Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment

Victor Brudney
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 2

II. CATEGORIES OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMBERSHIP ....... 4

III. INTERVENTION IN ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES OF
      MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATIONS ................. 10
      A. Preliminary Considerations .................. 10
         1. The “Negative” Speech Rights or Interests
            of Individuals .......................... 11
         2. Freedom of Choice and Uses of Wealth to
            Affect Advocacy Activity—Restrictions on
            Individuals and on Associations .......... 21
            a. Freedom of Choice of Individuals in
               Associations .......................... 21
            b. Restrictions on Uses of Wealth that
               Impede Individuals’ Freedom of Choice .. 24
      B. Intervention in Advocacy Activities of Compelled
         or Pressured Association .................. 30
         1. Integrated Bar ................................ 31
         2. Professional and Occupational Association .... 38

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I. INTRODUCTION

Elective associations1 come in many sizes and shapes and serve widely varied functions for their members and for society generally. They are not equally amenable, in principle or in doctrine, to government-imposed restrictions in their affairs, particularly in their advocacy speech or activities.2 For some associations the government may be (and

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1 Significantly different problems concerning the relationships between individuals and groups and between the group and the larger society arise with respect to groups that fairly can be called non-elective groups—i.e., groups to which people "belong," but do not join, and that are defined essentially by reference to immutable, or at least involuntary, characteristics such as race, gender, age, physical or mental handicaps, ethnicity, and associated cultural history and identity. While the membership characteristics of some of these groups are not necessarily immutable, all, including religious and sexual preference, may be treated for our purposes as non-elective. Members of non-elective groups often form elective associations to develop and advance their perceived interests as members of the non-elective source group (e.g., a religious society or a gay rights association) or otherwise (e.g., golf clubs, swimming groups, etc.). The rights, obligations, and privileges of members of those associations and the entitlements of (and limitations which may be imposed on) those associations differ from the comparable aspects of the non-elective source group. Indeed, the efforts of members of the latter to form exclusive elective associations, like the efforts of other elective associations to exclude on grounds of ethnicity, gender, or religion, can present special problems. See Douglas O. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1887-94 (1984); William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 75-91 (1986); Jose A. Bracamonte, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297-447 (1987).

2 In this Article, "advocacy activities" refers to contributions, expenditures, or other conduct in support of or in opposition to: (1) any candidate for any political office; (2) any pending or proposed referendum; or (3) any pending or proposed legislation. "Advocacy speech" refers to public (i.e., not addressed only to association members) expression in support of or in opposition to any candidates, referenda, or legislation. More precise delineation of those concepts is a subject for legislation and rules. The difficul-
should be) virtually as indifferent to the exercise of the advocacy voice or activities as it is (or normally should be) to the exercise of such activities or voice by individuals. For others, the government may select the collective advocacy activities or voice of the group for special restriction or limitation.\(^3\) At first blush, the notion of government interference with the advocacy activities or speech of organizations seems as objectionable, both in principle and under the First Amendment, as government efforts to restrict the speech of individuals. However, the problems generated by intervention in an association's speech are both significantly different in policy and considerably more complicated in practice than those generated by restriction of an individual's speech.\(^4\) This Article addresses the policy and constitutional propriety (or impropriety) of governmentally-mandated restrictions or limitations on the collective advocacy activities and voices of a variety of associations.

\(^3\) See supra note 2 (citing union shop and integrated bar cases).

II. CATEGORIES OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMBERSHIP

Associations have been described, analyzed, classified, and evaluated from different angles by sociologists, social psychologists, organization theorists, political scientists, and practitioners of other disciplines—on the basis of size, structure, social function, class and other characteristics of members, intimacy of contact among members, sources of support, and a variety of other factors. Examination of possible categories of associations will situate the kinds of organizations with which this Article is concerned.

Measured by reference to numbers, dispersion, and impersonality of members, elective associations may be said to range from the “intimate,” like the nuclear family, to the non-intimate but more or less “private,” like a local poetry reading society or bocce club, to the “public,” like business corporations, professional associations, unions, or chambers of commerce. The Supreme Court has indicated that association all

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5 For a useful collection of references, see CONSTANCE SMITH & ANNE FREEDMAN, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITERATURE (1972). For a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, listing of minority associations, see MINORITY ORGANIZATIONS: A NATIONAL DIRECTORY (4th ed. 1992). In theory, at least, the concept of association extends to such varied relationships as ordinary commercial contracts between two or more persons (whether of the one shot buy-sell variety or of the long term “relational contract” variety) and classes of litigants.

6 For example, affinity of personal relationships and relevance of personal characteristics of the members in conducting the group’s activities.

7 For purposes of determining the constitutionality of government intervention in organizations’ affairs, the difference between the contours of the “intimate” association and the others is, at least at the extremes, reasonably clear, even though Supreme Court opinions do not offer much help in deciphering differences at the margin. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) with Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) and United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973). Although the line between “private” and “public” associations so characterized is more a band with rough edges than a bright line, the distinction is generally visible. The public-private distinction among non-intimate associations often is made explicitly to define the limits on the scope of legislative prohibitions of racial or gender discrimination by associations. Legislative proscriptions often allude to criteria like numbers of members or provision of service and openness of facilities to non-members. Courts have often adverted to characteristics like size, selectivity, or transience of membership and degree of control over internal governance by members. See Joshua A. Bloom, Comment, The Use of Local Ordinances to Combat Private Club Discrimination, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 478-79, 485 (1989); Margaret E. Koppen, The Private Club Exemption from Civil Rights Legislation—Sanctioned Discrimination or Justified Protection of Right to Associate?, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 643, 654-77 (1993); Kimberly S. McGovern, Case Comment, Board
along the intimate—private—public spectrum thus conceived is entitled to constitutional protection as "liberty" protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; but although the matter is subject to substantial debate, association located at the intimate end of the spectrum is entitled to considerably more rigorous protection against government restriction or intrusion than is association of the more public kind, and possibly of the private kind. It is not necessary for the purposes of this Article to explore the rationale of the distinctions thus made, or the justification for the difference in levels of constitutional protection. The associations with which this Article is concerned are located well at the public end of the spectrum.

The vast bulk of such large elective associations are not formed to engage primarily (or indeed more than peripherally) in advocacy, or ideological activities or speech that is protected by the speech provisions of the First Amendment, even though significant numbers of such associations expend portions of their energies to do so. Many of the most powerful elective associations, like large business corporations, unions, and trade and professional associations, focus principally on providing and offering more or less impersonal monetary returns, goods or services, and facilities to members and possibly to the public generally. Others are engaged solely, or almost entirely, in activities that are grist of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: *Prying Open the Doors of the All-Male Club*, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 134-35 (1988).


10 This is not to say that varying degrees of constitutional protection of association—or refusal to associate—may (or should) not be accorded varying strictness of judicial scrutiny for claims of infringed rights based on gender, racial, or ethnic selectivity.

11 The state rarely seeks to intrude upon the advocacy speech of members of "intimate" or "private" associations individually or collectively.

12 For example, business corporations or producer cooperatives that offer economic returns to stockholders or members.

13 For example, services offered by consumer cooperatives or associations like unions, health maintenance organizations, or universities.

14 Associations like hospitals and medical societies also offer access to facilities and other advantages like professional comity; bar associations offer educational and professional facilities to members; and enterprises like the Junior Chamber of Commerce or Rotary Club offer commercial contacts and networking.
for the First Amendment mill—such as the print and electronic media, political parties, or ideologically organized groups that are engaged almost exclusively in advocacy activities.\(^6\) Still others, like fraternal organizations, veterans associations, automobile associations, associations of the elderly or of ethnic groups, or clubs like the Lions or Rotary Club, occupy marginal territory that houses both non-advocacy benefits (e.g., community service, network opportunities, or collateral economic benefits) and substantial advocacy speech and activities, at least if measured as a proportion of their agenda.

Attempts to restrict the advocacy speech and activities of associations that offer benefits in addition to advocacy activities and voice (hereinafter "multi-purpose" groups or associations) reflect and generate problems for their members and society generally that differ significantly from those generated by attempts to regulate the advocacy speech of expressive or advocacy associations. To the extent that the multi-purpose association's function for members is predicated considerably more on the monetary returns or goods, services, and facilities it offers than on its speech or advocacy activities, the question arises whether it is necessary or appropriate from the individual member's viewpoint to sever the member's obligation to contribute to the latter activity in order to obtain the benefits of the former. In addition, because multi-purpose associations obtain their funds and advocacy power by reason of the benefits their contributors expect from the association's offer of returns, goods, services, and facilities, there are the further questions whether such group's resources and incentives fuel a speech or advocacy role that differs from that of expressive, ideological, or advocacy associations (hereafter sometimes simply "expressive" associations), whether that difference can justify restriction by government in the former case that is not

\(^6\) The distinction between such expressive associations and non-expressive or multiple-purpose associations is plain enough at the extremes. Business corporations engaged almost entirely in manufacturing, mercantile operations, or finance (or any combination of them) can be categorized as non-expressive groups—notwithstanding that they often engage in ideological or advocacy speech to help fulfill their non-expressive functions and aspirations. The print and electronic media (whether or not engaged in activities for profit), political parties, or ideological groups (like the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, or political action committees (PACs)) can be categorized as expressive groups. However, large numbers of significant enterprises engage substantially in both advocacy speech and non-expressive activities—e.g., many unions, occupational and professional associations, trade associations, and enterprises like the Jaycees or the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Some of them attract members and offer them substantially more by reason of their non-expressive activities (services or facilities) than because of their advocacy programs. Others may attract members more to support their advocacy programs than to enjoy the benefits of their non-expressive activities.
permitted in the latter,\textsuperscript{17} and if so, to what extent.\textsuperscript{18}

For expressive associations, as the Supreme Court has suggested, entirely different considerations determine whether it is necessary, appropriate, or permissible for the government to intervene in internal decision-making processes or their advocacy activities or voices.\textsuperscript{19} If the association’s sole or essential function is to aggregate the advocacy voices of its members or to provide communication or expression, the command of the First Amendment engages directly the association’s \textit{raison d’etre}. As we shall see, for such groups both (a) conflicts between the expressive or advocacy preferences of a group and its individual members, and (b) issues involving the distortion in the quality or impact of a group’s speech pose radically different questions than do similar conflicts and issues in the case of multi-purpose groups. Even so, expressive or advocacy groups are not immune from government-imposed restrictions on their activities.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} For multi-purpose groups, as for others, problems generated by bureaucracy also may invite government intervention. Protecting the preferences of individual members with respect to advocacy speech may be justified even if the leadership of the group is in some sense adequately responsive to the members’ preferences (and the mechanism by which membership exercises its choice is otherwise acceptable) with respect to the group’s non-advocacy activities. It does not necessarily or systematically follow that leadership will be equally adequately responsive with respect to decisions about the group’s advocacy role.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Interventions that affect or curb the collective ideological voice of the multi-purpose group may take a variety of shapes—a requirement to fracture individual members’ contributions so as to rebate (\textit{ex ante} or \textit{ex post}) a proportion of dues equal to the proportion of the group’s expenditures, or a requirement of super-majority consent to advocacy speech or activities, or even a prohibition of such activities or speech. Intervention may be effected by judicial action, or by legislative or administrative action. The legislative or administrative process offers significant advantages over judicial intervention by way of flexibility, detail, monitoring, and adaptability to particular institutional configurations and changing circumstances. However, judicial intervention may be the only remedy available to protect discrete and insular minorities for whom legislation is more likely to be the problem than the solution.
\item \textsuperscript{20} The extensive government regulation of political parties, \textit{see infra} notes 203-06, illustrates both the responses to perceived bureaucratic distortion and corruption by leadership, and the tension generated by the conflict between government intervention in the party’s internal processes and the import of the mandate of the First Amendment to protect the members’ freedoms of association and speech. The considerations that justify the balance struck with respect to political parties may not, however, justify a similar balance for other advocacy groups or ideological associations, like political action com-
\end{itemize}
Several variables in the composition or role of a multi-purpose association are relevant to assessing the validity of government interventions in the association’s advocacy activities and of its claim to be free from those interventions. One concern is the extent to which the individual member’s support of the association, and pro tanto of its advocacy activity, is compelled rather than voluntary. The most obvious form of compulsion is that imposed by a government mandate to join or contribute funds to the group, such as the integrated bar.\textsuperscript{21} Less obvious, but often no less effective a form of compulsion, is the economic necessity to obtain the “goods” that an association offers.\textsuperscript{22} On still another level are the contributions induced to obtain the kinds of non-speech economic benefits offered by enterprises like business corporations, some professional and trade associations, and other organizations like the Elks or the Junior Chamber of Commerce. Such benefits do not rise to the level of “practical necessities,” and their pursuit does not rise to the level of compelled support. Yet a member’s support for the group’s advocacy voice is not as voluntarily given as if it were not induced in fair part by the pursuit of those other benefits or were induced solely by the association’s advocacy voice.

Other relevant variables include the extent to which the group is effectively a delegee of government power, or one whose structure and operation are dependent upon a pattern of special government authorization and support or subsidy, and have public import.\textsuperscript{23} Some groups, committees or religious associations. Still other considerations determine the appropriate level of government intrusion into the expressive activities of for-profit communications enterprises like newspapers or broadcast media, or of other kinds of enterprises like universities, whose activities normally engage the First Amendment.

\textsuperscript{21} The integrated bar is an arrangement prescribed in many states, sometimes by statute, often by court pursuant to statute, and occasionally by the state supreme court by rule acting under its “inherent” powers. Under the arrangement, a person’s admission to practice law or continued permission so to practice is conditioned upon joining and paying dues to the state bar association. The existence of that association is directed by statute or judicial action, and the association is given certain privileges and powers in addition to its entitlement to acquire as members all persons licensed to practice law.

\textsuperscript{22} Even in the absence of any government mandate, or imputed government mandate for an individual to join a group, an individual fairly may be said to be compelled to join or support the group if doing so is a condition precedent to gaining access to the services, facilities, or credentials of the group, and those benefits are a practical necessity for earning a living in the individual’s chosen occupation, trade, or profession that only the group affords. Such conditions have historically characterized access to local medical associations, and may well be true of access to associations of medical specialists or other kinds of occupational or professional associations. See infra text accompanying notes 100-08.

\textsuperscript{23} The public import of the group’s activities (i.e., is it “affected with a public inter-
like investor-owned business corporations, certain farm organizations, many professional associations and hospitals, veterans organizations, and, in some circumstances, trade unions, could not offer the non-speech benefits that attract participants without special government assistance. If organized only by private contract among the participants, such groups could not function because special government empowerment through protective rules and tailored arrangements or subsidies is necessary for the creation and operation of the enterprises. Other groups (like the Jaycees, the Rotary Club, possibly voluntary bar associations, many business and social clubs, trade associations, and, in some circumstances, trade unions) that offer benefits other than advocacy activities to induce participation are not supported by such an array of special government arrangements.

At the margin it may be difficult to separate an association whose members are compelled to join by government mandate or by the need for the practical necessities that it (and often it alone) offers from associations that offer less essential benefits. Among the latter, distinctions may be drawn to turn the color of legal litmus paper based on the extent of government support of the enterprise or on the relative weight in the enterprise’s agenda (and in its attraction for members) of the non-advocacy benefits it offers as compared to its advocacy activities. The difficulties in drawing lines at the margin among such activities as well as in degrees of government support may make the distinctions unfeasible.

See, e.g., Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 287-92 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992); Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 795 F. Supp. 50, 54-55 (D. Mass. 1992). The fact that “coercion” can fairly be said extensively to dominate many relationships in society and that no one enjoys quite the free choice pictured in the libertarian model does not preclude recognition of different degrees of freedom and volition in behavior by each individual in response to stimuli from others. There is wide room to argue about the different consequences that should attend behavior produced by debatably different levels of coercion or volition, but recognition of differences in the levels or kinds of inducements producing behavior is inescapable in the process of urging or assessing norms for any society.

For example, in order to distinguish a multi-purpose enterprise with an expressive role that so permeates its affairs as to justify according it the same First Amendment protection as an expressive association from one whose expressive role is so slight as fairly to preclude treating the enterprise as equivalent to an expressive association.

Compare, e.g., the extent of government “enmeshment” in voluntary state bar as-
ble as predicates for government intervention. Before so concluding, it is appropriate to inquire whether, in the polar cases, some sort of mandated disconnection of a multi-purpose association's advocacy voice and activities from its other activities is justifiable in policy and acceptable constitutionally.

III. INTERVENTION IN ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES OF MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATIONS

A. Preliminary Considerations

Intervention in the advocacy speech of multi-purpose associations rests essentially on either or both of two justifications—first, protecting individual members' preferences, or enhancing their freedom of choice, to refrain from supporting the group's advocacy voice (a kind of "negative speech interest"), and second, protecting society from a collective advocacy voice that is powered by compelled member contributions or by voluntary contributions offered for functions other than advocacy associations with its role in the integrated bar. Consider also publicly-built and operated housing projects, government-subsidized housing projects, and private housing projects that do (or do not) receive special tax encouragement.

As a formal matter, a distinction may be drawn between the act of a person in using assets to pay others to express (or amplify) what the person wishes expressed and that person's own act of expressing. There is debate over whether the former may be treated as the equivalent of the latter and thus be subject to the same protection against government restriction under the First Amendment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 197-231. Compare J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 631-42 (1982) [hereinafter Wright, Money] and J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005-13 (1976) [hereinafter Wright, Politics] with Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1052-65 (1985). See also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 787-95 (1988); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420-25 (1988); Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980). That debate becomes more complex if the individual pays or contributes dues to an organization which pays others to express (or amplify) what the organization wishes expressed. In that case, questions arise as to (a) whether the group's use of funds to pay others to express is equivalent to expression by the group, and (b) whether the individual may be deemed to be engaged in expression by reason of his or her dues contribution to the group. Constitutional doctrine appears to answer the former question in the affirmative. The latter question implicates the meaning of the concept "negative speech interest" and its constitutional value if the government legislates to protect it. See Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse over Corporate and Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1358-70 (1993).
speech and for which the group’s advocacy speech is peripheral. Justifica-
tion of government intervention designed to protect individuals’ nega-
tive advocacy speech interest requires, preliminarily, examination of the
nature of that interest. Justification of government intervention on behalf
of society’s interest in the group’s advocacy speech requires, preliminari-
ly, examination of multi-purpose groups’ claims to freedom of choice
and of finance in matters of such speech.

1. The “Negative” Speech Rights or Interests of Individuals

Individuals may be said to have a negative speech interest—i.e., an
interest in remaining silent and not being forced or “improperly” pres-
sured to speak. That interest may become involved when the individual
joins or contributes to the support of an association. The collective voice
of the association is, to be sure, not the same as the speech of the indi-
vidual. But there is a connection that implicates the latter in the former,
sometimes strongly and sometimes weakly; a connection that fruitfully
may be examined by beginning with the situation in which individual
support of a group is commanded by government.

The bulk of First Amendment case law on free speech is concerned
with the limits on government actions that impede or curtail expression,
i.e., interfere with a person’s positive interest in uttering or receiving
communication.28 Both jurisprudence and political philosophy generally
address those limits in terms of the consequences to society and to indi-
viduals (both speakers and listeners) of forbidding the communication.29

28 There is great force to the view that the values of freedom of speech cannot be
optimally, or even adequately, realized unless “private” power (at least that power gen-
erated by wealth) over expressive action is curbed or the expressive opportunities of the
less wealth-empowered elements of society are subsidized. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 197-256; J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L. REV. 375, 410-12; Thomas Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 223 (1972); Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1138-64 (1993). However,
it is not necessary for purposes of this Article to confront the problems that view poses.
This Article assumes the narrower premises of conventional free speech concepts and
doctrine in a private property economy in a modest welfare state. Cf. infra notes 122,
126, 127, 173.

29 For a sample of the literature explicating values underlying the First Amendment,
see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREE EXPRESSION (1970); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH (1994); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS (1984); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
As has been pointed out, not all the limits on government power to suppress speech nor all the justifications for those limits are equally applicable to government power to compel speech.\(^{30}\) Indeed, there may be good reason to treat such government compulsion as an intrusion on "liberty" if not on the speech protected by the First Amendment.\(^{31}\) In any case, in parsing a claim to resist such an infringement of "liberty," the closeness of the interests involved to interests protected by the First Amendment Speech Clause suggests significant protection by that Amendment. Government compulsion of individual speech intrudes on the right to freedom of speech to the extent that freedom of speech imports the speaker’s freedom of thought, belief, and conscience, and the audience’s (both the individual listener's and society’s) interest in the integrity of the communications that it receives. The intrusion on these rights by government-compelled speech requires justification under the jurisprudence of the First Amendment as well as under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

The considerations that support protection of the speaker’s persona against the injury caused by forbidding his or her expression also support, if they do not equally require, protection of the speaker against the injury entailed in government compulsion to speak—whether the compulsion is to carry a particular message or to forbid the person from declining to express any views.\(^{32}\) The interests of the audience in receiving\(^{33}\)

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\(^{30}\) For thoughtful, albeit differing, views of the relationship of the compelled contribution to compelled speech and the deference to be paid to what Gaebler describes as "negative rights" under the First Amendment, see David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 996 (1982); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3 (1983); Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson’s Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817 (1986).

\(^{31}\) Such compulsion might plausibly be said to intrude on a "fundamental element of personal liberty"—privacy, cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957), or personhood—that claims special constitutional protection and strict judicial scrutiny of the kind that would be accorded under the First Amendment. See supra notes 8-10.

and of society in exchanging ideas is also touched by such government compulsion. Less of either the audience interest or the social interest in free speech may be affected by compelling an individual to speak than by forbidding her from speaking. But, there is no doubt that compelled speech tends to distort the total mix of speech to be digested by the audience, whether the audience’s interest is defined by reference to the individual listeners or to society as a whole.

