A Win-Win Scenario: Using the Gold Standard to Improve the World Cup's Green Goal Initiative

Allison A. Kotula
A WIN-WIN SCENARIO: USING THE GOLD STANDARD TO IMPROVE THE WORLD CUP’S GREEN GOAL INITIATIVE

ALLISON A. KOTULA*

INTRODUCTION

The World Cup is undoubtedly the world’s biggest sporting event, with over thirty-two billion viewers worldwide.1 The World Cup consistently has the most media coverage throughout the world of any sporting event.2 With the advent of new viewing technology, the 2010 South African World Cup was credited as “the most popular web event ever.”3 The Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (“ESPN”) reported that over 1.7 million people frequented the ESPN3 website “in the first four days of the soccer tournament alone,” while the ESPN website hosted an additional 1.7 million viewers in the same time frame.4 Furthermore, within the first four days of the tournament, almost one million viewers accessed ESPN’s mobile phone application and viewed clips of the tournament.5

The World Cup Final, held on July 11, 2010 in South Africa, had 24.4 million viewers in the United States of America alone.6 According to the South African Tourism and Migration Report, 721,311 tourists came

---

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, William & Mary School of Law. B.A. 2008, Political Science, Rhodes College. I’d like to thank my family for getting me into soccer, particularly my sister who is one of the biggest soccer fans I know and who is set to be my travel buddy to all future World Cups!

4 Janko Roettgers, World Cup Stats: ESPN3 Scores 1.7M Viewers in 4 Days, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 17, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/world-cup-stats-espn3-scores-17m-viewers-in-4-days-2010-6.
5 Id.
to South Africa in June of 2010, and 680,414 in July of 2010.7 Four years earlier, Germany hosted twenty million fans for the 2006 World Cup.8

Unsurprisingly, the popularity of the World Cup, and the potential for profit, causes the World Cup bidding process to be extraordinarily competitive.9 For example, eleven countries submitted bids to host the 2018 World Cup tournament.10 The Federation Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”) has ultimate say over which country is awarded the opportunity to host the World Cup in any given tournament year,11 and considers various criteria when making that decision.12

Based in Zurich, Switzerland, FIFA was founded in 1904 and is the governing association of international soccer.13 The organization is governed by Swiss law, has 208 member associations, and employs individuals from over thirty-five different nations.14 While its main goal is the “constant improvement of football,” FIFA focuses its endeavors on much more than just the game.15 FIFA uses its organization to promote the importance of global integration by using “the power of football as a tool for social human development, strengthening the work of dozens of initiatives around the globe to support local communities in the areas of peacebuilding [sic], health, social integration, education and more.”16

---

8 Germany’s World Cup Report Hails Economic, Social Success, Deutsche Welle (July 12, 2006), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2263053,00.html.
14 Id.
15 Id.
Included in this sentiment is one of FIFA’s newest criteria for selecting hosts of the World Cup, the Green Goal Initiative. The Green Goal Initiative requires the host country to submit a comprehensive environmental plan detailing how they intend to reduce carbon emissions at the World Cup. This plan was instituted for the first time at the 2006 World Cup located in Germany.

The Green Goal Initiative provided for the offset of all carbon emissions released during the 2006 World Cup, with the overall goal being to make the 2006 World Cup totally carbon-neutral. Offsetting in this context means “investing in projects and measures that reduce GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions (or enhance carbon sinks) from sources outside the system boundaries.” After large success with this program at the 2006 World Cup, FIFA continued to encourage and expect environmentally friendly standards when it selected South Africa for the location of World Cup 2010.

FIFA and the host country attempt this carbon neutrality in two major ways: first, through the completion of “Gold Standard” projects in developing nations, and second, by encouraging (and essentially mandating) the host nation and host cities to participate in green building standards. These standards largely require and target the “economical use of water, the reduction of waste, an increase in energy efficiency, sustainable transport and climate neutrality.”

While the completion of Gold Standard projects is funded entirely by FIFA and other private organizations, the expense burden of green
building and infrastructure lies primarily with the host country and local municipalities, a number totaling more than six billion dollars in South Africa, and roughly 1.4 billion euro in Germany. This initial number is only increased by the millions of dollars it takes to simply produce a World Cup bid. Also, recent selections of larger and less-developed nations causes the amount of money required to invest in infrastructure improvements to reach astounding totals.

Despite the overall environmental benefits of the Green Goal Initiative, this Note argues that while the carbon emission offset program of the Green Goal Initiative is a worthwhile expenditure for FIFA, other private companies who invest, and the recipients of Gold Standard Projects, the “voluntary” green building standards do not benefit those host countries that have no reasonable expectation of continual use of the stadiums in the future, like South Africa. While Germany has Bundesliga (Germany’s primary professional soccer league) operations to ensure that there is continual use of stadiums to offset the initial expenditure of green building, a country like South Africa does not.

Moreover, a relatively poor country like South Africa, which has a per capita gross domestic product (“GDP”) of only $10,400 (in U.S. dollars) in 2009 compared to Germany’s $34,500 in the same year, should not be expected to contribute as much of its own capital to green building as those countries who are better developed and more economically stable. This is especially true considering the most recent 2010 estimate of South Africa’s per capita GDP is $10,700, only $300 more than it was before the

---

30 Humphreys, supra note 9.
31 See discussion infra Part III.
33 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
tourney.36 In fact, South Africa’s per capita GDP real growth rate has only increased by 2.8% in 2010, ranking it 129th in comparison to the rest of the world.37 This would suggest that hosting a World Cup tournament creates negligible immediate economic benefits.38 While the hosting of a World Cup tournament is ultimately voluntary, the potential economic benefits of the tournament should be counterbalanced against the expense of hosting a tournament in a country that will have to spend billions of dollars in infrastructure and improvements. This consideration is especially important considering that the economic advantages of hosting a World Cup tournament may be relatively short-lived.39

As it stands now, the Gold Standard projects and the carbon savings made from green building are used in conjunction to offset the projected carbon emissions of the World Cup tournament.40 However, much of the success of the Green Goal Initiative in the 2006 World Cup tournament was due to the reliance on Bundesliga operations to secure long-term uses of the newly rebuilt and modernized stadiums after the World Cup was over.41 In fact, one reason the 2006 World Cup tournament was considered to be a totally carbon-neutral event was because carbon savings would accumulate over the next several years as Germany used the stadiums for normal Bundesliga operations, and these projected Bundesliga operations were used as Germany’s “business as usual” standard.42 Future resource savings could then apply retroactively to carbon emissions of the 2006 World Cup tournament.43 Despite Germany’s unique situation regarding consistent, ongoing use of the stadiums and a relatively stable economy, the 2006 Green Goal Initiative is used as a model for future World Cup tournaments.44 Thus, countries like South Africa and Brazil are expected to achieve similar results, even though their economic strength

