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Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment

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PLEDGE YOUR BODY FOR YOUR BREAD: WELFARE, DRUG TESTING, AND THE INFERIOR FOURTH AMENDMENT

Jordan C. Budd*

ABSTRACT

Proposals to subject welfare recipients to periodic drug testing have emerged over the last three years as a significant legislative trend across the United States. Since 2007, over half of the states have considered bills requiring aid recipients to submit to invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition of public assistance. The vast majority of the legislation imposes testing without regard to suspected drug use, reflecting the implicit assumption that the poor are inherently predisposed to culpable conduct and thus may be subject to class-based intrusions that would be inarguably impermissible if inflicted on the less destitute. These proposals are gaining increasingly substantial political support, suggesting that the enactment of drug testing legislation is now a real and immediate prospect.

Given the gravity of the suspicionless searches at issue, the proposals raise serious concerns under conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine. Nevertheless, there is considerable doubt whether the federal courts will accede to that authority and prohibit the proposed intrusions, given the long tradition of relegating the privacy rights of the poor to inferior and indifferent enforcement. This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context within which they arise, and makes the case for using the impending battle over suspicionless drug testing to reclaim for the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.

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We are sending the absolutely wrong signal to the next generation about what is needed to get ahead in life if we don't threaten benefits for recipients who won't even lift a finger to help themselves or their children. . . . I am hearing from people who accept random drug testing as a condition for their jobs. They see no problem with having people on public assistance doing the same.¹

INTRODUCTION

In 1275, an English woman named Alice Crese failed to pay Richard of Ely for two shillings' worth of bread.² Richard brought her before the Court of St. Ives Fair, which ordered that she "pledge her body" for the debt.³ Seven centuries later, the poor still face the prospect of pledging their bodies for the debt of bread. Legislatures across the United States are considering scores of drug testing proposals that will require the indigent to periodically submit to invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition of public assistance.⁴ The majority of the proposals require no suspicion of drug use whatsoever; they rest instead on the implicit notion that the poor are intrinsically predisposed to immoral conduct and that, once indebted, their bodies are the domain of the state in any event.⁵ Not surprisingly, the proposals face nearly insurmountable difficulties under conventional Fourth Amendment authority. Perhaps more surprisingly, there is great uncertainty whether the federal courts will accede to that

¹ Andre Bauer, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, *Culture of Dependency Must be Broken*, TIMES AND DEMOCRAT (Orangeburg, S.C.), Feb. 13, 2010, available at http://www.thetandd.com/news/opinion/columnists/article_6b97a743-e3f6-5747-874e-0026fe6c3674.html.

² Stephen E. Sachs, *From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval 'Law Merchant'*, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 685, 704 n.54 (2006).

³ *Id.*

⁴ See *infra* Part II.C.

⁵ See *infra* Part II.A.1 & II.A.2.

authority and prohibit the proposed search practices, given a series of recent decisions that have upheld related privacy intrusions in defiance of apparently controlling law.⁶ This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context within which they arise, and makes the case for using the impending battle to reclaim for the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.

The poor as a class live largely beyond the Constitution. Unlike the indigent in many comparable constitutional states, impoverished Americans enjoy no positive socioeconomic rights nor any appreciable protection against discriminatory state action. Recent scholarship has characterized this absence of rights recognition as the “deconstitutionalization” of American poverty law⁷—a description that the United States Supreme Court itself would likely embrace.⁸ The rhetoric of American constitutionalism, however, holds fast to the assertion that rights of general applicability in fact apply equally and without regard to socioeconomic status. The law may be indifferent to the poor, we are told, but it certainly bears them no ill will.⁹ The claim is demonstrably false. In several contexts—the Fourth Amendment prominent among them—American law effectively if disguisedly denies the indigent the full force of generally applicable constitutional guarantees, thus establishing a dual system of rights enforcement that relegates the poor to subconstitutional status.¹⁰ Beyond declarations of formal neutrality, this veiled truth lies at the core of the nation's constitutional relationship with the dispossessed: the enforced Constitution is not only blind to poverty but frequently antagonistic to it as well.¹¹ Thus the poor live not merely beyond the Constitution but also beneath it, at once deconstitutionalized and subconstitutionalized in relation to the law.

This Article considers the subconstitutional dimension of American poverty law in relation to the Fourth Amendment's privacy right. Privacy intrusions that are plainly impermissible in analogous contexts are regularly imposed on the poor and upheld by the courts based on the improbable recharacterization of otherwise applicable doctrine or, as likely, its disregard. The willingness of the judiciary to suspend or dilute core

⁶ See *infra* Parts I.B.2 & II.D.2.

⁷ See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, *No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default*, 35 *FORDHAM URB. L.J.* 629, 629–36 (2008) [hereinafter *No Scrutiny*].

⁸ See, e.g., *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (“[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.”).

⁹ See, e.g., *Griffin v. Illinois*, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (noting aspiration to “[p]rovid[e] equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike”); cf. Stephen Loffredo, *Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law*, 141 *U. PA. L. REV.* 1277, 1358–59 (1993) (“[E]quality of formal rights are to be scrupulously maintained . . . but the immeasurably greater political inequalities that flow from private wealth through less visible and more ad hoc processes may not be disturbed.”).

¹⁰ See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, *A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and the Myth of the Inviolable Home*, 85 *IND. L.J.* 355 (2010).

¹¹ See *infra* Part I.B.

constitutional protections in this respect is consistent with the longstanding conception of the poor as inherently prone to and deserving of their predicament. Imagined as criminally predisposed and morally bereft, the indigent constitute a presumptively culpable class and, accordingly, face status-based intrusions that would be otherwise irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment's emphasis on individualized suspicion.¹² This biased and bifurcated rights analysis is sufficiently well-established to merit its recent characterization as a "poverty exception" to the Fourth Amendment.¹³

The next chapter of this constitutional assault is now being written in legislatures across the country. Over the last three years, over half of the states have considered legislation linking the receipt of public assistance to mandatory screening for drug use.¹⁴ Some of the proposals are relatively innocuous, involving written questionnaires and recommended treatment protocols for individuals whose responses suggest the possibility of drug dependence.¹⁵ Most of the proposals, however, are far more severe, often requiring that every recipient submit to the invasive extraction of bodily fluids and barring assistance to anyone testing positive.¹⁶ Recently, members of the United States Congress have joined the cavalcade and introduced legislation requiring states that administer federal welfare funds to conduct blanket drug testing of all program participants.¹⁷

To date, only one state has implemented a suspicionless and invasive testing requirement, although several others have enacted less onerous variants.¹⁸ In 1999, Michigan passed a mandatory testing law that conditioned public assistance for every adult recipient on a clean urinalysis report.¹⁹ The statute was challenged immediately and struck down by a federal district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit.²⁰ The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc and produced a perfectly ambiguous resolution: the court divided equally on the question, with six judges voting to uphold the testing requirement and six voting to

¹² See *infra* Part I.B.3.

¹³ Christopher Slobogin, *The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment*, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391 (2003); cf. *ACLU Challenges Invasive Home Searches Of Welfare Recipients in San Diego Area*, ACLU, July 24, 2000, <http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-challenges-invasive-home-searches-welfare-recipients-san-diego-area> ("There is no poverty exception to the Fourth Amendment . . . No one should be forced to waive her constitutional rights and submit to an unannounced, personally humiliating, and suspicionless search of her home just because she is in need of public assistance.").

¹⁴ See *infra* Part II.C.

¹⁵ See *infra* notes 287–88 and accompanying text.

¹⁶ See *infra* Part II.C.1 and II.C.2.

¹⁷ See *infra* note 188 and accompanying text.

¹⁸ See *infra* Part II.B.

¹⁹ Pub. Act No. 17, 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 49–50 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571 (2009)).

²⁰ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *rev'd*, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), *aff'd by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

strike it down, thus reinstating the lower court's injunction but failing to clarify the constitutional question in any respect.²¹

Not surprisingly, the evenly divided outcome has been taken not as a repudiation of such extraordinarily overreaching proposals but as an encouraging sign that the federal courts may well uphold such intrusions.²² In the years since the conclusion of the Michigan case, legislatures across the country have considered scores of bills proposing testing requirements of equal or harsher application.²³ The proposals have garnered ever-increasing and, recently, quite substantial support.²⁴ It thus appears that other states may soon follow Michigan's lead and require the federal courts to finally resolve the permissibility of blanket drug testing as a condition of public assistance. Based on the judiciary's approach to other seemingly impermissible intrusions upon the privacy of the poor, as well as the divided resolution in the Michigan litigation, the prospects of vindicating the constitutional rights of aid recipients is uncertain at best.

The Article is divided into two parts. Part One provides a brief overview of the relationship of the poor to the United States Constitution, describing both the overt exclusion of socioeconomic class from constitutional recognition and the veiled subordination of the poor with respect to the enforcement of generally applicable constitutional rights. The primary focus of the discussion is an elaboration of the subconstitutional characteristic of poverty law in the specific context of the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy, which sets the stage for the emerging controversy over the blanket drug testing of welfare recipients.

Part Two turns to the prospect of invasive drug testing as a condition of public assistance and presents the results of a national survey of related legislation over the last three years. As the survey reveals, bills with increasingly harsh provisions are being introduced in greater numbers each year and proceeding further through the legislative process, suggesting that the ultimate enactment of drug testing legislation may soon occur. Considering the absence of any data to suggest that the incidence of drug abuse among the poor is appreciably greater than in the general population, coupled with the harsh and disparaging rhetoric surrounding many of the current legislative proposals, this emerging political groundswell evidently seeks to vindicate little more than the familiar impulse to stigmatize and stereotype the impoverished.

In conclusion, Part Two contrasts the profound constitutional deficiencies of the harshest of these proposals under conventional doctrine with the irreconcilable approach of recent decisions sanctioning equally severe privacy intrusions upon the poor. When

²¹ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

²² *See, e.g.*, Allan Greenblatt, *Should Welfare Recipients Get Drug Testing?*, NPR (Mar. 31, 2010), <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125387528> (“[The sponsor of drug testing legislation in Kansas] thinks the constitutionality of the drug-testing regime is itself ‘definitely worth testing.’ The Michigan case was decided by a tied vote, which [the sponsor] believes is ‘hardly a definite decision against states’ rights.”).

²³ *See infra* Part II.C.

²⁴ *See infra* note 187 and accompanying text.

the time comes for the federal courts to finally resolve the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing proposals, these two lines of authority will present the judiciary with a clear and defining choice: either to reset the relationship of our nation's poor to the promise of equal justice, or to betray again the integrity of constitutional adjudication itself.

I. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION

The current debate over the drug testing of welfare recipients proceeds in the shadow of a substantial “if somewhat improvised and largely impoverished”²⁵ body of constitutional authority addressing the rights of the American poor. It is a familiar refrain that the jurisprudence accounts for class in a manner that unambiguously disfavors the indigent.²⁶ This general proposition in turn reflects at least three interrelated but distinct doctrinal themes. First, as a matter of express constitutional policy, the American poor enjoy no positive rights to socioeconomic security, irrespective of the magnitude of the deprivation at issue.²⁷ Second, and also as a matter of express doctrine, the American poor receive no special solicitude when defending against discriminatory state action and thus may be subject to virtually any burden that does not violate otherwise applicable constitutional constraints.²⁸ Finally, with respect to the enforcement of generally applicable constraints, American law implicitly differentiates on the basis of class by diluting the poor's exercise of rights that purport to apply without regard to socioeconomic status.²⁹ Taken together, these interrelated processes—the express denial of positive socioeconomic rights, the express denial of protected status, and the implicit dilution of generally applicable rights—render much of the Constitution irrelevant at best, and hostile at worst, to the American poor. Nowhere is that theme more powerfully evident than with respect to the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.

A. The Declared Constitution and the Irrelevance of Class

In significant contrast to the basic law of most comparable nations, the United States Constitution treats socioeconomic status as formally irrelevant in almost all respects.³⁰ This approach has been characterized as the “deconstitutionalization” of

²⁵ Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, *The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence*, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (2009).

²⁶ See, e.g., *id.*, *passim*; Loffredo, *supra* note 9, at 1305–13; Nice, *No Scrutiny*, *supra* note 7, at 629–36; James G. Wilson, *Reconstructing Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Assist Impoverished Children*, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 402–15 (1990).

²⁷ See *infra* Part I.A.

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ See *infra* Part I.B.

³⁰ See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, *Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State Farm*, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution treats questions of economic inequality as matters of policy largely immune from scrutiny by the judicial branch.”).

American poverty law³¹ and is embedded in the federal judiciary's broader retreat from fundamental rights enforcement over the last forty years.³² This indifference to class dictates a distinctive approach to positive socioeconomic rights as well as negative protections against discriminatory state action.

With respect to positive rights, American constitutional law unambiguously rejects any affirmative claim to minimal material security³³ despite repeated calls for the recognition of such interests.³⁴ As then-judge Antonin Scalia wrote in 1986, "It is impossible to say that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal imposition of even so basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to the destitute."³⁵ Most generally, the doctrine is but one manifestation of a broader conception of the Constitution as a guarantor of negative rights that imposes no affirmative duty on the state to protect or sustain the populace.³⁶ In particular, the absence of positive socioeconomic rights reflects the fact that the Constitution lacks express language addressing such

One of the few exceptions to this principle is the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, which imposes an affirmative state obligation to provide representation for indigent defendants. *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963); *see also* *Griffin v. Illinois*, 351 U.S. 12, 17–19 (1956). The Court has also barred economic discrimination in the exercise of the franchise. *Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663, 667–68 (1966). Outside the context of criminal prosecutions and the right to vote, however, American constitutional law is generally indifferent to the fact that poverty may impair or preclude the exercise of other rights. *See, e.g., infra* notes 58–59.

³¹ *See* Nice, *No Scrutiny*, *supra* note 7, at 629–36.

³² *See, e.g.,* Erwin Chemerinsky, *The Deconstitutionalization of Education*, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 123–24 (2004) (discussing deconstitutionalization of education-related interests of racial minorities and the poor); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, *Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law*, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1118–20 (1978) (discussing the deconstitutionalization of criminal procedure); Richard K. Sherwin, *Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majoritarian Rule*, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 388, 423–24 (1991) (discussing "the Court's deconstitutionalization of basic aspects of the freedom of religious conscience").

³³ *See, e.g.,* *Bowers v. DeVito*, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order."); Robin West, *Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine*, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1134–35 (2006).

³⁴ *See, e.g.,* CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., *A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED* 141–65 (1997); Peter B. Edelman, *The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor*, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 19–43 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, *The Supreme Court 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment*, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, *Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues*, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1254–56 (1965); Lawrence G. Sager, *Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law*, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 429–33 (1993).

³⁵ Antonin Scalia, *Scalia Speaks*, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at C2.