The problems associated with government-compelled speech become complicated when the power to speak exists in an association that is privately organized, whether or not specially empowered by government, and the government “compels” the individual to join and/or support the

15-16. To be sure, the locus of injury is more the individual’s belief, thought, or conscience than expression. However, the individual’s beliefs, and therefore expression in the future, are not less likely to be affected in that case than in the case of suppression of speech. See Harpaz, supra note 30, at 902. Arguably, the individual’s speech may be curtailed because he will refrain from some expression if faced with the possibility of government mandate to utter other expression to offset what he has said. See Mitchell C. Tilner, Government Compulsion of Speech: Legitimate Regulation or First Amendment Violation? A Critique of PG & E v. Public Utilities Commission, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485 (1987).

Moreover, in the case of compelled speech, the individual’s ability to define his or her public identity, see Gaebler, supra note 30, at 1004-05; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-5, is impaired, and indeed that identity is apt to be no less substantially distorted by compelled speech than by suppressed speech. The individual may thus be required to endure the fact, and the knowledge, that the public has a false impression of him, or that the public has an accurate view of beliefs about which she may prefer to remain silent. In the former case, he may be under some pressure to explain his views—a task which may present costs and difficulties in effectuation or risks by way of public exposure of attitudes.

33 That audience interest embodies, in part, respect for the listener as an autonomous individual who is able to hear and enabled to make reasoned choices. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969); Scanlon, Freedom, supra note 29.

34 Society’s interest in the exchange of ideas embodies the enriching social or communal (including political) values of the free exchange of ideas in a society, particularly a democratic society. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-83 (1978); Scanlon, Freedom, supra note 29, at 520-28; cf. EMERSON, supra note 29, at 6-9 (discussing speech as a safety valve for violent discontent); REDISH, supra note 29, at 14-19; Balkin, supra note 28, at 387-94; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 544-67.

35 Quite apart from the possibility of government “drown-out” resulting from compelled speech, if the government can compel individuals to utter particular ideas, it has power to influence social choices with a potency that it is a function of the First Amendment to deny. The cost of meeting the social interest in the subject matter of the views thus expressed is increased by the need to offset them, even if only to dilute their psychologically conditioning effect.
organization by dues or similar payments. In such circumstances, the utterance about which individuals complain is not "made" by them, but is "made" by the organization they are forced to support. Insofar as the injury to the individual comes from the act of associating with or contributing funds to the group (rather than "participating" in its speech), the issue is more one of protection of "liberty" than of a First Amendment violation.\textsuperscript{36} Insofar as the injury to the individual comes from association with the group's advocacy speech or ideological activities, questions are raised under the First Amendment. To the extent that the group's advocacy activities are enabled by the claimant's contribution, can the group's use of dues or "in lieu" payments which the member is compelled to pay be transformed into individual expression "compelled" by the government, such that the propriety of forced financial support for the group's expression can be said to entail intrusion on individual members' First Amendment negative speech rights?\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} See supra note 27. It may be argued that individuals' forced "formal" association with the group that speaks, even if none of their funds is used to support the group's advocacy speech, so identify them with that speech as to invoke the considerations that implicate their negative First Amendment rights against a government command to speak. Cf. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990). If this is so, questions arise (a) whether a claim to "speech" under the First Amendment rather than a claim to "liberty" tests the propriety of the command to join the group, and (b) whether the group's claims under the First Amendment should trump the individual's claim.

\textsuperscript{37} One argument against such transformation rests on the premise that the existence of, and the necessity for, a process by which a group reaches the decision to speak disconnects its members from its speech and justifies treating its utterance as emanating from "it" rather than from any of its members or any aggregation of them. See Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1234-44. Group action affecting public choice in a democracy may indeed implicate transformation of individual preferences of members and integration of those preferences to produce a collective voice that not all, or even most, members desire. Yet the democratic process does not require all groups to be authorized to invoke that transformative voice in affecting public choice.

Groups lack the autonomy conventionally claimed for individuals. Some groups are said to have a solidity that requires respect for them as something more than merely an instrumental aggregation of individuals; yet they are entitled to less than the respect to be accorded to an individual human being. See Morris Raphael Cohen, Reason and Nature 386 (2d ed. 1953). The role thus envisioned for groups as institutions operating in some space not occupied by individuals or government, and functioning as essential to individual self-realization and definition and to pluralist democracy, contemplates some indeterminate sort of status for the collective. Cf. Liberalism and Its Critics (Michael Sandel ed., 1984). The indeterminacy is mirrored in uncertainty about how the legal system can accord adequate respect for the group without scanting the "rights" of individuals and the claims of the rest of the society. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 9, § 12-26, at 1010-15, §§ 15-1 to 15-3, at 1302-12, § 15-17, at 1400-09; Balkin, supra note 28, at 384-87; Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1241-44; Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 627, 638-
Viewed solely in terms of the impact on a complaining member who is compelled to contribute to support the group, an affirmative answer may be urged persuasively. To be sure, there is no government effort to compel any particular communication, belief, or line of thought. Yet the thwarting of the individual’s will and the intrusion on the individual’s conscience by the group’s expression that the individual is forced to enable is as present in the case of restricting individual speech as in the case of “compelling” speech. The frustration of conscience may be less intense if one is made to pay for a joint product that includes group speech rather than being forced to speak personally, but the intrusion on the individual’s will to speak is real, and the jurisprudence of the First Amendment is properly invocable.

40 (1987); Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 383-84.

However that uncertainty may be resolved, to the extent that individual members do, or are forced to, contribute to the support of the group, they enable the group voice and can fairly be said to bear, and can reasonably expect that they bear, some responsibility for that voice. Hence an individual’s unwillingness to contribute or bear responsibility for the advocacy voice is plausibly entitled to protection analogous to the protection given to the individual against being mandated to speak. The function of an expressive or advocacy group requires limits on the protection that may be given to individual members in this regard. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. However, as we shall see, such limits are not required for multi-purpose groups.

38 Less apposite is the claimed distortion of the individual’s public identity. See supra note 32. However, that too may be affected by one’s forced participation in the group. In the clearest case—that of the integrated bar—one’s public identification with the content of the group’s speech is more remote than it would be with the content of personally uttered views. The distortion may be less remote in the case of enterprises that the individual is compelled to join or support by institutional considerations—as with a local professional or trade association or the union shop. Whether the reason for not wanting to facilitate the group’s speech is a desire to be silent on the matter under discussion or opposition to the views expressed, there is enough of a public connection between one’s known participation and the speech to require one either to endure the public’s uncertain inferences about him or her or to make his or her own statement. To make one’s own statement involves either losing desired silence or incurring the cost of making the statement and revealing one’s views.

There is likely to be a closer connection in the public mind between the group’s speech and the individual compelled to join the group than there is between, for instance, a public utility corporation and the consumer’s message that the utility was unconstitutionally “forced” to carry. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9-12, 20-21 (1986).

39 If the government-created or sponsored association is organized, albeit “privately,” for the principal purpose of communicating, and individuals are directed by government to contribute to the organization, the claim of intrusion on the individual’s First Amendment speech rights is considerably stronger than it is for members of a multi-purpose association. It may be possible to justify such an intrusion if, for example, only commercial speech is involved. See United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1130-39 (3rd
The fact that the target of governmental compulsion is the individual's pocket rather than his or her voice does not make persuasive the analogy to taxation in assessing the propriety of the coercion on the individual contributor, or in disconnecting the coercion from the claim of violation of the claimant's speech protection. The homogenization of tax money in the government's till serves to disconnect the taxpayer from particular government expenditures that may be necessary to enable the nation, of which all must (in some sense) be members, to function. If every government expenditure were required to mesh with every preference of every individual taxpayer for use of his or her tax money, collective action for the common good would be difficult, if not impossible. But the reasons which require persons to yield to collective decision-making by government do not require them to yield to all collective decisions in special organizations which they join or are forced to join for special purposes. The analogy to government, which people are compelled to support, is inapposite because other organizations that people are compelled to join are not formed in order to, and do not, represent the whole society and deal with all its problems. More importantly, other groups are not subject to the restrictions on their power to act, including their power to speak, that restrain government.

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). Even so, more is required by way of justification than in the case of forced membership in a multi-purpose association. The problems involved, and an unsatisfactory rationale for upholding such a mandate, are discussed in Frame, 885 F.2d at 1119.


While problems exist about limits on government speech, see MARK YUDOFF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Shiffrin, supra note 40, at 588-95, they do not sensibly arise from the claim of the protestant as contributor to the fisc.

It does not detract from this conclusion that an obligation to yield to many of the group's decisions should exist for members of "voluntary" groups. In order for the group to perform its essential functions, it is necessary to permit the group to spend collective assets on its functional operations without requiring it to satisfy each member's preferences about the expenditure. However, such deference to a majority with respect to collective conduct that is not essential to the group's function (e.g., much of advocacy speech of many multi-purpose associations) is unnecessary.


The government is constitutionally and politically more confined in its ability to spend funds than it is in the range of activities it can authorize for groups that it compels citizens to join and fund. Government is also more confined by procedural rules for making decisions. The person forced to join and contribute to an integrated bar is thus subject to looser procedural safeguards and a wider range of decisions made by fellow-
Concern for audience interests and for society's interest in the exchange of ideas expressed by the group implicates considerations that are comparable to, but far from identical with, those affecting assessment of compelled speech by an individual. If the government dictated the content of the group's speech, the objections from the audience's viewpoint would be the same in the one case as in the other—if not to drown-out, at least to systematic government-ordered distortion of the mix that the audience is offered as the basis for social choice. The fact that government leaves the organization free to make its own speech alters the import of the distortion because the content of the message is not government-dictated. However, the group's utterance of a communication which the individual member was forced to help the group to utter exposes the public to a louder voice and to an impression of larger, and possibly more diversified, support than exists for positions which the individual does not wish accepted. Although the government's compulsion in this circumstance does not address the content expressed, the likelihood of public acceptance of that content is affected and probably enhanced thereby; and the dissident is forced by the government to contribute to that enhancement.

The decisions of the Supreme Court are not entirely consistent, and the Court's rationale is not clear in cases involving government "compelled" personal speech through association. The same may be said of members than is the citizen compelled to pay taxes or to subject herself to the discipline of a government organization. To be sure, there may be some constitutional limitations on the conduct of an association thus created that would not restrict the conduct of an otherwise "private" group performing a comparable function such as a voluntary bar association. See Larry W. Yakle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 791, 796-811 (1993). The powers vested in the integrated bar association, including its power to determine the subject matter of its speech, are considerably less restrained by constitutional considerations than are the powers of a government organization. But compare Richard D. Silberman, The Compelled Contribution in the Integrated Bar and the All Union Shop, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 138, 142 with authorities cited infra note 79.


decisions interpreting the Constitution to require that \( A \) (an association) not be compelled by government to distribute \( B \)'s speech through \( A \)'s facilities. But even if the decisions were consistent and their rationales offered clearer support for the proposition that to compel an individual to speak is likely to entail as much a violation of the First Amendment as to suppress his or her speech, the analogy in the claim to First Amendment protection between compelled personal speech or compelled formal association and compelled contribution to support a multi-purpose


\textit{Pruneyard}, 447 U.S. at 85-88, touches the problem but is slightly off center because in \textit{Pruneyard}, the government was not compelling transmission or utterance by the coerced person of any message or expression, or subscription by that person to any belief, or even appearance (except possibly to some in the audience) of such subscription or utterance. \textit{See also Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra}, 855 F.2d 888, 904-06 (1st Cir. 1988), \textit{cert. denied}, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
group’s speech is not perfect. The likelihood of the individual being as intimately affected in belief, in persona, in repute, or in compensatory behavior (i.e., in the perceived need to engage in counter-speech) is plainly not as great in the one case as in the other.\(^49\)

It has been suggested that even if government-forced contributions or formal association can be metamorphosed into government-compelled speech, the impingement on any particular contributor’s speech rights by reason of the meagerness of the individual’s contribution to enabling the group’s speech is too slight, and the connection between the government mandate (which is neutral as to the fact or content of the group’s speech) and that impingement is too remote to permit a finding of a First Amendment violation.\(^50\) When balanced against the social value of (i.e., the compelling state need for) the forced contribution to, for example, a union or the integrated bar in order to fund the benefits that the association confers, the curtailment of the individual’s liberty or speech is said

\(^{49}\) By the same token, even if it is valid to treat use of funds as the equivalent of speech when the issue is the propriety of government effort to prohibit or limit a person’s contribution to a political candidate or cause, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59, it does not follow that a contribution of funds is speech or its equivalent when the issue is the propriety of compelling payment of funds for a service function and allowing use of part of the funds for political communications that are relevant to the service function, see, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 514-19, 522-24 (1991); Robinson v. State of N.J., 741 F.2d 598, 610-14 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985), or even for ideological communications that are more remotely relevant to the group’s service function, see Shiffrin, supra note 40, at 588-95. But cf. Stark, supra note 27, at 1362-78.

\(^{50}\) See Cantor, supra note 30, at 27-28; Gaebler, supra note 30, at 110-14; Shiffrin, supra note 40, at 588-95; see also Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1069-71 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986). Relevant in this connection is the possibility that the individual’s contribution to the group’s speech may be more imperatively commanded and may be assimilated more closely to personal speech (and public perception of personal speech) in some group settings than in others. Thus, for example, the ratepayer’s contribution to the utility’s speech in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980), or the student’s contribution to the group’s speech in Galda, 772 F.2d at 1060, Smith v. Regents, 844 P.2d 500, 519-33 (Cal. 1993), and Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 995-1003 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 300 (1993), is considerably less assimilable to compelled personal speech in its impact on the persona of the forced contributor or the public’s perception of his participation than is the lawyer’s contribution in the case of the integrated bar or the dissident employee’s contribution to the union in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 332-37 (1977). Hence, the protection of the individual (whether by Constitution or by legislative or judicial action) against being “forced” to make such contributions may be appropriate or “necessary” in some settings of compelled association but not in others when a court is required to balance the cost to the individual and society against the state’s “need” for imposing the compulsion to contribute or for relieving the individual of the obligation to contribute.
to be not enough to tip the scales against either the propriety or the constitutional validity of the requirement to contribute. Much may be said for that view; but if the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of it prevails, substantial questions arise with respect to the resulting impingement on the group’s freedom of speech.

Quite apart from an individual’s possible claim to a “right” to First Amendment protection against being compelled by government to support an association, and therefore its advocacy activities, is the “interest” of the individual in being relieved of the obligation to support the advocacy speech of an association that he or she is compelled by circumstances to join, or wishes to join, in order to obtain the other benefits it offers. In such circumstances, the constitutional “right” of individuals (if any) to be protected against government-compelled contribution to a group’s speech is not involved; but the individual’s negative speech “interest” is involved. Even if the individual’s support of the group is not compelled, he or she may find it objectionable to participate in, or contribute to support, the association’s advocacy speech as a condition of obtaining the other benefits the association offers. If individuals’ negative speech interests are protected by the state by, for example, legislation restricting the funding or subject matter of the group’s advocacy speech or activities, the question arises whether such legislation un-

51 If the impingement on the protestant’s negative speech rights is driven by non-communicative considerations such as those that underpin the integrated bar and the impact is not viewpoint-based, the impingement’s propriety may be tested under adumbrations from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-82 (1968). See TRIBE, supra note 9, §§ 12-2, 12-3, at 789-804; John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1482-1507 (1975). On that view, the propriety of the impingement is easier to accept.

52 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2. The lower courts uphold the even more attenuated claims to First Amendment protection made by students in state universities who resist contribution to student activities funds that implicate political action. See cases cited supra note 50.

53 It does not detract from the importance of that negative “interest” that imputation of the group’s view to the individual is more likely if his or her participation in the association is voluntary than if it is compelled.

54 The connection between contributing and speaking may be deemed to be broken by reason of the pooling of contributions in a general fund to be spent for a range of functions of which advocacy speech is only one, often quite peripheral, function. See DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 102-13.

constitutionally interferes with the group’s speech. Such legislation would seek to resolve the conflict between the negative speech interests of individuals who prefer not to support the group’s advocacy activities, and the speech interests (or indeed rights) of the group and those members who wish to support the multi-purpose association and its collective voice.\textsuperscript{56}

2. Freedom of Choice and Uses of Wealth to Affect Advocacy Activity—Restrictions on Individuals and on Associations

a. Freedom of Choice of Individuals in Associations

As an abstract proposition, unbundling a multi-purpose organization’s political or ideological activity and related advocacy speech from its other authorized behavior should lower the barriers to individual contributions and membership. In theory, such unbundling should make a rational individual more willing to contribute, join, or continue membership in the enterprise than if the activities of the enterprise were bundled.\textsuperscript{57} However, advantages may be offered by a bundled enterprise that are worth more than the opportunity to assemble the equivalent bundle by acting through separate enterprises. If the contribution to the

\textsuperscript{56} It may be argued that the individual’s interest at issue is not a “speech” interest but merely a “liberty” interest in the transfer and use of funds that he or she is contributing to the association. \textit{See supra} note 27. If that argument is valid, the claim of the association to use (i.e., transfer) the funds for expression (i.e., to pay someone to express notions that “the association” wishes expressed) would seem to be more a “liberty” interest than a “speech” interest. Except for the difference between the negative and the positive character of the claimed interest, it is problematic to treat the former as not a speech interest and at the same time treat the latter as a speech interest, for purposes of determining whether the First Amendment precludes the government from limiting enjoyment of the interest. \textit{See} Stark, \textit{supra} note 27, at 1362-78. To be sure, as Dan-Cohen has argued persuasively, it may not be necessary or appropriate to protect all associational speech identically with individual speech. \textit{See} Dan-Cohen, \textit{Freedoms}, \textit{supra} note 4, at 1241-44.

\textsuperscript{57} Individuals may oppose the use of collective funds to advocate all or some kinds of government action that would further those professional, occupational, or investment aspirations that impelled them to contribute to the organization. Use of the association’s funds and energies to urge consumer acceptance of a proposed program by the association may well be acceptable even if one disagrees with the proposed program; but use of those funds to seek enforcement of the program by government coercion may not be. Moreover, to the extent that government power is sought to prescribe regulation or deregulation with respect to externalities (such as environmental protection, taxes, race relations, political processes, or health, military, or foreign policy) that affect members as citizens apart from their interests as members, individuals may well be unwilling to furnish the funds for such proposals, particularly if they disagree with them.
group is induced by the offer of material benefits, individuals may be more willing to let a portion of their contribution be used for such activities than if they were solicited for funds only for such activities. The logic of collective action suggests that such bundling helps to solve free-rider problems. However, depending on the kind of association and the form of intervention, the net benefits to society from mandatory unbundling may exceed its costs to participating individuals.

The cost-benefit question is not answered by generic arguments about freedom of choice, such as the argument that if both bundled and unbundled associations are available to persons who wish to form or join one, the parties and the public are free to choose one or the other, and the virtues of unbundling are available, but the limitations of mandatory unbundling are avoided. That theme implicates two kinds of issues. Normatively, even if such private arrangements can be made with sufficient cognition and volition appropriately to reflect the parties' free consent to bind themselves, are there societal reasons to deny such freedom by mandating unbundling? Moreover, as a practical matter, is it possible for sufficient freedom of choice to be available to the parties to such private arrangements to meet the consensual norm embodied in the individual autonomy that entails freedom of contract, let alone freedom to make choices about public matters?

Both the normative and the practical questions have been debated and answers have been offered by free market economists and libertarian philosophers as well as by those devoted to republican virtues or communitarian values. Few would deny that to some extent government intervention is necessary to take care of "externalities" created by wholly volitional private arrangements. Others would raise the question whether,

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59 E.g., will the advocacy voice of the collective drown out or obscure the opposing voices of members acting individually, or if there is dissent in the group, will the collective voice distort (i.e., overstate) the power of the message the group sends? Does formation of one group alter the menu available to the public if formation of competing groups is thereby required but costly and often impossible?

60 For example, are there pressures on individuals to join or support the group (e.g., government mandate) that can be said to deprive them of adequate freedom of choice with respect to supporting the group's advocacy activities? Does the association have an actual or effective monopoly on necessities normally sought by individuals? Does the lure of the material inducements to join the group so far outweigh the cost of yielding to the group's political voice as to obscure the latter or make it de minimis in deciding to join, resulting in a mirror image of the free-rider problem? Will the incentive to form a political action group be so muted by the need to avoid free-rider problems that expressive groups are not likely to be formed as competitors unless multi-purpose groups are forced to unbundle?
in principle, the fully volitional private ordering advocated by libertarians is ever possible or always an unrestrictable "good" even from the point of view of its participants. Still others, perhaps most, also would be concerned with whether there should be limits on private ordering, if only to vindicate the volitional and cognitive premises underlying the free choice ascribed to the participants.

The debate does not signal that government should never (or often) intervene to impede or restrain collective advocacy choices of members of multi-purpose associations. Even if those debating the issue suggest an a priori tilt against government-imposed restraints in general, the debate contemplates some sorts of intervention on some occasions, and leaves open many crucial questions—such as questions about the kinds of impediments (publicly or privately imposed) to individuals' free choice to contribute in support of a group's advocacy activities that government may counter, and by what mechanisms government may do so consistently with the commands of the First Amendment. Answers turn on

61 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites and Tradition in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1712-47 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 43-47 (1989); Mark Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 205-14 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 487-99 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131-38 (1986). Quite apart from the problems that arise because individuals may lawfully exercise "coercive" power over other individuals in a "free" society, some sort of coercive state action—i.e., government intervention—is required to enable private ordering. If such "minimum" government intervention is necessary, to what extent do the considerations that justify intervention require, or at least permit, additional government intervention to restrain or prescribe some of the terms and consequences of the private ordering that is enabled by the underlying rules of contract, property, etc.?