36 South Africa Economy, supra note 34.
37 Id.
38 Palash R. Gosh, World Cup’s Impact on South Africa Likely Muted in Short Term, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 15, 2010, 3:40 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/28748/20100615/south-africa.htm (discussing how the main economic benefits of hosting the 2010 World Cup tournament occurred in the “preparation phase” and arguing that perhaps the money invested may have been more validly spent on ridding the country of problems such as AIDS, poverty, and unemployment).
39 Id.
40 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 30.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 32; see also infra note 122 (explaining the “business as usual” standard).
43 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 11, 46.
44 Id. at 102.
and reasonable expectations of continual use of the stadiums are exceedingly disparate from that of Germany.\(^{45}\)

A more sound policy would be to either have FIFA proportionally subsidize the essentially mandated building of environmentally efficient stadiums by donating to the host country, or allow the host country to collect the carbon credits accumulated through the construction of environmentally efficient stadiums and sell them on the voluntary carbon market to finance their own domestic projects, instead of using them to offset the World Cup.\(^{46}\) In doing this, the host country would still be required to calculate its “business as usual” standard,\(^{47}\) but would use these carbon emissions savings for necessary domestic improvements as opposed to offsetting the tournament itself.\(^{48}\) Thus, in order to make the World Cup a carbon-neutral event, FIFA and other private companies would need to take on more Gold Standard projects, either within the host country or in other developing nations around the world. This would enable developing nations to improve their infrastructure according to modern standards without bankrupting the local economy, allow economically disadvantaged countries to reap the economic benefits of hosting a World Cup tournament, and would still allow FIFA the opportunity to reach its goal of “touch[ing] the world, [and] build[ing] a better future.”\(^{49}\) This policy would also work to ameliorate the inherent environmental inconsistencies of building state-of-the-art facilities in nations without consistent, ongoing uses for such stadiums.

Part I of this Note will discuss the structure of the Green Goal Initiative and its implementation in both the 2006 and 2010 World Cup tournaments. The implementation of the Initiative will account for and describe the carbon emissions measurement used during the respective tournaments. Part II of this Note will research these projected carbon emissions savings.

\(^{45}\text{See infra Part III.}\)

\(^{46}\text{See STAHL ET AL., supra note 2 (explaining the methods used for carbon neutrality in Germany for the 2006 World Cup and how future World Cup tournaments have and will continue to follow these methods).}\)

\(^{47}\text{The business as usual standard is calculated by comparing the projected carbon emissions of the tournament using environmentally efficient stadiums with the hypothetical projections of the same tournament if these new standards were not put into place. See ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 52.}\)


\(^{49}\text{FIFA Brand—Our Commitment, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/mission.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).}\)
emissions measurements, discuss the various Gold Standard Projects implemented by FIFA, as well as discuss the details regarding the green building expectations of both Germany and South Africa in preparation for the World Cup tournament, i.e., those primary methods used to offset the projected carbon emissions of the tournament. Part III of this Note will discuss what the Green Goal Initiative means for future World Cup tournaments and their host countries, specifically Brazil in 2014, Russia in 2018, and Qatar in 2022. Finally, Part IV of this Note will suggest various other means of making the Green Goal Initiative a more fair and flexible program for those under-developed countries that have far less economic capabilities and a lack of ongoing business ventures that could possibly offset the initial expenditure of a World Cup tournament.

I. STRUCTURE OF THE GREEN GOAL INITIATIVE

Because the Green Goal Initiative is a relatively new program, the most effective way to determine its structure is to consider how it has been implemented in both Germany and South Africa. After a World Cup bid acceptance, FIFA, the Host City, and the Local Organizing Committee, pursuant to the Host City agreement, agree that it is the responsibility of the Host City to ensure that any adverse impact on the environment as a result of the hosting and staging of the Competitions in the Host City is minimized [sic], and adopt the principles of environmental sustainability and protection when considering issues such as water usage, energy consumption, air and ground transportation, procurement, construction and upgrading of infrastructure, waste management, tourism and the protection of environmentally sensitive areas affected by the Competitions.

---

52 Id.
53 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (stating that the concept originated in the summer of 2001).
54 FED’N INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS’N, supra note 11, at 37.
Thus, while the Green Goal Initiative was advertised as voluntary,\(^{55}\) there were “Minimum Environmental Standards for Green Goal 2010” that required, pursuant to this contract provision, each Host City to offset at least five percent of the carbon emissions during the tournament.\(^{56}\) It is the financial responsibility of the municipalities, therefore, to meet these objectives.\(^{57}\) Furthermore, each host city is not simply responsible for the building or renovation of official match stadiums, but each is also responsible for at least four “Venue-Specific Training Sites . . . located as close as possible to the respective Venue-Specific Team Hotel chosen by FIFA, but at a maximum of a twenty (20) minutes [sic] drive from the respective Venue-Specific Team Hotel.”\(^{58}\)

In 2001, the Executive Board of the Organizing Committee of the World Cup made the decision to incorporate a comprehensive environmental plan into the tournament.\(^{59}\) In so doing, it commissioned the Öko-Institut, a leading research team in Europe focused on sustainability,\(^{60}\) and the World Wildlife Fund of Germany, an independent foundation committed to conservation,\(^{61}\) to construct a plan that would help Germany attain carbon neutrality during the World Cup tournament.\(^{62}\) The plan focused on various factors, including “environmental objectives for waste, energy, transport and water; and with regard to global climate protection.”\(^{63}\)

In constructing Germany’s environmental plan, the organizations only accounted for the offset of those carbon emissions that would occur within the boundaries of Germany.\(^{64}\) Thus, the plan did not account for international travel to and from Germany for the World Cup.\(^{65}\) Instead, the German plan in 2006 calculated expected emissions by considering the following sources:

- energy use for accommodation; energy use at stadia and stadia precincts; embodied emissions in stadium con-