³⁶ *See, e.g.,* *Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748, 768–69 (2005); *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); West, *supra* note 33, at 1134–35.

interests,³⁷ unlike the majority of constitutions enacted in the modern era,³⁸ as well as a national sentiment that is relatively unreceptive to redistributionist principles³⁹ and an increasingly conservative Supreme Court that for forty years has emphatically rejected any reading of the Constitution that might accommodate such values.⁴⁰

This defining characteristic of the American approach to social welfare contrasts with the recognition by most comparable constitutional states of some minimal interest in health, education, and material security as an element of protected human dignity.⁴¹ The Italian Constitutional Court, for example, has held that “the right to health . . . [is] protected by the [Italian] Constitution as an inviolable part of human dignity. There can be no question that the right of poorer citizens . . . to free health care comes under this heading.”⁴² German constitutional doctrine likewise exempts from taxation “income that is minimally necessary for a humane existence—a ‘subsistence minimum’”⁴³ The law of most European nations follows suit,⁴⁴ and the obligations imposed by the leading international treaty on socioeconomic rights bind most other nations to similar commitments.⁴⁵ Conspicuously, the United States is not among the 160 states that are party to the agreement.⁴⁶

³⁷ Cass R. Sunstein, *Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?*, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3–4, 8 (2005).

³⁸ *Id.* at 4.

³⁹ See, e.g., *id.* at 17–19; cf. Dennis Jacobs, *Americans Oppose Income Redistribution To Fix Economy*, GALLUP (June 27, 2008), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/108445/americans-oppose-income-redistribution-fix-economy.aspx> (noting that 84% of surveyed adults oppose taking steps to distribute wealth more evenly among Americans).

⁴⁰ Sunstein, *supra* note 37, at 19–23; Barnes & Chemerinsky, *supra* note 25, at 123–24.

⁴¹ See MARK TUSHNET, *WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS* 220 (2008).

⁴² Corte Cost., 16 Luglio 1999, n. 309, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1999, 29 (It.), *translated in* NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., *COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM* 1363 (2d ed. 2010).

⁴³ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 10, 1998, 99 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 216 (Ger.), *translated in* DORSEN ET AL., *supra* note 42, at 1354.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., DORSEN ET AL., *supra* note 42, at 1354; TUSHNET, *supra* note 41, at 220; Sunstein, *supra* note 37, at 3–4.

⁴⁵ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, *opened for signature* Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (*entered into force* Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; see, e.g., John H. Knox, *Climate Change and Human Rights Law*, 50 VA. J. INT’LL. 163, 201 (2009). Article 11 of the Covenant recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.” ICESCR art. 11, ¶1. Articles 12 and 13 recognize corollary rights to health and education. ICESCR art. 12, 13. In view of these provisions, “a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.” U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], Gen. Comment No. 3, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/22-E/CN.4/1991/1 Annex III (1990).

⁴⁶ U.N. Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf>. The

The formal irrelevance of class in the American system also bears on the scope of the poor's negative protections against discriminatory state action. Under equal protection doctrine, special scrutiny is brought to bear on discriminatory enactments that draw suspect classifications.⁴⁷ To qualify as suspect, a legislative classification must target a class that is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."⁴⁸ For decades scholars have made the case that indigence meets these core criteria and that the poor accordingly should be entitled to heightened scrutiny when challenging class-based legislative burdens.⁴⁹ While the Supreme Court briefly flirted with the idea,⁵⁰ it ultimately and definitively rejected the proposition in *Dandridge v. Williams*⁵¹ and a series of subsequent cases in which the Court withdrew entirely from the field and suspended review of virtually all discriminatory classifications burdening the poor.⁵² As John Hart Ely summarized, "the retreat from the once glittering crusade to extend special constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a rout."⁵³ Discriminatory enactments targeting the indigent accordingly receive the lowest and most permissive degree of scrutiny, requiring only that there be some conceivably rational basis for the government to burden the poor as it has.⁵⁴ As a practical matter, this prohibits little more than legislative animus.⁵⁵

United States signed the ICESCR in 1977 but the Senate never ratified the treaty. *Id.*; see Sunstein, *supra* note 37, at 15.

⁴⁷ *San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).

⁴⁸ *San Antonio*, 411 U.S. at 28; see *Johnson v. Robison*, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); William D. Araiza, *Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value*, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 415–16 (1997).

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, *supra* note 25, at 117–30; Edelman, *supra* note 34; Loffredo, *supra* note 9, at 1306–13; Michelman, *Forward*, *supra* note 34, at 21; Lawrence Sagar, *Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent*, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 785–87 (1969).

⁵⁰ See, e.g., *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); *Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); *Griffin v. Illinois*, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); cf. *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

⁵¹ 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

⁵² *Id.* at 487; see, e.g., *Kadmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch.*, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); *Harris v. McRae*, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); *Maher v. Roe*, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977); *Jefferson v. Hackney*, 406 U.S. 535, 548–51 (1972); Loffredo, *supra* note 9, at 1306–13 (summarizing case authority).

⁵³ JOHN HART ELY, *DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST* 148 (1980).

⁵⁴ See, e.g., *Ortwein v. Schwab*, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); *Dandridge*, 397 U.S. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

⁵⁵ See West, *supra* note 33, at 1137 ("Thus, it is arguable, given our doctrine, that legislators cannot deny to poor people rights or privileges or goods solely on the grounds of their poverty, where that poverty bears no relation to any legitimate public purpose."); cf. Loffredo, *supra* note 9, at 1283–84.

The practical consequences of this doctrinal indifference cut sharply against the interests of the poor. As commentators have often observed, the construed Constitution's formal neutrality on questions of class is highly discriminatory in its secondary substantive effects⁵⁶—an elaboration of Anatole France's familiar remark that the law in its "majestic equality . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread."⁵⁷ Without the minimal resources necessary to access and exercise rights, the promise of formal neutrality is substantively hollow: a poor woman cannot exercise her right to abortion if she cannot purchase the procedure,⁵⁸ nor can the poor exercise equal rights of political participation if they cannot buy access to the conversation itself.⁵⁹ Likewise, without heightened negative protections against discriminatory legislation, the poor are at the practical mercy of lawmakers whose political debts rarely trace back to empty pockets. Robert Bork's infamous assertion in 1979 that "the poor and the minorities . . . have done very well" in the political process, and thus need no special protection from it,⁶⁰ has been reduced to malevolent farce by the intervening three decades of legislative animosity and escalating distress among America's indigent.⁶¹

The rights deficit of the American poor influences the terms of political discourse as well. Irrespective of the degree to which positive socioeconomic rights are judicially enforceable—and there is great disparity in that regard among nations recognizing such interests⁶²—the mere articulation of a right can legitimate corresponding claims in the political sphere.⁶³ Citing the experience of South Africa, Frank Michelman

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, *Cluster III—Introduction*, 55 FLA. L. REV. 319, 334–35 (2003); West, *supra* note 33, at 1138.

⁵⁷ ANATOLE FRANCE, *THE RED LILY* 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., John Lane Co. 1914) (1894).

⁵⁸ See *Harris v. McRae*, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); *Maher v. Roe*, 434 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1977).

⁵⁹ See *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (rejecting as illegitimate any "governmental interest in equalizing the relative [economic] ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections [as an incident of the First Amendment].").

⁶⁰ Robert H. Bork, *The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution*, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 701 ("The premise that the poor or the black are underrepresented politically is quite dubious. In the past two decades we have witnessed an explosion of welfare legislation, massive income redistributions, and civil rights laws of all kinds. . . . [T]he welfare-rights theory rests less on demonstrated fact than on a liberal shibboleth.").

⁶¹ See, e.g., Budd, *supra* note 10, at 376–80; Julie A. Nice, *Forty Years of Welfare Policy Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, No Politics, No Rights*, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 4–5, 9, 12 (2009) [hereinafter *Forty Years*]; Mark R. Rank, *Rethinking the Scope and Impact of Poverty in the United States*, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 170–76 (2007).

⁶² See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, *Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review*, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1898–1909 (2004).

⁶³ See, e.g., *id.* at 1901; cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, *Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364–65 (1988).

describes how merely declaratory socioeconomic rights supply “a useful basis on which to engage governments in a kind of public cross-examination of their relevant laws and policies.”⁶⁴ Julie Nice conversely notes that the rights deficit in the American context contributes to “a dialogic default on the very question of economic justice.”⁶⁵ As Nice argues, the inability of the American poor to ground political advocacy in rights rhetoric has frustrated their claims to social and economic inclusion, which in turn has reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of corresponding claims in the judicial context.⁶⁶

B. The Veiled Constitution and Class Bias

As the preceding sketch suggests, the declared Constitution is unapologetically indifferent to class. Proponents concede that the doctrine offers scant hope for the poor but assert that the case for distributive justice is moral, not constitutional, and thus must be made outside the judicial sphere.⁶⁷ In this respect, the law as it relates to poverty is overtly deconstitutionalized; it frankly acknowledges the irrelevance of class and accepts with relative candor the harsh substantive implications of that precept. As others have thoroughly documented, it is a jurisprudence that defies the effects of poverty on the exercise of basic rights while failing to “center[] class in the judicial analysis or creat[e] a humane and robust constitutional jurisprudence for socioeconomic disparity.”⁶⁸

For all of its manifest failings, however, the doctrine of class indifference is at least transparent: the law does what it purports to do. From the perspective of adjudicative integrity, it is obviously quite a different matter when a jurisprudence is not merely unmoved by the brutal consequences of its stated terms but instead skews or misrepresents the terms themselves to prejudice a particular class of disfavored litigants. This reaches beyond class indifference to the question of veiled bias and the subconstitutional status of the American poor. The articulation and enforcement of fundamental rights so as to withhold from the poor the full force of generally applicable guarantees is not merely an offense to the indigent but to the core legitimating principle of American constitutionalism: that the “equality of formal rights” will be “scrupulously maintained.”⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Frank Michelman, *Economic Power and the Constitution*, in *THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020*, at 45, 52 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009).

⁶⁵ Nice, *Forty Years*, *supra* note 61, at 9; cf. Jack M. Balkin, *How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure*, 39 *SUFFOLK U. L. REV.* 27 (2005).

⁶⁶ See Nice, *No Scrutiny*, *supra* note 7, at 662–63; Nice, *Forty Years*, *supra* note 61, at 9 (“Poor people seem trapped in a perpetual stalemate: without rights, no politics and without politics, no rights.”).

⁶⁷ See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, *TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN* 319–24 (1985); Antonin Scalia, *Scalia Speaks*, *WASH. POST*, June 22, 1986, at C2 (“[T]he moral precepts of distributive justice . . . surely fall within the broad middle range of moral values that *may* be embodied in law but *need not* be.”).

⁶⁸ Barnes & Chemerinsky, *supra* note 25, at 112.

⁶⁹ Loffredo, *supra* note 9, at 1358.

For several decades, scholars writing in areas across the rights spectrum have drawn attention to the veiled subordination of the poor through the enforcement of purportedly neutral doctrine.⁷⁰ Without attempting to classify the diverse manifestations of this bias, it is useful to distinguish generally between two particular ways in which the subordinating process plays out. First, the articulation of certain constitutional doctrines itself embeds socioeconomic bias.⁷¹ In such cases, the law is enforced on its stated terms but the terms themselves skew constitutional enforcement against the interests of the poor.⁷² Second, and most threatening to the claim of legitimate adjudication, are instances where the judiciary subordinates the rights of the poor by simply ignoring or grossly misrepresenting the articulated doctrine itself.⁷³ Both of these processes are relevant to the poor's inferior relationship with the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.⁷⁴

There are two dimensions of protected privacy under the Fourth Amendment, each reflecting a different aspect of enforcement bias. First, the articulated doctrine protects what the Supreme Court characterizes as "reasonable expectation[s] of privacy."⁷⁵ This formulation embeds socioeconomic bias in the terms of the doctrine itself insofar as the construction of "reasonableness" reflects a particular set of social arrangements and assumptions that largely excludes the experience of the American poor.⁷⁶ Second, and

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, *Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-Invasive Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-Burden Test*, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing "dual system" of constitutional enforcement in the context of substantive due process rights); McCluskey, *supra* note 30, at 1057; Nice, *No Scrutiny*, *supra* note 7, at 650–55; Jacobus tenBroek, *California's Dual System Of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status*, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964) (Part I), 16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964) (Part II), and 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) (Part III).

⁷¹ The doctrine of formal indifference also implicates socioeconomic bias insofar as it ignores the practical impossibility of exercising certain fundamental rights without material resources. See *supra* notes 56–59 and accompanying text. In that respect, however, the doctrine discriminates against the poor in its secondary effect, as the enforced law interacts with the underlying material conditions of poverty; its enforcement in the first instance is class-neutral. In contrast, the discriminatory impact discussed here is a primary effect the doctrine: the law directly differentiates based on class and distributes its protections unequally in its immediate application.

⁷² See, e.g., McCluskey, *supra* note 30, at 1043–57; *infra* Part I.B.1.

⁷³ See, e.g., Budd, *supra* note 10, at 385–403; *infra* Part I.B.2.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Budd, *supra* note 10, at 385–403; Kaaryn Gustafson, *The Criminalization of Poverty*, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 708 (2009); Nice, *No Scrutiny*, *supra* note 7, at 652–55; Slobogin, *supra* note 13, at 392; William J. Stuntz, *The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy*, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter *Fourth Amendment Privacy*]; William J. Stuntz, *Race, Class, and Drugs*, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1822–24 (1998) [hereinafter *Race, Class, and Drugs*].

⁷⁵ *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., *Kyllo v. United States*, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).

⁷⁶ See William J. Stuntz, *The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice*, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 798 (2006) [hereinafter *Political Constitution*].

at its textual core,⁷⁷ the Fourth Amendment protects certain uniquely inviolable physical spaces per se—in particular, the home⁷⁸ and the person.⁷⁹ In decisions that barely attempt to reconcile with prevailing authority, the courts have simply refused to safeguard the poor when facing intrusions upon these uniquely protected interests.⁸⁰ We consider each of these dimensions of the privacy right in turn.

1. Bias Embedded in the Privacy Doctrine

The discriminatory effect of the Fourth Amendment's protection of "reasonable expectations of privacy" is rooted in the formulation itself. The concept of reasonableness is irreducibly subjective; what may seem to be a reasonable expectation of privacy to an indigent resident of a crowded tenement may seem entirely unreasonable to an affluent member of the federal bench. The Court attempts to address this problem by declaring broadly that the relevant measure of reasonableness is the judgment of "society" generally.⁸¹ But there is no isolable "society" in a nation as diverse and divided as ours.⁸² Necessarily, then, the Court must choose among competing perspectives and experiences to resolve the reasonableness inquiry. As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the Court predictably chooses its own:

There's been much talk about diversity on the bench, but there's one kind of diversity that doesn't exist: No truly poor people are appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter. Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the class of people who don't live in trailers or urban ghettos. The everyday problems of people who live in poverty are not close

⁷⁷ U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons [and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .").

⁷⁸ *Payton v. New York*, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); *see, e.g., Kyllo*, 533 U.S. at 34; *Wilson v. Layne*, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); *United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith)*, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).

⁷⁹ *Schmerber v. California*, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966); *cf. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford*, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").

⁸⁰ *See infra* Part I.B.2 & Part II.D.3.

⁸¹ *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); *see, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory*, 41 UCLAL. REV. 199, 250 (1993) ("[B]y asking whether the expectation in dispute is one society is willing to recognize as reasonable, the test's second prong implicitly encourages decisionmakers to define fundamental constitutional values by referring to contemporary social values, goals, and attitudes.").