62 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhouser eds., 1985); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403-10 (1985). Even if preferences are exogenous, but cf. supra note 61, their exercise requires volition and cognition. The requisite volition is lacking if the associational arrangements are compelled, and is problematic if they are effected between one person or a coherent group, on one side, and a dispersed multitude of individuals, each with relatively trivial stakes, on the other. Resolution of the intractable problems encountered in attempting to define "volition" of an individual on the ambiguous assumptions of individual autonomy is not necessary for present purposes. It is sufficient to recognize that there are degrees or levels of volitional behavior, and to focus on the purpose for which definition is sought—e.g., what degree of individual volition should society protect by law, subsidy, or otherwise against impairment by others and for what purposes?
more particularized examination of kinds of association and of intervention.

b. Restrictions on Uses of Wealth that Impede Individuals’ Freedom of Choice

In the American vision of democratic society, the validity of collective political decisions or public choice generally turns on the number of individual human beings who signify that they favor (or oppose) a proposal or candidate. The underlying assumptions are that such individuals choose knowledgeably and freely, and that all should be bound by the majority (or super-majority) choice thus made.

If the premise is added that it is proper to multiply each vote by some measure of the intensity with which each person seeks the decision, the wealth of individuals may be relevant to the validity of the decision. Expenditure of that wealth may be seen as an appropriate implementing measure of the intensity of the individual’s preference. On that assumption, individuals are entitled to expend lawfully as much or as little of their wealth as they wish on expressive activities or to further political or advocacy results they seek. To be sure, the free-choice assumption and the wealth expenditure proposition are subject to considerable disagreement, even if they are embodied in current constitutional doctrine. The considerations that justify individuals’ use of their wealth to power the intensity of their advocacy preferences and magnify their advocacy voices (in elections, referenda, public support of legislation, or otherwise) may appropriately justify the voice of an advocacy group.

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63 The notions of “one human (citizen): one vote” and majority rule subtend an arc of possible operational rules that need not include wealth as a permissible measure of intensity. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 29, at 45-46; SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 163; Bruce A. Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM. PROSPECT 71 (Spring 1993); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Judicial Review, 17 STAN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1982); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206-13 (1994); Wright, Politics, supra note 27, at 1005-13. The impact of the use of wealth in advocacy activity by some individuals on the knowledge and freedom with which others are able to make choices has induced occasional discussion of a need for restrictions on such use or for subsidies of those who lack wealth. See supra note 28. The phenomenal expenditures by some individual candidates in the 1994 congressional elections suggest a certain grotesquerie in the notion that wealth may appropriately be a proxy for intensity in making public choices.

group organized and funded to act collectively to amplify the individual participants' voices. But the same considerations do not justify the advocacy voices of multi-purpose associations.

Members of associations often do not all agree with their organizations' collective choice. Such dissonance poses a problem inherent in collective decision-making even when a purely advocacy association is involved and only one issue is to be resolved. That problem, which is solvable tolerably in an advocacy organization, is exacerbated (and not equally solvable) if funds are contributed by individuals to an association under compulsion (by reason of government mandate or economic necessity) or in order to obtain goods, services, or other non-advocacy benefits that the enterprise offers, and those funds also fuel the enterprise's advocacy voice.

If the individual's contribution is compelled or indisputably made solely in order to obtain the goods or collateral benefits and the contributor is ignorant of, or effectively indifferent to, the group's uses of collective funds for advocacy activities, that contribution can fairly be said not to constitute, and that use not to reflect, volitional support of those activities by the contributor. If the contribution is not forced and is indisputably made to support the advocacy activity of the group by the contributors who are relatively indifferent to the collateral benefits, the contributors' support of the advocacy activities is not relevantly less volitional than their support of the activities of a purely advocacy organization. In the "real" world, although the polar cases are not infrequently approximated, many kinds of multi-purpose associations exist between the poles. The magnitude of the compulsion or collateral rewards inducing individuals to join or remain members of particular kinds of multi-purpose associations (both in absolute terms and in relation to the advocacy activities on the association's agenda) affects the volitional character of the individual's support of the particular group's advocacy activ-

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65 An organization's speech is apt to be the result of different, sometimes contradictory, preferences of its members (or agents), and therefore may well not constitute the speech of any of its individual participants. To recognize this difference does not deny the separateness of the individual participant's claim (and if the government yields to that claim, his or her entitlement) to be free from the obligation to support, by funds or otherwise, the organization's capacity to offer "its" speech. If that claim or entitlement is a negative speech interest protected by the First Amendment (as the Supreme Court states in cases of mandated membership and implies for other forms of membership by its reasoning in those cases), see cases cited supra note 2, there is often a sharp conflict between the individual's speech interest and that of the group which may have effects on the audience and on society. Analysis of the various speech interests involved, which suggests different values for each, has been offered by Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1234-67.
ities. That the logic of collective action may require some selective incentives or collateral inducements to individuals to support even an advocacy group’s advocacy activities\(^6\) does not mean that any and all such inducements or tie-ins are necessary or appropriate in order to solve free-rider problems or to enable interest groups to perform such of their functions as may be claimed, praised, or deplored.

Doubtless an interest group’s advocacy voice will be more powerful if it is fueled by the funds raised through a multi-purpose association than if it is effected through the more modest funding induced by emotional or affective appeals\(^7\) of an association formed solely to give a collective advocacy voice. However, at least with respect to compelled support, and possibly to some kinds of collateral inducements or tie-ins, the cost to individuals of having part of their advocacy voice held hostage to their need or desire for the tied-in goods is not trivial. That cost deprives the individual’s advocacy voice of the volitional character that may appropriately be deemed necessary to give it validity in matters of public choice, if not also in matters of private choice. In decisions on matters of public governance, the effect of one person’s choice on how the state’s coercive power should be exercised (or restrained) over all persons gives each an interest in preserving the freedom of others to choose that is lacking for choices made about private exchanges or returns.

Moreover, the resulting power in the group supports a collective advocacy voice that lacks the justification of an individual’s expressive role. Wealth gives power to individuals to color the mix of information and advice the audience receives in favor of the expressions or views the wealthy person prefers, particularly in matters on which the audience is asked to make an advocacy choice. The argument that airing of offsetting or contrary views by others enables public decisions to be made appropriately by reason of the resulting mix in the marketplace of ideas is less persuasive today than it may have been historically.\(^8\) Such justi-


\(^7\) That such appeals have power, notwithstanding the impulse of “rational” actors to see only their self-interest and to free-ride, is the suggestion of a growing body of literature that does not question the basic premise. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 101-24 (1982); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 24-30, 233-44 (1980).

\(^8\) Justification for the coloring power of wealthy individuals on public discourse, or at least for forbidding government to limit that power, sometimes proceeds on the assumption that disagreements among those with wealth will result in the audience receiving a full (or at least a broad enough) range of conflicting views. That assumption may be valid for many matters on which the public is addressed. However, that assumption’s
As exists for entitling the audience to receive and act upon a mix of information and advice that is so colored is to be found less in the notion of possible expressive offsets to the advocacy power of wealthy individuals or expressive associations than in other considerations. Those considerations stem from the notion of individuals’ entitlement to spend their wealth and exercise “disproportionate”\textsuperscript{69} power in advocacy activities and expression, and society’s interest in freedom from government efforts to control or influence the viewpoints in that mix or to prohibit individual inputs to that mix, whether made personally or collectively through expressive associations.

Whatever the validity or reach of those arguments,\textsuperscript{70} they do not justify empowering the advocacy voices of multi-purpose associations, or the use of their wealth to enhance the power of their voices over the voices of individuals or purely expressive associations. Nor do they preclude fettering the voices of multi-purpose organizations. Such enterprises obtain their funds for non-advocacy activities by contributions from individuals who, although they wish to (or must) support those activities, need not, and may not wish to fund the group’s advocacy voice apart from the non-advocacy activities that induced the contribution. To preclude collective voices so funded from affecting the mix of advocacy voices that the public receives does not mean that the public will be denied views funded by those individuals who wish to give, or add, particular color to advocacy messages, or that those individuals will be precluded from so using their wealth. Those persons remain entirely free, collectively or individually, to provide such colors—by spending personal funds for advocacy activities or contributing them to advocacy enter-

\textsuperscript{69} That is, more than the power of others who have little or no wealth.

\textsuperscript{70} There is room to argue over the quality and quantity of information and persuasion that is appropriate to influence citizens in making public choices in a democratic society, and particularly over the extent to which an individual’s wealth or lack of wealth should affect the menu offered to those making the choice. See supra notes 28, 63.
prises uninfluenced by the inducement to receive the benefits from the enterprise's non-advocacy activities.

The considerations that justify prohibition of vote-buying in the electoral process (notwithstanding that such prohibition precludes Pareto superior exchanges), may not deny all uses of wealth by individuals in electoral contests or referenda or the like, including purchase of advocacy voices. However, those considerations suggest problems with forcing individuals' advocacy support or inducing it by offering collateral benefits which necessarily obfuscate the extent to which advocacy choices of individuals are made when they contribute to associations organized principally for non-advocacy purposes. The state need not be confined in protecting individuals' freedom of choice in advocacy matters to forbidding coercion or fraud by multi-purpose associations\footnote{The assumption that the source or existence of an individual's wealth is irrelevant to, and may not qualify, his or her right to use or spend it on expression protected by the First Amendment, including advocacy activity, see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684-85 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 125-59 (1992), does not protect him or her from sanctions for acquiring it improperly. In some cases, such sanctions may entail impediments to the individual's speech, such as ordering the return of improperly acquired property (e.g., a speech amplifier) or even an injunction against use of misappropriated cash to fund speech if the misappropriator is an agent and the victim his principal. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-16 (1980).} in acquiring funds that may be used for advocacy activities. Other kinds of obstructions to choice in the contribution of funds for advocacy activities may also be deemed improper by a society that respects individuals' freedom to have, and to make, advocacy choices. Moreover, a democrat-
The principle that underpins government decisions to protect individuals from being forced or induced by incentives that mask the support of a group's advocacy voice to give such support does not require government to protect individuals against the compulsion that disadvantages in their social or economic condition, like poverty, may impose upon them to give aid to candidates or causes that promise them government benefits. The considerations underlying the First Amendment that permit, and indeed support, the former do not require the latter, even if they support or permit it. In short, not all impediments to free choice in advocacy matters need be removed by government (by proscription, subsidy, or otherwise) even if some are removed and the removal of others, such as disadvantages resulting from disparities in education, health, or the like, may also be desirable. Nor is freeing individuals' opportunities for advocacy choice from being tied to their need for, or desire for, other goods incompatible—in principle or in practice—with preserving individuals' freedom to seek or support government action (or inaction) in order to obtain personal benefits that will result from the government action (or inaction) that they support. Cf. Karlan, supra note 72, at 1460-61. Nor does providing such protection to individuals even implicate limiting the expenditures of wealthy individuals for advocacy activity in order to even the playing field for those lacking such wealth, or restricting "the speech . . . of some . . . in order to enhance the relative voice of others." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).

Even metaphorically to analyze the choices embodied in exchanges between interest groups (or individual voters) and elected officials as buying and selling "goods," cf. Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 341-51, 363-64 (1988), assumes volitional behavior on all sides. That assumption implicates inquiry into the funding of those exchanges, and in particular whether the funds that associations obtain and use for advocacy action are freely given or are obtained by government mandate, economic necessity, or even merely tie-in sales of goods that are desired but not necessary for the purchaser. Cf. Kelman, supra note 61, at 204-15. The shadow on the volition that fuels the advocacy views of an association funded by compelled contributions or by a tie-in process does not equally darken the volitional character of an individual's gift to a political association or personal expenditure on behalf of a candidate or cause.
the premise that people who contribute to advocacy action without the inducement of immediate collateral rewards for making the contribution are more likely than those offered collateral rewards to evaluate the relationship of their contributions to their advocacy preferences.\textsuperscript{75} Even if society is not required—or permitted—in every case to enforce that conception of free choice in the exercise of advocacy action, it should not be precluded from protecting that vision in such matters, at least as the compulsion or lure of the collateral inducement increasingly obscures the import of the accompanying advocacy action.

Degrees of compulsion and obfuscation to informed and free individual choice in affecting an association’s advocacy voice vary with associations.\textsuperscript{76} The cost of implementing protection of such freedom on the circulation or distribution of advocacy voices to the public also varies with the scope and mode of protection proposed. The wisdom and the constitutionality of a proscription of the use of funds for collective advocacy action by multi-purpose associations turn on examination of the institutional role and the operation of particular kinds of multi-purpose associations and particular types of intervention.

B. Intervention in Advocacy Activities of Compelled or Pressured Association

To discuss in the abstract the existence or import of a “negative” speech right or interest of individuals, or society’s legitimate interest in having multi-purpose associations’ advocacy speech undertaken by its members individually or collectively in a separate expressive association does not solve the problems that assertion of those interests generates in

\textsuperscript{75} A requirement of full disclosure by the multi-purpose association of its past or contemplated uses of funds for specified advocacy activities may mitigate the obscuring effect of the non-advocacy incentives to contribute to or support it. Nevertheless, the problem is not one that disclosure will cure. \textit{Ex ante} relief is hard to effect, and \textit{ex post} relief by way of damages does not prevent the \textit{ex ante} failure to disclose or use the funds. \textit{Cf. supra} note 72. More important, disclosure of a potential use of funds does not remove the fetters on the contributor’s freedom of choice in advocacy matters, although illumination of the choice may in some circumstances unfetter the constraints enough to be relevant in measuring whether the government intervention is narrow enough.

\textsuperscript{76} For example, where smaller “private” associations are involved, the lure of the tied-in benefits is less likely to obscure or overbear the import of the group’s advocacy activities. A relatively small multi-purpose association will offer higher visibility for its advocacy activities to aspirants who are more likely to contemplate active participation in its affairs. In such enterprises, the free-rider problem is less serious and unbundling less needed to enhance individual choice. OLSON, NATIONS, \textit{supra} note 66, at 53-65.
specific institutional or operational contexts. In each of those contexts honoring, or deferring in whole or in part to, the individual’s claim or society’s interest in protecting it entails curtailing the right of the group to speak and of its audience to hear its communication. Assessing the propriety of that curtailment requires examination of particular associations and particular government interventions.

1. Integrated Bar

We begin by examining constitutionally-begotten court-imposed limitations on the advocacy speech of associations whose members are directed by government to join or support the organization. A flowering garden of jurisprudence on the problem of such associations and their advocacy speech—albeit cultivated largely in state law—has grown from the claims of members of integrated bars. The claims are made primarily by dissident individuals seeking to be excused from membership in the state bar association, seeking rebate of a portion of their dues payments, or seeking to curtail the public utterances that the bar association makes—generally in the form of lobbying and urging public acceptance or support for particular policy proposals.

Generally the association functions primarily for the licensure, education, and discipline (including promulgation of ethical standards) of the members of the bar. In addition, however, almost all such associations are empowered in very general terms to seek to improve the administration of justice, to provide legal research in areas of substantive and procedural law, and to provide for discussion of law reform. Under those general provisions, integrated state bar associations acting either by their boards alone or with approval of their membership have used portions of the associations’ funds, largely supplied by compelled dues, to lobby and otherwise to publicize positions in support of or opposed to proposals on public questions before the legislature or the voters.

That membership in such associations is compelled by government is not disputed by anyone, notwithstanding that the sanction for failure to join may be only denial of access to a reasonably chosen mode of work (and the personal fulfillment, as well as the material returns it brings) rather than imprisonment or other criminal sanction. The considerations supporting an integrated (rather than a voluntary) bar association have

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77 See supra note 21. There are many variations in the formulae (contained in the charter or rules creating the bar association) defining the powers and authority of such organizations. See infra notes 90, 92, 93.

been deemed "reasonable" by the Court, even though a case certainly can be made that a voluntary bar association may reasonably achieve the same societal goals and, therefore, a mandate to join is not necessary.79

Delegation by government of power to regulate substantial areas of professional conduct of the legal profession to a "private" association subject to implicit restrictions against "arbitrary" action80 raises no


Although the Supreme Court, in assessing the claim of infringement of freedom of association, noted the distinction between the compulsion to become a member and the compulsion to pay dues, see Keller, 496 U.S. at 17, state courts do not make much of that distinction. However the claim is cast, the opinions seem to proceed on the premise that the requirement to associate should be upheld if the state has a reasonable basis for forcing the association. E.g., In re Chapman, 509 A.2d 753, 755-56 (N.H. 1986); Report of Comm. to Review the State Bar, 334 N.W.2d. 544, 546-47 (Wis. 1983) ("[A] unified bar association is more likely to administer its programs in the public interest [and] . . . the performance of such functions is more efficient and economical if conducted by a single association financially supported by all lawyers . . . "); see also Cheryl A. Cardelli, Casenote, Falk v. State Bar of Michigan: First Amendment Challenge to Bar Expenditures, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 737, 738-39, 747-50.

Occasionally there are imputations that the First Amendment is the source of the complaining individual's entitlement to freedom of association and of the limits on government power to restrict association. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1567-69 (11th Cir. 1986); Arrow, 544 F. Supp. at 462; Falk v. State Bar, 342 N.W.2d 504, 506-14 (Mich. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984); Chapman, 509 A.2d at 757-58; cf. Gibson v. Florida Bar, 906 F.2d 624, 631-32 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 499 U.S. 918 (1991), cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 104 (1991). However, the logic of the apparent standard of judicial review (i.e., reasonable basis) is that, apart from its relation to speech activities, the claim of freedom not to associate derives from the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and is to be so tested. See Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1569; cf. Gibson, 906 F.2d at 631-32; cf. Kidwell v. Transportation Communication Int'l, 946 F.2d 283, 299 (4th Cir. 1991). For the Supreme Court, the substantive judgment about the propriety of coercing membership, at least in a more or less "impersonal" association, is derivative because the case comes to it with the state's "reasonable" preference already expressed. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).

80 See Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Asso-
questions that have not been answered in upholding such delegation for other trades or professions.\textsuperscript{81} Being forced by government formally to join or to contribute to the support of a government-sponsored professional or occupational association goes a step further but presents no significantly different constitutional or other normative obstacles. Compelling a person to join, or at least support, a self-regulatory organization is reasonable in order to solve free-rider problems and to assure that the association can educate, prescribe standards for, and discipline the profession.\textsuperscript{82}

The Supreme Court has divided claims to be free from such compulsion (at least insofar as the association effectively consisted only of paying dues to the bar association) into claims for freedom to decline to associate and claims for freedom to decline to support the group’s speech.\textsuperscript{83} The former was apparently reviewed as a claim to deprivation of “liberty” (not implicating the First Amendment) and rejected.\textsuperscript{84} The


\textsuperscript{83} See, e.g., Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-17; \textit{Lathrop}, 367 U.S. at 842-43. The sources of protection of association or associational relationships for individuals and for associations are not easily found in the Constitution. The Constitution contains no explicit reference to association, possibly because of a reluctance to offer too protective a stance against government for some associational relationships. \textit{See} Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., \textit{The Open Window and the Open Door}, 35 CAL. L. REV. 336, 341-42 (1947). \textit{Cf:} \textit{THE FEDERALIST} No. 10 (Madison); THOMAS HOBBES, \textit{THE LEVIATHAN} 190 (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed., 1950) (1651). Both the individual’s and the group’s claims to protection of association seem to be
latter was reviewed as a claim of interference with speech and therefore as a violation of the First Amendment, and was upheld.\textsuperscript{85} Hence, while based upon the assumption of a more or less "natural right" of individual human beings to associate—i.e., to relate to others in intimate affiliation or in private or public groups and to act collectively. See Alexis DeToqueville, Democracy in America 323 (Henry S. Commager ed. & Henry Reeve trans., Oxford University Press 1947) (1840); Robert A. Horn, Groups and the Constitution 16 (1956); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 109-10 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859); Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association 1-18 (1962); Tribe, supra note 9, § 15-3, at 1308-12; cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875). But cf. Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of Dibartolo, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 149, 180-88. For a suggestion that the "right" of association is independent and not merely instrumental in implementing other individual rights, see Tribe, supra note 9, § 12-26, at 1010-15; Reena Raggi, An Independent Right of Freedom to Association, 12 Harv. C.L.-C.R. L. Rev. 1, 11-14 (1977). See also Dan-Cohen, Rights, supra note 4, at 177.

Possibly the principal source of constitutional protection for the "right" of association (which, as we have seen, entails several substantially different kinds of relationships) is the "liberty" which is protected in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25 (1989); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Notwithstanding the sweeping language in many opinions about the protection that the First Amendment offers for freedom of association, those particular cases involve behavior that implicates, in addition to the freedom of association, First Amendment speech and religion claims, as the Court later suggested in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), and Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 23-25. But cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978). Support may also be found in the "privacy" concept suggested by additional protective provisions in, and adumbrations from, the Bill of Rights. Tribe, supra note 9, §§ 15-3, 15-4, at 1308-14; see William O. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1368-70 (1963). The limitless Ninth Amendment has also been urged as a source of the right of association. See Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have?: The Case of Association Freedom, 10 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 101, 110-12 (1987). But cf. Wyzanski, supra, at 341-42. The claim to protection of religious liberty is likely to be a more substantial, if narrower, source of some associational rights. Another viable constitutional source of protection of association or refusal to associate may be found in the ricochet off the equal protection concept that is explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and implicit in the Fifth Amendment. See Stanglin, 440 U.S. at 25-30.

\textsuperscript{85} Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-17. The First Amendment is increasingly the source of a claimed freedom of association that first unfolded in Supreme Court opinions that protect a group and its members against government threats to its members' freedom to speak and to join as groups engaged largely in communication or advocacy speech. See supra note 47; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363-65 (1937). To be invoked, the First Amendment presumably requires a claim that the government intervention that impairs freedom of association (whether by compelling a person to join a group, by compelling the group to accept outsiders, by seeking to deter persons from joining, or otherwise) in some sense also impairs speech or related
the portion of the compelled dues payments that was used to implement the association’s professional activities could constitutionally be exacted without involving any speech right or violating any “liberty” right of the payor, the portion expended on “activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of [professional] activity” violate the payor’s First Amendment speech rights.

In Keller v. State Bar, the Court barely acknowledged the difficulty of administering the constitutional regime thus created, which requires distinguishing between expenditures for ideological or political activities and expenditures for professional activities. It referred to the elaborate jurisprudence generated for “compelled” dues payments under union or agency shop arrangements to illuminate the methods for administering the distinction so as to protect individual objectors without unduly interfering with the group’s First Amendment speech rights. The Court’s opinion in Keller offers a constitutional solution that substantially tracks assembly or petition rights of the claimants. The relationship thus protected is more public than private, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1030-40 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 99 (1987), and it entails more the protection of public activities and the social value of exchange and development of ideas and information than fulfillment of the persona of the individual member. But cf. Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1251-54.

