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Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations

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RELIGIOUS TESTS IN THE MIRROR: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ETIQUETTE OF RELIGION IN JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS

Paul Horwitz*

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* Associate Professor, Southwestern Law School. This Article is based on a talk delivered before the Law and Religion Section of the American Association of Law Schools at its annual conference in Washington, D.C., in January 2006. My sincere thanks to Rick Garnett for inviting me to participate. I have benefitted from the opportunity to present this Article to my colleagues at Southwestern, and wish to thank Chris Cameron, Michael Dorff, Michael Epstein, Bryant Garth, Joerg Knipprath, Myrna Raeder, and K.C. Sheehan for their comments on that occasion. Thanks also to Andrew Eveleth for inviting me to present this Article to the Federalist Society chapter at the Pepperdine University School of Law, to Robert Cochran, Doug Kmiec, and Mark Scarberry for their questions, and especially to Joel Nichols for serving as respondent in that discussion. I appreciate the comments offered on a written draft of the Article by Marc DeGirolami, Mike Dorff, Kent Greenawalt, Kelly Horwitz, Ronald Kerridge, and Steve Smith. Thanks also to Andrew Holmes-Swanson for dogged research assistance.

It is interesting how a different nominee changes the standards around this town.

—Senator Richard Durbin¹

INTRODUCTION

The Religious Test Clause of the United States Constitution is simple enough. It provides, briefly and with seeming clarity and finality, that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”² And it has generally been assumed that the simplicity of the Religious Test Clause is matched by its unimportance. Although it is the only place in the main text of the Constitution that mentions religion, it is generally ignored.³ Indeed, it is an almost obligatory move, for those few scholars who have chosen to delve into the history and meaning of this constitutional provision, to cite Laurence Tribe’s magisterial treatise on constitutional law, which finds room in its overflowing pages for precisely one *footnote* on the Religious Test Clause.⁴ To add insult to injury, that footnote says little more than that the Clause has “little independent significance.”⁵

We might thus fairly conclude that the Religious Test Clause belongs in the category of forgotten or irrelevant constitutional clauses, doomed to desuetude by history

¹ *The Situation Room: Harriet Miers Nomination* (CNN television broadcast Oct. 5, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Richard Durbin) (transcript available at <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0510/05/sitroom.02.html>).

² U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

³ See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, *The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself*, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 677 (1986–87) (“Neither court nor commentator has shown any interest in [the Religious Test Clause] as a clue to the Constitution’s ‘philosophy’ of religion.”). There are some notable exceptions to the relative lack of scholarly interest in the Clause. See ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, *NO RELIGIOUS TEST: THE STORY OF OUR CONSTITUTION’S FORGOTTEN ARTICLE* (1987); Bradley, *supra*; Daniel L. Dreisbach, *The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test Ban*, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261 (1996); J. Gregory Sidak, *True God of the Next Justice*, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (2001); James E. Wood, Jr., Editorial, “No Religious Test Shall Ever Be Required”: *Reflections on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution*, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 199 (1987); Winston E. Calvert, Note, *Judicial Selection and the Religious Test Clause*, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (2004).

⁴ See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, *AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* § 14–2, at 1155 n.1 (2d ed. 1988).

⁵ *Id.* For the obligatory cites to the Tribe footnote, see Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 678 n.19; Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 262 n.4 (both citing the first edition of Tribe’s treatise). Interestingly, in the very act of forswearing further work on the third edition of his treatise, Professor Tribe has suggested that there might be more questions left in the Religious Test Clause than his much-cited footnote suggests. See Laurence H. Tribe, *The Treatise Power*, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 303 (2005). As this Article will make clear, however, I am not sure I can agree with his statement that the Religious Test Clause indicates that the Constitution “prioritizes the secular over the religious in the public realm.” *Id.*

and practice and, as Tribe notes, by the ever-expanding jurisdiction of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.⁶ That conclusion is quickly belied, however, by even the briefest look at our public dialogue. Since 2003, the phrase “religious test” has appeared some 931 times in general news sources such as newspapers and magazines.⁷ A Google search for the same phrase turns up 235,000 hits.⁸ It would seem that the Religious Test Clause is busting out all over.

The reason, of course, is our recent history of judicial nominations. The Religious Test Clause has become a major part of the discussion of judicial nominees in the past few years. The Clause was first invoked in the context of a series of lower federal court nominations, such as that of William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit, and later in the context of two nominations to the United States Supreme Court that occurred in 2005. In a sense, these latter nominations⁹—the successful nomination of John Roberts as Chief Justice of the United States, and the abortive nomination of Harriet Miers as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court—present mirror images of each other, with religion playing an apparent role as both a qualifying and a disqualifying feature in those nominations. Taken in combination, these nominations have given rise to loud debate over whether, when, and how religion may enter the subject of federal judicial nominations and confirmations.