\(^{55}\) StaHL Et Al., supra note 2, at 6.
\(^{56}\) Econ Pöyry, supra note 21, at 21.
\(^{57}\) See id.
\(^{58}\) Fed’n Internationale De Football Ass’n, supra note 11, at 15–16.
\(^{59}\) StaHL Et Al., supra note 2, at 9.
\(^{60}\) The Institute, Öko-Institut E.V., http://www.oeko.de/the_institute/dok/594.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
\(^{62}\) StaHL Et Al., supra note 2, at 9.
\(^{63}\) Id.
\(^{64}\) Sustainable Energy Africa, supra note 26, at 19.
\(^{65}\) Id.
struction and materials; inter-city transport and intra-
city transport.\textsuperscript{66}

Because international travel was not included in the carbon offset study of the 2006 World Cup, no attempts were made to offset the carbon emissions of this travel.\textsuperscript{67}

The 2010 South Africa World Cup, however, broadened its scope of emission calculations, per the insistence of stakeholders involved in the study.\textsuperscript{68} In measuring the projected emissions of travel to and from South Africa, the study divided the attendees into two separate groups: the Spectator Group and the Special Travel Group.\textsuperscript{69} The Spectator Group included those individuals who held tickets for the matches, and those individuals who did not have tickets but came to South Africa during a specific time frame: “one day before the start of the tournament to one day after the World Cup final,” totaling only thirty-two days.\textsuperscript{70}

Conversely, the Special Travel Group included any member of the “FIFA family”\textsuperscript{71} involved in the matches, including referees, teams, delegates of the Local Organizing Committee, etc.\textsuperscript{72} This group’s international travel was calculated using a broader time frame: twelve days prior to the start of the tournament on June 11, 2010, to thirteen days after the final match on July 11, 2010, totaling fifty-five days.\textsuperscript{73} Any individual who was not a member of the FIFA family and who traveled to South Africa outside of the thirty-two day time frame was not included in the carbon offset study, as they were deemed to be on vacation in South Africa and not visiting primarily for the World Cup tournament.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, the amount of carbon emissions measured in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (t\textsubscript{CO2e}) projected for just international travel to South Africa totaled 1,856,589,\textsuperscript{75} a staggering sixty-seven percent of the total projected emissions.\textsuperscript{76} Though the measurements of expected carbon emissions are likely imperfect, and perhaps underestimated given the limited time frame, there do not seem

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{ECON PöYRY}, \textit{supra} note 21, at 16.
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Id.} at 42.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at 16.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id.} at 19.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{ECON PöYRY}, \textit{supra} note 21, at 19.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id.} at 42.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{ECON PöYRY}, \textit{supra} note 21, at 42.
to be any arguments suggesting that the World Cup emissions projections do not accurately satisfy the “business-as-usual” standards.77

Once the factors to be considered regarding carbon emissions calculations were determined for World Cup 2006, the Organizing Committee and the Öko-Institut began working with the host cities to implement various environmental measures focused around offsetting.78 The host cities in Germany set up working groups committed to the Green Goal Initiative, with the specific goal of using the program to develop and promote local environmental projects.79 These projects included the “installation of solar plants, waste avoidance measures and the promotion of public transport.”80

In September of 2005, the program in Germany began receiving outside support, resulting in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Organizing Committee and the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”),81 an organization created as a branch of the United Nations in 1972 that aids countries in the implementation of environmental policies.82 This Memorandum stated that UNEP would commit itself to aiding in the realization of the Green Goal Initiative in Germany.83 Shortly thereafter, FIFA, FIFA’s official partners (e.g., the Coca-Cola Company and Deutsche Telekom), and other businesses committed themselves to the realization of the Green Goal Initiative.84

By the time these other entities had signed on to the Green Goal Initiative, the construction and renovation of stadiums in Germany had already begun.85 As a result, the amount of environmental operations that could be put into effect regarding green building for the Cup was limited.86 Those factors that were implemented at this late stage in the construction focused on energy and water efficiency.87 More specifically, four of the

---

77 See, e.g., id. at 21 (“Many of the local greening initiatives undertaken by cities as part of the Green Goal 2010 programme will be beyond [Business-As-Usual], so they would potentially reduce the carbon footprint.”).
78 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 10.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
83 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 10.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
twelve stadiums were equipped with “rainwater cisterns and . . . water-saving sanitary fittings and systems.”

A. Water Conservation Initiatives

Water conservation was one of the main focuses of the 2006 Green Goal Initiative, with the ultimate goal being to reduce the consumption of water in the stadiums by at least twenty percent. This was largely achieved through the “installation of dry urinals, water-saving toilets and water-flow regulators.” Other measures were also used to achieve this goal, including the “desealing of land, the water-permeable paving of open spaces and the greening of roofs.”

In South Africa, on the other hand, the main goal for water reduction was minimizing the use of potable water by finding an alternative source of water for the irrigation of the Green Point Common, the location of Cape Town Stadium. This endeavor alone cost R200,000 from South Africa’s 2010 Operating Budget, not to mention an additional R15,000,000 was needed for its general construction. The City of Cape Town hoped, however, that this irrigation endeavor would continue to conserve water in the future. South Africa also marketed, using R150,000 of the 2010 Operating Budget, the “Drink tap water campaign,” encouraging tourists to drink tap water as opposed to bottled water during the tournament.

One main reason why the offsetting of carbon emissions through water consumption in Germany was considered to be a success was that a large part of the consumption of the World Cup would be offset by only two years worth of Bundesliga operations, a factor that South Africa cannot include in its own offset program as it has no comparable league. Although South Africa hopes that the irrigation of Green Point Park will

88 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 10.
89 Id. at 11.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 GREEN GOAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 27, at 14.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 57.
95 Id. at 35.
96 Id.
97 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
98 SOUTH AFRICAN FOOTBALL ASS’N, http://www.safa.net/index.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (noting that the SAFA was only formed in 1991).
continue to produce water savings in the future, any stadium is only given a lifetime of thirty years,99 and the estimated use of the stadium following the World Cup only amounts to thirty days per year.100 Thus, an irrigation project that cost the host city of Cape Town over R15,000,000 (not including the cost of building the stadium itself) was designed for a stadium that was used for only eight World Cup matches and will only be used a projected thirty times a year.101

B. Waste Avoidance

Another large portion of the 2006 Green Goal Initiative was waste avoidance,102 with the ultimate goal being to reduce waste consumption by twenty percent.103 This was done through a variety of campaigns specifically designed to reduce waste at the concession stands during the Cup and through the reuse of building materials used to construct the “International Broadcasting Centre” in Munich.104 This goal was also largely achieved, with an estimated waste reduction of seventeen percent.105 Not included in the official costs of implementing the Green Goal Initiative were the waste management changes made to parking lots, roads to and from the stadiums, and locations where the public could view ongoing World Cup events (other than matches).106 Thus, German municipalities were encouraged to contribute, at their own expense, additional capital to projects that were not specifically called for in the Green Goal Initiative, even though these projects would not be used when totaling the offset of the emissions.107