86 See Keller, 496 U.S. at 11-13. But see id. at 17. On the assumption that joining the state bar association was mandated by government, the Court in Lathrop treated the complaint as raising a question under the Fourteenth Amendment as to the scope of the imputed First Amendment’s prohibition against government interference with freedom of association. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 842. Apparently on the assumption that the only obligation of membership was to pay dues, id. at 843, the propriety of the compulsion to associate was reviewed under a less strict standard than is said to be required for measuring a claimant’s rights (certainly for measuring free speech rights) under the First Amendment. Id.; see Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989). The Lathrop Court relied expressly on Railway Employes’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and simply found that the state “might reasonably believe” that regulating its bar by requiring membership in the state bar association was preferable to leaving the matter to a voluntary association and that a “legitimate end of state policy” overshadowed any claims of individuals that they not be required to join or become members of the association in order to practice law. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843; cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1976) (suggesting that freedom of association differs from freedom of speech and is, at least when not connected to speech, entitled to less protection).

87 Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.


the results reached in some jurisdictions in addressing comparable challenges to the integrated bar—i.e., pro-ration of members’ dues. The Court’s solution does not expressly preclude the integrated bar association from engaging in ideological or political speech so long as it supports such speech only by voluntary contributions from members. Such a solution leaves the association with greater freedom than do solutions adopted by states that “interpret” the powers of the integrated bar to be so limited (either by reason of the authorizing mandate or by the court’s supervisory authority) as to preclude the association from engaging in political or ideological activities. Those states rely on the same kind of ambiguous distinction between permissible and impermissible expression as does the Supreme Court. However, they invoke the distinction to limit the subject matter of the group’s speech rather than to limit the funds with which it can fuel its ideological speech.

The conclusion of those states, as well as the question left open by the Supreme Court in Keller, implicates the constitutional right of the group to speak at all on ideological or political questions. If the association were not created under special government auspices as an institution which all lawyers must join and support, it might plausibly urge that the limitations on ideological or advocacy activities that the Court’s ruling creates violate its rights and its complying members’ speech rights under

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91 But in Keller, the Court expressly left open a question that casts a shadow on such engagement. Keller, 496 U.S. at 17. The Court referred back to the California courts the question whether notwithstanding the limits placed on the group’s use of the forced dues payments, the speech rights of persons who were compelled to become members of the association were violated if the organization engaged in any ideological or political activities. Id.; cf. Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 299 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992).


93 Some states have rejected the claimant’s First Amendment claim and authorized the integrated bar association to engage in ideological activities. See, e.g., Falk v. State Bar, 342 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1983). But Keller vitiates the premise of those rulings. Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-17.
the First Amendment. But it is hard to validate the argument that the government, by curtailing the group's ideological or advocacy speech and limiting its activities to matters necessary to fulfill the functions which alone justify creation of the compelled association, cannot protect the speech interests of those whom it expressly directs to join or contribute to a group that it specially authorizes and empowers.\(^9\) And the justification for government thus protecting individuals' speech interests makes that protection not unduly restrictive of any possible "rights" that the other members may have to act or speak collectively,\(^9\) since those other members are free to form a voluntary association to communicate their advocacy views.\(^9\)

The contention may be made that an audience's interest in the group's speech precludes the government from curtailing that speech. Whether the argument is cast in terms of respecting the autonomy of individual listeners\(^9\) or of the social value of allowing ideas to be expressed in order to be exchanged or considered,\(^9\) it has no power as a basis for compelling an individual personally to speak or to contribute toward the utterance of speech. The enlightenment of \(A\), either individually or for political or general societal purposes, does not justify coercing \(B\) to speak—both because of the considerations that entitle \(B\) as an autonomous human being to be free from such coercion, and because the enlightenment of \(A\) achieved through coerced speech is questionable.\(^9\)

Thus, if the audience interest is not sufficient to require the government

\(^9\) The fact that the government mandates the existence of, and empowers, the group does not entitle the government to restrict the group's conduct by imposing unconstitutional conditions such as authorizing or directing the group to exclude members on grounds of race or gender, or to support some but not other ideas or political views or candidates. However, neutrally precluding the government-mandated group from engaging in advocacy speech or ideological activities, and confining the group narrowly to the technical aspects of the functions that impelled its creation, does not reach any of the troublesome areas shadowed by the notion of unconstitutional conditions.

\(^9\) Even if the Constitution did not of its own force require such protection, the government could as a matter of policy offer protection (as some states do) without violating the constitutional rights of those members who wish the association to engage in advocacy activities. Cf. supra note 90.


\(^9\) See supra note 33.

\(^9\) See supra note 34.

\(^9\) Moreover, even if the notion of free speech and the terms of the First Amendment required government, on occasion, to subsidize speech, see supra note 28, nothing in the considerations justifying such a subsidy for the benefit of the speaker or the audience could justify compelling a person to speak or contribute to an association to support speech.
to compel persons to speak, the audience interest has little more power as a basis for compelling persons to pay money to an organization in order to furnish the wherewithal for that organization to provide speech for an audience.

2. Professional and Occupational Associations

There are also reasons to limit the advocacy activities of associations that, often because they exert effectively monopolistic power, offer benefits that constitute practical necessities for members. The power of such groups to induce membership is frequently enhanced by the special relationship of their activities to government function. Membership in such associations is not significantly less compelled if driven by economic necessity than if mandated by government; pro tanto, the


101 For example, failure to join county medical societies in the past and, more recently, societies of medical specialists, frequently denied physicians access to hospitals, referrals from colleagues, and other professional benefits so that practice of the profession without being a member was either impossible or severely restricted. See Ezekiel v. Winkley, 572 P.2d 32, 39 (Cal. 1977); see also Blende v. Maricopa County Medical
individual’s negative speech interest is no less impinged.

In addition to its interest in freeing the compelled member from the obligation to support advocacy activities with which he or she does not agree, society may be concerned with narrowing the agenda of such associations to only those activities necessary to support the organization’s professional or occupational functions. For example, a legislature, which by comprehensive delegation of authority has facilitated a medical society’s “strangle-hold” on access to the profession in order to serve professional purposes, might reasonably believe that the association should be confined to serving those professional purposes by expressly defined activities, and should not be able to function as a mechanism that obtains coerced financial support for advocacy of ideological positions from doctors who do not wish to give such support. Society may also be concerned that the government-supported internal structure of the association permits bureaucratic distortion of the membership’s voice in effecting the group’s advocacy speech. Hence the legislature might reasonably require a medical society to focus its activities on technical, ethical, and educational problems in the practice of the profession rather than to address the public on political or ideological questions.

To be sure, the audience interest in the medical association’s advocacy speech may be deemed more legitimate than its interest in the integrated bar’s expression because the medical association is not a speaker created by the government. In the case of the medical association, it is less doubtfully “the willing speaker” that engages the individual audience


Although membership in such enterprises is effectively compelled, in theory the members are free to agree that the association would not engage in advocacy activities. In the absence of a nonadvocacy agreement, it can be argued that the group’s engagement in advocacy activities is voluntary even if membership is compelled. That the potential for advocacy activities is part of the incentive for the existence of the association does not mean that dominating collateral incentives should be permitted as tie-ins to induce participation, particularly for late-comers who cannot easily alter the terms of reference, even if they wish to do so. The difficulty of forming competing associations which do not have the collateral incentives of the initial enterprise implicates the inadequacy of the volition with which members support the initial venture’s advocacy activities.

102 See supra notes 100-01. Activities that focus on professional problems may involve responding to requests by the legislature or licensing agency for information on such professional matters.
and the society interested in exchanging views. However, the association funds its expression by contributions from members who are "compelled" to be members whether or not they desire to support or participate in the enterprise's advocacy speech. To the extent that the message is thus supported by coerced contributions, the audience receives a signal of magnified intensity if not also of distorted content.

The economic imperative that compelled membership in local medical societies has been considerably diluted in most areas of the country since the first half of this century. Still, the magnetic attraction of associations of medical specialists continues to reflect the "practical necessity" of belonging to them.\textsuperscript{103} Doubtless similar pressures exist to join other professional and occupational associations,\textsuperscript{104} some of which are specially supported or empowered by government. The pressures on stock brokers to join the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)\textsuperscript{105} derive from such practical necessities. So too may the pressures to join some farm organizations, stock or commodities exchanges, state or local associations of real estate agents or brokers,\textsuperscript{106} optometrists,\textsuperscript{107} pharmacists, architects, or accountants—particularly if the association's magnetism for members is strengthened by government support, such as empowering the association to accredit candidates for government-imposed license requirements.\textsuperscript{108} To the extent of such

\textsuperscript{103} See supra notes 100-01. Physicians' access to medical care providers like HMOs may require membership in "accredited" specialist associations.

\textsuperscript{104} See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 58, at 132-67.

\textsuperscript{105} NASD is statutorily authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78A-78ll (1988) and is closely regulated by the government. Although membership is not compelled by government quite as directly as it is in the case of the integrated bar, the role of the government in the authorization, supervision, and regulation of the NASD is pervasive, see generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2794-816 (1992) (describing pervasive regulation of NASD); [June 1983] Nat'I Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc. Reprint of the Manual (CCH) ¶ 101 (same); SHELDON M. JAFFE, BROKER DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 132-67 (1977) (same), and considerably more extensive than in medical societies and in most other trade or professional associations.


\textsuperscript{108} See Note, Exclusion from Private Associations, 74 YALE L.J. 1313, 1319 (1965).
“compulsion” to join, the considerations that justify severing the group’s advocacy activities from its other operations, as discussed above in the case of local medical associations, are relevant to support intervention to curb such groups’ advocacy speech.109

Vindication of the community’s interest by legislation requiring “compelled” professional associations to unbundle advocacy speech from their other activities or otherwise to restrict the compelled funding of (or decision-making process for) such speech would not deprive members of the occupation or profession of the power to amplify voluntarily their voices by collective action in advocacy speech. Nor would such legislation deny their message to any interested audience. Doctors and securities brokers, for example, would remain free to band together in organizations other than the specially empowered medical association or the NASD and amplify their voices by such collective action.110

Many states authorize professional societies to design and grade licensing examinations for their professions. For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is authorized to create and grade licensing exams in every state. Id. Possibly there are organizations that are not empowered by special government support but that do have a stranglehold on a trade or profession so that their membership may fairly be deemed to be “compelled.” The stranglehold is not often likely without government. However, if it occurs, government regulation of the membership rules and intrusion on advocacy activities of such associations is more readily justifiable than is comparable regulation of groups that do not offer practical necessities to aspirants. Cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1022 (1930); Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 993-94 (1963).

109 See supra text accompanying notes 100-03. Even if membership in, or support for, many such associations cannot fairly be said to be compelled by economic necessity, the incentive to join may be almost entirely powered by the professional or occupational benefits that membership offers. In such cases, the advocacy voice of the enterprise, if not an afterthought in inducing membership, may well not be a factor whose absence would diminish membership or materially alter function. The propriety of unbundling support for the advocacy activities of the group from support for its other activities would turn on considerations affecting that question in the case of voluntary associations. See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 66, at 28; see also text accompanying notes 186-90.

110 It is difficult to envision circumstances other than government-mandate which could compel a person to join or support a wholly advocacy enterprise. See supra text accompanying note 39. But in such circumstances, cf. infra note 203 (discussing “white primary cases”), legislation severing individual members’ obligations to support is at odds with (and may be trumped by) the enterprise’s entitlement to protection under the First Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. The reasons that preclude unbundling in the case of wholly advocacy organizations are not applicable to the case of multi-purpose associations that people are compelled to join. In the former case, advocacy activities would effectively be suppressed by mandated unbundling because of the obstacles to carrying on the advocacy activities in newly-created advocacy associa-
The Constitution of its own force does not require medical or other professional or occupational association's advocacy activities to be so confined, even if it might so confine comparable activities of the integrated bar, and, more doubtfully, those of unions with union shop arrangements. However, if the state imposes such a requirement, constitutional issues are raised.

The most rigorous criterion for assessing government proscriptions affecting speech—the "strict scrutiny" standard that requires a compelling need for the government restriction and imposition of the least restrictive alternative—does not easily fit the context of proscribing advocacy activity by professional organizations. Neither the considerations nor the circumstances which should determine how "compelling" the state's need must be to justify restricting the group's advocacy speech, or how narrowly drawn those restrictions must be, are clearly delineated. Applying those criteria to assess the propriety of restricting the advocacy speech of associations of the kind here considered presents a particular puzzle. The same doubts that afflict the integrated bar cases as to whether dues payments or memberships are the equivalent of speech by the individual are present in cases of effectively "compelled" membership. If those doubts are similarly resolved, society is confronted with conflicting claims for protection of speech interests. On

As we shall see, restrictions on the activities of purely expressive associations present different problems than do restrictions on the advocacy activities of multi-purpose associations. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. Restrictions on the activities of purely expressive organizations demand the strictest judicial scrutiny and can rarely, if ever, be justified. In the case of multi-purpose associations, such restrictions present a call for a somewhat different, and less demanding, review. The formulae by which the Court couches the degrees of deference it accords to the legislature produce a nominally varied array of standards for testing the propriety of different kinds of protected speech in different contexts. See, e.g., Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & Edward V. Heck, The Battle over Strict Scrutiny: Coalitional Conflict in the Rehnquist Court, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1049 (1992). There is much room to argue over whether different results under the different standards are driven by the particular standard invoked, or by the special circumstances or content which are said to call for different standards, cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-767, 1257-337 (1991), or whether the standards are simply conclusory devices to bless results driven by other considerations. In any event, it is not necessary for our purposes, if indeed it is possible, to mark or justify all the lines the Court has thus drawn among strict scrutiny review, intermediate scrutiny review, deferential scrutiny review, review of restrictions on commercial speech, and other patterns of review.


See infra note 176.
the one hand are the claims of persons who effectively are compelled to support the group and, pro tanto, its advocacy speech with which they may disagree. Their claim is not lessened if the compulsion is a function of the often monopolistic power that the government specially delegates over practical necessities sought by individuals from the associations. On the other hand is the claim for protection of the speech interests of the association and its complying members. Which claims present the compelling need? How does the conflict between the claims affect the compelling character of the government’s “need” and the scope of permissible restrictions?

The integrated bar and union shop cases\(^4\) provide some clues to answers. In those cases, considerations of individual autonomy support the judgment to relieve members of such groups from obligations to help support the groups’ advocacy speech. Those cases also argue for confining the role of the enterprise to the more or less technical, professional, or occupational activities that were instrumental in calling it into being and empowering it so that membership in it a practical necessity. The government may reasonably seek to protect individuals against being forced by economic compulsion (generated in fair part by government privileging of associations) to contribute to those associations and thereby to advocacy activities that the Constitution forbids the government from mandating them to support.

To be sure, such government interventions address only advocacy speech, the core expression that is at the heart of the First Amendment; but they do not purport to impinge on expression of viewpoints. Interventions that thus focus solely on subject matter and are neutral as to viewpoint have been upheld in many contexts in which the impact of subject matter restriction on viewpoint expression is closer than it is in the context of multi-purpose associations’ advocacy speech and individual members’ possible speech preferences.\(^5\) That distinction has also

\(^4\) See supra note 2; infra note 134.

been invoked to justify government restrictions on political speech in a variety of contexts, including protecting the negative speech interests of compelled members. The distinction between subject matter-based strictures on speech that are viewpoint-neutral and those that are not suggests testing regulation of the former by less critical standards than test regulation of the latter—at least insofar as the regulation of the viewpoint-neutral speech does not either suppress the content of the speech or seek or effect restriction of viewpoint expression under the guise of content-neutrality.

Whatever the possible levels of scrutiny for the standards of judicial review of content-neutral restrictions of expression, something less than the strictest scrutiny is called for where the regulation operates at the point of conflict between the speech interests of individuals and those of the group. The threat to the association’s speech interest by such a restriction is offset (even if not entirely) by the gain to the negative speech interest of individuals forced to support the association. The courts inevitably must compare (or balance) the value of the association’s speech interest against the value of the individual’s speech interest in a context.


Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1990); see also infra note 134 (citing union shop cases).
that contemplates possible substitution of expression by individuals or expressive associations for the expression of the multi-purpose group—a process that implicates a standard less critical of the restriction than "strict scrutiny."\(^\text{118}\)


If the requisite "need" to protect the speech interests of individuals by impeding or restricting the group's advocacy speech can be found, the union shop and state integrated bar decisions also suggest varied modes of drawing sufficiently narrow restrictions on the group's speech. Arguably the narrowest restriction that would serve to protect the individual is offered by the dues proration prescriptions. A broader, but possibly necessary restriction, may be a requirement that the association obtain the consent of a majority or super-majority of its members for each item of group advocacy speech, or even a limitation of the advocacy Categorization of speech by reference to its content without implicating its viewpoint is difficult to effect, and to the extent that consequences follow therefrom the categorization is dangerous to make operative. See, e.g., Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458-59; Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 29-39 (1990); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Delegation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 667-84 (1990). Nevertheless, some kind of categorization, either by content or by context is unavoidable, see Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466; Scanlon, Freedom, supra note 29, at 537-42; Scanlon, Content Regulation, supra, at 343; STONE ET AL., supra note 111, at 1256-57; SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 233-34; Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1308-13 (1993), even if the categories cannot be clearly delineated and differential treatment for speech among categories cannot easily be justified. See cases cited supra note 2; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511 (1993) (involving commercial speech); Richard Hiers, Public Employees' Free Speech, 5 U. FLA. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 169, 171-72 (1993).

119 As in the case of the integrated bar, the professional functions of the association may require speech that borders on advocacy speech. Thus, to the extent that the state delegates to the association a significant role in licensing procedures and examinations and in monitoring state-prescribed standards of conduct, some such speech to government will be necessary and appropriate. Associations dealing with the legislative and administrative process will require exchange of information and explanation of policy, but it need not require lobbying or public pleading. Cf. 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905) (statement of Theodore Roosevelt urging legislation limiting corporate contributions in elections); Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees before House Comm. on Election of the President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1905).

120 Disclosure requirements alone are inadequate. See supra note 75. The Supreme Court has recently left open the question whether even dues proration prescriptions are narrow enough, if formal membership is required. Keller, 496 U.S. at 17. The mere fact of being formally associated with the group, and therefore its speech, may be thought to be such an interference with the individual's negative speech rights that it is not cured merely by pro-ration of dues. This argument may raise somewhat different questions than are implicated in a First Amendment choice. See supra note 36.

121 Advocacy speech by the group may reasonably be regarded by the legislature as so peripheral both to the function for which the association was specially empowered and to the individual "compelled" to join that rules requiring such consent will not interfere materially with the group's principal functions. These rules will offer protection to the individual members (even though not to every member) who are forced to
speech of the association.

If the compelling need is understood to be not only to protect the "compelled" individual member but also to limit the power of enterprises that the state specially authorizes to collect funds and membership for particular purposes, the narrowest feasible restriction to meet that need appropriately could encompass confinement of the group to those functions for which it has been empowered, thereby wholly precluding its advocacy speech. That is the suggestion of some state courts in defining the powers of the integrated bar. To be sure, the integrated bar is both more formally and substantively a creation of the state than is a voluntary professional or occupational association like county medical associations, and pro tanto, the integrated bar should be entitled to less autonomy. However, so long as the association has "a strangle-hold" on access to (and continuation in) a trade or profession, at least in part because it enjoys special government support, it is hard to find a valid substantive distinction between the integrated bar and enterprises such as county medical associations with respect to the state's power to limit the advocacy activities of the group.2

3. Trade Unions with Agency or Union Shop Arrangements

The union or agency shop agreement operates to deny employment with a particular employer unless the worker joins or pays dues or their equivalent to the contracting union. Toleration of the union or agency shop agreement by common law courts or authorization of the phenomenon by legislation entails some government support, but not the elaborate join without imposing upon the public the loss of the message that a majority of the group's members wish to convey.

122 No different conclusion is suggested if, because of the significance of special government support or empowerment, the restriction on advocacy speech is challenged as a claim of an unconstitutional condition. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist (and occasionally a majority of the Court) have signalled views to the contrary, it has been powerfully urged that the judicial test of the propriety of conditioning government assistance on the recipient foregoing a preferred liberty should be no less strict than the test of the propriety of express government regulation of that liberty. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415, 1505-06 (1989). Even on that premise, as we have seen, there is good reason to uphold a restriction on advocacy speech. But it may well be appropriate to test limitations on the advocacy or ideological speech of a multi-purpose association that is created or specially empowered by government to perform limited non-speech functions by a less demanding standard than should govern the propriety of conditioning a benefit to an individual (like employment or a subsidy) on his foregoing advocacy speech. See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 717-39 (1992); infra note 173.
legislative scheme, subsidy, or intertwining encountered in the case of many other professional or occupational associations. Indeed, such support is not necessary to underpin the conclusion that an individual’s membership or support is effectively compelled even if not by government command. Where union shop arrangements are industry-wide, the worker’s obligation to join or pay is no less compelled than is the lawyer’s support of the integrated bar or than may be the need of the doctor or plumber to join the association of his profession. Even when, as is increasingly common, the union’s control over jobs is less than industry-wide, the loss of employment opportunities is likely to generate more than trivial costs. Not only is there the problem of geographic dislocation, but other costs (like loss of health care benefits or the firm-specific asset embodied in the specialized accommodation to particular jobs and routines that comes from work experience) make it likely that exclusion from the union (or expulsion from employment for failure to pay the equivalent dues) should no more be permitted arbitrarily than should exclusion from the integrated bar or the medical association.

To be sure, the union’s existence reflects the government’s willingness through the judiciary to respect, to a limited extent, the employees’ private ordering. The union’s role as collective bargainer is facilitated by reason of the government-granted or government-respected exclusive bargaining power of the union, the government-authorized requirement of dues or “in lieu” payments, and the imposed requirement of collective bargaining. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-65 (1975); NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 740 (1963); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-39 (1944). But there is also ground to argue that the government’s support of unions does not reach that level of special empowerment offered to many professional or trade associations or to business corporations. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665 (1990); Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 105-33 (1990); Kohler, supra note 84, at 180-88; Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 99-117; Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 364-82 (1984); Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights of Self Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1774-87 (1983).