⁸² *See, e.g.,* MICHAEL HARRINGTON, *THE OTHER AMERICA* 158–61 (Touchstone 1997) (1962).

to our hearts and minds because that's not how we and our friends live.⁸³

Thus the Court, in giving specific content to the category of reasonable privacy expectations, relies on a set of assumptions about prevailing social norms and arrangements that bears little relationship to the lives of the poor.⁸⁴ In particular, the Court links the reasonableness of privacy expectations to “the existence of ‘effective’ barriers to intrusion”⁸⁵ upon occupied space itself—a consideration that largely overlaps with the exercise of private property rights.⁸⁶ In spaces where one exercises no power to bar intrusions—the underside of a bridge, for example, or a park bench—the doctrine accordingly offers negligible protection.⁸⁷ Obviously this concept of reasonableness works well for those who can retreat to the private confines of their homes, offices, or judicial chambers, but it leaves very little protected privacy for individuals without a home or who share their physical space with others.⁸⁸

Most of the American poor are not homeless, however, and have some private space to call their own.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, their ability to utilize that space for private purposes is still differentially burdened by the reality that “the homes of the rich are larger and more comfortable, making it possible to live a larger portion of life in them. Privacy follows space, and people with money have more space than people without.”⁹⁰ With relatively less access to private space, the poor spend a greater proportion of their lives in available common space—such as parks, playgrounds, sidewalks, and streets—

⁸³ *United States v. Pineda-Moreno*, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review).

⁸⁴ *See, e.g.*, Stuntz, *Political Constitution*, *supra* note 76, at 798; Stuntz, *Race, Class, and Drugs*, *supra* note 74, at 1823–24 (“Existing social arrangements define the Fourth Amendment baseline. This proposition has large distributive consequences, for people with money enjoy more privacy than people without.”).

⁸⁵ Slobogin, *supra* note 13, at 401.

⁸⁶ *See Pineda-Moreno*, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing) (“The very rich [are] able to protect their privacy with the aid of electric gates, tall fences, security booths, remote cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols . . .”); *cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.*, 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”).

⁸⁷ *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); *see* Slobogin, *supra* note 13, at 401.

⁸⁸ *See* Ronald J. Bacigal, *Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment*, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 541–42 & nn.94–95 (1978); Slobogin, *supra* note 13, at 401; Stuntz, *Fourth Amendment Privacy*, *supra* note 74, at 1266.

⁸⁹ Jonathan L. Hafetz, *Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and Directions for the Future*, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2003) (noting that between five and ten percent of the poor experience homelessness in a given year).

⁹⁰ Stuntz, *Fourth Amendment Privacy*, *supra* note 74, at 1270.

where Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes only limited privacy expectations.⁹¹ Necessarily then, the articulated doctrine, while neutral on its face, cuts powerfully against the poor in its direct application.⁹²

Speaking directly to his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit, Chief Judge Kozinski recently decried this “unselfconscious cultural elitism”⁹³ in a case upholding the ability of police to surreptitiously attach a GPS tracking device to the underside of a car parked in the driveway of a modest home:

[P]oor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can’t afford all the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it. . . . When you glide your BMW into your underground garage or behind an electric gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might attach a tracking device to it while you sleep. But the Constitution doesn’t prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his trailer is entitled to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man whose urban fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol.⁹⁴

2. Bias Enforced on the Privacy Doctrine

The second dimension of protected privacy relates to the first but predates and subsumes it. Historically, the Fourth Amendment privacy right has reserved its highest protection for certain textually-specified spaces—most prominently, the home and the person.⁹⁵ While the Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not

⁹¹ *See id.* at 1271–72.

⁹² This embedded bias is evident in other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine as well. For example, in establishing the “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing required to justify a search or seizure, the Supreme Court has identified two factors that embed profound class bias. First, the Court has held that mere presence in a “high-crime area” independently contributes to suspected wrongdoing. *Illinois v. Wardlow*, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); *Adams v. Williams*, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972). This consideration applies in practice almost exclusively to poor urban neighborhoods with high rates of street crime, thus placing an innocent poor person at objectively greater risk of a permissible search than an identically situated individual in an affluent community. *See* Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, *The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis*, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605–06 (2008); Margaret Raymond, *Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion*, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 137–38 (1999). This bias is exacerbated by the Court’s identification of “evasive” behavior as an additional factor contributing to reasonable suspicion. *Wardlow*, 528 U.S. at 124. Given that “contact with the police can itself be dangerous” for the urban poor, “unprovoked flight [by an innocent person] is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’” *Id.* at 132–33 (Stevens, J., concurring).

⁹³ *United States v. Pineda-Moreno*, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing).

⁹⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁵ *See supra* notes 78–79 and accompanying text.

places,”⁹⁶ when it announced the reasonable expectation standard in 1967, it has subsequently and repeatedly underscored the singular protections afforded the home and the person without first filtering its analysis through the lens of reasonable expectations.⁹⁷ This reflects the indisputably protected status of these intimate spaces; it is axiomatic that individuals possess the highest expectation of privacy within their dwellings and with respect to their bodies, and the doctrine takes that premise as a starting point.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, the federal courts have withheld from the poor the full reach of these doctrinally unambiguous protections as well. In the absence of any credible basis to subordinate the interests of the poor in this respect, the courts have simply ignored or distorted otherwise applicable authority.⁹⁹ This doctrinal subterfuge has played out primarily in the context of the poor’s privacy within the home—the location of the Fourth Amendment’s “ultimate protection.”¹⁰⁰ The long tradition of respecting the sanctity of the home¹⁰¹ follows an equally long tradition of excluding the indigent from the full reach of that protection,¹⁰² and the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the intermediate appellate courts reflect the disjuncture.¹⁰³

The Supreme Court spoke directly to the poor’s domestic privacy rights in its 1971 decision in *Wyman v. James*,¹⁰⁴ which addressed the constitutionality of mandatory home visits conducted by welfare caseworkers.¹⁰⁵ In upholding the practice, *Wyman* departed from Fourth Amendment doctrine in two significant respects. First, the Court concluded that the visits were not “searches” at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—and thus were not subject to constitutional review—because of their

⁹⁶ *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

⁹⁷ Regarding the home, *see, e.g.*, *Wilson v. Layne*, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); *Payton v. New York*, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Regarding the body, *see, e.g.*, *Wyoming v. Houghton*, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999); *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968).

⁹⁸ *Id.*; *see, e.g.*, *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond*, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] person’s body and home [are] areas afforded the greatest Fourth Amendment protection.”); *cf.* Erik G. Luna, *Sovereignty and Suspicion*, 48 *DUKE L.J.* 787, 847–56 (1999); Stephanie M. Stern, *The Inviolable Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment*, 95 *CORNELL L. REV.* 905, 912 (2010).

⁹⁹ *See infra* notes 104–55 and accompanying text.

¹⁰⁰ *United States v. Haqq*, 278 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2002).

¹⁰¹ *See Budd, supra* note 10, at 359–63.

¹⁰² *Id.* at 363–68.

¹⁰³ The one contemporary appellate opinion addressing the poor’s parallel right of bodily privacy disparaged that interest as well but was reversed by an equally divided en banc court. *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), *rev’d by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). That decision, addressing the permissibility of mandatory drug testing as a condition of public assistance, is discussed in detail in Part II.D.3.

¹⁰⁴ 400 U.S. 309 (1971).

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at 310.

predominantly rehabilitative (as opposed to investigatory) character and the fact that they purportedly occurred by consent.¹⁰⁶ This conclusion defied otherwise applicable authority establishing that the presence or absence of criminal consequences has no bearing on whether an intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,¹⁰⁷ and that consent, if any, serves not to eliminate a search but to validate it.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, the Court was “unquestionably incorrect in its assertion that a home visit is not a search.”¹⁰⁹

The second rationale offered in *Wyman* was equally suspect. Assuming *arguendo* that home visits fell within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court offered an “ad hoc”¹¹⁰ list of reasons why the suspicionless and warrantless searches were nonetheless reasonable.¹¹¹ The enumerated factors—including the non-criminal nature of the visit, the friendly attitude of the caseworkers, and the state’s interests in fiscal integrity and the welfare of poor children¹¹²—offered virtually no doctrinal support for the conclusion that the visits constituted a permissible entry in the absence of a warrant or suspicion.¹¹³ *Wyman* thus stood in obvious conflict with the surrounding body of Fourth Amendment law, and the “glaring inconsistency” was not lost on the lower courts.¹¹⁴ As Christopher Slobogin notes, its analysis is coherent only “on the ground that the homes of people on welfare get less Fourth Amendment protection.”¹¹⁵

Wyman, however, was limited in its scope. The Court stressed that its conclusions turned upon the rehabilitative¹¹⁶ and non-invasive¹¹⁷ nature of the visit, which in the Court’s estimation more closely approximated an interaction with “a friend to one in need” than an adversarial encounter with the state.¹¹⁸ Whether or not one accepts that characterization,¹¹⁹ the analysis clearly does not extend to endorse highly invasive investigative intrusions by law enforcement officers for the sole purpose of uncovering

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at 317–18.

¹⁰⁷ *See, e.g.,* *California v. Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); *Camara v. Mun. Court*, 387 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967).

¹⁰⁸ *Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).

¹⁰⁹ 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, *SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT* § 10.3(a) (4th ed. 2004).

¹¹⁰ *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

¹¹¹ *Id.* at 318–26 (majority opinion).

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ *See* Budd, *supra* note 10, at 369–73.

¹¹⁴ *Reyes v. Edmunds*, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (D. Minn. 1979); *see, e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer*, 689 F. Supp. 106, 140–41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).

¹¹⁵ Slobogin, *supra* note 13, at 403.

¹¹⁶ *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 317, 319–21, 323; *see* Budd, *supra* note 10, at 386–87.

¹¹⁷ *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 321; *see* Budd, *supra* note 10, at 393–94.

¹¹⁸ *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 323; *see* Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 700.

¹¹⁹ *See, e.g.,* Sherry F. Colb, *The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,”* 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1720–22 (1998); Thomas Ross, *The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness*, 79 GEO. L. J. 1499, 1522–25 (1991).

evidence of ineligibility or fraud.¹²⁰ However, those are precisely the practices that the intermediate courts have recently read *Wyman* to sanction.¹²¹

In the wake of federal welfare-reform legislation devolving administrative authority for public assistance to state and local governments,¹²² many jurisdictions have utilized their new discretion to impose exceptionally harsh verification procedures on aid applicants and recipients.¹²³ Among the requirements is an updated variant of the *Wyman* home visit that lacks virtually all of its moderating characteristics.¹²⁴ The prototype for these new home visits is San Diego County's "Project 100%," which employs investigative practices that are among "the most aggressive in the country."¹²⁵ As a condition of public assistance, all aid applicants in the county must agree to an unscheduled home visit by a sworn law-enforcement investigator from the District Attorney's Public Assistance Fraud Division.¹²⁶ Refusal to permit the visit or to accept the scope of the investigator's inspection results in the denial of benefits.¹²⁷ The visit itself is exclusively for investigatory purposes and has no rehabilitative component.¹²⁸ Once in the home, the investigator's discretion is unlimited and any area of the home is subject to inspection.¹²⁹ Investigators accordingly rifle through dresser drawers, medicine cabinets, closets, and refrigerators,¹³⁰ all in search of evidence of ineligibility or fraud.¹³¹

¹²⁰ See, e.g., *Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Budd, *supra* note 10, at 386–95.

¹²¹ *Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 464 F.3d 916, 918–19, 923–25 (9th Cir. 2006); *S.L. v. Whitburn*, 67 F.3d 1299, 1306–11 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. *Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors*, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712–14 (Ct. App. 2002).

¹²² Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see Matthew Diller, *The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government*, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1121, 1145–86 (2000); William P. Quigley, *Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages*, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101, 102 (1998).

¹²³ See Amy Mulzer, Note, *The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs*, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 674–78 (2005).

¹²⁴ See Budd, *supra* note 10, at 379–85.

¹²⁵ Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 646.

¹²⁶ *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 918–20; *Sanchez v. County of San Diego*, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 10, 2003), *aff'd*, 464 F.3d 916.

¹²⁷ *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 919; *Sanchez*, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2.

¹²⁸ *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 919; see *id.* at 935 (Fisher, J., dissenting).

¹²⁹ *Sanchez*, 2003 WL 25655642, at *8 n.8 (“[N]o specific protocol limits where the investigator may look . . .”).

¹³⁰ *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 919; *id.* at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting).

¹³¹ *Sanchez*, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2, *8 n.8; Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 9–10, *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122), 2004 WL 1949000, at *23–25.

In *Sanchez v. County of San Diego*,¹³² the Ninth Circuit relied on the “radically different”¹³³ facts of *Wyman* as controlling authority for the conclusion that Project 100% does not even implicate the Fourth Amendment search doctrine¹³⁴—or, in the alternative, that its practices are a reasonable exercise of the search power in the absence of suspicion or a warrant.¹³⁵ Other courts have reached the same holding on similar facts.¹³⁶ To equate *Wyman*’s friendly visit with an adversarial search by sworn fraud investigators, however, defies any plausible comparison.¹³⁷ As seven circuit judges noted in their dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in *Sanchez*, “The differences between San Diego’s program and the program in *Wyman* are of a quality and character that cannot be ignored. . . . [T]he simple fact of the matter is that a home visit in *Sanchez* is fundamentally different from a home visit in *Wyman*.”¹³⁸

There is a second reason why *Wyman* cannot support these contemporary search practices: it no longer states the relevant Fourth Amendment standard for the intrusions at issue.¹³⁹ Idiosyncratic from the start, *Wyman* was long ago superseded by the special-needs doctrine as the appropriate analytic framework within which to assess warrantless and suspicionless searches for purposes unrelated to law enforcement.¹⁴⁰ Under the special-needs analysis, courts engage in a reasonableness calculation that directly balances the magnitude of the threatened privacy loss against the weight of the state’s countervailing interest in the search at issue.¹⁴¹ Under prevailing authority, this balancing calculation cannot possibly authorize the practices at issue in San Diego and related jurisdictions.¹⁴² On one side of the equation is a privacy interest of the highest order—the sanctity of the home itself.¹⁴³ On the other side of the equation is an entirely pedestrian administrative objective—the state’s general interest in the fiscal integrity

¹³² 464 F.3d 916. Before joining the faculty of University of New Hampshire School of Law, the author served as Legal Director of the ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties and in that capacity represented the plaintiff class in *Sanchez*.

¹³³ *Id.* at 938 (Fisher, J., dissenting).

¹³⁴ *Id.* at 921 (“*Wyman* directly controls the instant case.”).

¹³⁵ *See id.* at 923–25.

¹³⁶ *S.L. v. Whitburn*, 67 F.3d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We are bound by *Wyman*”); *see also id.* at 1306–11; *cf. Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors*, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712–14 (Ct. App. 2002).

¹³⁷ *See Budd*, *supra* note 10, at 386–95.

¹³⁸ *Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

¹³⁹ *See, e.g., Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 922 n.8.

¹⁴⁰ *See generally* Budd, *supra* note 10, at 395–97; Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “*Special Needs*” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997).

¹⁴¹ *See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n*, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).

¹⁴² *See infra* notes 143–47 and accompanying text; *see also* Part II.D.1.