The South African 2010 World Cup also had waste management as one of its main environmental sustainability factors.108 Much like in the 2006 World Cup, South Africa branded recycling bins with the Green Goal logo in an effort to promote tourist access to recycling as well as to

---

99 ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 36.
100 Id.
102 STAHLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 54.
107 STAHLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 54.
108 GREEN GOAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 27, at 37.
promote awareness of the Green Goal Initiative.\textsuperscript{109} The total expense for
the South African waste reduction portion of the Green Goal Initiative was R1,160,000.\textsuperscript{110}

C. Energy Efficiency Plans

The Green Goal Initiative energy efficiency plan was the most
expensive and expansive portion of both the 2006 and 2010 World Cup
tournaments,\textsuperscript{111} especially considering the stadiums used in the World
Cup consumed roughly 3.5 million kilowatts of electricity and roughly 4
million kilowatts of heat per year.\textsuperscript{112} In both Germany and South Africa,
these energy requirements may vary depending on how often other events
are held in the stadiums.\textsuperscript{113} Furthermore, because the media coverage at
the World Cup is so high, the host country must build an International
Broadcasting Center, as well as various other temporary facilities at their
own expense,\textsuperscript{114} and factor those energy requirements into their offset
goals.\textsuperscript{115} The electricity expenditure for lodging accommodations for ticket
holders was also factored into the energy emissions;\textsuperscript{116} however, this num-
ber was roughly three times higher in South Africa than in Germany due
to geographic location and comparative distances between games, as well
as South Africa’s lack of high speed rails.\textsuperscript{117} It was estimated that during
the four-week Germany 2006 World Cup tournament, the total consump-
tion of energy would amount to thirteen million kilowatts,\textsuperscript{118} thus suggest-
ing that the energy consumption in South Africa would be much higher.\textsuperscript{119}

In its construction and renovation of stadiums for the 2006 World
Cup, Germany used the “most modern and energy-efficient technology”\textsuperscript{120}
available. The incorporation of these technologies was not always factored
into the country’s emissions offset figures,\textsuperscript{121} however, as they were not

\textsuperscript{109} Id. at 52.
\textsuperscript{110} Id.
\textsuperscript{111} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 25; see also ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 40.
\textsuperscript{112} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 62.
\textsuperscript{113} Id.
\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 52.
\textsuperscript{115} Id. at 26–27.
\textsuperscript{116} ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 40.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 41.
\textsuperscript{118} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 66.
\textsuperscript{119} ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 41.
\textsuperscript{120} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 62.
\textsuperscript{121} Id.
considered a deviation from the “business as usual” standard.122 Thus, in order to offset emissions through green building, it is necessary for the host country to go beyond “conventional techniques and activities” typically used in the construction or renovation of new stadiums.123 While these renovations are largely funded by the host city of any particular stadium,124 occasionally Green Goal partners aided in the endeavor by donating “environmentally-friendly technology.”125 For example, in the 2006 World Cup, Coca-Cola donated 2000 energy efficient refrigerators to all twelve host cities of Germany.126

The host country also focuses on renewable energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.127 In Germany specifically, the installation of the three largest solar plants in the country on the roofs of three of the twelve stadiums will help produce electricity for years following the 2006 World Cup.128 In reducing its energy consumption, South Africa not only used green building technologies in the construction and renovation of stadiums,129 but also performed various other projects in and around the host cities.130 For example, at a cost of R70,000 (roughly $10,000 American dollars)131 a fleet of “eco-taxis” was put into operation by June of 2010.132 These eco-taxis would have low fuel consumption and would be branded with the Green Goal 2010 logo to promote awareness of the environmental initiative.133

D. Transport Initiatives

Germany hosted some twenty million fans for the 2006 FIFA World Cup tournament.134 As already discussed, Germany did not consider

---

122 See ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 52 (defining the business-as-usual standard for an offset project as “a new project that would not have happened without the additional revenue from carbon credits”).
123 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 63.
124 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
125 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 64.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 65; see also SUSTAINABLE ENERGY AFRICA, supra note 26, at 4.
128 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 65.
129 GREEN GOAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 27, at 13.
130 Id. at 6–10.
132 GREEN GOAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 27, at 22.
133 Id.
134 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
international travel in offsetting its transportation-related carbon emissions,\textsuperscript{135} thus making its estimated carbon footprint six times lower than its 2010 counterpart of South Africa.\textsuperscript{136} Even considering Germany’s superior transportation infrastructure, the German Federal Ministry of Transport still totaled the money spent on infrastructure-related measures for the tournament to be more than 802 million euros.\textsuperscript{137} Despite the high price of transport improvements, transport was still the biggest contributor to carbon emissions during the 2006 World Cup.\textsuperscript{138} These measures ranged from the construction of new routes (for example, extension of a city-rail line 1 in Cologne) to improving the capacity and efficiency of particular routes (for example, city-rail services to the Olympia Stadium in Berlin) and improving bus and tram stops (for example, alterations to platforms to accommodate longer trams at Gelsenkirchen main station).\textsuperscript{139}

Also, train operations were increased during the time period of the World Cup to prevent the local municipalities from having to buy additional vehicles.\textsuperscript{140} Germany also offered what was called the “KombiTicket,”\textsuperscript{141} a combined ticket which allowed ticket holders to travel cost-free to and from the stadiums on match days if they used public transportation.\textsuperscript{142} This program also allowed some 15,000 World Cup volunteers to travel free of charge on days that they were working.\textsuperscript{143}

Unlike Germany, the host cities in South Africa were extremely distant from one another, with the shortest distance between any two stadiums being twenty kilometers (Hub to Johannesburg),\textsuperscript{144} and the greatest distance being 1981 kilometers (Cape Town to Durban).\textsuperscript{145} With the numbers of arrivals for all host cities being totaled at 2,896,699

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{137} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 72.
\item \textsuperscript{138} GREEN GOAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 27, at 1.
\item \textsuperscript{139} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 72.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Id. at 73.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Id. at 74.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{144} ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 27.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Id.
\end{itemize}
individuals, South Africa’s need to remedy its lack of transportation infrastructure undoubtedly accounted for a large amount of its projected carbon emissions (524,538 tCO₂e or nearly twenty percent). South Africa invested over R40,000,000,000 to increase accessibility in and around the host cities for the World Cup games.