For the most part, the worker, particularly the less skilled worker, is excluded from working for a particular employer or group of employers, but not necessarily from all employment for which he is equipped. On the other hand, in many cases the union controls access to employment in an entire industry or a substantial part of the entire industry for which the individual is equipped to work. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 58, at 75.

See, e.g., Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 320 P.2d 494, 497-98 (Cal. 1958); James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329, 334-35 (Cal. 1944); Moore v. Local Union No. 483, 334 A.2d 1, 2-4 (N.J. 1975); Miller v. Ruehl, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395-96 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1938); Dorrington v. Manning, 4 A.2d 886, 889 (Pa. 1939).
There is much room to argue over whether an individual's contribution to the support of a labor union under an agency shop or union shop contract is compelled by the government.\textsuperscript{126} That argument need not detain us. If the individual's obligation to contribute to the union is deemed not to be government compelled, it is nevertheless compelled by social and economic pressures which derive in part from government authorization for the union and employer effectively to mandate union membership.

Whether or not government-compelled \textit{speech} is deemed to be involved,\textsuperscript{127} there are good reasons to protect the employee against the

\textsuperscript{126} Possibly the notion of "government action" should extend beyond mandates to join an integrated state bar association to other arrangements that are less dependent for their existence upon government mandates than the state bar association, but more dependent upon government-mandated infrastructure than simple contract enforcement. Those possibilities raise questions that have been much debated. See STONE ET AL., \textit{supra} note 111, at 1499-500. It stretches the concept of "government action" almost to the breaking point to make it embody the union's and employer's action in "compelling" dues payments to the union in agency shop arrangements under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1988), and even further to make it embody compelled speech in agency shop arrangements. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON, \textit{LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS} 213-64 (1968). It goes beyond that point to extend the concept to agency shop arrangements authorized under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), or at common law. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, \textit{Union Security Agreements under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck}, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 57-63 (1990). For the government to be the actor legitimately charged with compelling speech, it must be involved not merely with supporting the association, but also with the activity that caused the injury. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968); Lang, \textit{supra} note 100, at 47-49. Arguably, the government's connection with the speech of an individual in a union shop arrangement is so much less than it is with the forced dues payment that its impingement on the individual's speech rights in union shop arrangements is too attenuated to offset the need to authorize a union shop. See Cantor, \textit{supra} note 30, at 51-52; cf. DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 187 P.2d 769, 773-76 (Cal. 1947), \textit{cert. denied}, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (a need that was found sufficient to justify compelled dues payments quite apart from the use of some portion of them for union advocacy activities or public speech).

For an employer (whether government or private) to seek the non-speech benefits of a union shop at the cost of allowing the union to spend dues on \textit{intra vires} union advocacy speech does not entail employer dictation of content of speech that is supported by dues. Absent such dictation of content, the case for government-authorized union shop arrangements violating the employee's speech rights under the First Amendment is weakened considerably.

\textsuperscript{127} If the union shop arrangement is seen, as it well may be seen for enterprises covered by the Railway Labor Act and should be seen for others, as not entailing \textit{government} compulsion to join or pay dues, the argument certainly does not entail government compulsion to speak. No constitutional objection can seriously be raised against the
use of his or her compelled contributions supporting the union’s advocacy speech, but they do not stem from the same considerations that are urged to protect him or her from government-compelled speech. A society, particularly an industrial society, could reasonably make the judgment that exclusive bargaining power in the union, compulsory collective bargaining, and union shops offer a desirable regime for optimal collective bargaining and achievement of industrial stability, or at least industrial peace. Because the legislature “has great latitude in choosing the methods by which [industrial peace] is to be obtained,” it could also reasonably conclude that the reasons for a union shop arrangement do

union’s use of institutionally- (as opposed to government-) coerced dues for its public or advocacy speech.


There are good reasons, in principle, to limit the employee’s freedom not to associate with the union. Hence, even if an employee may properly challenge as government action the arrangements to which he is thus compelled to submit, it does not follow that the Constitution requires that he prevail. Employees may be required to support (by dues payments or their equivalents), if not to join, a union in order to avoid free-rider problems and to promote labor peace. Non-union members may reasonably be required to pay for benefits from wage scales and working conditions for which the union bargained and which are enforced by use of teams of officers, lawyers, and others who are paid from union dues. Because it is not feasible and not lawful to set terms that do not cover union and non-union employees alike, the latter may appropriately be required to contribute their fair share to meet the financial and organizational burden. There is also reason to believe that many persons who would normally form or join a union will not do so if free-riders are permitted. See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 66, at 21-22.

Indeed, at least in England, the notions of “effective and stable organization” and full workers’ bargaining strength are said to require union shops or their equivalents. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS, 1965-1968, at 160-63 (The Rt. Hon. Lord Donovan, Chmn., 1968). It also has been pointed out that there are advantages to management in dealing with a union representing all its employees, if only to lessen the likelihood of unrest resulting from the competing unions and jurisdictional disputes.

129 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233. The Court apparently treated the employee’s claims to be relieved of the obligation to associate, which were cast in terms of the First Amendment, as asserting a deprivation of liberty rather than an interference with speech. See id. at 233; International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760-63 (1961). The Court in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), used the rhetoric of the First Amendment with respect to the dues payment obligation, but reviewed the issue under a “reasonable basis” standard, id. at 217-32, in contrast to the strict scrutiny standard applied to the speech support question, id. at 222-35. But see id. at 244-67 (Powell, J., concurring). Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), implicitly upheld the associational obligation without even discussing the question of the constitutionality of applying the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) to limit the obligation to pay dues under an agency shop contract. Id. at 761-62.
not require, and moreover the effectuation of the arrangement would be
impeded by requiring, individuals to contribute to the support of the
union's advocacy speech. Implementation of that judgment may be em-
body in statutes or court orders separating support of the union's advoca-
cy speech from the obligations of membership.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's constitutional view, society
could equally reasonably conclude that industrial peace and economic
efficiency do not require (but on the contrary preclude) separation of
the obligation to join or pay dues and the obligation to support union
advocacy speech. That judgment could be implemented by legislation
expressly requiring payment of dues in solidum, by legislation expressly
authorizing the union and the employer to enter into such arrangements,
or merely by failure of the legislature to forbid common law enforce-
ment of such arrangements between union and employer.

On either view, the government can be said to be intruding on
individuals' freedom of speech—of members who do not wish to con-
tribute to support the group's speech or of the group and its members
who do wish the group to speak. The validity of the intrusion on the
speech of either the dissident individual or the group raises substantial
questions under the First Amendment. Striking the balance between the
conflicting claims is not without difficulties. As with the integrated
bar or the economically compelled association of many professional or
occupational organizations, to the extent that the government's mandate
or the economic pressure on the individual to join or pay "in lieu" fees
is seen as remote from a compulsion to participate in the union's advo-
cacy speech, the weight of the individual's claim that his or her speech
is impaired diminishes. Nevertheless, the burden imposed on the
individual's speech interest is, as in the case of other compelled associa-
tions, considerably heavier than if no mandate or economic compulsion
to make such payments is imputed. On the other hand, legislation relie-
ving members of the obligation to support the union's advocacy speech
impairs the union's (and its complying members') speech. Indeed, be-

130 See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 514-19 (1991); Abood, 431
U.S. at 223-37. The Court's opinions dealing with labor relations statutes permit, if not
require, legislatures to limit union advocacy activities by restricting the use of union
funds for advocacy purposes. See infra note 134. These decisions do not go so far as to
prohibit union speech in advocacy matters, but the opinions do not forbid such a prohi-
bition either, and at least some of the Justices suggest the propriety of such a prohibi-
tion. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 550-62 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
131 Cf., e.g., DeMille, 187 P.2d at 773-76.
cause the union is neither a government-created institution like the integrated bar, nor, arguably, a specially empowered enterprise like the medical association or the NASD, its (and its majority members’) claims to freedom of speech for its collective voice may be stronger than the claims of either of the others.\textsuperscript{133}

Such claims by unions may not be doctrinally incompatible with legislation preventing unions from freely using dues compelled (by government or institutionally) for its advocacy speech. An uneasy tension exists, however, between the suggestion of constitutional protection for union speech and the teaching of cases authorizing (or indeed requiring) union speech to be impaired by restricting the use of portions of members’ dues payments.\textsuperscript{134} The level of tension would be raised if \textit{all} union speech were confined by legislation to the speech for which the Court allows the dissidents’ funds to be used. Such a limitation would impose a greater cost on society and the union (or its non-dissident

\textsuperscript{133} The Supreme Court has suggested that “the gravest doubt” would arise from a prohibition against publication “by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their interests from adoption of measures, or the election to office of men espousing such measures.” United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948). Powerful arguments to the same effect also were urged by dissenters in a later opinion dealing with a different application of that statutory prohibition. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). \textit{Cf.} Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1945).

\textsuperscript{134} The Court’s opinions construing the labor relations statutes are less than clear either in theory or in the reach of their holdings. Aggregately, they require limiting the union’s use of employees’ “compelled” contributions to the collective bargaining activities for which the contributions were forced, but in defining those activities they interdict much more than is required by concern for the First Amendment rights of individual members. For cases wrestling with delineation of the proper amount of interdiction under the Railway Labor Act, see \textit{Hanson}, 351 U.S. at 232; compare Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 443-55 (1984); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963); \textit{Street}, 367 U.S. at 750-70, under state employment agreements, see \textit{Lehment}, 500 U.S. at 507; Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301-04 (1986); \textit{Aboud}, 431 U.S. at 303, under the LMRA, see \textit{Beck}, 487 U.S. at 744-62. See generally Friessen, \textit{supra} note 89, at 610-11 (analyzing the effects of placing restrictions on the uses of contributions to the union).

The requirements that the Court has fashioned effectively place the burden on the union to prove the correctness of its expenditures. The requirements thus surprisingly place a burden on the victim of speech restriction to prove the speech’s entitlement—a burden that may be substantial. \textit{Compare} Rex H. Reed, \textit{Revolution Ahead: Communications Workers v. Beck}, 13 \textit{HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y} 635, 645-47 (1990) with Dau-Schmidt, \textit{supra} note 126, at 53 and Friessen, \textit{supra} note 89, at 610-14. On the other hand, the requirements appear to place on the dissenting member the burden of coming forward to reveal his or her dissent. \textit{See Street}, 367 U.S. at 774.
members) because it would narrow the area of permissible union advocacy speech. The Constitution does not require that result, as the Court’s decisions make clear. Whether it does or should permit that result to be mandated by a legislature is a more difficult question.

An affirmative answer is supported in this context by the same considerations that support an affirmative answer in the case of other compelled associations, particularly since such a limitation on the union’s speech does not preclude the members from making their collective voice heard through a separate, voluntarily formed expressive association. If the union’s functions evolve to include a larger role for advocacy activities on behalf of its members and a lesser role for benefits from traditional collective bargaining activities, and its membership remains effectively compelled, the problem of unbundling individual support for advocacy activity is somewhat different. Even if collective bargaining and resulting economic benefits dominate the role of the union for its members, and its expressive voice is peripheral, the claim for protection of the collective voice at the expense of the individual’s

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135 Cf. supra note 92 (citing state court decisions in the integrated bar context).


137 As the relationship of members to unions more closely approximates that of political party members to the party, the union’s and its members’ claim for First Amendment protection becomes a more significant obstacle to severing individuals’ contributions from the group’s advocacy action whether by proration or otherwise. For an advocacy association whose membership is voluntary, it is difficult to find constitutional justification for legislative severance. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. If membership is compelled by government mandate, the validity of severance turns on the considerations that would constitutionally justify government mandate to support or join such an enterprise, if any can do so. But see supra note 39. It is difficult to envision a purely advocacy enterprise whose membership is compelled by social or economic pressure, because the compulsion is generally a function of non-advocacy benefits. The more compelling the pressure to join, the less likely is the enterprise to be an advocacy, rather than a multi-purpose, enterprise. However, the compulsion may be a function of the monopoly power of the advocacy association, such as may be true of a political party or parties with respect to access to the ballot. A union which is simply an advocacy association, no less than a political party, is constitutionally amenable to a wide range of regulatory restrictions. See infra text accompanying notes 203-06.
speech interest is at its strongest when the union is not able to compel support by an agency or union shop agreement. At that point, government intervention entails restrictions on a less compelled, even if not entirely voluntary,\textsuperscript{138} association, and the focus then shifts to examining the propriety of intervention to restrict the group’s use of funds acquired through the offering of desired, but non-essential, non-advocacy benefits to finance advocacy activities.

C. Intervention in Advocacy Activities of Voluntary Association

Most large multi-purpose associations (like investor-owned business corporations, many farm organizations, some trade or professional associations, environmental groups, and groups such as the Elks or the Jaycees that offer networking contacts, social activities, or community activities) do not attract their members because they are the sole or principal source of practical necessities that members are under considerable social or economic pressure to acquire. Although the material benefits such enter-

\textsuperscript{138} Cf. Kidwell v. Transportation Comm’n Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 291-92, 297 (4th Cir. 1991). In theory, and notwithstanding the impact of the Railway Labor Act on state “right to work” laws, employees start with freedom to join or refrain from joining “voluntary” unions that may be compared with investors’ freedom to invest in a business corporation or the freedom to join social or “network” associations like the Jaycees or the Rotary Club. While they therefore cannot be said to be “forced” to support the union’s advocacy speech by joining the union, these employees have economic incentives that are not less powerful than those of an investor if the object is to measure the power of those incentives against the lure of supporting the union’s advocacy speech. In part, the more intense free-rider problem in the case of unions impels the union members to put pressure on outsiders to join. See OLSON, supra note 58, at 66-97; OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 66, at 21-22. In part, outsiders are likely to feel more need to join in order to have a voice in decisions that affect wages and the terms of employment. See Summers, supra note 100, at 49. Apart from the items of considerable value acquired by union membership, see Mitchell v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813, 815 (Ct. App. 1961), there may also be items of property like health benefits and pensions; see also Minnesota Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280-88 (1984). Those incentives constitute stakes for the employees that may well exceed those for investors, and certainly represent higher stakes for the employees than the benefits offered by many professional or “network” associations to their members. Moreover, the benefits offered by such associations, such as improving the skills and opportunities of members, do not depend upon collective action in bargaining with a single well-informed and intensely motivated employer or group of employers. To have a voice in defining the terms for employment bargains may be seen as more important than obtaining the more diffused benefits offered by the Jaycees or Rotary Club. See Mitchell, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 815. Thus, the obligation to support the union’s advocacy speech comes at a higher cost to the individual whose need to join and remain with the union is greater than his or her need to join or remain with the Jaycees or Rotary Club.
prises offer to members individually are real enough, those benefits do not rise to the level of "practical necessities," and indeed are often simply modest components of a social-economic-political pie. While some of those groups (like investor-owned business corporations, some veterans associations, farm organizations, and occupational associations) may depend in large measure on an elaborate scheme of government legislation and administration to facilitate their formation and enable their operation, others (like the Elks, the Rotary Club, the Jaycees, and the Sierra Club) function without such a filigree of authorization and protection. In assessing the permissible scope of government restrictions on the advocacy activities of such "voluntary" associations, it is relevant to consider the significance of their non-advocacy activities in their agenda and as inducements to join them and the significance of government support to their operation.

1. Investor-Owned Business Corporations

The constitutional validity of restricting advocacy speech or activities of large, publicly held business corporations in deference to the speech interest of its relevant stockholders does not imply the validity of a similar proposal to restrict corporate speech or activities in deference to the speech interests of its other stakeholders—i.e., creditors, employees or customers, suppliers, or the community. To be sure, analytically it is possible to decompose the enterprise, and focus separately on each type of contributor to its operation. On one level of abstraction, stockholders may be said to be no more (or less) contractual parties or necessary contributors to the enterprise's operations or viability than are creditors, employees, customers, or other suppliers of goods, services, or capital.

Undoubtedly, distinctions can be made in policy among the kinds of contributors who ought to be required to be consulted when the corporation's public voice is to be exercised, and those who could otherwise be made hostage to "the corporation's" speech preferences. Cf. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898-90 (3rd Cir. 1983). It is not necessary now to examine whether the First Amendment does, or should, limit the kind of consultation which might thus be made a condition to advocacy speech by large public investor-owned enterprises in order to reflect, or at least respond, to the views of those other constituencies. Notwithstanding claims on behalf of other constituencies, see Ribstein, supra note 71, at 126-27, 152, nothing in either policy or the Constitution requires the enterprise's public voice to echo all possible constituencies merely because the stockholder constituency, with its passive role in assuming the residual risk of the enterprise, is singled out for resonance. Moreover, the investor-stockholder's claim for government action to limit collective decisions in corporate advocacy activities (in the making of which he has at least a nominal role) differs from the claim of an individual for government to limit comparable decisions by another individual to whom she lends funds or with whom he transacts. Cf. Karlan, supra note 72; Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1243. At stake in the latter case is the speech interest of the autonomous human being who is the borrower in a discrete transaction. No comparable interest exists for the collective
An individual who "voluntarily" joins a multi-purpose association has a considerably weaker claim to government action to relieve him or her of the obligation to support the association's advocacy activities or speech than does the individual who is "compelled" to join the association. Unlike the multi-purpose associations whose membership is compelled, investor-owned business corporations' attraction for stockholders may fairly be characterized as voluntary. Nevertheless, stockholders' support of the enterprise's advocacy activity by reason of its use of the stockholders' proportionate interest in the collective assets may not fairly be so characterized. Indeed in some, if not many, matters stockholders may well oppose the advocacy position of the enterprise.

It is said that investors "know" that business corporations engage in advocacy activities in which they have little or no input, and therefore must be taken to consent to those activities when they invest. But the consent of a purchaser of stock to the business corporation's advocacy activity is even less volitional than is the consent of a purchaser of a soft drink to the form of the label on the can or bottle or to the chemical composition of the label. The difference (as an incentive for choosing an investment) between the strength of the appeal of expected return on what is often a form of savings, and the weakness of the investor's concern about corporate advocacy activity is, in most cases, likely to be so great that investors normally (and "rationally") resolve the latter concern simply by their choice of the former, without much consciousness of speech of the corporation in which the stockholder has a continuing interest.

It should be noted that an investor whose corporation engages in advocacy speech that he opposes cannot "exit" costlessly. If he exits after the speech, he has to bear the cost (or enjoy the gain) resulting from the speech. In any event, transaction costs and the cost of finding equivalent investments (notwithstanding efficient market theory) create a certain "stickiness" in changing investments. That "stickiness" grows as institutional investors increasingly intermediate between individuals and portfolio companies and thus force individuals' choices to a third level. Nonetheless, investors in such shares enter into those contracts, if not wholly knowingly and willingly, at least more "voluntarily" than those who join unions with union shop arrangements, some medical societies, or similar "compelled" membership enterprises.


Opposition by churches or "cause" groups to the products or the operations of a corporation (e.g., environmental or race discrimination concerns) generate campaigns that have some modest spillover effects on investors. However, rarely are the corporation's advocacy activities the subject of such campaigns or effects. Moreover, disclosure of the advocacy activity is quite beside the point. The problem is more one of adhesion. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
about the import of the corporate advocacy activity. The notion of "consent" to finance the firm’s advocacy activities in such circumstances is particularly problematic when the activity whose consent is thus purchased entails advocacy of political proposals for which society generally provides that the consenter could not lawfully be paid to vote. Even if a person’s support (but not vote) for a proposal or candidate may lawfully be purchased by another individual, the lawfulness of the purchase requires knowledgeable and freely given support in exchange for the purchase price. The extent to which such support is freely “sold” turns in part on the relative visibility of the advocacy voice purchased.

In the case of such tie-in sales by business corporations, the extent to which support is freely “sold” also depends upon whether alternative choices for investing without yielding advocacy voice are generally available. Few business corporations unbundle investment and advocacy voice. The aspirations of those who form and expect to control investor-owned public business corporations suggest that unbundled enterprises will not be (and in fact are not) formed sufficiently frequently (or extensively) to offer to passive investors any real choice. Hence, in the absence of a prohibition against bundling, those who prefer unbundled investments effectively will not have such a choice. That a person’s economic interests may appropriately affect his or her personal voice in support of (or opposition to) candidates or government policies does not require those interests to be given collective voice in a joint purpose association by tie-in sales of non-advocacy benefits that intrinsically obscure the advocacy support thus given.

The limitations on individual investors’ freedom of choice in advocacy activities thus resulting from corporate advocacy power raise the question whether society should intervene to relieve individual investors of the necessity to support financially corporate advocacy speech and to encourage freer investment. Corporate advocacy power also raises the

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143 On the opposite side of the investment transaction (i.e., corporate expenditure on advocacy speech as a percentage of revenues or profit), the amounts involved rarely exceed sums the loss of which would result in disciplining managers or the expenditure of which would, under governing corporate law norms, be found to be “waste,” even if their utility to corporate ends was nil. Cf. Stern v. General Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 474-77 (2d Cir. 1991).

144 See supra note 72.

145 Cf. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 156-58 (1974). The marginal role of advocacy activity in investors’ choices of investments that makes competition among business corporations with respect to that activity remote and unlikely does not negate the societal interest in effecting the freer choice for individuals that comes from prohibiting tie-in sales in such circumstances.
question whether society should intervene because of the impact on the audience of speech funded by contributions made (and augmented) only for purposes other than advocacy to an enterprise that lacks the autonomy of a human being—particularly if the enterprise’s specially authorized internal structure entails a bureaucratic arrangement that filters out the influence of members’ voices in the group’s advocacy decisions.

a. Protecting the Individual’s Voice

Not only do institutional arrangements normally preclude the stockholder’s entry into the corporation (i.e., the act of investing) from providing the consent to corporate advocacy activities that would be the equivalent of the volitional act of advocacy by the stockholder, but those arrangements give the investor little or no power to affect the corporate voice and little more to exit costlessly. Those limitations on stockholder power result from the rules that the government provides for corporate governance and operation.