¹⁴³ *See supra* notes 100–01 and accompanying text.

of a benefits program¹⁴⁴—that falls well outside the relatively narrow range of public safety¹⁴⁵ and *in loco parentis*¹⁴⁶ concerns that the Court has recognized as sufficient to justify a special needs search.¹⁴⁷

In the face of this doctrinal impediment, the Ninth Circuit simply distorted both sides of the analytic equation.¹⁴⁸ As to the privacy interest at stake, the *Sanchez* court explicitly equated welfare recipients with convicted felons to establish the proposition that the poor have a diminished expectation of privacy within their homes—citing as controlling authority a case that permits a state’s penal authorities to search the home of a probationer without a warrant.¹⁴⁹ Taking a slightly different tack, other courts have returned to *Wyman* as authority for some generalized diminution in the expectation of privacy of all welfare recipients, simply by virtue of their receipt of a public benefit.¹⁵⁰ Stating the obvious but to no avail, the dissenting judge in *Sanchez* reminded his colleagues that “unlike convicted felons, welfare applicants have no lesser expectation of privacy in their homes than the rest of us.”¹⁵¹

On the other side of the equation, *Sanchez* and related cases have declared that the state’s pedestrian fiscal interests are sufficient to support the intrusions at issue, despite the absence of any special-needs authority to support the assertion, and have notably failed to acknowledge the broader consequences of their reasoning.¹⁵² If the state may search the home of any recipient of a public benefit merely to verify compliance with administrative requirements, the search power is essentially unlimited in its application to the general population—since it is exceedingly difficult to find anyone who is not a recipient of some public benefit, subsidy, credit, or deduction that depends in part on representations about conditions within one’s home.¹⁵³ Of course, the prospect of

¹⁴⁴ *Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 483 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review).

¹⁴⁵ *See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab*, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989); *Skinner*, 489 U.S. at 634; *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); *cf. Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”); *Bd. of Educ. v. Earls*, 536 U.S. 822, 836–37 (2002).

¹⁴⁶ *Earls*, 536 U.S. at 836–37; *Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646, 654–57 (1995).

¹⁴⁷ *See, e.g., Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 309 (referring to the “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches”).

¹⁴⁸ *See Budd*, *supra* note 10, at 397–403.

¹⁴⁹ *Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 464 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 483 U.S. 868, 872–73 (1987)).

¹⁵⁰ *S.L. v. Whitburn*, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995); *Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors*, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002).

¹⁵¹ *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 940 (Fisher, J., dissenting); *see Gustafson*, *supra* note 74, at 708.

¹⁵² *See Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 926; *Whitburn*, 67 F.3d at 1310; *Smith*, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.

¹⁵³ *See Wyman v. James*, 400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); *Sanchez*, 464 F.3d at 941 n.12 (Fisher, J., dissenting); *Slobogin*, *supra* note 13, at 403 (“Those

the federal courts authorizing such a sweeping expansion of the search power is non-existent as a practical and jurisprudential matter,¹⁵⁴ and it is beside the point to worry about the possibility. *Sanchez* and related authorities do not threaten the broader security of Americans in their homes; they instead demonstrate that the poor stand alone, beneath those protections, and face unique intrusions based on rationales that apply to no one else.¹⁵⁵

3. Rationalizing Bias: Poverty as a Proxy for Cause

Unusual in several respects, these cases are notable in particular for the degree to which they overtly mischaracterize controlling authority. This is not the way courts typically go about their business,¹⁵⁶ however politicized one believes them to be,¹⁵⁷ and the holdings raise obvious questions regarding subjective motivation and intent. At one end of the explanatory spectrum is simple malice—the possibility that the decisions arise from unvarnished class animus. Innumerable intermediate possibilities range forward from that point, involving various shades and degrees of cognitive dissonance, objectification, paternalism, and the like.¹⁵⁸ At the far end of the spectrum is the possibility that the judges have no subjective sense whatsoever of how far outside the parameters of conventional adjudication these cases fall.¹⁵⁹

suspected of tax fraud get full Fourth Amendment protection; those suspected of welfare fraud get none.”); Note, *Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent to Suspicionless Home Visits—Sanchez v. County of San Diego*, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2003 (2007).

¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond*, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (observing that the Fourth Amendment must be construed to prohibit suspicionless intrusions “from becoming a routine part of American life.”).

¹⁵⁵ See *Sanchez*, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review).

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, *Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty*, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 758–60 (2010).

¹⁵⁷ See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., *ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY* 17–57, 147–50 (2006).

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Bradley W. Joondeph, *The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making*, 77 UMKCL. REV. 347, 374 (2008) (“[J]udges’ subjective motivations can only explain a part what is going on in their decisions. Human beings are often, and perhaps mostly, unaware of why they hold particular beliefs or choose certain courses of action.”).

¹⁵⁹ *Id.* at 375 (“Thus, even if judges subjectively experience their decision-making as an attempt to reach the most coherent, logical reading of the relevant legal authorities, their own perceptions generally misapprehend much of what actually determines their behavior. The judges themselves can only see a part of what moves them. No matter what they write in their opinions, or how much they might protest to the contrary, there is much more to their choices than the objective interpretation of law. Forces external to the law and outside the judges’ cognition shade their interpretations of texts and precedent and frame their readings of history and tradition.” (footnote omitted)).

The complexity of the question is confounding, to say the least, and any effort to address it would be an ambitious project of its own. There is, however, a related and more modest inquiry that sheds some light on the internal logic of these decisions. Presuming a judge were interested in rationalizing the outcomes as the product of legitimate adjudication, any explanation would necessarily require some articulation with the values of the Fourth Amendment itself. The narrower question, then, is how might the wholesale suspension of the poor's domestic privacy rights be articulated with those values—and, in particular, the Fourth Amendment's emphasis on individualized suspicion?¹⁶⁰

A possible answer begins with the broader societal conception of the poor that contextualizes the decisions. As the literature exhaustively documents, the “able-bodied” poor have been demonized for centuries as indolent, immoral, and intrinsically predisposed to their predicament.¹⁶¹ This caricature traces back to the colonial era¹⁶² and has played a central role in shaping the contemporary American ideology of class.¹⁶³ Most recently, the stereotypical account of the poor—and, more specifically, of welfare recipients—has taken the form of the mythical “welfare queen”¹⁶⁴ or “welfare mother”¹⁶⁵ whose imagined exploits continue to shape the public debate surrounding issues of socioeconomic justice.¹⁶⁶ Reinforcing this longstanding caricature has been the increasing isolation and residential segregation of poor Americans, who are now largely invisible to broader society.¹⁶⁷ As the lives of the poor become more divorced from the experience of others, the dehumanizing and reductionist force of the caricature

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., *Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, *REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN* 144–45 (1988); Budd, *supra* note 10, at 363–65; Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 648–55; Quigley, *supra* note 122, at 105–06; William P. Quigley, *Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States*, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 114 (1997) [hereinafter *Reluctant Charity*]; Ross, *supra* note 119, at 1502–08; see generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, *IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA* (1986).

¹⁶² See Ann M. Burkhart, *The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness*, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 211, 221–22 (2003).

¹⁶³ See, e.g., HERBERT J. GANS, *THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR* 74–102 (1995); Ross, *supra* note 119, at 1502–08.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., Peter Edelman, *The World After Katrina: Eyes Wide Shut?*, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 3–4 (2007); Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 655–58; April Land, *Children in Poverty: In Search of State and Federal Constitutional Protections in the Wake of Welfare “Reforms,”* 2000 UTAH L. REV. 779, 811.

¹⁶⁵ Thomas W. Ross, *The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?*, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 167, 172 (2002).

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 658–64; Ross, *supra* note 165, at 172.

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., HARRINGTON, *supra* note 82, at 2–7; Debra Lyn Bassett, *Distancing Rural Poverty*, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 3, 13 (2006) (“[P]overty is literally out of sight as well as out of mind.”); David Ray Papke, *Keeping the Underclass in its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential Segregation*, 41 URB. LAW. 787, 788 (2009) (“[C]ontemporary American metropolitan areas remain overwhelmingly segregated by socioeconomic class.”).

correspondingly increases¹⁶⁸—and the strengthening caricature, in turn, further intensifies the isolation of the poor.¹⁶⁹ Over time, the individual fades into the encompassing myth.

So objectified, welfare recipients as a class are understood to possess characteristics that evoke the reasonable suspicion and disdain of broader society. As Kaaryn Gustafson has recently documented, these imputed qualities increasingly correspond not merely with poverty but with criminality as well.¹⁷⁰ She notes that “welfare applicants are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves,”¹⁷¹ and that federal and state welfare laws increasingly “assume[] a latent criminality among the poor.”¹⁷² Consistent with these assumptions, contemporary state and federal welfare policy is punitive, adversarial, and distrustful.¹⁷³ Surveillance, sanctions, and verification “extremism” are now prominent characteristics of welfare administration,¹⁷⁴ all with the intended purpose of reducing the total number of individuals receiving relief¹⁷⁵—either by blocking entry to the programs at the front end¹⁷⁶ or by terminating benefits as quickly as possible.¹⁷⁷ Thus it comes as no surprise that the number of individuals receiving federal welfare assistance has dropped precipitously¹⁷⁸ as the poverty rate escalates.¹⁷⁹ These outcomes coincide with the archaic notion that the immorality of the poor is the ultimate cause of their plight and that the state’s capacity and responsibility to ameliorate poverty is limited as a result.¹⁸⁰

This conception of the indigent influences judicial perceptions as well.¹⁸¹ As Thomas Ross notes, “When judges construct their arguments, they must depend on

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, *Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural Constitutional Law Course*, 34 *FORDHAM URB. L.J.* 1239, 1247 (2007) (“This socially constructed otherness of the poor is reinforced by (or perhaps serves as justification for) the social and spatial isolation of low-income families in economically segregated neighborhoods and inferior public schools.”).

¹⁶⁹ See Ross, *supra* note 119, at 1503 (“[The poor] have been cast as different, deviant, and morally weak. These assumptions make coherent the physical separation of the poor from the affluent.” (footnote omitted)).

¹⁷⁰ Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 665–66; see also CYNTHIA A. BRIGGS & JENNIFER L. PEPPERELL, *WOMEN, GIRLS, AND ADDICTION* 126 (2009).

¹⁷¹ Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 646.

¹⁷² *Id.* at 647.

¹⁷³ See *id.*

¹⁷⁴ See *id.* at 646; Mulzer, *supra* note 123, at 674–78.

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)–(b) (2006); Diller, *supra* note 122, at 1178–84.

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM, *OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY* 40 (2001).

¹⁷⁷ See, e.g., Diller, *supra* note 122, at 1171, 1184.

¹⁷⁸ See *id.* at 1123; Michele Estrin Gilman, *Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System*, 66 *U. PITT. L. REV.* 721, 741 & n.85 (2005); Land, *supra* note 164, at 818.

¹⁷⁹ See Rank, *supra* note 61, at 170–76.

¹⁸⁰ See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, *supra* note 25, at 125–26.

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., *id.* at 126; Budd, *supra* note 10, at 403–06; Ross, *supra* note 119, at 1513–38.

assumptions widely shared by their audience. Judges depend on these assumptions both because they give their arguments power and the potential for influence, and because the judges, as members of the culture, are likely to believe them.¹⁸² The Fourth Amendment's skewed application to the poor occurs against the backdrop of such assumptions, and considering the law in that broader context suggests a rough logic to the judicial bias. If welfare recipients are understood in the collective (sub)consciousness as a malingering class of "liars, cheaters, and thieves,"¹⁸³ it is then only a small step to the conclusion that each among them merits suspicion by virtue of that status. In this sense, the outcomes in *Wyman*, *Sanchez* and related cases begin to align on some visceral level with the Fourth Amendment's normative allocation of privacy. Quite simply, poverty serves as a proxy for cause, relieving the state of the obligation to establish individualized suspicion when it seeks to search the homes—and perhaps the bodies—of the intrinsically culpable poor.

To suggest that the popular conception of welfare recipients aligns with their exclusion from specific Fourth Amendment protections is not to say that any judge has purposively reasoned from one to the next. But it does imply that the deep and wounding myth of the immoral poor has particular resonance for a doctrine that turns on subjective judgments about the "reasonableness" of the state's suspicions. As part of the context within which those judgments have been made, the caricature of the poor may well have exerted some influence over the judiciary's decision to classify welfare recipients as a presumptively suspect class—whether or not the courts consciously acknowledge the connection.¹⁸⁴

II. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING

The poor's exercise of Fourth Amendment privacy rights remains under siege. Having authorized government to search the homes of welfare recipients without individualized suspicion or a warrant, the courts may soon be asked whether the bodies of aid recipients are subject to similar intrusions. Over the last three years, proposals to drug-test welfare recipients have emerged as a significant legislative trend across the country.¹⁸⁵ Introduced in just a few legislatures in 2007, drug testing legislation appeared in over half of the states by 2009.¹⁸⁶ The bills have garnered increasingly substantial support, with some having passed at least one legislative chamber.¹⁸⁷ Recently

¹⁸² Ross, *supra* note 119, at 1513.

¹⁸³ Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 646.

¹⁸⁴ See *supra* notes 158–59.

¹⁸⁵ See *infra* Part II.C.

¹⁸⁶ See *infra* notes 284 & 287.

¹⁸⁷ See, e.g., Tom Breen, *Some States, Including Minn., Move Toward Drug Tests For Welfare Recipients*, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/41904442.html?elr=KArks:DCiUMcyaL_nDaycUiacyKUUr; Terry Ganey, *Senate Keeps Welfare Drug-Testing Item From Advancing*, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Columbia,

members of Congress have joined the effort and introduced legislation requiring all states to test recipients of federally-funded public assistance.¹⁸⁸ While very little attention has yet focused on this emerging development, it may soon present the judiciary with an important occasion to revisit its treatment of the poor's right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Involving suspicionless intrusions into one of the two spheres of privacy at the apex of constitutional sanctity—the body itself—the proposals, if enacted, will require the courts to decide between two starkly different visions of the privacy right.

A. Prelude: Federal Welfare Reform

The recent surge in mandatory drug testing proposals traces back to a provision of federal welfare reform passed in 1996.¹⁸⁹ Among a vast array of punitive provisions that fundamentally altered the nature of federal public assistance,¹⁹⁰ the legislation expressly authorizes individual states to impose drug testing as a condition of aid: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be prohibited by the Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances”¹⁹¹ This provision is one of several that address drug use among welfare recipients, including a related measure that permits states to impose a lifetime ban on aid to individuals who have been convicted of certain drug-related offenses.¹⁹²

1. The Premise of the Addicted Poor

The legislative debates attending the passage of the federal statute made clear that its proponents fully embraced the disparaging caricature of the American poor as well as the corollary proposition that state aid only exacerbates the problem. In justifying the legislation, a parade of representatives took to the floor to recite a litany of charges

Mo.), May 14, 2009, <http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/may/14/senate-keeps-welfare-drug-testing-item-from/>; Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking Drug Testing to Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_releases_2009/pr20090225c.html; S. Minutes, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. Feb. 11, 2008).

¹⁸⁸ Drug Free Families Act of 2009, S. 97, 111th Cong. § 2; Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Hatch Introduces Amendment Requiring Drug Testing for Welfare, Unemployment Benefits (June 15, 2010), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=3d3e1ab4-1b78-be3e-e099-95c71cb7495e&Month=6&Year=2010.

¹⁸⁹ Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).

¹⁹⁰ See, e.g., Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 658–78.

¹⁹¹ 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2009).