II. GOLD STANDARD PROJECTS AND CARBON NEUTRALITY

In Germany, the first step to carbon neutrality was calculating the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that would have to be offset as a result of the World Cup tournament. Using this calculation, German experts then considered various “climate protection projects,” making the ultimate decision to focus on those projects that would benefit under-developed nations as opposed to those projects that might benefit Germany domestically.

In doing so, Germany followed the “clean development mechanism (CDM),” a mechanism set out for in the Kyoto Protocol. The main goal of the project selection process was to find projects that had “a large environmental effect while also offering great social benefits to the local population.” Thus, to ensure that these regulations are met, the Green Goal Programme only uses “Gold Standard” projects. The Gold Standard, created in 2003 chiefly by the World Wildlife Federation, is the safest type of CDM investment as the “Gold Standard voluntary credits are beyond reproach—[they are] independently validated, clearly additional, and promise sustainable development benefits in a renewable energy economy.” As a result, Gold Standard credits consistently garner premium rates when sold on the carbon market.

Germany decided to focus one of its projects on Southeast Asia, in an attempt to counteract damage that was done in the 2004 tsunami.

146 Id. at 32.
147 Id. at 42.
149 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 86.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 86.
156 Id.
157 STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 89.
Specifically, the German Football Association and FIFA funded “Family Clean Energy Packages”\textsuperscript{158} in India, which allowed for the construction of biogas units which both lowered greenhouse gas emissions and incidences of respiratory illnesses in the country.\textsuperscript{159} Money was also spent to repair roughly one hundred residences in the area.\textsuperscript{160}

Germany and FIFA also decided on several other Gold Standard projects, including two projects in South Africa.\textsuperscript{161} The first provided a new boiler to a citrus fruit farm in Kruger National Park, and the second provided a gas engine to a local sewage plant near future host city Johannesburg.\textsuperscript{162} These projects totaled over 1.2 million euros, and funding was split between the German Football Association, FIFA, Deutsche Telekom, and PlasticsEurope.\textsuperscript{163} These projects reportedly accounted for 100,000 tonnes of greenhouse gases, helping to make the 2006 World Cup entirely carbon neutral.\textsuperscript{164}

Because South Africa’s carbon emissions were estimated to be so much higher than Germany’s were four years prior (900,000 tCO$_2$e in South Africa compared to 100,000 tCO$_2$e in Germany),\textsuperscript{165} the selection of offset projects was that much more important. Acknowledging the need to keep administrative costs low,\textsuperscript{166} South Africa decided that doing several small-scale offset projects would not be as effective as doing a few large-scale projects.\textsuperscript{167} The country hypothesized that given the large amount of carbon to offset, even if the carbon offset results were considered over a ten year period, the program would need to conduct roughly “8 to 16 projects . . . to offset the domestic footprint, and another 13 to 26 projects to offset emissions from international travel.”\textsuperscript{168} Thus, South Africa decided to focus on domestic projects.\textsuperscript{169}

Unlike in the 2006 World Cup campaign, South Africa decided to use a voluntary market standard as opposed to a CDM standard,\textsuperscript{170} despite the fact that “the CDM is the most robust and well developed carbon

\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 90.
\textsuperscript{159} Id.
\textsuperscript{160} Id.
\textsuperscript{161} Id.
\textsuperscript{162} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 91.
\textsuperscript{163} STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 92.
\textsuperscript{164} Id.
\textsuperscript{165} ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 59.
\textsuperscript{166} Id. at 58.
\textsuperscript{167} Id. at 59.
\textsuperscript{168} Id.
\textsuperscript{169} Id. at 60.
\textsuperscript{170} ECON PÖYRY, supra note 221, at 60.
mitigation project certification system.”171 South Africa’s primary reason for doing this was to lower the overall transaction cost of the projects,172 considering that it was found in the 2006 World Cup that “private sponsors and donors did not want their carbon offsets funding to be used to cover overheads and administration,”173 necessitating that South Africa bear these costs itself. In addition, several teams and team sponsors involved in the 2010 World Cup volunteered to offset their own emissions, amounting to a savings of roughly 6050 tCO₂e.174

There are tradeoffs, however, to operating on the voluntary market. For example, while voluntary credits are typically more flexible,175 “this flexibility may come at the cost of reduced credibility and insufficient quality.”176 This is largely due to the fact that voluntary markets do not have uniform project standards, resulting in some organizations employing “higher standards of additionality [sic] and sustainable development than demanded by the CDM” and some “employ[ing] less rigorous project standards and verification methods.”177 The voluntary carbon market is also much smaller than the CDM market, though it has been theorized that the voluntary market will expand in the coming years.178

III. FUTURE WORLD CUP TOURNAMENTS AND THE GREEN GOAL INITIATIVE

A. Brazil 2014

On October 30, 2007, FIFA announced that the 2014 World Cup tournament will be held in Brazil.179 Brazil is one of only five countries that has hosted the tournament twice,180 with the last time being in

171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 56.
174 Christy van der Merwe, Greening Initiatives Launched to Offset World Cup Carbon Emissions, ENG’G NEWS (June 8, 2010), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/greening-initiatives-launched-to-offset-world-cup-carbon-emissions-2010-06-08.
176 Id.
177 Id.
Even though Brazil has some existing stadiums, the estimated cost of remodeling these stadiums and building new stadiums in the twelve host cities totals roughly 2.8 billion American dollars. In addition, the country intends to update the airports in ten of the twelve host cities, resulting in the additional expense of up to 4.9 billion American dollars. The World Cup selection was also the impetus for the country to begin the creation of a high-speed rail system that would connect several of the host cities to one another, costing them an additional 19.5 billion American dollars. The deadline of this endeavor, however, was pushed back and is not scheduled to be finished until 2016.

It is of note that Brazil has its own national soccer league, as well as several other leagues, consisting of more than four hundred teams total, with soccer undoubtedly being the most popular sport in the country. Brazil has won a record five World Cup tournaments, with the last one being in 2002. Considering the popularity and abundance of soccer games in Brazil, and the continued success of the national team, it makes a great deal of sense to upgrade the facilities and infrastructure of the country in preparation for a World Cup tournament. Much like in Germany, it is assured that the stadiums will be used again, and with some frequency.