It may or may not be accurate to characterize many of the requirements of corporate statutes as embodiments of clauses that rational persons would have negotiated in contracts among themselves if they could

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146 The impotence of stockholders to affect corporate action in general, resulting from both the legal allocation of decision-making authority and rational apathy, is specially marked in matters of corporate advocacy because of the marginal economic character of such conduct.

The breadth of managerial discretion allowed by the business judgment rule needs no elaboration when there is no showing of management diversion of assets or similar self-serving use of corporate property. Regarding management’s freedom to engage in political speech, see Joseph L. Naar, Open Politics, A New Problem, 40 AM. J. ECON. & SOC’Y 221 (1981); The Corporate Image: PR to the Rescue, BUS. WK., Jan. 22, 1979, at 47, 48-54.

The notion that management that uses assets for advocacy purposes will be displaced by stockholders who disagree with management in such matters, see, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978); Ribstein, supra note 71, at 136-40, is simply not consonant with either observed reality about proxy fights and motives for take-overs, or with decision theory. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 58, at 55-57. While the movement toward empowering and inducing institutional investors to participate in corporate governance is growing, its ultimate success does not solve the problem of separating corporate political and economic power.

Most corporate decisions, particularly those affecting the profitability of normal business dealings in free markets, can only be made effectively and implemented efficiently if stockholders “delegate”—i.e, relinquish—to management decision-making power over the use of contributed funds. However, when corporate power is exercised in the form of advocacy speech, there is more reason to require express stockholder approval, if only because it is less costly to seek advance stockholder consent for such action, which is not a matter of daily routine.
have bargained freely and knowingly. Those statutory clauses are said to be preferable to negotiated clauses struck among rational wealth maximizing individuals because they save the transaction costs that would be involved in negotiating such multi-faceted contracts among thousands, perhaps millions, of dispersed participants. It is precisely because of the risk consequences to the investors posed by savings in transaction costs thus effected by the corporate form that the necessity exists for the state to intrude into the terms of the arrangement more than it would (and possibly more than it constitutionally could) into separate contracts between individuals.


148 It is said that in order to overcome the obstacles to individuals contracting inter se, an elaborate scheme of laws (e.g., the state corporation codes) is required to embody in standardized form crucial portions of the contracts that theoretically might, but practically cannot, be struck by bargaining among the participants. See supra note 147. Those laws (e.g., providing limited liability, easy transferability of participations, centralized management, unlimited duration, personification of the corporation for some purposes, and fiduciary strictures) are not attributes or “natural rights” of individuals acting singly or in concert. They are fashioned by the state as necessary conditions for corporate power. So too is the stockholder’s insulation from tort liability and regulatory sanction, an insulation that could not be achieved by contract among stockholders. Historically and functionally, the limits that the state imposes upon the exercise of corporate power by those who wield it, and the modes of decision-making within the enterprise that it prescribes, are of the same “essence” of corporateness as the state’s offer of special arrangements embodied in its corporation codes that enable such power.


149 The mechanism by which transaction costs are saved exposes the dispersed stockholder participants to governance uncertainties (e.g., of agents or controllers changing the investment risks of the enterprise and of the stock, diverting assets for their personal benefit, altering the terms of the arrangement, etc.) with which they might deal if they had negotiated their “contracts” on a one-on-one basis. As dispersed atoms they cannot negotiate to reduce or diminish those risks. Hence, the state that authorizes the mechanism (including its voting and management arrangements, perpetual duration, corporate “personality,” stockholder limited liability, and liquidity) for exposing the stockholders to such risks may appropriately restrict the terms of the mechanism in order to protect
In matters of corporate decision-making with respect, for example, to the expenditure of corporate assets for advocacy speech, decisions might theoretically be made other than by management or by holders of a mere majority of stock. Society might plausibly seek to disentangle the individual’s investment opportunity from his or her support of corporate advocacy activities on issues that affect the individual in a capacity other than, or in addition to, his or her role as investor. Severing corporate advocacy speech from other corporate activities frees investors from the need to yield to the corporation some of their advocacy voice as part of the price of investing, and such severance does not prevent investors from spending their own funds to advocate public policies in their own economic interest either individually or through advocacy groups.

The matter has civic import as well as some economic significance for investors, whether the problem is seen as one of agency costs to control management which effectively makes the corporate deci-

the dispersed participants for whom it is saving the transactions costs. All states impose certain restrictive rules of internal decision-making on state chartered corporations in order to limit the power of the enterprises’ agents. Possibly also those rules reflect deference to a theoretical need to limit the impact of group choice on individual preferences of members, or recognition of the limits on the volition and knowledge of dispersed public investors when they buy or vote their stock. Many of those rules cannot be avoided in the initial corporate charter arrangements, nor can they be altered by even unanimous consent. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 148. Notwithstanding the current fashion of characterizing corporate arrangements as a nexus of contract, there is reason to conclude that the state’s power to prescribe the terms for such arrangements is, and should be, considerably broader than its power to restrict the terms of the general run of commercial contracts between two parties, particularly in view of the externalities that the state creates by granting limited liability.

In theory, the parties could arrange their private ordering or the state could establish requirements, inter alia, so that the essentially transient stockholders decide any or all questions by majority or super-majority vote, simply by delegating authority to agents to act, or by some other mechanism. The corporate take-over decisions make plain that the state’s special powers over the operation and structure of corporations include the power to shift the locus of decision-making in corporate affairs from the stockholders individually to the stockholders collectively. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 81-86, 91 (1987). The considerations that have induced most states to prescribe limits and requirements on such decision-making processes in general suggest that there may also be reason for a state to impose limits on the process by which the corporation makes decisions to engage in advocacy speech or ideological activities.

Severance also relieves stockholders of the need to spend personal funds to offset messages paid for by their share of collective funds.

See infra note 158.

or one of collective choice. The notion that the holders of a majority of the shares of stock must be the decision-makers on the question of use of corporate funds for advocacy activities, even on questions said to affect corporate affairs, assumes that such questions must be decided in corporate solution. Nothing requires that assumption, even

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154 Whether the interests of management and the interests of stockholders in political decisions are the same is an open question. No doubt there is a substantial overlap of interest, but there are many holders of substantial portions of stock of larger corporations, particularly institutional investors like churches, universities, and pension funds, that are likely to reflect political, moral, and social viewpoints that differ substantially from those of corporate managers on many issues. A state may take that potential difference into account in enacting restrictive legislation designed to prevent the agents’ use of their principals’ assets to espouse the agents’ political or social preferences. That the state in fact permits loose (perhaps too loose) stockholder control of management’s behavior does not imply that the First Amendment prohibits the state from precluding management’s use of corporate assets to speak either personally or on behalf of stockholders. If a manager unlawfully removes funds from the corporate till and deposits them in his own personal account, the manager’s speech purchased with such funds may be protected by the First Amendment, unless stockholders are able to enjoin use of funds misappropriated by their unfaithful agents. *But cf.* Ribstein, *supra* note 71, at 125-26. But nothing in the First Amendment precludes the state from seeking to prevent management from using cash actually in the corporate till to pay for the managers’ personal speech.

It does not detract from this conclusion that unbundling might induce even higher agency costs for investors by enabling (and possibly encouraging) managers to appropriate corporate assets through extra compensation and by using that cash to fund separate advocacy collectives, like PACs. *See, e.g.,* Ribstein, *supra* note 71, at 140-44.

155 On the contrary, requiring stockholders to be bound by their fellow investors’ political choices for the advocacy use of corporate funds conflicts with expectations of many investors, and in any event is at odds with the simple premise of investing for profit. That premise relieves stockholders of the need to deal with the complex problems of social choice when they make investments. *See, e.g.,* Milton Friedman, *The Social Responsibility of Business, N.Y. Times*, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32.

It has been suggested in the literature that hailed the *Bellotti* decision that the very passivity of dispersed public investors and the liquidity of their investment coupled with the special competence of management argues for a need to delegate to management the corporate voice on advocacy matters. *See, e.g.,* Francis H. Fox, *Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Referendum Spending*, 67 KY. L.J. 75, 95 (1978-79); John R. Bolton, *Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech*, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 415 (1980); Robert A. Prentice, *First Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech*, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 639-40 (1981). That suggestion implausibly assumes special managerial competence in matters of public policy and ignores the agency cost of delegating such power to managers without any real accountability to the constituents. Moreover, such an arrangement is at odds with democratic political values because, in effect, it requires investors to delegate to the management of the economic collectivity the political power which is normally exercisable by individuals acting alone
if it were valid in the case of compelled professional association or union membership. Indeed, the process of voting by share rather than by person raises questions about the wisdom of allowing corporate assets to be used to influence political decisions.\footnote{\textsuperscript{156}}

b. \textit{Limiting Corporate Advocacy Power}

More is involved than the interest which the state may have in protecting the individual investor against tie-in sales of advocacy voice to investment in business enterprises. The state also has a legitimate interest in limiting the advocacy activities of investor-owned business corporations by decoupling the corporation's advocacy speech and ideological activities from its economic functions. Quite apart from concern with "corruption" of candidates, the potentially distorting impact of corporations' advocacy is a legitimate source of concern to a democratic or in organizations having substantial political purposes. The arrangement assumes that the virtues that are claimed for interest group pluralism are served by (or require) treating the large business corporation as one of the many competing interest groups. EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, \textit{THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS} 221-30 (1969); Bolton, \textit{supra}, at 414-16; Ribstein, \textit{supra} note 71, at 130-34; cf. DAN-COHEN, \textit{RIGHTS, supra} note 4, at 180-81. That notion is neither self-evident nor necessary for such validity as the pluralist hypotheses may have. On the contrary, the case remains to be made for assimilating those enterprises that attract capital so overpoweringly for narrow economic purposes and so opaque for advocacy activity with expressive associations or multi-purpose membership associations with advocacy roles. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, \textit{POLITICS AND MARKETS} 161-233 (1977); CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, \textit{THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE} 92-100 (1987). That modulating or stilling the corporate advocacy voice will leave the field to other multi-purpose associations and advocacy associations that can be formed by investors reinforces the conclusion that there is little reason to infuse interest group virtues or entitlements to investor-owned business corporations.\footnote{\textsuperscript{156}} The practice of share voting determines corporate decisions by aggregate wealth rather than by aggregate number of persons. The views of stockholders on political, moral, or social matters would therefore be reflected by the share rather than by the person on votes to use corporate assets for advocacy or public speech. Moreover, the assets of \textit{all}, not merely the majority, of the shares would be used to support the particular views that prevail. The premise of equal weight per individual vote to reflect political preferences is eroded more significantly by the use of corporate expenditures than by the use of individual voters' expenditures, notwithstanding the disparity in wealth among individuals. The distortion is even more complicated by reason of the ownership of stock by institutions, both for-profit and not-for-profit. The fear of undue political power inhering in a system of voting by the share was reflected in the early requirement in some states of voting by the shareholder rather than by the share. See David L. RATNER, \textit{The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote"}, \textit{56 CORNELL L. REV.} 1, 6-8 (1970).
government. The distortion is in part a function of the content of a message that does not emanate from, and is not subject to the full range of motives and preferences of, individual human beings. In part also

157 Cf. HOBBES, supra note 84.

158 David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 577-84 (1991); cf. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3rd Cir. 1983). In prevailing economic theory, investor-owned corporate business enterprise exists principally, if not solely, to maximize returns to the enterprise, and thereby its shareholders' wealth and the productive use of social resources. To be sure, human investors in such enterprises are not less profit-focused in making their investments than is (or should be) "the corporation" in performing its functions. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 683, 689-96. Nor are individuals who engage in businesses that they own directly less profit-focused than the corporation; but the corporation does not have the personal autonomy that implicates exercise of non-economic preferences and the possibility of self-realization or self-fulfillment by expression (or by listening to expression) that the First Amendment seeks to assure for individual human beings. In practice, large business corporations are rarely recorded as intentionally departing very far from wealth maximizing theory, notwithstanding so-called "charitable" giving or touted social responsibility. See, e.g., Charles R. O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1349-51 (1949); William Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 494, 498, 509-510; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05, 809-10 (1978).

Presumably in a free market economy the players require some restraints in their pursuit of society's resources and creation of externalities, and those restraints are to be imposed by government acting in response to the preferences of individual human beings who have a much broader range of preferences than simply wealth maximization. To allow the wealth maximizing business corporation a powerful voice in determining how social resources are to be allocated by government is to give that corporation significant power in determining how the rules of the only game it is playing should be changed, rather than confining it to play under the rules preferred by human individuals. If market forces are the energizing source of economic creativity, corporate political power should not be allowed to impede operation of those forces by seeking government alterations or favors. Nor should such power be allowed to shift (or to avoid internalizing) externalities or to produce excessive public goods. Not only may such power divert managerial attention from focusing on optimal economic results, but it also tilts the operation of the processes of choice in the political system to affect allocations of market power, the costs of externalities, taxes, defense expenditures, foreign policy, etc.

If the "private" long-term economic decisions of large for-profit corporate businesses significantly affect the economic condition of the entire society, it is difficult to legitimate their entitlement to the power to prevent the imposition by society of constraints on their economic behavior. Society could reasonably conclude that allowing authority in such firms to make political expenditures goes too far down the road to such power. It is not necessarily true that what is good for General Motors is good for the country.

To be sure, individual owners of businesses or individual investors who accumulate
it is a function of the magnitude of the public investor-owned corporation’s power to communicate by use of collective assets thus assembled (from persons who may not wish to support its advocacy voice) which are apt systematically to be larger than individuals’ assets.

It is not inconsistent with the premises that the audience should be, and is, able to comprehend and parse political messages to recognize that the process of comprehension and parsing is made more difficult if contestants with agendas that are substantively colored and structurally narrowed can systematically present more (and more timely) messages than others, whether in connection with referenda,\textsuperscript{159} other electoral contests, or otherwise. The result is a distortion in the character of the aggregate information disseminated to, and the content of the messages received by, the public.\textsuperscript{160} Moreover, the audience is left with an impression of human support for particular viewpoints that may well be inaccurate, and

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That support for the same causes or candidates may not always be given by all investor-owned business corporations does not mean that corporate advocacy voices are as diversified as individual voices. To that extent, corporate advocacy voices have a systematic economic advantage that alters the process of electoral choice that advocacy action only by individuals (separately or organized in advocacy groups) would produce.

\textsuperscript{160} See, e.g., Shelledy, \textit{supra} note 158, at 568-77.
in any event is costly to offset.\textsuperscript{161} To curtail the distorting effects of the structurally restricted advocacy speech offered by business corporations by confining those enterprises to the economic roles for which they are specially empowered, does not require so restricting expenditures by wealthy individuals who inevitably have broader potential advocacy agendas. Identification of the legitimate reasons that society may have for limiting the power of business corporations to engage in advocacy speech thus raises the question whether vindicating those legitimate interests violates the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{161} Whether or not corporations outspend individuals in elections or referenda, they can focus the light they shed more powerfully on particular candidates and causes than can dispersed or less organized individuals. See Shelledy, supra note 158, at 543, 573-77. In addition, notwithstanding the constitutionally-authorized power of individuals to expend their wealth in electoral matters, there is little reason to doubt that the demonstrated corporate ability to skew the results of referenda, see supra note 158, applies, at least to elections in which corporate managers tend to favor the same candidates. Against those results, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that more speech fueled from corporate sources necessarily means a more enlightened electorate. See Schneider, supra note 159, at 1280-83; Shelledy, supra note 158, at 568-77; cf Novosel, 721 F.2d at 901.

To be sure, the audience may discount the content of the message because of, or notwithstanding, the name recognition of the sender. However, the extent (and direction) of that discount is not self-evident, and in any event a question is raised as to the appropriate role of such corporate "name recognition" in the rational process of making a voting decision. Moreover, to offer speech to offset the sender's message is costly. Hence, the possibility of such discount does not preclude the state from appropriately concluding that the investor and society are best served by requiring a greater congruence between the speakers and the funders.

\textsuperscript{162} Other questions may be raised with respect to curtailing the property rights of the corporation and its investors by precluding the corporation from engaging in speech that conditions the public on political issues or in lobbying or other activities which would affect government policy having an impact on the corporation's operations. There is, for example, no doubt that in today's society the role of government regulation on the productivity, efficiency, and profitability of corporations is very large. Therefore, business corporations have a property interest in determining how those regulations should be adopted and which ones should be adopted. That interest, however, generates no more and no less than the normal interplay of tensions between regulating the uses of property and the requirements of due process or equal protection of law. Deep deference is given to the legislative judgment in such matters by judicial review limited simply to inquiring whether there is, or whether there can be said to be, a reasonable basis for the stricture. If restricting advocacy speech of investor-owned business corporations not in the communications business were tested by that standard, the reasonable basis question would be asked in response to a claim under the Equal Protection, Due Process, or possibly the "Takings" Clauses. It is possible that in some circumstances, prohibition of advocacy activity that seeks to avert government intervention (or failure to intervene) in its affairs will fail to meet that standard. But that possibility approaches the vanishing point if access to courts as part of the right to petition is not hampered and if corpora-
c. The Relevant Criteria for Judicial Review

In the classic formulation, regulation directed at classifications that implicate curtailing expression is not valid unless it is the least restrictive alternative adopted to meet a compelling state need. That formulation, which may appropriately test government suppression or even lesser intrusions on the speech of individuals or expressive associations is not so clearly the appropriate standard in the case of multi-purpose enterprises. A puzzling configuration of tensions appears in the case of business corporations that is comparable to that which affects the constitutional question in the case of compelled association. It is comparable but not identical because the stockholder’s participation is more voluntary than compelled. Hence the individual’s negative speech interest may plausibly be regarded, in current constitutional jargon, to be of lower value than the interest in not being compelled to speak. But that interest is yielded when a stockholder makes an investment; and it is not as freely given up as it would be if that interest were not surrendered in exchange for collateral rewards, particularly rewards of a magnitude that obscures the actuality of the choice being made.

The question whether the First Amendment prohibits the state from limiting corporate advocacy speech by restricting a corporation’s internal decision-making rules or its advocacy power must be answered in the light of the inevitability of some state-imposed burdens on the speech interests of some investors. Moreover, each choice of allocation of...
decision-making powers within the corporation that the state makes inevitably affects the speech the audience receives.

Hence, although the issue confronting the reviewing court is posed by the prohibitions of the First Amendment, the issue does not involve the validity of a "compelling need" simply to silence a message to the detriment of the "speaker" and the audience.\textsuperscript{65} To treat the corporation as the "speaker" entitled to protection under the First Amendment is to reify an association of human beings at the expense of the First Amendment interests of some, perhaps many, of the human members of the association. Such reification is as improper as it is unnecessary. The problem is not whether the speech of "the corporation" is suppressed. The questions are: (a) who in the association, which is "the corporation," should have what decision-making role on whether the group collectively acting as the corporation should speak; and (b) whether the members should be remitted to speaking individually or through an expressive association. The emphasis in the decided cases on the audience's interest in hearing corporate speech\textsuperscript{66} quite ignores the question whether the corporate speaker has power—in the sense of authority—to speak. If the government validly defines the internal mechanism of authority to enable

\textsuperscript{65} The issue is not, as the \textit{Bellotti} Court suggested, comparable to the issue in \textit{Buckley v. Valeo}, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (deciding whether "government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others"). \textit{See} First Nat'l Bank v. \textit{Bellotti}, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978) (quoting \textit{Buckley}, 424 U.S. at 48-49). Nor does the First Amendment claim challenge the validity of a legislative choice to put a cap on the sums that may be spent on speech by persons who can claim a personal individual right or power to speak, or by expressive associations which they form to speak.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n}, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1980); \textit{Bellotti}, 435 U.S. at 781-83; \textit{see also} \textit{Martin H. Redish, Reflections on Federal Regulation of Corporate Political Activity}, 21 J. PUB. L. 339, 344-45 (1972); cf. \textit{Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n}, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986). The Court's analysis in \textit{Bellotti} and its progeny purports to focus on the abstraction of "speech" and to subject to "strict scrutiny" a denial of the audience's entitlement to receive it. The Court's analysis assumes (although the Court purports to deny the relevance of its assumption) that the speech emanates from a "speaker" that has a natural and ineluctable authority to express itself, so that impeding that speech deprives the audience of an entitlement protected by the First Amendment.

If the corporation is not reified, and its decision-making structure in the form that the state law provides is viewed as the mechanism that powers its speech, there is nothing natural or ineluctable about "the corporation's" speech. \textit{See} \textit{David L. Ratner, Corporations and the Constitution}, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 19 (1980); \textit{Mayer, supra} note 148, at 627-29, 633-34, 637-38.
the corporation to speak or limits its power to speak other than by its members, the audience's entitlement to the speech is thereby equally defined. If there exists a right to hear, it is only the right to hear what others can and wish to say.\textsuperscript{167} Listeners do not themselves generate the speech that the First Amendment protects; nor can they be "enriched" by it unless willing and able speakers exist.

That the corporation's collective voice may differ from the voices of any or all of its stockholders\textsuperscript{168} does not require that "it" be authorized to speak for the benefit of listeners or society. The cost of doing so entails (apart from individual investors yielding part of their advocacy power) empowering a "speaker" that lacks the autonomy or aspirations of a human being to furnish messages for individual listeners to digest and for society to consider,\textsuperscript{169} and amplifying that speaker's message to a volume that may well distort the menu from which the audience is asked to choose.\textsuperscript{170}

If society seeks to anchor the corporate advocacy voice in the authority of those who own the corporation\textsuperscript{171} or to limit the corporation's power to exercise that voice as a component of its "property," the "compelling" quality\textsuperscript{172} of society's need to do so must be assessed in the

\textsuperscript{167} For a critical interpretation of the cases relied upon by the Court in \textit{Bellotti} as spawning and developing the notion of a right to hear that operates quite independently of a need for a willing and able speaker, see Schneider, \textit{supra} note 159, at 1246-51.