¹⁹² *Id.* § 862a(a). PRWORA also authorized substance abuse treatment as part of “an individual responsibility plan” for welfare recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2)(A).

against the “welfare system”¹⁹³ and its recipient population. Speakers alleged that welfare teaches people “to depend on it and not to be able to depend on themselves,”¹⁹⁴ “discourages thrift, discourages work, separates . . . and destroys families, isolates children, and from an early age, stifles their ambition,”¹⁹⁵ creates an environment that “is not . . . morally healthy,”¹⁹⁶ and “fosters poverty, despair, hopelessness, and illegitimacy.”¹⁹⁷ Others asserted that “the Federal Government is completely incapable of helping these people”¹⁹⁸ and that welfare instead constitutes “federally funded child abuse.”¹⁹⁹

Allegations of criminal behavior and drug abuse among welfare recipients were high on the list of rationales recited in support of the bill.²⁰⁰ Representatives declared that “[t]he high crime rates, the high drug abuse rates . . . are very, very closely linked to our welfare system,”²⁰¹ while others decried “the destructive practice of giving . . . benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, blighting their lives at great public expense.”²⁰² Poor children, whose “ideologues and . . . role models are pimps and drug dealers,”²⁰³ were depicted as “selling drugs . . . [and] killing each other.”²⁰⁴ It was, in short, a world of “skyrocket[ing]”²⁰⁵ crime, illegitimacy, “fraud, and abuse,”²⁰⁶ and Congress had a “very straightforward” message in response: “No more money for nothing. . . . [G]et a real job.”²⁰⁷

While empirical data regarding drug abuse among the poor played little part in the hyperbolic political debate,²⁰⁸ it is noteworthy that the correlation between poverty and drug addiction is quite weak. Researchers analyzing data from the National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey—described by the National Institutes of Health as the “‘gold standard’ for estimating the prevalence of adult alcohol and other drug disorders”²⁰⁹—concluded in 1996 that “[p]roportions of welfare recipients using, abusing,

¹⁹³ 142 CONG. REC. 17674 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ensign).

¹⁹⁴ *Id.* at 17603 (statement of Rep. Kasich).

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at 17677 (statement of Rep. Traficant).

¹⁹⁶ *Id.* at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).

¹⁹⁷ *Id.* at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).

¹⁹⁸ *Id.* at 17618 (statement of Rep. Weldon).

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).

²⁰⁰ *See, e.g.*, H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 4 (1996); *see also* H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 490 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).

²⁰¹ 142 CONG. REC. 17618 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon).

²⁰² *Id.* at 17674 (statement of Rep. English); *see, e.g., id.* (statement of Rep. Ensign) (“Should we continue to give cash payments to prisoners and drug addicts?”).

²⁰³ *Id.* at 17614 (statement of Rep. Cunningham).

²⁰⁴ *Id.* at 17683 (statement of Rep. Shays).

²⁰⁵ *Id.* at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).

²⁰⁶ *Id.* at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).

²⁰⁷ *Id.* at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).

²⁰⁸ *See generally supra* notes 193–207 and accompanying text.

²⁰⁹ Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIAAA Researchers Estimate Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse and Dependence Among Welfare Recipients

or dependent on alcohol or illicit drugs are consistent with proportions of both the adult U.S. population and adults who do not receive welfare.”²¹⁰ The researchers found that the rate of alcohol abuse and/or dependence among welfare recipients ranged from 4.3 to 8.2 percent across five welfare programs, compared to a rate of 7.4 among the general population,²¹¹ while the rate of drug abuse and/or dependence among welfare recipients ranged between 1.3 and 3.6 percent in comparison to a rate of 1.5 percent among the broader population.²¹² Data from the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse roughly coincides with these findings, with a rate of drug dependence among welfare recipients in 1994 and 1995 of approximately four percent and a rate of alcohol dependence of nine percent.²¹³ Perhaps most notably, the data suggests that no more than one in five welfare recipients uses an illicit drug in any given year—and half of those individuals use marijuana alone.²¹⁴ The depiction of aid recipients as welfare-enabled drug addicts and the resulting statutory provisions authorizing drug testing and related sanctions thus bear little relation to the actual lives of the American poor.

Finally, even if poverty did correlate with significantly higher rates of drug abuse and addiction, the question of causation would remain: does the harsh reality of poverty lead to drug use, or do reckless choices by individuals lead to addiction and then to poverty as a secondary effect?²¹⁵ The answer obviously bears on the punitive rationality of get-tough proposals denying assistance to impoverished applicants who test positive for illicit drug use. There are “surprisingly few studies”²¹⁶ that have examined this relationship, and what little research exists suggests that there “is not a direct, causal relationship between the two social problems, but instead one which is mitigated by a range of complex factors, including characteristics of the agent (e.g., alcohol), of the person (e.g., coping style), and of the environment (e.g., availability of substances, family structure, lack of job opportunities).”²¹⁷ Rather than grapple with this complexity and factual uncertainty, federal welfare policy simply posits the politically expedient myth that drug abuse among welfare recipients is a volitional choice reflecting a punishable moral failure.²¹⁸ To the extent that the policy thus denies assistance to debilitated

(Oct. 23, 1996), *available at* <http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/newsevents/newsreleases/pages/welfare.aspx>.

²¹⁰ *Id.*

²¹¹ *Id.*

²¹² *Id.*

²¹³ RUKMALIE JAYAKODY ET AL., *SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND WELFARE REFORM 2* (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Policy Brief Ser. No. 2, Apr. 2004), *available at* http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/policy_briefs/brief02/brief2.pdf.

²¹⁴ *Id.*

²¹⁵ *See, e.g.*, Nancy J. Smyth & Kathleen A. Kost, *Exploring the Nature of the Relationship Between Poverty and Substance Abuse: Knowns and Unknowns*, 1 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 67 (1998).

²¹⁶ *Id.* at 78.

²¹⁷ *Id.*

²¹⁸ *See supra* notes 193–207 and accompanying text.

applicants whose drug use is enmeshed with the trauma of poverty, it simply exacerbates their misfortune.²¹⁹

2. The Premise of State Dominion

Just as the 1996 federal legislation posits a caricature of the addicted poor, so too it rests on a longstanding conception of the state's dominion over the private lives of welfare recipients. For centuries, the assistance of the state has come at the sacrifice of personal autonomy.²²⁰ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, those in need of public assistance were regularly auctioned off or indentured as laborers, barred from moving to new communities, and functionally imprisoned in poor-houses.²²¹ The process extended to children as well, whose labor could be auctioned to pay a parent's debts.²²² In the early twentieth century, officials continued to closely regulate the intimate lives of aid recipients—raiding their homes at night to search for male visitors,²²³ barring evening dates for women receiving assistance,²²⁴ and mandating religious instruction for dependent children.²²⁵ Investigators assessed the “suitability” of applicants and denied aid based on “use of tobacco, lack of church attendance, dishonesty, drunkenness, housing a male lodger, extramarital relations, poor discipline, criminal behavior, child delinquency, and overt child neglect. Agencies even forced families to move from neighborhoods with questionable reputations.”²²⁶ Some of these practices continued through the 1950s and 1960s, including most notably the use of surprise midnight raids in search of male guests.²²⁷

This tradition of intrusion has extended to the bodily autonomy of welfare recipients, as several scholars have observed in the context of reproductive choice.²²⁸ In the last twenty years, policymakers have considered a long list of measures linking the level and availability of welfare benefits to marital status,²²⁹ limitations on childbearing,²³⁰

²¹⁹ See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack et al., *Substance Use Among Welfare Recipients: Trends and Policy Responses*, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 256, 261 (2002).

²²⁰ See, e.g., GILLIOM, *supra* note 176, at 22–24.

²²¹ See *id.* at 23–24; Quigley, *Reluctant Charity*, *supra* note 161, at 140–75.

²²² See Burkhardt, *supra* note 162, at 223.

²²³ See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: *Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 208–09 (2002).

²²⁴ See *id.* at 222–23.

²²⁵ See GILLIOM, *supra* note 176, at 25.

²²⁶ ABRAMOVITZ, *supra* note 161, at 202.

²²⁷ See *id.* at 324–25; GILLIOM, *supra* note 176, at 31–32.

²²⁸ See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, *The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare*, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1995); Lucy A. Williams, *The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals*, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).

²²⁹ See Williams, *supra* note 228, at 720.

²³⁰ See Rebekah J. Smith, *Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences*, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 151, 152–54 (2006).

the use of contraception,²³¹ and even “the sterilization of women on welfare as a condition of receiving benefits.”²³² As Lucie White observes, “these kinds of ‘welfare reform’ provisions [relate] back to this country’s long history of targeting the reproductive autonomy of poor women, particularly women of color. The powerful have repeatedly marshalled state power to use the bodies of poor women to further their own economic and symbolic ends.”²³³ Federal legislation permitting states to physically intrude upon the bodies of welfare recipients for purposes of invasive extraction procedures continues quite literally in this incursive tradition.

3. The Irrelevance of Efficacy

Among the most striking aspects of the push for suspicionless drug testing, and a telling indication that it has little to do with ordinary public policy concerns, is its inefficacy in achieving any of the purported objectives associated with the procedure. Drug testing is variously touted as a means of encouraging welfare recipients to overcome substance abuse as a barrier to employment,²³⁴ stopping drug-related child abuse,²³⁵ and removing government from the business of subsidizing drug addiction.²³⁶ All of these objectives rest, in part, on the unfounded premise that drug abuse is a significantly greater concern among the poor than in the general population.²³⁷ Putting aside that assumption, however, the use of punitive drug testing to address issues surrounding drug abuse is a highly overinclusive and ineffective means of accomplishing any of the declared policy goals.

First, a positive drug test reflects only recent drug use, not drug abuse or impairment, and is accordingly an overinclusive means of identifying drug-related dysfunction.²³⁸ Thus, “[i]f drug testing is used as a form of screening, many recipients likely to test positive will be casual drug users who do not satisfy diagnostic criteria for

²³¹ See Pamela D. Bridgewater, *Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights*, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401, 404–08 (2000); Williams, *supra* note 228, at 720.

²³² Smith, *supra* note 230, at 163; see Lynn M. Paltrow, *Why Caring Communities Must Oppose C.R.A.C.K./Project Prevention: How C.R.A.C.K. Promotes Dangerous Propaganda and Undermines the Health and Well Being of Children and Families*, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 11, 11–12, 93 (2003) (describing program that “offers \$200 for current and former drug users to get sterilized or to use certain long-acting birth control methods”).

²³³ Lucie White, *Searching for the Logic Behind Welfare Reform*, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 427, 433–34 (1996).

²³⁴ See, e.g., *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *aff’d by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

²³⁵ *Id.* at 1141.

²³⁶ See, e.g., *supra* notes 200–02 and accompanying text; *infra* notes 276–83 and accompanying text.

²³⁷ See *supra* notes 209–14 and accompanying text.

²³⁸ See, e.g., Pollack et al., *supra* note 219, at 269.

dependence.”²³⁹ Because “[w]idespread drug testing of welfare recipients will detect use among many women who have no accompanying problem with impaired social performance or employment,”²⁴⁰ it will inevitably sanction individuals for whom the state has no cause for concern with respect to its stated objectives.

Second, drug abuse itself is not a significant contributing factor to welfare dependency. “Although [welfare] recipients have become more disadvantaged along a number of characteristics related to health and mental health, substance abuse and dependence is not a major contributor in defining the core group of recipients remaining on the rolls.”²⁴¹ As noted above, the incidence of drug abuse among welfare recipients is estimated to be no higher than four percent of the entire beneficiary population.²⁴² If all illicit drug use were completely eliminated among recipients, the number of individuals in need of public assistance would decline by no more than three to five percent.²⁴³

Finally, current drug testing methods are poorly designed to detect the types of illicit drug use that are most likely to impair the lives of welfare recipients. Because drugs such as heroin and cocaine are metabolized quickly, their use is undetectable within a few days of ingestion.²⁴⁴ By contrast, marijuana use is detectable for a much longer period of time due to the fact that metabolites of the drug are fat soluble and thus are retained in body tissue.²⁴⁵ The use of marijuana, however, has a less statistically significant association with welfare receipt than even tobacco.²⁴⁶ Conversely, welfare receipt is most powerfully associated with cocaine, a drug that current testing methods regularly fail to detect.²⁴⁷ Compounding the poor fit is the exclusion of alcohol from federally authorized drug testing,²⁴⁸ despite the fact that it is by far the most widely abused drug among the recipient population.²⁴⁹

Summarizing these efficacy considerations, researchers from the University of Michigan reached the following conclusions:

²³⁹ *Id.*

²⁴⁰ Rukmalie Jayakody et al., *Welfare Reform, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health*, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 623, 644 (2000); see also SUSAN BOYD, *MOTHERS AND ILLICIT DRUGS: TRANSCENDING THE MYTHS* 14–15 (1999).

²⁴¹ JAYAKODY ET AL., *supra* note 213, at 3.

²⁴² See *supra* notes 212–13 and accompanying text.

²⁴³ Pollack, *supra* note 219, at 261.

²⁴⁴ Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang, *Examples of Specific Drug Assays*, in URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 84–112 (Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph Series No. 73, 1987).

²⁴⁵ *Id.*; see LYNN ZIMMER & JOHN MORGAN, *MARIJUANA MYTHS, MARIJUANA FACTS: A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE* 121–22 (1997).

²⁴⁶ Pollack, *supra* note 219, at 261–62.

²⁴⁷ *Id.* at 262.

²⁴⁸ 21 U.S.C. § 862(b) (2006) (authorizing testing for “controlled substance[s]”).

²⁴⁹ Bridget F. Grant & Deborah A. Dawson, *Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse, and Dependence Among Welfare Recipients*, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1450, 1451–53 (1996).

Most recipients likely to test positive are casual marijuana users who do not satisfy DSM III-R criteria for drug-dependence. Moreover, the benefits of drug testing must be weighed against the potential misallocation of resources if positive results divert scarce treatment slots to occasional users. . . . Suspicionless, population-based chemical testing of welfare recipients will detect some “true positives” who are drug-dependent, a greater number of “accidental positives” with complex psychological problems, and a larger group of “false positives” who have no apparent psychiatric (including drug-related) disorder. . . . [C]hemical testing [also] does not detect the large group of “false negatives” . . . who are alcohol-dependent or who experience psychiatric disorders, but who do not use illicit drugs.²⁵⁰

That Congress pressed ahead with the authorization of punitive drug testing in the face of such serious efficacy concerns lends considerable support to the suggestion that its purpose had less to do with crafting coherent public policy than with the symbolic affirmation of a politically expedient stereotype.

B. The Initial Response of the States

Following passage of federal welfare reform and its invitation to the states to impose suspicionless drug testing on welfare recipients, several states responded by adopting more limited programs that sought to avoid the most serious constitutional concerns associated with mandatory testing.²⁵¹ Many of these ongoing programs apply only to convicted drug felons or other individuals for whom the state has some individualized reason to suspect drug abuse.²⁵² Other programs apply generally to the applicant or recipient population but rely on noninvasive screening assessments to identify individuals for whom there is reasonable suspicion to support more invasive drug testing.²⁵³ The State of Idaho, for example, “requires substance abuse testing of

²⁵⁰ Harold A. Pollack et al., *Drug Testing Welfare Recipients—False Positives, False Negatives, Unanticipated Opportunities*, 12 *WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES* 23, 29–30 (2002).

²⁵¹ This is not to suggest that the adopted measures are unobjectionable. To the contrary, they raise serious legal and policy questions. *See, e.g.*, Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, *Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders*, 30 *N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE* 527 (2006); Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 672–74. The focus here, however, is the particularly severe constitutional threat posed by suspicionless drug testing.