Hosting such an expensive tournament, however, becomes less advantageous when one considers that Brazil’s per capita GDP in 2010 was 

---

181 Id.
183 Jeremy Lemer & Andrew Downie, World Cup Lands Brazil with Airport Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed8d2196-f348-11df-a4fa-00144feab49a.html#axzz1EhLyyza7.
185 Id.
186 See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
only $10,800. Additionally, Brazil is the fourth largest country in the world, resulting in the greatest distance between host cities being 3100 kilometers (almost 2000 miles). Because of the nation’s size, domestic travel for the World Cup will likely result in at least an equivalent carbon offset emission figure to that of the 2010 World Cup, mandating more money spent on carbon offset programs. This reality, combined with the multibillion dollar infrastructure commitment, suggests that the 2014 World Cup will again require a huge investment by a country that has a relatively weak economy.

Furthermore, Brazil is already behind schedule for all of its stadiums, and the situation involving the construction of its airports has been deemed “frightening.” Brazil is likely going to make the improvements to its airports modular, such that they can be taken apart after the tournament. Thus, the modernization of infrastructure that Brazil could have hoped to gain from improvements made in preparation for the Cup is unlikely to have a lasting effect, as the country is cutting corners to prepare for the increased demand it will face in three short years.

Brazil is a good example of a country that would benefit greatly from a change in FIFA’s World Cup policy. The country is currently unable to keep up with deadlines, causing people to doubt whether the country will be prepared for the World Cup tournament. There are widespread

195 See supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
196 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Though using GDP per capita as an indicator of wealth has its flaws, it is “the standard means of measuring a country’s economic growth.” See Lizzy Davies, Sarkozy Attacks Focus on Economic Growth, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 14, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/14/sarkozy-attacks-gdp-focus. Also, Brazil ranks 102nd in GDP per capita. See Brazil Economy, supra note 191.
197 See supra note 191.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Report: Brazil Needs to Improve Upgrade Pace for 2014 World Cup, supra note 189.
concerns as to how effectively the Brazilian government is spending public money. At least one stadium “has yet to have a stadium project approved by FIFA even though the deadline from the governing body expired last year,” while another stadium is considered to be an “incomplete and deficient” project,” and yet another will be “rarely used by local teams after the tournament, despite having a seating capacity of 71,000.” Brazil’s economy is already relatively weak, even without the “very great risk” of [the] misuse of public funds.

Thus, while FIFA’s ultimate goal of an environmentally friendly World Cup is undoubtedly honorable, a country that can hardly afford the basic improvements (both monetarily and in terms of time) should not be expected to contribute more of its own capital to making the tournament carbon-neutral. Rather, FIFA should subsidize these efforts or come forward with additional Gold Standard projects, such that the country can focus on sustainable development rather than a “quick fix” that will simply make it ready for a World Cup tournament.

B. Russia 2018

Recently, it was announced that the 2018 World Cup tournament will be held in Russia. In preparation for the World Cup bidding process, the country indicated that it would be willing to spend upwards of ten billion dollars on preparing for the tournament. In hosting the tournament, Russia theorized that at least ten host cities with suitable infrastructure would be required. The bid itself, however, indicated only one stadium could be considered ready, at the time of the bid, for the World Cup tournament. Thus, the country promised to build or renovate an additional sixteen stadiums in thirteen cities.

---

201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Brazil Economy, supra note 191.
205 Report: Brazil Needs to Improve Upgrade Pace for 2014 World Cup, supra note 189.
206 See, e.g., Downie, supra note 197 (showing that Brazil is considering temporary infrastructure improvements despite its need to modernize).
209 Id.
211 Id.
Though several of the host cities are already relatively developed, others will require additional infrastructure, including airports, hotels, highways, shopping malls, etc.212 Though the bid originally envisioned a ten billion dollar commitment,213 analysts are hypothesizing that the amount of money required to fulfill these goals will total nearly fifty billion dollars.214 The bulk of the money, however, will not be put toward the construction of stadiums.215 Rather, the country will spend an estimated thirty-five billion dollars to create a functional highway and transportation system.216

It is of note, however, that some of these stadiums were already planned on being constructed, as Russia was selected to host the 2014 Olympic Winter Games.217 Russia also has an ongoing soccer league, the Russian Premier League, currently with sixteen teams.218 This typically results in roughly thirty games a year in the country at the professional level, as each team plays one another twice.219 The country’s national team is also internationally ranked.220 Even though Russia does have a somewhat consistent ongoing use for the stadiums,221 it still cannot be considered an ideal location for a World Cup tournament, simply due to its lack of economic strength and the sheer size of the country.222

The greatest distance between any two host cities in Russia totals roughly 2500 kilometers (1550 miles).223 This is more than 500 kilometers greater than the greatest distance between host cities in South Africa.224 Considering that travel between host cities accounted for a large part of

212 Id.
213 Supra note 208 and accompanying text.
214 Zubko, supra note 210.
215 Id.
216 Id.
221 See supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text.
222 Russia and Qatar Concerns in World Cup Bid Reports, ESPN (Nov. 16, 2010), http://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=843330&sec=global&cc=5901.
224 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
the carbon emissions in the South African World Cup,\textsuperscript{225} it is inevitable that carbon emissions released for travel in a larger country will exceed that of the 2010 campaign. Thus, the cost of offsetting the World Cup itself will be correspondingly higher, provided FIFA continues to mandate adherence to the Green Goal Initiative. This reality is especially staggering considering that the per capita GDP in Russia in 2010 was $15,900.\textsuperscript{226} Thus, while it can be argued that the infrastructure improvements the country will make as a result of the World Cup bid acceptance are inherently advantageous, completing what could be potentially a fifty billion dollar project\textsuperscript{227} within seven years could result in a crippling amount of debt that no World Cup tournament could ever offset.\textsuperscript{228}