\textsuperscript{168} See \textit{supra} note 37; see also Bolton, \textit{supra} note 155, at 387-88; Ribstein, \textit{supra} note 71, at 134; Shelledy, \textit{supra} note 158, at 579-81.

\textsuperscript{169} Efforts to impute aspects of a human's value preferences to a corporation, see \textit{ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS} § 2.01 & comments (American Law Inst. 1994), do not suggest that the corporation has the equivalent of human autonomy, particularly in ordering preferences for government action. Apart from any theoretical challenges to such imputation, the reality of corporate behavior suggests how limited is the range of non-profit-maximizing preferences thus imputed.

\textsuperscript{170} As a practical matter, the substance of the corporation's message (as distinguished from its volume) can be offered by a separate advocacy organization of stockholders. Any resulting reduction in amplification of the message may curtail some aspects of robust public debate, but that curtailment is not without its virtues for enhancing the quality of the debate. See Shelledy, \textit{supra} note 158, at 568-71.

\textsuperscript{171} See Dan-Cohen, \textit{ Freedoms}, \textit{supra} note 4, at 1241-43; Shelledy, \textit{supra} note 158, at 577-84; Prescott M. Lassman, Note, \textit{ Breaching the Corporate Walls: Corporate Political Speech and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 78 VA. L. REV. 759, 786-87 (1992). The justification for thus limiting the wealth-powered speech of "the corporation" does not extend to curtailment of the speech of wealthy individuals.

\textsuperscript{172} The criteria for determining whether there is a compelling need are vague. See, e.g., Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The historic fear in the United States of the power of aggregated wealth in corporate solution may have diminished in the latter half of this centu-
context of the state as necessary intervenor in allocating power over corporate advocacy activities among stockholders, because the state, as architect of the corporate enterprise, has large discretion over its design.\textsuperscript{173} Judicial review of restrictions on corporate advocacy poses problems for the reviewing court that do not differ from those posed by restrictions on advocacy by multi-purpose associations whose support is induced by compulsion, although the question is closer.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{173} If viewed as a problem in unconstitutional conditions by reason of the government's special assistance, judicial assessment of the propriety of conditioning enjoyment of corporate privileges on foregoing advocacy speech need not preclude that restriction. See supra note 122. The government's discretion in granting privileges is not unlimited. For example, furnishing amplifiers for speech expressing some viewpoints, but not others, or for use by some persons but not by irrelevantly different others, or on irrelevantly different terms, must meet the strictest scrutiny and presumably would not be upheld. Within the limits permitted by those considerations, judicial review of the propriety of the government grant, if the grant is neutral as to content (e.g., if it permits only limiting decibel volume or use only to amplify music) and is backed by a sanction that merely requires the recipient to forego such use, may be less strict than it should be if the sanction were to require not merely foregoing use of the amplifier, but prohibition of use of privately available amplifiers. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-92 (questioning validity of subsidy). At least in a minimalist state, the test of the propriety of conditions on such government grants, while demanding in order to preclude favoring some views or speakers or substantial monopolization or suppression of speech, need not be as strict as would be required in a welfare state. But see Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 53-58.

Thus, to the extent that the privilege foregone (collective advocacy speech) may be exercised without difficulty other than through the special government-empowered instrument (e.g., by forming another group to speak) there is less need for a court to test the propriety of the condition (i.e., the limited use permitted for the government-created instrument) as rigorously as if it were a mandated proscription of the message.

\textsuperscript{174} Arguably, restrictions on the advocacy speech of business corporations may be more closely related to the general tenor of viewpoints than comparable restrictions in the case of other organizations. The possibility that restrictions formally addressed neutrally to subject matter will indirectly address particular viewpoints requires careful judicial examination for such an occurrence. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-93; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1991). In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court upheld the validity of a Michigan prohibition against corporate contributions and independent expenditures in assistance of, or in opposition to, the nomination or election of candidates. Id. at 658-69. The Court's opinion disavows support for any broader restriction on corporate political or public speech (e.g., in referenda or speech in support of or opposition to legislation). Still, the Austin decision implements the logic and import of footnote 26 in Bellotti (see Austin, 494 U.S. at 659), in terms that imply that footnote 26 of the Bellotti opinion offers a loose thread which might be pulled hard enough to unravel the decision. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26; cf. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 814 F. Supp 186, 190-91 (D.R.I.
Whether the compelling need is to relieve individual investors of a tied-in obligation or to limit the corporate power that has been created or facilitated for special purposes, the question of the scope of the permissible restriction remains. Is a prohibition against advocacy speech, as contrasted with a super-majority requirement, rebate requirement, or a lesser intrusion with respect to such speech, the least restrictive alternative to effect the compelling state need? The criteria by which to determine what constitutes a “least restrictive alternative” are no more discernible or illuminating than those that determine what constitutes a “compelling state need.”

As Justice White pointed out in his dissent in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the state may appropriately consider whether the rebate scheme is either feasible or enforceable, and in any event whether the porosity of its stricture will adequately meet the need to enhance stockholder freedom of advocacy choice or to curb corporate political power. If a broader restraint is to be considered—e.g., a proscription of corporate advocacy speech or a requirement of stockholder-

175 Although a disclosure requirement is not adequately responsive to the problem, see supra note 75, there is room to argue, as in the case of labor unions, that a proportionate rebate or the like to dissenting stockholders is the only appropriate technique for protecting the individual, the group, and the social interest in free speech. To be sure, the relationship of union members to the union differs from that of investors to their corporations in ways that may justify the rebate technique more than the prohibition technique in the case of unions but not in the case of publicly-held corporations. See supra note 139. There is also room to argue that corporate existence and operation are more intricately and pervasively connected to the state than are labor unions. Like the integrated bar or government-supported institutionally-compelled association, government limits on the scope of the enterprise’s power, including neutral prohibition of some kinds of speech by the group, are an appropriate technique for protecting the various interests in free speech. Cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 665-66.


er consent for such speech\textsuperscript{179}—the question is whether the restraint is sufficiently narrow to be constitutionally tolerable.\textsuperscript{180} In answering that question, it is relevant that even if practical difficulties make a requirement of stockholder consent the equivalent of prohibition of advocacy by the corporation, the stockholders individually or collectively through another association may engage in such advocacy activity.\textsuperscript{181} The costs

\textsuperscript{179} To require stockholder consent presents problems that may make that remedy inadequate or too costly. The votes of corporate, particularly institutional, investors (such as investment companies, pension funds, banks, or insurance companies) in the stock of the portfolio corporation may require “pass-through” to the human investors in those institutions. Without such pass-through, there is a replication at the institutional investor level of the problem met at the portfolio corporation level—except possibly for institutional investors which are themselves advocacy organizations or their equivalent. In addition, there is the question whether in principle anything less than a requirement of unanimity protects the interests of dissenters.

\textsuperscript{180} That the states are authorized to charter corporations under our federal system does not deprive the federal government of power to restrict (or allocate internal power over decision-making with respect to exercise of) the corporate advocacy voice, at least for corporations with publicly traded stock. If protecting or enhancing stockholders’ freedom in making advocacy choices is (as it can well be) seen as a national problem with respect to investor-owned enterprises, even if states “create” corporations, federal intervention is not precluded, as the securities laws and the union shop cases make plain. See also United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2700-01 (1993).


Whether the federal-state dichotomy in the regulation of corporations’ affairs should thus operate to deprive each state of a sufficiently compelling need for adopting such restrictions or requirements that might be sufficiently compelling if wholly intrastate behavior were involved is a puzzling question. Nevertheless, the federal system presents a less troubling analytic problem if the question is determining whether State B’s need to restrict the behavior of State A’s corporation is sufficiently compelling when the restriction is designed to protect the electoral system and citizens of State B from advocacy activities in its territory by corporations (including State A corporations) that are financed by contributions induced by collateral rewards. Cf. Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1991).

\textsuperscript{181} To prohibit corporations from urging views on “ideological” questions does not preclude the formation by stockholders of groups to do so, a possibility to which the Supreme Court has repeatedly attributed significance in assessing the permissibility of restrictions on a group’s speech. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (prohibiting union from fueling its speech with dues from coerced payers does not prohibit “the union” from financing its speech with voluntary contributions);
are principally: (a) the loss of the use of funds available in corporate solution and the use of the corporate organization,\textsuperscript{182} coupled with the need to set up a new organization; and (b) the free-rider problem, i.e., the uncertainty of collecting funds for the new organization from stockholders as voluntary individual contributions. That very uncertainty underscores the propriety of imposing such a requirement. It is the state’s act of empowering management or holders of a majority of shares to allocate corporate funds that effectively denies to individual investors the opportunity to separate their political and economic interests, and exposes society to the expression of views that many of the owners of the assets financing the expression of those views may oppose. Substituting individual contributions for agency centralization in this area comports more with the theory of democracy than does the bundling of economic and speech interests.\textsuperscript{183}

The audience may lose something that might be contained in corporate speech because of the costs of forming an independent group to speak collectively and the free-rider problem in financing such a group.\textsuperscript{184} If stockholders do not have sufficient incentive to band to-

\textsuperscript{182} Cf. \textit{Austin}, 494 U.S. 652 at 657-58. The notion that only the corporation can produce certain kinds of information relevant to the message to be sent, see \textit{Austin}, 494 U.S. at 681 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Prentice, \textit{supra} note 155, at 636, does not preclude the corporation from sharing the information with stockholders organized in an advocacy group.

\textsuperscript{183} See \textit{supra} note 156.

\textsuperscript{184} For example, unbundling may result in reduction of public debate on issues of concern to “business” such as taxes, regulation of pollution or working conditions, etc. In theory, the independent group may lose, or unwittingly filter out, some of the content that would be focused in corporate speech. See \textit{Ribstein, \textit{supra} note 71, at 134. In practice, such loss of content does not seem likely. Compare the suggestion that loss of the free-rider effects is a significant impediment to purveying the corporate message, \textit{Meese, \textit{supra} note 174, at 318-24, with the suggestion that this effect may not be a
gether and form a new group to support speech that they or management would otherwise make through the corporate mechanism, the audience has lost nothing to which it is entitled. The state is not obliged by the First Amendment or otherwise to create speakers. Nor is there reason to oblige it to permit all collectivities formed for non-speech purposes, particularly those it specially empowers, to fuel their public advocacy powers by way of tie-in sales of their investment returns. Where, as in the case of public corporations, the collateral incentives drown out the advocacy activities as inducements for individual support of the serious interference with robust debate, Shelledy, supra note 158, at 568-77.

It has been argued that imposing restrictions on the advocacy speech or activities of publicly-held investor-owned business corporations, but not on those of other business associations or individuals, is unconstitutional because the restriction is both overinclusive and underinclusive. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 688-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793-94. Those arguments turn in part on the terms of the specific restrictions. However, insofar as the arguments address the failure to cover all corporations or to cover non-corporate aggregated wealth amassed for commercial purposes, they are flawed. Close corporations and most partnerships are relevantly different from large publicly-owned corporations. The restricted role that corporate law leaves for the individual investor in a public corporation contrasts sharply with the multi-dimensional role which the same law and different institutional parameters leave for investors in close corporations or their partnership equivalents. In close corporations, individual owner-participants can contract more or less effectively for collective decisions on all matters, including advocacy activities. State corporate law recognizes this distinction in a variety of ways that do not offend the Constitution. There are probably systemic limits on individual cognition and volition in so contracting. But any government effort to curb the advocacy speech of close corporations in order to reflect more fairly individual participants’ preferences is not needed by the participants or the audience nearly as much as in the case of public corporations; and such intervention approaches restriction on the individual’s speech. Restrictions on advocacy speech by close corporations are not made more tolerable because the speech is funded by proceeds from the individual’s business rather than from the individuals themselves. But cf. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1976). The similarity to individual speech justifies a more protective stance for speech of close corporations than of public corporations.

Aggregation of wealth in other collective non-corporate forms may or may not present the same need for restriction of speech as does aggregation of wealth in public business corporations. Whether the failure to include publicly-held limited partnerships in the associations whose advocacy activities are restricted is justified depends upon examination of relevant differences between publicly-held limited partnerships and corporations. Nothing in the Constitution should prevent including public limited partnerships in the coverage, or excluding them if the differences are relevant to the regulatory purpose, in the absence of any suggestion of viewpoint discrimination or suppression of content.

corporation's activities, the state's effort to assure that it is the advocacy rather than the collateral returns that the member contributions support need not offend the protection the First Amendment affords to the individual speaker or to the audience.

2. Other Multi-Purpose Associations with Voluntary Membership

To conclude that investor-owned business corporations may constitutionally be subjected to restrictions on advocacy speech does not imply the constitutionality of similar restrictions on all voluntary multi-purpose associations, whether or not they receive special government support. The magnitude of the impairment of the individual's free choice in supporting advocacy activities resulting from the overwhelming power of the non-advocacy incentives offered to stockholders by business corporations is much reduced for members of most other multi-purpose associations.

Few enterprises offer investors collateral benefits with greater drown-out effects on attention to advocacy activities than the business corporation. But enterprises like stock exchanges and some farm organizations offer membership on terms that make the sound of the economic benefits little less powerful as an inducement to participate, and the voice of advocacy activities not much more audible as an objection to potential members. Similar relationships may well exist with respect to benefits offered by associations of real estate brokers, pharmacists, optometrists, plumbers, and others. On the other hand, a vast range of associations offers social and cultural attractions or other very modest non-advocacy benefits as an inducement to participation and relatively more prominent advocacy activities connected to the association's function. Enterprises like the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the Sierra Club, and many veterans associations or social or community groups are of that variety. Other groups such as unions without union shop arrangements, voluntary bar associations, the American Automobile Association, some farm associations, and various occu-


187 Government intervention in the advocacy speech of voluntary bar associations generates special problems. To the extent that lawyers' functions entail the subject matter of the First Amendment (e.g., petitioning government), any restriction on the group's activities implicates the First Amendment. Restrictions on the association's advocacy speech may present problems comparable to restrictions on the advocacy speech of a union of journalists or of a media enterprise. Cf. supra note 82; infra text accompanying notes 208-11.
pational associations offer a balance of non-advocacy benefits and advocacy activities that is more even, but in some cases closer to that of a business corporation, stock exchange, or real estate brokers’ associations than to the AARP or many veterans associations.

The essential justification for unbundling advocacy speech from non-advocacy activities of those associations is to enable advocacy voice to be uttered and decisions to be made relatively free of entanglement with pursuit of other benefits from membership which are strong enough to obscure the advocacy voice linked to those non-advocacy benefits.\textsuperscript{188} To the extent that the non-advocacy benefits offered to individuals as inducements to support the association are modest, particularly if they are social or cultural rather than economic, the entanglement of participation with advocacy activities is apt to present little trammelling of the individual’s advocacy choice. In many such enterprises, the social or cultural activity is functionally related to the advocacy activity and so visible that the choice of the former entails little or no pressure on freedom of choice with respect to the latter. For such associations, particularly if advocacy activity is heavy in the scale of their operations and their non-advocacy benefits are obtainable in other associations, the individual’s decision to support the association is more consciously addressed as a choice to support its advocacy activity. By the same token, joining the enterprise on those terms suggests a collective voice that is not significantly distorted by contributions from people whose incentive to get collateral benefits that the association offers obscures their support of its advocacy activities. In sum, the lighter the comparative weight of selective non-advocacy benefits in the enterprise’s agenda and as inducements to participate, and the closer the content and meaning of those activities are to its advocacy activity, the more the members’ support of the advocacy activities of the group can be said to be volitional—or at least sufficiently volitional to be analogized appropriately to member support given to an association pursuing only advocacy activities.

The variety of associations that offer visible advocacy activities along with some collateral benefits is large; and the benefits offered and their relative importance in associations’ agenda vary considerably.\textsuperscript{189} Inter-

\textsuperscript{188} Removal of the advocacy power may encourage broader membership in some organizations such as voluntary medical or legal societies, with resulting social benefits from diversity among the participants. Diversity benefits carry some weight in cases addressed to discrimination. However, the protection of individuals against tie-ins to race or gender generally implicates less impairment of the group’s speech than would comparable efforts to encourage diversity by protecting individuals against tie-ins with the group’s advocacy activities.

\textsuperscript{189} See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 103-08 (1982); MOE, supra note 186; OLSON, supra note 58, at 135-65.
vention to restrict the group's speech (by rebate, super-majority vote requirement, or restriction of its subject matter) cannot be justified in all such cases if, or merely because, they can be justified in any of them. Restrictions on associations' advocacy activity or speech solely because that activity is tied in with offers of non-advocacy (particularly non-economic) benefits entails an absolute proposition that is as doubtful in principle as it is infeasible in practice. In a world in which few enterprises engage only in advocacy activities and so many engage in joint activities (if only to overcome free-rider problems), even membership in a wholly political club often offers some non-advocacy benefits. If the logic of collective action presses for tolerance of some tie-ins, it does not require tolerance of tied-in benefits that overwhelm the impact on members of the advocacy activities in the group's agenda and substantially encumber the participant's freedom of choice to support such activities.

A norm for testing the propriety of government intervention in a multi-purpose association's advocacy activities by reference to how large a place (absolutely and relatively) those activities occupy on the agenda of the association presents obvious difficulties in implementing the command of the First Amendment. A context sensitive to chilling effects

\[190\] Except where visions such as the civic republican vision inform the members of society, it may be necessary (not merely helpful) to offer some sorts of collateral benefits to individuals in order to produce a collective advocacy voice. But to yield to that necessity may imperil the validity of the collective advocacy voice and may do so more intensely as the lure of the collateral benefits more substantially obscures the fact of the group's advocacy power.

\[191\] The complex relationships described in Olson, supra note 58, MOE, supra note 186 (particularly in the various farm organizations), and Hardin, supra note 189, illustrate the difficulties.

An added complexity is involved if the organization is heavily dependent upon, or enmeshed with, government support. An organization like a government-authorized and subsidized veterans' association attracts members for the social and community benefits it offers as well as for its advocacy activities. There is room to argue that such organizations are not simply expressive associations and that anti-tie-in considerations (of the sort, albeit not the magnitude) that support unbundling in the case of investor-owned business corporations also support unbundling for veterans' associations. But even though a government-supported veterans' association involves activities in addition to those of an expressive or advocacy organization, advocacy activity plays a role in the agenda of many such associations that is not simply proportionately larger than it is in the business corporation, but is toto coelo different. Advocacy activity can fairly be said to be central to many veterans' associations' operations; without advocacy activity, it is likely that veterans' association membership would be considerably smaller. In any event, their non-advocacy activities do not offer the immensely dominating incentive for participating that collateral benefits do for investors in a business corporation. Membership in an enterprise such as a veterans' organization may more accurately be analogized to membership in an indisputable advocacy organization than to investment
calls for sharp critical assessment of the weight of non-advocacy (particularly non-economic) benefits that induce membership, and a generous readiness to recognize the weight of advocacy activities in the association’s agenda. When non-advocacy benefits cannot be easily severed, cannot be found substantially to outweigh the advocacy benefits in the group’s agenda, and are found to be modest in incentive power, restrictions on the group’s advocacy activities must be tested more like an advocacy or expressive association. That it is difficult to fashion clear subsidiary rules to implement those guidelines need not leave the matter without constitutionally adequate boundaries for judicial review of restrictions that actually are imposed in particular cases. The Supreme Court has suggested a capacity to mark such boundaries. And the

in a business corporation. To the extent of the “fit” of that analogy, the constitutional objection to unbundling that is insurmountable in the case of an expressive association is also insurmountable in the case of the veterans’ association, notwithstanding its government support. The problem arises over a range of enterprises with varying degrees of enmeshment with government, varying kinds of non-advocacy benefits to induce membership and various balances of non-advocacy and advocacy activities in their agendas. Compare, for example, the drawing power and relative weight of non-advocacy benefits offered by the New York Stock Exchange or the American Farm Bureau Federation with those offered by the American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Indeed, the problems have arisen most acutely with the claims of gays and lesbians to be included in some enterprises that plausibly claim to be expressive as well as social associations, like the St. Patrick’s Day parades in New York and Boston. See New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358, 366-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Mass. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995); Yakle, supra note 44, at 859-62. Similar problems are encountered when the government requires that African Americans not be excluded as a condition to authorizing a parade by the KKK. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 288 (D. Md. 1988). In a different genre is the claim of an association like the Boy Scouts, that is organized to give education, skills training, or social activities, but which desires to be treated as an expressive association for purposes of determining the impact on its voice of its membership and employment policies with respect to homosexuality. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580, 585-88 (1994).

Specific statutory or regulatory language backed by appropriate study and reporting narrows the scope of the reviewing court’s task.

need to do so is inescapable because there can no more be permission for all tie-ins than there can be prohibition of all tie-ins.

IV. INTERVENTION IN ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES OF EXPRESSIVE OR ADVOCACY ASSOCIATIONS

In contrast to the multi-purpose associations thus far examined are a large number and wide variety of associations that may be designated expressive associations. Their dominating (and often exclusive) activities consist of expressive behavior, sometimes including ideological or advocacy speech. Thus, there are groups like political parties or other advocacy enterprises that seek to aggregate funds and members in order to amplify (and possibly integrate) their voices, and thereby more effectively generate public support for particular opinions, views, causes, legislation, or candidates that their members prefer. Other kinds of associations, like book publishers, the print and electronic media, and theatrical or motion picture exhibitors, engage in communication or information-purveying generally, without being limited to advocacy roles. Unlike advocacy associations, their role, at least in the case of for-profit enterprises, focuses on the exchange value of the information they offer, often without much concern for advancing the views of their members. The activities of still others, like educational institutions, implicate to a greater or lesser degree the speech that is the subject matter of the First Amendment, but with an import that differs from that of advocacy groups or the media. For some associations, the participants’ interest in associating...
and their interest in the enterprise’s speech are not disentangleable.\textsuperscript{197} For still other associations like media enterprises or universities, the matter is more complex. Government efforts directly or indirectly to regulate the expression of any such associations implicates the operation of the First Amendment Speech Clause significantly differently than does comparable government intervention in the advocacy speech of multi-purpose associations.