²⁵² *See, e.g.*, 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws 3rd S.S., ch. 10, § 27; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:10 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 609B.435 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-29.1 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-605 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. §§ 49.79(5), 49.148(4) (2009).

²⁵³ *See, e.g.*, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-209j (2009); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 1249(B) (2009).

any [welfare] applicant or recipient, if the [state] has a reasonable suspicion they are engaged in, or at high risk of, substance abuse. Testing will be conducted if screening and assessment give a reasonable suspicion the participant is engaged in substance abuse.”²⁵⁴ These programs may exist independently of or in combination with other measures that temporarily or permanently bar the provision of aid to individuals convicted of certain drug-related offenses, as authorized by a separate provision of the 1996 federal statute.²⁵⁵

In contrast to this more limited approach, Michigan embraced the federal invitation and enacted legislation in 1999 to impose suspicionless drug testing as a blanket condition of state aid.²⁵⁶ Michigan’s statute called for the establishment of a pilot program in at least three counties as a prelude to statewide testing within the following four years.²⁵⁷ The program required all new applicants to submit to a drug test and additionally mandated that twenty percent of existing recipients would be randomly tested every six months.²⁵⁸ The statute directed that any individual testing positive would participate in a substance-abuse treatment program²⁵⁹ and that noncompliance could trigger the termination of aid.²⁶⁰ In the brief period that the program operated prior to being enjoined by a federal court,²⁶¹ the state tested 258 welfare applicants of whom only twenty-one tested positive for illicit drug use.²⁶² Consistent with the efficacy considerations discussed above, all but three of those positive test results were for marijuana use alone.²⁶³

As discussed in detail in Part II.D, below, the pilot program was challenged immediately and struck down by a district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit.²⁶⁴ The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc and upheld the district court by an equally divided vote.²⁶⁵ The constitutional question was thus left entirely unresolved, and the resulting ambiguity has opened the door for

²⁵⁴ IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.16.03.08.120 (2009).

²⁵⁵ 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a); *see, e.g.*, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709e (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:233.2 (2009).

²⁵⁶ MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571 (2009).

²⁵⁷ *Id.* § 400.571(2).

²⁵⁸ *See* Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 679.

²⁵⁹ MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571(3) (2009).

²⁶⁰ *Id.*; *see* Michael D. Socha, *An Analysis of Michigan’s Plan for Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients Under the Fourth Amendment “Special Needs” Exception*, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1099, 1101–02 (2001).

²⁶¹ *See infra* Part II.D.2.

²⁶² Lisa R. Metch & Harold A. Pollack, *Welfare Reform and Substance Abuse*, 83 MILBANK Q. 65, 76 (2005).

²⁶³ *Id.*

²⁶⁴ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *rev’d*, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), *aff’d by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

²⁶⁵ *Id.*

other states to reconsider more aggressive drug testing proposals.²⁶⁶ Scores of such proposals have appeared over the last three years,²⁶⁷ suggesting that the enactment and implementation of another blanket testing program is a genuine threat.

C. *The Legislative Groundswell*

A recent survey of state legislative activity over the last three years reveals very substantial renewed interest in aggressive drug testing of welfare applicants and recipients. Since 2007, lawmakers in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia have proposed over sixty bills to impose testing requirements as a condition of eligibility for public assistance.²⁶⁸ With limited exception, this body of legislation provides broadly for ongoing suspicionless testing and embraces the entire population of public aid beneficiaries, but omits any privacy protections or procedural safeguards.²⁶⁹ Notably, the number of aggressive drug testing bills has climbed each of the last three years,²⁷⁰ corresponding with the onset of the recent financial crisis²⁷¹ and consistent with the thesis that public policy grows increasingly punitive towards the poor during periods of economic hardship.²⁷² Whatever the cause may be, this legislative groundswell has quickly emerged as an important development with serious implications for the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of the poor.

Consistent with the legislative history of the authorizing federal statute, recent state efforts reflect a caricatured conception of welfare recipients²⁷³ and make no effort to grapple with data suggesting that drug dependence among the poor is not a significantly greater concern than it is among the general population.²⁷⁴ The political rhetoric thus depicts recipients as addicts and criminals, the welfare system as a counter-productive enabler of addiction, and drug abuse as a moral failing that drives families into poverty.²⁷⁵ A state senator from Arizona captured these themes in his recent defense of a drug testing bill:

There's a moral issue here. . . . If you're getting taxpayer benefits, and this isn't money you've earned, you're getting free stuff. . . .

²⁶⁶ See, e.g., Greenblatt, *supra* note 22.

²⁶⁷ See *infra* note 284.

²⁶⁸ See *infra* Part II.C.1.

²⁶⁹ See *infra* Part II.C.1 & II.C.2.

²⁷⁰ See *infra* note 284.

²⁷¹ MARTIN NEAL BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE U.S. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 3–5 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf.

²⁷² See, e.g., Clark Allen Peterson, *The Resurgence of Durational Residence Requirements for the Receipt of Welfare Funds*, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 305, 334 n.195 (1993).

²⁷³ See *infra* notes 276–83 and accompanying text.

²⁷⁴ See *supra* note 212 and accompanying text.

²⁷⁵ See *infra* notes 276–83 and accompanying text.

The minimum ought to be that you ought to not be somebody's [sic] that's engaged in criminal activity. . . . A lot of the folks that are in desperate need are (that way) because they have a substance abuse problem. . . . So I'm hoping that this will drive them to get help or at least protect the taxpayer from funding folks who need to get their act together.²⁷⁶

Other state legislators describe drug testing proposals as an effort to “provide[] these drug-addicted welfare recipients with the wake-up call they need,”²⁷⁷ to change “the status quo system that enables drug addicts with taxpayer money,”²⁷⁸ “to prevent the state . . . from becoming an enabler to addiction,”²⁷⁹ to assure that “taxpayers [do] not have to subsidize drug abuse,”²⁸⁰ and to “protect[] our tax dollars from fueling drug addictions.”²⁸¹ The theme of moral failing pervades the debate: “individuals who continue to use drugs are unable to provide for their families and end up on public assistance,”²⁸² and, once there, “[t]oo often . . . take advantage of our public assistance program and try to pocket or use their extra funds to purchase items they’re not suppose to such as drugs.”²⁸³ Against this backdrop of moral condemnation, the rising tide of drug testing proposals is predictably severe.

1. The Elimination of Individualized Suspicion

The most significant attribute of recent legislative proposals is the overwhelming absence of any requirement that individualized suspicion support invasive drug testing. Suspicionless testing is thus a condition of aid embraced by forty-nine bills introduced

²⁷⁶ *Drug Test for Arizona Welfare Recipients May Be Needed*, DOUGLAS DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2009, <http://www.douglasdispatch.com/articles/2009/02/02/news/doc4987b79c78787767632585.txt> (quoting Ariz. State Sen. Russell Pearce).

²⁷⁷ *Party-Liners Again Reject Compassionate Reforms of Welfare System*, CAL. CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 2009, <http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/view/100510> (quoting Cal. State Sen. John Benoit).

²⁷⁸ *Id.*

²⁷⁹ Juana Summers, *Missouri House Approves Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, But Proposal Shows Trouble in Senate*, ST. LOUIS TODAY, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/political-fix/article_12c95ddd-654b-56ed-943a-169704da04a6.html (quoting Mo. State Sen. Gary Nodler).

²⁸⁰ Marshall Griffin, *Missouri House Passes Bill to Require Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients*, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010, <http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/kwmu/news.newsmain/article/0/0/1611354/St.Louis.Public.Radio.News/Mo.House.passes.drug.testing.bill> (quoting Mo. State Rep. Ellen Brandom).

²⁸¹ *Lawmaker Introduces Bill to Require Drug Tests for Public Assistance*, CBS NEWS AUGUSTA (Apr. 1, 2009), <http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/42272572.html> (quoting S.C. State Rep. Rex Rice).

²⁸² Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking Drug Testing to Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), *available at* http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_releases_2009/pr20090225c.html.

²⁸³ NY Spons. Memo., Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).

in twenty-seven legislatures since 2007,²⁸⁴ accounting for eighty percent of the identified drug testing legislation over the last three years. Ten legislatures— those of Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee—have each produced multiple bills providing for suspicionless testing,²⁸⁵ while seventeen others have each produced one such bill.²⁸⁶ By contrast, only thirteen bills from seven states and the District of Columbia follow the lead of earlier programs and limit invasive testing to circumstances supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion,²⁸⁷ often established by a preliminary noninvasive assessment of the entire applicant or recipient population.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).

²⁸⁵ See *supra* note 284.

²⁸⁶ See *id.* (Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming).

²⁸⁷ S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).

²⁸⁸ See, e.g., Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).

Suspicionless testing under these bills takes one of two forms—it is either imposed on an entire class of applicants or recipients or it is applied randomly to some subset of the target population. In this regard, thirty-one bills in nineteen states impose invasive testing upon their entire target population,²⁸⁹ while seventeen bills in ten legislatures impose testing on randomly selected individuals.²⁹⁰ Two bills combine these methods by testing the entire population of applicants while randomly testing some subset of the larger class of current recipients.²⁹¹

2. The Attributes of Testing: Breadth, Process, and Consequences

The surveyed legislation varies to some extent regarding the breadth of the population subject to drug testing, the steps taken to protect procedural integrity and personal privacy, and the consequences of a positive test result. On balance, a substantial majority of the proposed bills apply to the broadest possible target population, provide very few, if any, privacy or procedural protections, and impose the harshest possible sanction for a positive drug test.

With respect to the breadth of the subject population, drug testing may target aid applicants, current recipients, or both. Among the sixty-two identified bills introduced

²⁸⁹ H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).

²⁹⁰ S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).

²⁹¹ S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008).

since 2007, over half—thirty-five—reach both categories.²⁹² Of the remaining bills, sixteen apply to recipients alone²⁹³ while eleven are limited to applicants for assistance.²⁹⁴ There are a few notable outliers. Two Mississippi bills from 2009 expand the subject population to include children as young as thirteen years old.²⁹⁵ In an egalitarian nod, two bills require drug testing not only of applicants and recipients but also of all candidates for the Illinois state legislature²⁹⁶ and all sitting members of the Missouri General Assembly.²⁹⁷

²⁹² S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).

²⁹³ S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).

²⁹⁴ Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007).

²⁹⁵ H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009).

²⁹⁶ H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).

²⁹⁷ H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).

The testing itself requires the extraction and collection of bodily fluids and tissues including blood,²⁹⁸ “urine, hair, saliva, sweat, or whatever [other] specimen proves to be the most cost-effective.”²⁹⁹ Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of the surveyed legislation makes no mention of privacy protections for individuals facing such intimately invasive procedures.³⁰⁰ Only two bills specifically provide for the collection of samples with “due regard to the privacy of the individual” and “in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or interference”³⁰¹ with the collected material.

With respect to the use and distribution of test results, the legislation likewise imposes few restrictions.³⁰² A handful of bills require that results be maintained in confidence, with no public disclosure except by consent of the person tested or pursuant to a judicial order.³⁰³ Three other bills specify that positive test results may not be used in criminal proceedings.³⁰⁴ Only one bill combines these protections of confidentiality and immunity from prosecution.³⁰⁵ Similarly, the vast majority of legislation offers no procedural safeguards with regard to the testing process.³⁰⁶ Bills proposed in Indiana,³⁰⁷ Missouri,³⁰⁸ and Tennessee³⁰⁹ provide for a hearing or other appeal of a positive test result, while a few others require specific notice prior to actual testing.³¹⁰ Bills in Illinois,³¹¹ Indiana,³¹² and Tennessee³¹³ provide for the retesting of samples to rule out

²⁹⁸ H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).

²⁹⁹ H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).

³⁰⁰ See generally, *supra* notes 284, 287.

³⁰¹ S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); see S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009).

³⁰² See generally, *supra* notes 284, 287.

³⁰³ S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).

³⁰⁴ S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).

³⁰⁵ S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009).

³⁰⁶ See generally, *supra* notes 284, 287.

³⁰⁷ H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).

³⁰⁸ H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).

³⁰⁹ H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).

³¹⁰ H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).

³¹¹ H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).

³¹² H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).

³¹³ H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).

false positives. Also to rule out false positives, a handful of bills allow individuals to submit additional medical information that may provide an alternative explanation for positive test results.³¹⁴ Notwithstanding these provisions, fully two-thirds of the recent legislation contains no privacy or procedural protections whatsoever.³¹⁵

Finally, a substantial majority of the bills impose the harshest possible consequence for a positive test result. Over two-thirds of the identified legislation, from twenty-one states, mandates the immediate termination or denial of benefits as the sanction for a positive test.³¹⁶ Of these bills, several deny aid without specifying when, if ever, benefits might resume.³¹⁷ Others permit individuals to reapply for assistance after some prescribed period of ineligibility.³¹⁸ Among the bills requiring the denial or termination of

³¹⁴ S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009).

³¹⁵ See *supra* notes 284, 287.

³¹⁶ S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).

³¹⁷ See, e.g., S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).

³¹⁸ See, e.g., S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 4452,

aid to a primary beneficiary, a few provide that aid to dependents may continue through disbursements to a third-party payee.³¹⁹ By contrast, only seventeen bills allow benefits to be paid to an individual who tests positive for illicit drug use, typically on condition that the recipient participate in a drug rehabilitation treatment program.³²⁰

Across the identified legislation, the most common provisions are invariably the harshest. The typical bill applies without suspicion to the entire class of welfare applicants and recipients, makes no provision for the protection of either the individual's privacy during the testing process or the security of test results, affords no procedural recourse for individuals testing positive, and mandates the immediate denial of aid to anyone identified as having used an illicit drug. While it is impossible to predict whether such legislation ultimately will be enacted, the character and intensity of legislative activity over the last three years suggests that the possibility is significant.

D. Two Visions of a Constitutional Response

The enactment of suspicionless drug testing legislation will force the federal courts to answer, finally, the constitutional question left open by the Michigan litigation.³²¹ In assessing how the courts might approach the issue, the Michigan decisions are highly instructive. The district court in *Marchwinski* considered the issue within the conventional parameters of the Fourth Amendment and reached the straightforward conclusion that the state's blanket drug testing proposal was impermissible.³²² On

96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).

³¹⁹ H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).

³²⁰ H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).

³²¹ See *supra* notes 264–65 and accompanying text.

³²² *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *rev'd*, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003), *aff'd by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed based on an entirely different, if unstated, premise—that the poor constitute a subconstitutional class for purposes of the privacy right and thus fall beyond the protections of conventional doctrine.³²³ These irreconcilable approaches perfectly mirror the parallel controversy, discussed above, over the application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right to the homes of welfare recipients.³²⁴ If the federal courts are asked again to consider the question in the context of suspicionless drug testing, the divergent outcomes in the Michigan litigation will frame for the judiciary an unambiguous choice.

1. Bodily Privacy: A Preface

At the core of the Fourth Amendment is “the individual’s legitimate expectations that in certain places and at certain times he has ‘the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”³²⁵ When the state seeks to intrude upon the body, it implicates the “most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy”³²⁶ grounded in the “moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.”³²⁷ These deeply invested expectations trigger, in turn, “the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s person.”³²⁸

The Fourth Amendment traditionally guards this private sphere through the dual requirements of probable cause and a warrant. As the Court noted in *Schmerber v. California*, both requirements apply with considerable force in the context of intrusions upon the body.³²⁹ As to cause, the *Schmerber* Court noted:

The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions [beyond the

³²³ 309 F.3d 330.