C. Qatar 2022

Finally, FIFA announced Qatar as the host of World Cup 2022.\textsuperscript{229} While there was some backlash to what many considered to be an odd choice,\textsuperscript{230} it could arguably be FIFA’s most prudent decision yet, at least when considering the environmental effects of the tournament. Barring the climate considerations facing a World Cup tournament in Qatar,\textsuperscript{231} as well as any uncertainty regarding the overall political climate of the area,\textsuperscript{232} the area itself is geographically conducive to a World Cup tournament.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{225} See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{227} Zubko, supra note 210.
\textsuperscript{228} See Dennis Coates, World Cup Economics: What Americans Need to Know about a U.S. World Cup Bid 4 (Working Paper No. 10-121), available at http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_10_121.pdf (showing that hosting a World Cup has questionable economic benefits for the host country).
\textsuperscript{229} Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{231} The temperature in Qatar during June and July (the months when the tournament is traditionally held) is typically 106 degrees Fahrenheit. See Average Weather for Doha, THE WEATHER CHANNEL, http://www.weather.com/outlook/travel/business/traveler/wxclimatology/monthly/graph/QAXX0003 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
Qatar is only roughly 4400 square miles, making it smaller in size than Connecticut.\footnote{Qatar—Location, Size, and Extent, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Qatar-LOCATION-SIZE-AND-EXTENT.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).} Furthermore, the chairman of Qatar’s bid for the World cup and member of the royal family, Sheikh Mohammed bin Hammam bin Khalifa Al Thani, has assured the world that all of the World Cup games will be played within the borders of the country.\footnote{Joanne Bladd, Qatar Must Host 2022 World Cup Alone, Says Bin Hammam, ARABIAN BUS. (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-must-host-2022-world-cup-alone-says-bin-hammam-377300.html.} Thus, in terms of domestic travel, the carbon offset emissions should be slight compared to Brazil and Russia, countries that are roughly 750 and 1500 times the size of Qatar, respectively.\footnote{These figures were determined by dividing the size of Brazil and Russia by the size of Qatar. \textit{See supra} note 192 (detailing the size of Brazil); \textit{see also} Russia—Location, Size, and Extent, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies /Europe/Russia.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (detailing the size of Russia); \textit{see also supra} note 234 (detailing the size of Qatar).}

Despite Qatar’s relatively convenient size, the country is still, at present, ill-equipped to handle a World Cup tournament. Currently, Qatar has only three stadiums, all of which will have to be expanded in order to hold crowds of World Cup magnitude.\footnote{FIFA World Cup Stadiums, Qatar: Architecture Information, E-ARCHITECT (Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.e-architect.co.uk/qatar/fifa_world_cup_stadiums.htm.} In addition to these stadium renovations, Qatar will have to build nine new stadiums in time for the tournament.\footnote{Id.} The cost of these stadiums is drastically increased by Qatar’s decision to alleviate hundred degree temperatures by installing air conditioning systems in each stadium.\footnote{Id.} While at first glance the idea of air-conditioned stadiums might seem at odds with the Green Goal Initiative’s objective of carbon-neutrality, Qatar plans to use solar technology to achieve this end.\footnote{Rob Anderson, Qatar’s World Cup Bid: What is ‘Green’ Air Conditioning?!?, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/blogs/the_angle /2010/12/qatars_world_cu.html.}

Specifically, solar thermal collectors on the stadium roof will transfer and store energy which on match days will chill water, creating cold air that will be delivered into the stadium and on to the pitch through slots in the seats. When the
stadium is not in use. The system will continuously export energy to the Qatar electric grid, enabling the stadiums to be carbon neutral.241

Qatar also plans to make the upper levels of each stadium modular, such that they can be dismantled after the World Cup and reused in other tournaments.242

In addition to the building of new stadiums, the country also plans on creating a new metro system,243 and will spend additional funds to cultivate tourist attractions, including hotels and other leisure activities.244 Overall, the budget for the 2022 World Cup is estimated to be sixty to seventy billion dollars.245

While this may seem to be a daunting number, the expenditure is much more justified in a country like Qatar, as opposed to a country like South Africa, Brazil, or Russia. The most recent estimate of per capita GDP in Qatar is $179,000, establishing it as the richest nation in the world.246 Furthermore, Qatar’s economic growth rate was estimated to be 16.3% in 2010, again ranking it as the strongest economy in the world.247 If any country can afford to host a World Cup tournament that requires major infrastructure investments, it is Qatar, as it has the resources to afford the technology necessary to develop a carbon-neutral and environmentally friendly World Cup, without crippling the local economy.248 Though lacking in international prestige,249 Qatar has both a national soccer team and a professional soccer league, suggesting that some of the stadiums built in Qatar will not go totally unused following the 2022 campaign,250 although it is doubtful that a country the size of Qatar truly needs (and will continue

241 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
242 FIFA World Cup Stadiums, supra note 237.
243 Id.
245 Id.
247 Id.
248 See id.
to use) sixteen soccer stadiums. However, the country is increasing efficiency of construction by making a portion of the stadiums modular, and thus reusable.251

IV. ESTABLISHING A MORE FAIR APPROACH TO THE GREEN GOAL INITIATIVE FOR UNDER-DEVELOPED NATIONS

In addition to producing a World Cup tournament, FIFA’s mission is “to contribute towards building a better future for the world by using the power and popularity of football.”252 It also seeks to “use[football] as a symbol of hope and integration.”253 This mission appears to be the driving force behind its culturally, geographically, and economically diverse selections of host countries in recent years.254

A World Cup selection, however, comes with much more than hosting soccer games, as a host country must equip itself to deal with not only roughly sixty-four games,255 but also huge amounts of tourists.256 Since the adoption of the Green Goal Initiative, hosting the World Cup also entails a commitment to environmentally efficient building and the promise of carbon-neutrality,257 something not all countries are equally capable of affording.258 As FIFA continues to diversify its selections, countries with weaker economies must sacrifice profits and establish a multitude of state-of-the-art stadiums that may never be used again. Though the host countries are the ones primarily responsible for funding the green building of these stadiums,259 they must use the carbon credits accumulated to offset the tournament itself, as opposed to selling these credits for profit on the voluntary carbon market, or using them to offset other domestic projects.260

The host countries and FIFA could benefit, however, if less of the economic burden was placed on the host countries themselves. Considering it is FIFA’s goal to encourage “developing the game around

251 FIFA World Cup Stadiums, supra note 237.
252 Our Commitment, supra note 49, at 6.
253 Id. at 5.
254 See supra Part I.
256 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 6–20 and accompanying text.
258 See supra Part III.
259 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
260 See ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 46.
a greater commitment to financing Gold Standard projects could enable otherwise economically disadvantaged countries to host the World Cup, while increasing the goodwill of FIFA and the tournament itself. This would enable host countries to build infrastructure improvements according to modern standards, and then use the construction of these stadiums to their own economic advantage in the future. This would prove especially advantageous to those host countries where the World Cup tournament will necessarily be the main and only use for the stadiums. Otherwise, numerous expensive stadiums will be built in developing nations, the carbon emissions savings will be used to offset the World Cup tournament, and the stadiums will then provide little economic benefit to the host countries in the future, as they will not be used again.