The level of protection to be offered to expressive or advocacy associations derives in fair part from the notion that such associations are essentially amplifiers and possibly integrators, or in any event communicators, of individual expressive interests, albeit strained through the process of collective decision-making.\textsuperscript{198} As such, their speech is presumptively entitled to no less protection than is that of individuals, particularly as the justification for the latter’s protection is to be found in the autonomy values or interests of the speaker,\textsuperscript{199} not merely of the listener. To the extent that the justification for protecting speech rests on the social or political values of exchange of ideas or information, the expressive association’s demand for protection of speech may well be stronger than that of the individual.

Relevant differences between multi-purpose and expressive groups may be illustrated by examining and comparing the usual inducements to join and remain with the former with the inducements to join and continue as members of the latter—particularly (a) political parties and other advocacy or voice aggregative groups and (b) media corporations. Because the political party or advocacy group exists essentially, if not exclusively, to amplify the advocacy voices of its members, both the principle and the import of the First Amendment require powerful justification for any attempt by the government to interfere with the members’

\textsuperscript{197} For such associations, as Justice O’Connor has suggested, “the selection of members is the definition of [the association’s] voice.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984); see also New York State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 12-15; Dickson v. Taylor, 105 F. Supp. 251, 255 (W.D. Tex. 1952), appeal dismissed, 202 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1953); McClain v. Fish, 251 S.W. 686, 689 (Ark. 1923); Brandenburger v. Jefferson Club Ass’n, 88 Mo. App. 148, 158-59 (1901).


\textsuperscript{199} See Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1248-54; Shelledy, supra note 158, at 546-55.
efforts to generate a collective voice. The possibility that the members may not always agree on the content of the collective voice does not alone justify interference. An intrinsic cost of fashioning the collective advocacy voice of an association is the necessity for some members to yield to the preference of others, presumably a minority to a majority, when action is to be taken. Government intervention to protect the minority, by way of a dues rebate prescription, for example, will pro tanto weaken the collective voice; and intervention to forbid advocacy speech will ultimately preclude any of the amplification of the speech which it is the essential objective of the members to achieve. In each case, the affected speech is substantially reduced or suppressed, not merely, as in the case of a multi-purpose association, left to be uttered through another amplifying mechanism. The crucial difference in the consequence of government intervention stems from the different incentives that stimulate joining or supporting the two kinds of associations.

Multi-purpose associations such as business corporations, medical societies, the Jaycees, and unions, attract members because they wish to participate in, or share the benefits from, the enterprises' non-advocacy activities; those persons may or may not wish to participate in or support the group's advocacy speech activities. In contrast, members of political parties or advocacy groups are attracted by, and seek to share in or support, the enterprises' dominant or perhaps only, function—advocacy activity or speech. Potential members may be moved by the non-speech benefits offered, but would not join or support the enterprise if not for its advocacy activity.

The existence of the non-advocacy functions of a union, trade association, or business corporation furnishes the principal basis justifying state intervention to restrict the group's advocacy activity. The restrictions would be imposed, in part, in order to encourage, or require, access to the group for individuals, in order to make more readily available to them the benefits of the group's non-speech functions and to society the benefits of their members' participation in the group.\(^{200}\)

And in part,

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\(^{200}\) Requiring individuals to join an association is also justified essentially on the basis of the group's non-advocacy function when the need arises to make those non-members who benefit from the function share the group's costs of performing it. The considerations that impel overriding the individual's claim of liberty not to associate with a multi-purpose enterprise such as a union or the integrated state bar are not present with respect to an advocacy group. Such non-advocacy benefits as may be attainable from forcing individuals to join the non-advocacy group are entirely derivative from the group's non-advocacy role. For an advocacy association, there are no comparable non-advocacy benefits; and the act of associating cannot be separated effectively from the act of supporting advocacy activity. To force an individual to enter into an advocacy association is to implicate the protection of the First Amendment for the individual's
the state's effort would be to make the process of choosing to support advocacy activity independent of the incentive to obtain the non-advocacy benefits of joining the group. In the case of political parties or advocacy groups, there is little or no function other than advocacy, and thus little or no non-advocacy benefits, that society can seek to make available to outsiders by prescribing decision rules that impinge upon the group's advocacy activities or speech. Any intervention in the speech activity of political parties and advocacy groups, whether to protect the individual against supporting the group's voice or to curb the group's function, is necessarily an intervention that has little to do with access to the benefits of the group's non-speech functions but can serve only to intrude in the speech or advocacy function. By the same token, there is no need to disentangle the process of choosing an advocacy voice from collateral inducements to yield part of one's advocacy voice to the group.

Moreover, any intervention in the group's advocacy activities in order to protect those members who do not agree with, or are not within the range of, the association's then prevailing views, not only threatens distortion of the group's avowed purposes, but inevitably mutes its collective voice. Those who support its purposes and objectives must then form another advocacy group from which the dissidents are excluded in order effectively (i.e., collectively) to articulate or communicate their message. A rule of law that requires curbing the old group's voice in deference to potential dissidents or diluents also requires tolerance of similar dissonance in the new group, and simply starts the cycle over again. In short, restricting the group's advocacy speech in the interest

negative speech rights with no offsetting non-speech benefits that might justify overriding that protection by forcing such association upon the individual, even if the group desires compelling association. If compulsion to join is generated by the monopoly power of the advocacy organization (e.g., the monopoly held by a political party), some government intervention in the association's affairs that may affect its voice may be defended, but not at the cost of thinning its voice to the extent that requiring pro-ration or super-majority approval would do. Compare supra note 110 with infra note 203.

It is essential to the function of such groups that members share in at least some large part of the enterprise's ideology or aspirations. The point of aggregating persons in the group is to attract persons who share the ideology and to amplify their voices and powers in achieving public acceptance of whatever it is that they deem it appropriate to advocate. To allow the state to interfere with the group's membership or to relieve the members of the obligation to help fund the group's speech would be to impair the essential purpose of the group's existence—its shared ideology and its advocacy role. Cf. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13-14; see also supra note 200.

The existence of constitutional power to restrict the speech of one advocacy group by regulating access to the group or its funding by its members threatens the same restriction on the speech of alternative advocacy groups formed to convey the messages
of protecting individual members’ preferences may not only distort its function, but may leave the members of the group with no viable alternative for collective speech. As a result, the audience will also be deprived of the group’s advocacy speech; its content will be suppressed, not merely diverted for presentation through alternate channels.

In sum, the multi-purpose group invites society’s interest in protecting the advocacy preferences of individual members at the expense of group advocacy. The political party or advocacy group emphasizes society’s interest in the group’s advocacy preference at the expense of the individual’s preference, particularly because protecting the individual’s preference is apt to deny (rather than divert to another speaker) the benefit of the speech to the audience.

To recognize this fundamental distinction between the multi-purpose association and the advocacy enterprise is not, however, to deny that factors which are significant in determining the propriety of government intervention in the former may also play a role in the latter.\textsuperscript{203} Incon-

\textsuperscript{203} For example, the political party is linked to a government function and empowered by an elaborate system of special government authorization because the government must both prescribe rules for the election process (e.g., time and place for voting, eligibility, etc.) and because only government can bridge the “private” action of the party (including particularly candidate selection) with the “public” process of voting in the government electoral system. It does not lessen the necessity for such government intervention that it is also a response to the felt need to avert or cure perceived corruption or bureaucratic distortion of the organization. The scope of such intervention during the past century suggests deeply felt and widely perceived societal needs for government prescription or restriction of internal decision-making processes and membership practices of political parties. The consequence of such state regulation has been substantially to diminish the parties’ “nearly autonomous common law status.” G. Theodore Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party Organizational Autonomy, 42 MINN. L. REV. 245, 258 (1957); see also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 196-200 (1982); Robert Kerstein, Unlocking the Doors to Democracy: Election Process Reform, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 687, 696-709 (1987); Note, Developments in the Law—Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1151-54 (1975). Thus, the groups’ membership and decision-making rules have been required to yield to government restriction in the interest of implementing and preserving the social goal for which the special government support was fashioned—e.g., a fair and undistorted electoral process.

Similarly, to the extent that the group is the sole source of a “practical necessity” for aspiring members, its exclusivity may have to yield to government efforts to open it up. Thus, for example, a political party may have an effective monopoly on access to the ballot, in part because of its assigned role in the state-created electoral process and in part because of the history of its assigned role in the community, as was true in the white primary cases. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953); Julia E. Guttman, Note, Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Freedom of Association,
gruities, if not contradictions, have appeared in the case law that responds to the tensions generated by the conflict between the unavoidable necessity for state regulation in order to integrate the political party into the electoral process and to avoid corruption and distortion of voice within the enterprise on one hand, and the command of the First Amendment to refrain from government abridgement of the participants' freedom of speech through association on the other. Those tensions and incongruities are reflected in courts' efforts at assessing the "compelling need" for the intervention and whether the form of the intervention is "the least restrictive alternative."

94 YALE L.J. 117, 124-25 (1984). But see Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460, 463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946). Such a party may be required by government to refrain from excluding people, even at the cost of affecting the positions or views ultimately taken by the party.

On another level, the cases upholding intervention in party membership and candidate selection in order to dilute the consequences of monopolistic access to the ballot by one party, as in the white primary cases, rest uneasily alongside the more recent cases giving the party autonomy in the matter of open primaries. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986); cases cited infra note 206.

The felt necessity for extensive government regulation of political parties requires courts to create a filter to separate those party activities that are sufficiently related to the mere mechanics of the electoral process to be legitimately constrainable in the interest of assuring the integrity of that process from those activities that engage the party's advocacy role and substantive decisions. The latter are presumably protected by the First Amendment, and the former are protected by the First Amendment only as their regulation impinges upon the latter. Nonetheless, many party structures and activities related to the mechanics of the electoral process—e.g., selection and operation of state committees with specific functions—so closely affect party advocacy activities that regulation addressed to one must intrude upon the other. More significantly, some party activities—e.g. candidate selection—implicate equally the integrity of the electoral process and the party's advocacy role. The Court's decisions reflect the tensions generated by the need to regulate the one and the command of the First Amendment not to abridge the other. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 790-806 (1983); Bellotti v. Connolly, 460 U.S. 1057, 1057 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting), dismissing appeal from Langone v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 446 N.E.2d 43, 50-51 (Mass. 1983); see also Gottlieb, supra note 203; Kerstein, supra note 203; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993); Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and Political Primaries: Supreme Court Jurisprudence and its Implications for Party Building, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 433 (1991); Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (1984); Guttmann, supra note 203, at 117, 118-19 & n.9; Nancy Northup, Note, Local Non-Partisan Elections, Political Parties, and the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677 (1987).

Compare Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-33 (1989) and Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213-25 and Democratic Party of United States v. Wis-
If the government were to seek to restrict the advocacy speech of for-profit communications enterprises such as the electronic or print media in order to enhance or protect the role of individual preferences in the group’s advocacy voice, other (possibly more intractable) difficulties would be encountered. The principal (or only) product of the media, like the product of political parties and advocacy groups, is the special subject matter of First Amendment speech protection. However, advocacy speech is only a part of the media’s product; separating it from the other parts would present more costly obstacles than would unbundling an industrial or commercial enterprise’s advocacy speech from its non-speech products. Identifying advocacy speech, separating it from the media enterprise’s other speech, and restricting, or requiring stockholder consent to, the advocacy parts of the enterprise’s speech is


Some of the considerations that justify government regulation of political parties may affect political action committees. Those committees range from groups composed of large numbers of widely dispersed contributors that attract millions of dollars in contributions from millions of people who do not relate to one another or participate in the enterprise beyond making the contribution, to small groups (some very well funded, some poorly funded) with active membership participation. Many advocacy groups are formed to litigate, to lobby, or to “educate” the public on particular issues and in support of particular views. They function more or less continuously in such advocacy roles and rarely engage in support of, or opposition to, candidates in elections. Other kinds of advocacy groups, like many political action committees, function wholly or principally in connection with election of candidates to office. There may be more reason to protect the collective voice and autonomy of the former (most political groups) more than of the latter (political action committees). The episodic functioning of the latter groups (principally in connection with elections) often generates internal bureaucratic conditions that invite regulation for the same reasons that invite regulation of political parties, even though they do not involve the extensive structural government support or linkage that obtains between political parties and the electoral process.

207 The import of the protection offered by the First Amendment for broadcast media (both cable and over-the-air) is considerably different from that offered to the print media. See supra note 48. The difference may follow from some underlying perception of the broadcast media, in contrast to the press, as more a forum than a voice. See cases cited supra note 48; FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 386-95 (1984). But neither the differences between the print and electronic media nor the differences between the levels of First Amendment protection offered to each need alter the inquiry about advocacy speech interests of members in the affairs of those enterprises.
likely to chill otherwise protected speech. Because the enterprise’s daily operations consist of producing speech, requiring stockholder consent for advocacy speech would have a paralyzing impact on the enterprise’s operation.\(^8\) The costs to society of such unbundling implicate virtual suppression of speech, as distinguished from the increased cost of using other mechanisms for speech.

That the media enterprise may be organized as an investor-owned, for-profit corporation does not assimilate it to the non-speech investor-owned business corporations.\(^9\) To be sure, a media enterprise generally attracts investors for the same profit-making purpose as does a non-speech business corporation. However, the advocacy interests of investors and of the public that are served by unbundling the non-speech enterprise’s advocacy speech from the activity which is the essential source of the economic benefits it produces for investors cannot be served in the case of media corporations, except at prohibitive costs. On the contrary, the investor’s interests are likely to be disserved by any attempt at unbundling. Hence, society may more appropriately subject individual investors to the bundling and corresponding restraints on individual negative speech interests embodied in conventional corporate decision-making rules in the case of media enterprises than in the case of the commercial business corporation.\(^10\)

\(^8\) The process of identifying advocacy speech and separating it from the media’s protected product presents difficulties that at worst cannot be overcome, and at best chill the product. For example, a column or commentator may “support” or merely “report on” a candidate or a legislative proposal in terms that are formally identical. \textit{But cf.} Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1976). Moreover, separating the two products (forms of speech), even if possible, imposes larger proportionate costs on the profitability of the enterprise than would be incurred in the case of a non-speech enterprise—costs that are likely to stifle operation of many enterprises. Unbundling by way of pro-ration would present similar difficulties, albeit not quite as paralyzing.

\(^9\) As in the case of commercial or manufacturing corporations, there is room to debate whether the persons to be protected in their access to the “association” and from supporting the “association’s” speech should be only those in the “stockholder” category. Employees might, by some standards or in some contexts, appropriately be included as members of the association (or indeed form a separate category in the association) to be given protection in such matters. The rights to be accorded to such persons and to the association in relation to them, however, raise considerably broader and more difficult questions than those thus far addressed. They are appropriately subjects for a another inquiry.

\(^10\) If society were to deny corporate status to media enterprises in order to avoid the question of unequal treatment of different types of corporate enterprises, substantial objections to thus disadvantage them would be generated from both equal protection and First Amendment considerations. In contrast, neither set of considerations precludes more speech protection for media enterprises than for others whose speech is otherwise justifiably curtailed.
Aggregating capital for non-communicating businesses gives power to the controllers of that capital, whether management or majority stockholders, by reason of contributions that are not made in connection with, or expectation of, the advocacy speech potential of the enterprise. On the other hand, when contributions or investments are accumulated for a business engaged solely in operating a communications or advocacy enterprise,\textsuperscript{211} the power over expression is a contemplated and an unavoidable aspect of the aggregation of wealth which the contributions seed. Society’s interest in checking (or protecting) the power of wealth so aggregated may be comparable to, but is not identical with, its interest in checking (or protecting) the power of any wealthy individual who chooses to engage in, or support an association engaged solely in, such conduct or speech. But even though the former may be entitled to less rigorous protection under the First Amendment than the latter,\textsuperscript{212} nothing in the Constitution or acceptable policy requires protection of the advocacy voice of corporate wealth accumulated for expressive purposes to be extended to the advocacy voice of corporate wealth accumulated almost entirely for non-speech purposes.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{211} So long as the group is a non-profit expressive or advocacy group, it should make no difference whether it is in corporate form or not, although the Supreme Court is less than clear on the point. Thus, non-profit advocacy groups and their members are said to be entitled to no less protection under the First Amendment if they are in corporate form than if they are not. Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-65 (1986). It is difficult to reconcile the result in \textit{Massachusetts Citizens For Life} with Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982), which held that an advocacy group organized in corporate form was subject to the same restrictions in soliciting contributions for its segregated political fund as was a commercial for-profit business corporation. \textit{Id.} at 207-10.

\textsuperscript{212} Assuring the integrity of an association’s voice as the transmitter of the aggregate of its individual members’ preferences involves complex problems such as internal institutional obstacles and difficulties in effecting collective choice that are not involved for an individual’s voice. Hence, the considerations that may justify government intervention in the affairs of an association are not likely to support intervention in the behavior of individuals. Some considerations that justify intervention in the affairs of multi-purpose organizations, see, e.g., supra note 17, may justify more extensive intervention in the case of investor-owned for-profit expressive enterprises than in the case of non-profit expressive associations. The latter, particularly if like the electronic media, they may be viewed as a forum more than a voice, may in any event not be immune from such intervention, as the regulation of political parties shows. See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 203-06.

\textsuperscript{213} To acknowledge significant differences between the power to regulate advocacy expression by communications businesses and advocacy speech by other businesses generates problems about conglomerates that have some enterprises in each category. Similar problems are encountered in addressing the advocacy speech of professional or trade associations, where the question is how to determine whether the service function
V. CONCLUSION

Both principle and doctrine have long established that the First Amendment does not protect all speech or all protected speech equally. Variations in content and context are inescapably relevant. It is a fixture in American political theory that participation in public discourse and advocacy activities by elective associations of all sorts significantly serves the governance of a democracy and enriches the individual participants and audience. However, not all associations serve those goals, and even those associations that do differ in their contributions to their achievement. Hence, in assessing the propriety of government interventions in the advocacy speech of associations, recognition of differences in the composition and roles of different associations is essential.

To accord such recognition implicates classifying or categorizing associations. On one level are the problems of delineating categories of speech and of associations, and of justifying differential restrictions on the advocacy speech of associations in particular categories, assuming that adequately separable categories can be delineated. On another level are the problems resulting from the inability to separate cleanly the defined categories by operational rules that draw bright (or at least feasibly administrable) lines, and the consequent difficulties in fitting particular associations into one category or another and applying appropriate standards in assessing the propriety of the restrictions on the advocacy speech of the association.

This Article addresses the first level of problems. It explores criteria by which to define categories of elective public associations whose advocacy speech may appropriately be limited by government. It also seeks to

and the advocacy function are comparable, or which predominates, and at what point the enterprise’s advocacy activities sufficiently “tilt” it so as to entitle it to protection as a communications enterprise. Despite these difficulties, the problems are not intractable. Practical, constitutionally feasible, solutions are possible. Cf. New York State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634-38 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). But cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511-17 (1993).

Legislation could provide for stockholder consent only for advocacy speech by the non-media corporation or division of the conglomerate. In order for the media division to be free of a stockholder consent requirement for its product, that division must be publishing a bona fide publication of general circulation, not merely a trade “give-away.” The definitional problem is not without its difficulties. Moreover, evasion may be possible by use of the media division to advance political policies favorable to the industrial division. The constitutionally adequate distinction drawn in Buckley, between “independent” and controlled or coordinated expenditures, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46, suggests that the problem is solvable.
explain and justify differential limitations on such speech by reference to the possible conflicts between speech interests and preferences of individual members and those of multi-purpose associations, as distinguished from expressive associations. Within the multi-purpose association category, sub-classifications may be delineated by considering whether membership is compelled (by government mandate or economic necessity) or is voluntary, and, if it is voluntary, whether the enterprise depends upon special government support and whether its agenda offers non-advocacy benefits which dwarf its advocacy activities as incentives to join and participate in the association.

Wholly different inquiries are involved when the issue is the propriety of government intrusion in the advocacy speech of associations dedicated solely or principally to expressive conduct, with or without ideological content. The sole (or virtually the sole) basis for membership in an advocacy group is to affect its voice, in contrast to the reasons for joining non-advocacy associations. The voice of an advocacy or ideological association cannot readily be replaced through the mechanism for replacement available to members of non-advocacy groups—i.e., by the members forming another group to perform the advocacy activities. Any government intervention in the group's voice not only raises intractable questions under the First Amendment, but is unlikely to have any of the justifications that support such intervention in the affairs of non-speech groups.

Other difficulties affect the propriety of government intervention in the advocacy speech of other expressive or communications enterprises like the electronic or print media or educational institutions. The functions of those enterprises differ significantly from those of advocacy or ideological groups and also differ between themselves; so do the incentives for individuals to participate. Those differences implicate differing costs and benefits and differing equilibria in assessing the propriety of particular government intervention in membership rules, operations, or speech of such groups. Those differences emphasize the necessity for focusing on category and context in developing principles to define the "right" to free speech and the protection offered by the First Amendment.

To identify the relevant considerations affecting the propriety of government intervention is not to offer formulae that dictate clear results. The considerations upon which categorization depends produce less than precise definitions. Hence, it is difficult to separate some of the categories at the margin—for example, determining when the pressure to support or join an association is strong enough to amount to compulsion, separating advocacy speech from other speech, or separating multi-purpose enterprises from expressive associations by determining when the
association's non-advocacy benefits sufficiently outweigh advocacy activities in its appeal or its agenda. The flexibility of the resulting process puts a premium on careful legislative drafting and on judicial self-consciousness with respect to the discretion available to the court and the values imported in invoking that discretion.

The ambiguous boundaries of the categories that this Article suggests may make some categories more acceptable and others less acceptable as predicates for constitutionally permissible restrictions on particular associations. Where speech or advocacy is the focus of concern, ambiguities in limiting the category of those whose speech is affected or the kind of speech involved may have prohibitively chilling effects. However, if the premises on which the categories rest are valid, if the categories and the proposed consequences can be justified in the easily recognizable cases, it is worth further effort to explore the possibilities for clearer delineation of categories that will be constitutionally acceptable.