³²⁴ See *supra* Part I.B.2.

³²⁵ *Winston v. Lee*, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

³²⁶ *Id.* at 760.

³²⁷ *Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists*, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, *Correspondence*, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288 (1977)).

³²⁸ *Wyoming v. Houghton*, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999). The highly protected status of the body is recognized across other constitutional doctrines as well, most notably as a component of liberty and privacy under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., *Riggins v. Nevada*, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); *Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990); *Washington v. Harper*, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990); *Rochin v. California*, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952); *Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson*, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also *Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“[*Roe v. Wade*] . . . may be seen . . . as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.”).

³²⁹ 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966).

body's surface] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.³³⁰

The requirement of judicial review plays an equally important role, as the Court also underscored in *Schmerber*:

Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. . . . The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.³³¹

While these requirements obviously do not prohibit a search of the body, they provide a significant constraint "against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner."³³²

In applying these principles, the Court has required that probable cause support the extraction of blood from a drunk-driving suspect,³³³ barred suspicionless drug testing of maternity patients for purposes of identifying child-abuse suspects,³³⁴ and prohibited the extraction of a bullet from a suspect's body even in the presence of probable cause, given the gravity of the intrusion.³³⁵ Prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court similarly restricted the search of a suspect's stomach under the Due Process Clause³³⁶ and more recently has underscored the significant liberty interest implicated when the state seeks to forcibly inject medication into a nonconsenting person's body.³³⁷ As these cases intuitively confirm, "The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society"³³⁸ and triggers "the greatest Fourth Amendment protection."³³⁹

Outside the context of criminal law enforcement, the Court has relaxed the requirements of the Warrant Clause in certain circumstances to permit the state to conduct

³³⁰ *Id.*

³³¹ *Id.* at 770.

³³² *Id.* at 768.

³³³ *Id.* at 770.

³³⁴ *Ferguson v. City of Charleston*, 532 U.S. 67, 84–86 (2001).

³³⁵ *Winston v. Lee*, 470 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1985).

³³⁶ *Rochin v. California*, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).

³³⁷ *Washington v. Harper*, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990).

³³⁸ *Schmerber*, 384 U.S. at 772.

³³⁹ *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond*, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

otherwise impermissible body searches for civil or administrative purposes.³⁴⁰ The authority that embraces these circumstances—the special-needs doctrine³⁴¹—bears directly on the permissibility of recent drug testing proposals insofar as the searches at issue rest on neither cause nor a warrant. Under the doctrine, the Court engages in a two-step analysis considering, first, whether the proposed search advances a “special need” of the state, and, if so, whether the search strikes a reasonable balance between individual privacy interests and the strength of the countervailing government objective.³⁴² The doctrine has been used primarily to justify targeted drug testing programs³⁴³ but has been applied in other contexts as well—for example, to sustain a warrantless home search conducted as a condition of probation.³⁴⁴

The first and central inquiry under the doctrine is whether the state’s special need is sufficiently compelling to suspend otherwise applicable constitutional restrictions.³⁴⁵ In the absence of a special need, the analysis goes no further.³⁴⁶ While the need must be unrelated to the ordinary demands of criminal law enforcement,³⁴⁷ a civil or administrative objective is not sufficient, standing alone, to satisfy the doctrine. In addition, the need “must be substantial—important enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”³⁴⁸ Although the formulation is highly indeterminate,³⁴⁹ the practical application of the doctrine has typically involved one of two permissible objectives: the promotion of public safety and the related protection of the health and security of schoolchildren under the state’s *in loco parentis* control.³⁵⁰ Regarding the first rationale, the Court has stated that “where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”³⁵¹ Regarding the second, the Court has “caution[ed] against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional

³⁴⁰ See *infra* notes 345–52 and accompanying text.

³⁴¹ See, e.g., *Skinner v. Ry. Labor Excs.’ Ass’n*, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).

³⁴² See, e.g., *19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque*, 156 F.3d 1068, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998).

³⁴³ See, e.g., *Bd. of Educ. v. Earls*, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); *Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); *Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab*, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); *Skinner*, 489 U.S. 602.

³⁴⁴ *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).

³⁴⁵ See, e.g., *19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs.*, 156 F.3d at 1072.

³⁴⁶ *Id.*

³⁴⁷ *Von Raab*, 489 U.S. at 665–66.

³⁴⁸ *Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).

³⁴⁹ See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, *Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?*, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 165, 170 (2006); William J. Stuntz, *Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment*, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992).

³⁵⁰ See Budd, *supra* note 10, at 397–98; cf. *Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 309.

³⁵¹ *Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 323; see, e.g., *Bd. of Educ. v. Earls*, 536 U.S. 822, 836–37 (2002).

muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this case is . . . that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care."³⁵²

There is considerable speculation about how far these two categories reach.³⁵³ While the Court has underscored in recent opinions that special needs constitute a "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,"³⁵⁴ the decisional law demonstrates that the doctrine may be employed to permit suspicionless body searches in circumstances that only tenuously relate to the sanctioned rationales.³⁵⁵ Regardless of how distant the two categories may extend, however, they cannot rationally stretch so far as to justify suspicionless drug testing of the entire population of welfare applicants and recipients—for whom the state has neither *in loco parentis* responsibility nor any encompassing public-safety concern.³⁵⁶ The constitutionality of such proposals is accordingly highly doubtful under conventional doctrine, as Wayne LaFave and others have observed.³⁵⁷

2. Principled Adjudication

Accepting this conventional account of the Fourth Amendment, the district court in the Michigan litigation concluded that the challenged testing program failed to advance any recognized special need and was thus impermissible.³⁵⁸ The district court first noted that the declared purpose of the authorizing federal statute was to move welfare recipients to work, and that the state's drug testing program rested on the complementary objective of "address[ing] substance abuse as a barrier to employment."³⁵⁹ Since neither goal touched remotely on a public safety concern, the district court concluded that the testing program was irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's specification of permissible special needs.³⁶⁰

³⁵² *Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).

³⁵³ *See, e.g., supra* note 349; *cf. Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State*, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1231–34 (2004).

³⁵⁴ *Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 309; *Ferguson v. City of Charleston*, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).

³⁵⁵ *See, e.g., Aubrey v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd.*, 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of school janitors on grounds that they hold safety-sensitive positions and work closely with children).

³⁵⁶ *See* 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(d) (3d ed. 2007) ("While federal legislation authorizes states to undertake suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients, such action is not justified by . . . the Supreme Court's drug testing decisions."); *see, e.g., Corinne A. Carey, Crafting a Challenge to the Practice of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients: Federal Welfare Reform and State Response as the Most Recent Chapter in the War on Drugs*, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 281 (1998); Socha, *supra* note 260, at 1118–19.

³⁵⁷ *Id.*

³⁵⁸ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139–40 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *aff'd by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

³⁵⁹ *Id.* at 1140.

³⁶⁰ *Id.*

The State nevertheless proposed that it sought to protect recipients' children from drug-related child abuse and thus pursued a safety-related objective as well.³⁶¹ After noting the post hoc nature of the rationale,³⁶² the district court addressed its implications:

[This] excuse could be used for testing the parents of all children who receive Medicaid, State Emergency Relief, educational grants or loans, public education or any other benefit from the State. In all cases in which the State offers a benefit on behalf of minor children, the State could claim that it has a broad interest in the care of those children which overcomes the privacy rights of the parents. . . . "Such a categorical approach to an entire class of citizens would be dangerously at odds with the tenets of our democracy."³⁶³

To the district court's rejoinder might be added the fact that welfare recipients abuse drugs at no greater rate than the general population³⁶⁴—and, thus, that the state has no greater interest in stopping drug-related child abuse among welfare recipients than it has with respect to the vast majority of other parents who receive some tax deduction, credit, or similar subsidy on behalf of dependent children.³⁶⁵ Michigan's child-safety rationale would thus eviscerate the Fourth Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion across the spectrum of American families—a result that is neither politically nor doctrinally tenable.³⁶⁶

The court turned next to Michigan's separate contention that its drug testing scheme was authorized by the Supreme Court's decision in *Wyman v. James*, which upheld mandatory home visits by welfare caseworkers.³⁶⁷ The district court dismissed the argument on two grounds. First, as the district court noted, *Wyman* held that the home visits at issue did not even constitute a Fourth Amendment search and authorized the entries, in part, on that basis.³⁶⁸ Since it is indisputable that invasive drug testing is

³⁶¹ *Id.* at 1141.

³⁶² *Id.* at 1141–42.

³⁶³ *Id.* at 1142 (quoting *Wyman v. James*, 400 U.S. 309, 342 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).

³⁶⁴ See *supra* note 212 and accompanying text.

³⁶⁵ See, e.g., Alan Berube, *Individual Income Tax Credits as Social Policy in Rural America*, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 151, 155–59 (2006).

³⁶⁶ Cf. *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond*, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). Outside the context of welfare, at least one other court has rejected a suspicionless drug testing proposal on grounds that parents have no diminished expectation of privacy simply by virtue of the state's general interest in the well-being of their children. See *State v. Moreno*, 203 P.3d 1000, 1008–12 (Utah 2009) (barring drug testing of the parents of delinquent minors for purposes of assuring that they set a good example for their children).

³⁶⁷ 400 U.S. 309 (1971); see *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43.

³⁶⁸ *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43; see *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 317; *supra* notes 106–09 and accompanying text.

a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the *Wyman* analysis is obviously irrelevant in that respect.³⁶⁹

Michigan argued, however, that *Wyman*'s alternative holding—that the home visits constituted a reasonable entry under the Fourth Amendment³⁷⁰—supported its testing program by establishing that welfare applicants have a generally diminished expectation of privacy as a result of their voluntary request for assistance.³⁷¹ The district court rejected the argument in light of the conflicting analysis in *Chandler v. Miller*, which struck down a suspicionless drug testing program directed at candidates for public office.³⁷² As the court noted, the act of seeking elected office is considerably more voluntary than submitting an application for public assistance, which typically reflects some measure of economic coercion.³⁷³ Nevertheless, the *Chandler* Court recognized that candidates for political office possess a legitimate and defensible expectation of privacy irrespective of the highly consensual nature of the activity at issue.³⁷⁴ Necessarily, then, welfare recipients must possess an equally defensible privacy expectation in the substantially less voluntary context within which they interact with the state.³⁷⁵ Finally, the district court noted that *Wyman* predates the Supreme Court's special-needs jurisprudence and in particular the requirement articulated in *Chandler* that a safety-related justification support a special-needs search.³⁷⁶ “To the extent that *Wyman* could be construed as allowing otherwise, its holding is no longer viable.”³⁷⁷

Unable to identify either a special need or a credible basis to defer to the fading authority of *Wyman*, the district court enjoined Michigan's testing program as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.³⁷⁸ In view of prevailing special needs authority, the holding is a straightforward application of reasonably well-settled law.

3. Subconstitutional Adjudication

A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion rooted in an entirely different, and frankly biased, set of analytic assumptions.³⁷⁹ The opinion proceeds squarely in the tradition of the bifurcated Fourth Amendment and offers arguments and rationales that are impossible to reconcile with conventional

³⁶⁹ *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43.

³⁷⁰ See *supra* notes 110–13 and accompanying text.

³⁷¹ *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; see *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 324.

³⁷² 520 U.S. 305 (1997).

³⁷³ *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.

³⁷⁴ *Id.*; see *Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 318.

³⁷⁵ *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.

³⁷⁶ *Id.* at 1143; see *Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 323.

³⁷⁷ *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.

³⁷⁸ *Id.* at 1144; see also *Drug Tests as a Condition of Receiving Public Assistance*, Op. Att'y Gen. 07-84 (Tenn. 2007).

³⁷⁹ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh'gen banc granted, judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

authority.³⁸⁰ To make sense of the opinion, one must accept at the outset the premise that the poor inhabit a different constitutional universe where their presumed culpability justifies intrusions that are otherwise at odds with traditional doctrine. Throughout the opinion, poverty is implicitly employed as a proxy for individualized suspicion as the poor are cast as an inherently criminal, child-abusing, and drug addicted class.

The Sixth Circuit's decision begins with the state's asserted special need. To accommodate its substantive objectives, the court first reframed the governing standard to drain the special-needs concept of virtually any limiting effect. Rejecting the pronouncement in *Chandler* that a permissible special need must be grounded in some public safety concern,³⁸¹ the court asserted instead that safety "is but one consideration" and "need not predominate" in the special needs calculation.³⁸² In support, the circuit relied exclusively on *Board of Education v. Earls*,³⁸³ the Supreme Court's latest opinion dealing with the *other* rationale for a special needs search—the state's *in loco parentis* responsibility for schoolchildren under its care and supervision.³⁸⁴ In *Earls*, the Court upheld a school's suspicionless drug testing program for students involved in extracurricular activities on the expressly qualified basis that "Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children."³⁸⁵ Moreover, within that uniquely supervisory context, the *Earls* Court accepted as "correct" the proposition that "safety factors into the special needs analysis" but concluded that "the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children" in the setting of a public school.³⁸⁶ To derive from *Earls* that safety "need not predominate"³⁸⁷ in a special-needs analysis beyond the context of public education—thus trumping the express requirements of *Chandler*—is a "dubious conclusion"³⁸⁸ that defies the terms of the opinion itself.

Having rewritten the constitutional standard to accommodate an open and undefined set of additional special needs, the Sixth Circuit proceeded to manufacture an amalgam of rationales that bear no relation to any preceding authority and that render the doctrine nearly limitless in its application to the general population. First, in a nod to *Chandler*, the court embraced Michigan's post hoc safety rationale for drug testing and asserted without analysis that the program was designed to protect children from

³⁸⁰ See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., *supra* note 109, at § 10.3 ("[The opinion] misread *Wyman* and reached the dubious conclusion that *Earls*, the Supreme Court's latest school drug testing case, trumped *Chandler* even outside a public school context").

³⁸¹ *Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).

³⁸² *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 335.

³⁸³ 536 U.S. 822 (2002).

³⁸⁴ *Id.*; see *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 334–35.

³⁸⁵ *Earls*, 536 U.S. at 829–30 (quoting *Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)).

³⁸⁶ *Id.* at 836.

³⁸⁷ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 335.

³⁸⁸ LAFAVE, *supra* note 109, § 10.3.

drug-related abuse.³⁸⁹ In doing so, the court ignored the fact that the authorizing federal statute as well as Michigan's own policy rationale made no mention of child safety in justifying the testing at issue,³⁹⁰ ignored empirical data refuting the premise that welfare parents abuse drugs at a significantly greater rate than the general population,³⁹¹ and declined to acknowledge the necessary implication of its argument: that any parent could henceforth be subject to suspicionless drug testing simply by accepting a child-related state subsidy.³⁹²

Moving further beyond the record, the Sixth Circuit next imagined that the drug testing program might advance an even broader public safety concern—"the risk to the public from the crime associated with illicit drug use and trafficking."³⁹³ Reasoning now in a factual vacuum, the court conjured the image of welfare-subsidized drug dealers preying on a victimized public and declared that the threat constituted yet another safety-related special need supporting universal drug testing among welfare recipients.³⁹⁴ The characterization, however, bears no relation to available data establishing that no more than one in five welfare recipients even uses an illicit drug in a given year,³⁹⁵ that no more than four percent of recipients are addicted,³⁹⁶ and that less than six percent of applicants and recipients in related aid programs have lost benefits based on drug-related criminal activity.³⁹⁷ The court's analysis at this juncture mirrors rational-basis review in the context of equal protection, where any imaginable justification is sufficient to sustain the state's conduct irrespective of the record or the state's actual objectives.³⁹⁸ Rational basis review is essentially synonymous with no review at all,³⁹⁹ and its application in this context reduces the special-needs inquiry to pretense.⁴⁰⁰

³⁸⁹ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 336.