Should the host countries instead be able to sell their carbon credits on the voluntary carbon market, the host countries would continue to see an economic benefit as a result of their green building. The tournament would teach under-developed nations the benefits of green building, and the stadiums could then serve as a model for future environmentally friendly construction. Furthermore, if host countries received a higher return on their investments in green building, above and beyond simply offsetting the World Cup, they could then justify spending more money initially. If ongoing uses of the stadiums are not going to be primary concerns to FIFA in the selection process (as the selections of South Africa, Russia, and Qatar suggest), then at least under-developed host countries will have an immediate economic benefit from the mandated building standards during the tournament itself.

261 Our Commitment, supra note 49, at 6.
262 See Humphreys, supra note 9 (expressing distaste for FIFA’s economic conduct relating to South Africa).
263 See, e.g., STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 24.
266 See, e.g., STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 109.
267 See supra Part III.
The voluntary carbon market is expected to grow in the upcoming years. In March 2007 it was estimated that one ton of CO₂e could garner anywhere between five and more than twenty American dollars if sold on the voluntary carbon market. Thus, a country like South Africa that seeks to offset nearly 3,000,000 tCO₂e for the World Cup tournament could make millions of dollars if it was able to sell its carbon emissions savings on the voluntary carbon market, as opposed to offsetting the tournament itself. This would provide economic incentive to build according to modern environmental standards, and would help South Africa afford to continue to improve its infrastructure after the tournament is over. The carbon emissions of the World Cup will still be lessened dramatically, as the green building standards of the Initiative will be adhered to, but underdeveloped host countries will no longer be economically disadvantaged by these standards. In fact, continued use of the stadiums after the tournament would be encouraged, as host countries will immediately see the economic benefits of operating below the “business as usual standard,” and would necessarily want to duplicate these results.

Undoubtedly, this major policy change would result in a much larger burden on FIFA and the other private companies that typically fund Gold Standard projects. It could be argued that it is not FIFA’s responsibility to accommodate underdeveloped host countries. Furthermore, it could be contended that hosting the tournament itself is voluntary, and countries that are unable to afford the necessary improvements should simply not apply.

One of FIFA’s ultimate goals, however, is to promote soccer globally. Thus, a country should not be denied the opportunity to host the tournament because it cannot afford to invest in sustainable development. The World Cup tournament should be an impetus to improve infrastructure and the overall standard of living in a nation, thus it should not be cost-prohibitive to under-developed nations that would benefit

---

270 The Voluntary Carbon Market, supra note 265.
272 See The Voluntary Carbon Market, supra note 265.
273 See ECON PÖYRY, supra note 21, at 48–52.
274 Compare supra Part III (explaining current policy costs to host nations), with, e.g., STAHL ET AL., supra note 2, at 92 (example of costs to the non-host nations under the current policy).
275 Our Commitment, supra note 49, at 9.
most from the economic boost. This is especially true considering FIFA’s stated commitment to “build a better future” through soccer.\textsuperscript{276}

It is of note that FIFA needs to garner all the goodwill it can get, as the recent selection of Qatar for the 2022 World Cup has raised concerns that members of the World Cup Selection Committee were bribed ten million dollars each to vote for the country.\textsuperscript{277} Regardless of whether this claim has any validity, the backlash that resulted from the 2022 selection process was substantial.\textsuperscript{278} In addition, South Africa has been struggling to continue the upkeep on the multitude of stadiums it constructed for the 2010 World Cup, while FIFA has billions of dollars in its reserve.\textsuperscript{279} FIFA also recently announced that it made roughly 1.2 billion dollars from the World Cup in South Africa, nearly doubling the amount of profit it made in Germany four years prior.\textsuperscript{280} There is therefore no doubt that FIFA has the economic stability to finance additional Gold Standard projects, especially considering the positive publicity the organization would inevitably receive in response. Additionally, if more countries were able to afford hosting a World Cup tournament, FIFA could continue to make diverse selections, possibly increasing tourism to the tournament itself.

CONCLUSION

Much is to be gained, for both FIFA and the world, if the policies regarding hosting the World Cup tournament were changed. With the development of the Green Goal Initiative, countries are asked to spend more than ever before when hosting a tournament in an effort to make the World Cup carbon-neutral. Because the hosting of a World Cup tournament is highly competitive and ultimately voluntary, the Green Goal Initiative puts the onus on the host country to prove to FIFA that a World Cup in their country will be both environmentally friendly and spectacular.\textsuperscript{281} While this is undoubtedly a reasonable, and as the world

\textsuperscript{276} Id. at 6.


\textsuperscript{279} Peck, supra note 264.


\textsuperscript{281} See, e.g., Qatar2022Bid, Introducing Qatar’s First Five Stadiums!, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-yz2jtUS9-Y.
has seen, obtainable goal, FIFA has the ability to ensure that under-developed nations are not overlooked. By allowing host countries to collect carbon credits during the World Cup tournament and to sell those carbon credits on the voluntary market (as opposed to offsetting the tournament itself), FIFA would ensure that less economically stable countries could receive a greater economic return when hosting the tournament, helping to justify the initial expenditure of sustainable building. This would also allow FIFA greater latitude when deciding where to host World Cup tournaments, as countries with weaker economies could attempt to take on the world’s most popular tournament with far less financial risk.

If both FIFA and FIFA’s corporate partners invested more of their own capital in Gold Standard projects, both the host country and those recipients of the Gold Standard projects would benefit. Thus, FIFA could be seen as a worldwide leader in sustainable building, could continue to provide for a carbon-neutral World Cup tournament, and could solidify their reputation as a non-profit organization committed to “bringing hope to those less privileged.”

With the backlash against recent World Cup tournament selections, it seems clear that without change, FIFA might have to refuse to accept the bids of nations that cannot prove that they have an ongoing, consistent use for World Cup stadiums, or the infrastructure already in place to handle World Cup crowds. The policy proposed in this Note could help ameliorate the environmentally inconsistent provisions of requiring sustainable building in countries that are unlikely to use the stadiums in the future, or that simply cannot afford the price of hosting a tournament of this magnitude. While the problem would not be completely eradicated, the host countries would at least have an economic impetus for building environmentally friendly stadiums, aside from offsetting the tournament itself. By selling their carbon savings on the voluntary carbon market, host countries could potentially make millions of additional dollars, not including those economic benefits that are inherent in hosting a World Cup tournament. Thus, the host nations could continue to profit from their construction efforts over time, the recipients of additional Gold Standard projects (typically developing nations) would see an increase in their standard of living, and FIFA would reap nearly all of the social and political benefits.

282 Our Commitment, supra note 49, at 6.