,
and the renunciation of all the hateful doctrines
of the proclamation. These men do not mean
to lose their prey, and will eat all their big
words sooner than do it. This may be a hard
lesson for General Jackson to learn, but he can
Page 3
have able teachers. Mr. Madison delivers lectures on the art of eating word gratis. His new ally, Mr. Webster, can give him examples which I would be sorry to see him follow; and besides these, the President has always at hand, in his own cabinet, a lecturer and experimenter who cannot be surpassed, in the person of that vile political prostitute, that "triple turned whore" who writes proclamations.

A Friend of State Rights, because
A Friend of Union.