³⁹⁰ See *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *aff'd by an equally divided court*, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

³⁹¹ See *supra* notes 212–13 and accompanying text.

³⁹² See *supra* notes 363–66 and accompanying text.

³⁹³ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 336.

³⁹⁴ *Id.*

³⁹⁵ See *supra* note 214 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁶ See *supra* notes 212–13 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁷ See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF SELECTED BENEFITS 13–15 (2005) (setting forth data from public housing programs).

³⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Ortwein v. Schwab*, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

³⁹⁹ *Id.*; cf. *Loffredo*, *supra* note 9, at 1283–84 ("Indeed, in the nearly twenty years that this rule has been in effect, the Court has not invalidated a single poverty classification or social welfare restriction.").

⁴⁰⁰ To the extent that the circuit's imagined crime-fighting rationale might envision testing as a means of identifying specific criminal suspects, it would also run headlong into the first and primary restriction placed on special-needs searches—that they be employed only for purposes "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement." *Ferguson v. City of Charleston*, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001); *Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab*, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).

Completing its reinvention of special needs, the court struck out beyond public safety to declare yet another rationale for suspicionless searches—the state’s pedestrian interest in the fiscal integrity of its benefits program.⁴⁰¹ The court asserted, without citation to any authority, that it is true “beyond cavil that the state has a special need to insure that public moneys expended in the [program] are used by the recipients for their intended purposes and not for procuring controlled substances”⁴⁰² The implications of this claim are most sweeping of all. Applicable to virtually any government benefit, the rationale establishes that the simple receipt of a tax deduction, credit, or subsidy empowers the state to conduct warrantless and suspicionless searches to verify that the beneficiary does not use the funds to buy contraband. There is virtually no one left who, in the wake of such reasoning, might remain protected from suspicionless searches to advance the state’s generalized interest in assuring that its ubiquitous largesse is not diverted to the purchase of illicit drugs.⁴⁰³

Having devised an unprecedented set of special needs to justify Michigan’s testing program,⁴⁰⁴ the Sixth Circuit was obliged to proceed to the next step of the special-needs inquiry and balance the strength of the government’s rationale against the individual privacy interests at stake.⁴⁰⁵ Acknowledging that this inquiry required consideration of the efficacy of Michigan’s search policy in meeting the government’s asserted goals,⁴⁰⁶ the Sixth Circuit declared that blanket drug testing was indeed an effective method of addressing drug abuse—for the sole reason that Michigan’s program applied universally to the applicant and recipient population and thus assertedly would catch all abusers in its net.⁴⁰⁷ As discussed above, however, blanket drug testing is actually an ineffective method of identifying drug-related abuse and associated dysfunction.⁴⁰⁸ The overwhelming majority of positive drug tests will be for the casual use of marijuana, which implicates none of the state’s purported concerns.⁴⁰⁹ Conversely, much of the most serious drug abuse will avert detection due to the speed with which such drugs are metabolized following ingestion.⁴¹⁰ Rather than an effective means of addressing the state’s interest in drug-related abuse and crime, blanket drug testing of the

⁴⁰¹ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated*, 319 F. 3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

⁴⁰² *Id.* Notably, recent drug testing legislation has incorporated this rationale. A bill introduced in Louisiana in 2009 declares that the state has a “compelling interest in providing safeguards to eliminate the misappropriation of entitlement benefits.” H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).

⁴⁰³ *Cf.* Note, *supra* note 153, at 2001–02.

⁴⁰⁴ *See* Gustafson, *supra* note 74, at 679.

⁴⁰⁵ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 336–37.

⁴⁰⁶ *Id.* at 336; *see, e.g.*, *Bd. of Educ. v. Earls*, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).

⁴⁰⁷ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 336.

⁴⁰⁸ *See supra* Part II.A.3.

⁴⁰⁹ *See supra* note 250 and accompanying text.

⁴¹⁰ *See supra* notes 244 & 247 and accompanying text.

welfare population is precisely the kind of symbolic empty gesture that the Supreme Court has repudiated as a basis for suspicionless searches in other contexts.⁴¹¹

The results of Michigan's brief period of testing corroborate this conclusion. Of the 258 participants, only twenty-one tested positive for an illicit drug, all but three of whom for marijuana use alone.⁴¹² Thus, of the subject population, only 8.1 percent tested positive for any drug, and only 1.2 percent were identified as using a serious illicit drug.⁴¹³ In the recounting of the Sixth Circuit, however, this data reduced to the following fiction: "[T]he tests so far conducted have resulted in approximately ten percent positive results, demonstrating that the means utilized by Michigan are effective in detecting drug abuse among aid recipients."⁴¹⁴

Positing the efficacy of drug testing, the Sixth Circuit turned next to the countervailing privacy interests and predictably concluded that welfare recipients lack a defensible expectation of bodily privacy.⁴¹⁵ The court based this conclusion on the novel assertion that welfare is a heavily regulated "industry"⁴¹⁶ that carries with it "a correspondingly diminished expectation of privacy."⁴¹⁷ In support of the proposition, the Sixth Circuit cited—but did not quote—a passage from *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association* that referenced the scope of industrial regulation in upholding a drug testing program for certain railroad employees.⁴¹⁸ The actual language of the cited passage, however, demonstrates a quite different and especially unhelpful point: "[T]he expectations of privacy of [the tested] employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of the covered employees."⁴¹⁹ The diminished expectation of privacy in *Skinner*, then, was not a function of regulation generally but of the specific employees' state-supervised obligation to protect public safety—a concern that obviously offers no support for Michigan's blanket drug testing scheme.

The Sixth Circuit thus advanced a proposition bearing no relation to the holding in *Skinner*: that the state's general power to search regulated businesses⁴²⁰ establishes by analogy an equivalent power to search the blood and urine of "heavily regulated" welfare recipients.⁴²¹ It is not an elusive distinction, however, that

⁴¹¹ *Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).

⁴¹² *See supra* notes 262–63 and accompanying text.

⁴¹³ *Id.*

⁴¹⁴ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh'g en banc granted*, *judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

⁴¹⁵ *Id.* at 336–37.

⁴¹⁶ *Id.* at 336.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.* at 337.

⁴¹⁸ *Id.* at 336–37.

⁴¹⁹ *Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n*, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).

⁴²⁰ *See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court*, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

⁴²¹ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 337.

the general acceptance of random inspection programs with respect to the scrutiny of business *premises* does not support a comparable approach as to drug testing of [individuals] Urinalysis in particular is more intrusive, as it involves a “basic offense to human dignity.” This means, for one thing, that random drug testing should be rarely allowed and only upon a showing considerably more substantial than would suffice to support a random business inspection scheme.⁴²²

Needless to say, the suggestion that a welfare recipient’s expectation of bodily privacy is analogous to the privacy of a meat-packing plant is an improbable stretch. Were it not, the Sixth Circuit’s argument would subject virtually anyone receiving a regulated government benefit to suspicionless searches within the administrative scope of the program in question. By unhinging privacy expectations from public safety, as in *Skinner*, and linking them instead to the degree of government regulation, the court’s argument would empower the state to unilaterally disable the Fourth Amendment—since by simply increasing the extent of its regulatory intrusion, government would simultaneously invalidate any countervailing privacy expectation.⁴²³ So construed, the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a perfectly circular nullity.⁴²⁴

The circuit completed its analysis by turning to *Wyman v. James*.⁴²⁵ “Even were we to conclude that the state could not show a special need sufficient to justify the drug testing,” the court declared, plaintiffs would still lose under *Wyman*.⁴²⁶ Reliance on the superseded and idiosyncratic authority of *Wyman* to trump the special-needs analysis, however, is impossible as a matter of ordinary adjudication. First, as the district court noted, *Wyman*’s analysis rests on a variety of assumptions that are irreconcilable with more recent special needs authority, including the proposition that the voluntary nature of a request for assistance generally diminishes a recipient’s expectation of privacy with respect to all related administrative interactions.⁴²⁷ If *Wyman*’s voluntariness analysis were still good law, the Supreme Court’s subsequent special-needs decisions in the employment context would have been reasoned in an entirely different fashion, since in each the individual’s relationship with the state was the product of a voluntary employment arrangement that would have obviated any further inquiry under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.⁴²⁸ Indeed, as the district court noted, the outcome

⁴²² LAFAVE, *supra* note 109, § 10.2(g) (footnote omitted).

⁴²³ See Stuntz, *Fourth Amendment Privacy*, *supra* note 74, at 1268.

⁴²⁴ *Id.*

⁴²⁵ 400 U.S. 309 (1971).

⁴²⁶ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 337.

⁴²⁷ See *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (E.D. Mich. 2000), *aff’d by an equally divided court*, 60 Fed. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); *cf. Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 337.

⁴²⁸ See *Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab*, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); *Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n*, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

itself would have changed in *Chandler v. Miller*, since the activity in question—running for public office—is voluntary as well.⁴²⁹ Similarly, *Wyman*'s reference to the state's interest "in ensuring that the money it gives to recipients is used for its intended purposes"⁴³⁰ echoes the Sixth Circuit's effort to devise a special need on the same fiscal-oversight grounds and suffers from the same insurmountable flaws.⁴³¹ Thus, to accede to *Wyman* in the face of the conflicting requirements of the special-needs doctrine necessarily requires that one accept a poverty-specific Fourth Amendment doctrine which, through *Wyman*, bypasses the protections afforded all others. In dismissing special needs in deference to *Wyman*, this is precisely the conclusion reached by the Sixth Circuit.

Beyond the fact that the special-needs doctrine supersedes *Wyman* and forecloses its reasoning, the *Wyman* analysis itself provides quite limited support for the privacy intrusion at issue in the Michigan litigation. In *Wyman*, caseworkers visited the homes of welfare recipients for the specific purpose of assessing their needs and the welfare of dependent children.⁴³² The *Wyman* Court relied heavily on this rehabilitative objective to uphold the contested practice—emphasizing in particular that the entries were friendly,⁴³³ involved no close inspection of the premises,⁴³⁴ and were designed not to penalize program participants but to aid in their assistance.⁴³⁵ By contrast, drug testing is punitive, invasive, and has only an attenuated connection to either the needs of recipients or the well-being of their children.⁴³⁶ Ignoring these differences, the Sixth Circuit declared that the Michigan program was analogous to *Wyman* because "[t]he State is attempting to insure that children are adequately cared for" and that "ascertaining whether the adult recipients . . . are abusing controlled substances is directly related to that end."⁴³⁷

Having thus mischaracterized all material aspects of the special-needs inquiry and its relationship to *Wyman*, the Sixth Circuit reached the predestined conclusion that Michigan's drug testing program was constitutionally permissible.⁴³⁸ The breadth and magnitude of the court's analytic errors, and their improbable implications if applied beyond the context of welfare administration, highlight the fundamentally different type

⁴²⁹ See *Marchwinski*, 113 F. Supp. at 1143; *Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).

⁴³⁰ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 338; see *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 318–19.

⁴³¹ See *supra* notes 401–03 and accompanying text.

⁴³² *Wyman*, 400 U.S. at 319–20.

⁴³³ *Id.* at 322–23.

⁴³⁴ *Id.* at 320–21 ("snooping in the home [was] forbidden").

⁴³⁵ *Id.* at 317, 319–20; see, e.g., *id.* at 319 ("The emphasis of the [program] is upon the home, upon 'close contact' with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient 'to a condition of self-support,' and upon the relief of his distress.").

⁴³⁶ See *supra* notes 408–13 and accompanying text.

⁴³⁷ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 309 F.3d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2002), *reh'g en banc granted*, *judgment vacated*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see LAFAVE, *supra* note 109, § 10.3 (noting that the *Marchwinski* court "misread *Wyman*").

⁴³⁸ *Marchwinski*, 309 F.3d at 338.

of adjudication at issue here. To make sense of *Marchwinski* in light of the conventional Fourth Amendment, one must accept that the analysis operates outside the constraints of normal doctrine—as illustrated by the court’s desultory effort to reconcile its reasoning with otherwise binding authority. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion inhabits a separate and subconstitutional dimension of the law, demarcated by the court’s instinctive sense that welfare recipients are simply different when it comes to the question of privacy. Within that separate sphere, poverty functions as a proxy for cause and the requirements of individualized suspicion yield to the presumptive culpability of an imagined class of drug addicts, criminals, and welfare queens.

The fate of Michigan’s testing program, however, was still not settled. On plaintiffs’ petition for en banc review, the full Sixth Circuit vacated the panel opinion,⁴³⁹ reheard the matter, and ultimately upheld the district court’s injunction by an equally divided vote announced in a four-sentence order.⁴⁴⁰ That divided and conclusory resolution, while bringing an end to Michigan’s testing program, simply underscored the broader challenges that face indigent litigants asserting privacy interests. The question should not have been remotely close: neither the special-needs doctrine nor *Wyman* provides any principled basis to inflict suspicionless body searches upon the entire population of welfare recipients. The full circuit’s equivocation in addressing the question merely deferred the issue to another day and compounded the sense that few rights come easily to the American poor.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution remains an elusive and often hollow promise for impoverished Americans. Facing doctrine that formally rejects both positive socioeconomic rights as well as any meaningful protection against discriminatory state action, the poor as a class are explicitly deconstitutionalized in relation to the law. Beyond doctrinal indifference, however, the indigent face affirmative bias as well. Across a range of fundamental interests, the judiciary has established a bifurcated system of rights enforcement that denies indigent litigants the full force of otherwise applicable constitutional guarantees. The construed Constitution is thus not merely irrelevant but at times quite hostile to the interests of those most in need of its protection.

This Article proposes a modest step forward in the effort to reset this constitutional relationship: to finally repudiate the longstanding bias that burdens indigent litigants seeking to vindicate basic privacy rights. In a series of decisions stretching from *Wyman* to *Marchwinski* and *Sanchez*, the federal appellate courts have crafted a subconstitutional privacy doctrine that subjects welfare recipients to unique and humiliating intrusions. The decisions reflect the familiar premise that the poor constitute an inherently culpable class and thus that poverty itself may be used as a proxy for cause in

⁴³⁹ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

⁴⁴⁰ *Marchwinski v. Howard*, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

justifying suspicionless intrusions. In rejecting this caricature, the district court in *Marchwinski* took the Constitution at its word and applied the Fourth Amendment on its conventional terms to uphold the poor's basic right to bodily autonomy. The prospect of litigation around the flood of new drug testing proposals may offer the federal judiciary a chance to revisit its choice between these two starkly different visions of the privacy right, and to finally remedy an enduring injustice.

The choice should not be difficult. Embracing neutral adjudication in this context, however, would represent a decisive shift in the judiciary's treatment of impoverished Americans. The opportunity may soon arrive for the courts to take that small but defining step. It will be an occasion not only to redeem a corrupted doctrine but to affirm for the poor the legitimating promise of constitutional adjudication itself.