Thus, this is a good time to re-examine the Religious Test Clause: to ask hard questions about its meaning and scope, and about its applicability to recent judicial nominations. More broadly, it is a good time to talk about the use, and perhaps the abuse, of religion in the public discourse that surrounds judicial nominations and confirmations. Broader still, this discussion may shed light on the appropriate role of religion in political discourse, whether by public officials or by private citizens.¹⁰

⁶ TRIBE, *supra* note 4, at 1155 n.1.

⁷ This number is yielded by a search for “religious test,” performed on March 21, 2006, in the LEXIS “News, All (English, Full Text)” database. I have not accounted for duplication of stories or other possible influences on the number.

⁸ Again, I have not accounted for duplications or other distortions of this number. Moreover, in tallying search scores on Google, we must keep a sense of perspective: a search for, say, “Anna Nicole Smith” comes up with some 3.1 million hits. Still, in a database in which “commerce clause” yields only 1.2 million hits, the number of hits for the phrase “religious test” is surely significant.

⁹ The third nomination to take place in 2005, the successful nomination of Samuel Alito, presents a different case. See *infra* notes 123–26 and accompanying text.

¹⁰ Although he is making a somewhat different point, I agree with David Hollenbach that the relevant sense of “public” in any consideration of the role of religion in political dialogue extends beyond the statements of public officials themselves, and includes “those components of civil society that are the primary bearers of cultural meaning and value—universities, religious communities, the world of the arts, and serious journalism.” David Hollenbach, *Civil Society: Beyond the Public-Private Dichotomy*, 5 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1994–95, at 15, 22, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/rcq/rcq_archives.html. In this article, I take a fairly undifferentiated approach to the role of religion in various aspects of public

The subject of this Symposium is "Religion, Division, and the Constitution." This Article certainly falls within the ambit of that discussion. Ultimately, though, it is somewhat different in its orientation. As I will show, the Religious Test Clause in fact has little to contribute in policing the involvement of religion in judicial nominations. We must turn elsewhere for a guide through this perilous territory. We must struggle to agree upon principles that can guide us in using religion and religious rhetoric in the public discourse and official actions—nominations, confirmations, and votes in opposition to confirmation—that are implicated by the selection of our federal judges. To paraphrase a term that regularly features in current constitutional law scholarship, the true subject of this contribution is "Religion, Division, and the Constitution *Outside the Courts*"¹¹—or perhaps even "Religion and Division *Outside the Constitution*."

Part I of this article summarizes the relevant facts with respect to the use of religion in judicial nominations and confirmations.¹² It focuses primarily on the most recent eruption of debates about the role of religion in judicial nominations, beginning in 2003 with a series of controversies over several lower federal court judges, and continuing through the latest series of nominations to the Supreme Court. In recounting this recent history, I will also discuss, in this section and in Part II, arguments that have been raised, both in political discourse and in academic discourse, that using religion as either a disqualifying feature or a qualifying feature of a judicial nomination violates the Religious Test Clause.¹³ In the remainder of Part II, I will examine the Religious Test Clause, discussing its role in the constitutional structure in light of its text and history.¹⁴ I will argue that, ultimately, the Religious Test Clause is of profound historical importance but little present application.¹⁵ The Clause applies to a narrow set of circumstances in which government requires a nominee to formally swear his allegiance to, or otherwise comply with, particular faiths or faith propositions, or to disavow that allegiance.¹⁶ It does nothing more. Thus, nothing in the Religious Test Clause ultimately prevents the use of religion in the kinds of statements and actions by various politicians and others that we have seen in the past few years

discussion and the role of various participants in that discussion, whether they are public officials or private citizens. It is possible, however, that the role of different institutional speakers, the norms that might govern their conduct in this or other areas, and the means of enforcing those norms could vary according to the institution in question. *See generally* Paul Horwitz, Grutter's *First Amendment*, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005).

¹¹ *See, e.g.*, Symposium, *Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts*, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2005). For an early use of the phrase by one of its leading scholars, see Mark V. Tushnet, *The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry*, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 437 (1992); *see also* MARK TUSHNET, *TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS* (1999).

¹² *See infra* Part I.

¹³ *See infra* Part II.A.

¹⁴ *See infra* Part II.B–D.

¹⁵ *See infra* Part II.C.

¹⁶ *See id.*

in the context of judicial nominations, whether in opposition to or in support of those nominations.¹⁷ However treacherous the waters we must navigate when we invoke religion in the course of judicial nominations, the Religious Test Clause offers us no beacon. For a variety of reasons, I will argue that this conclusion is not only descriptively accurate, but normatively attractive.

With the textual constitutional provision out of the way, I will argue in Part III that we can think more productively about the debate concerning the role of religion and religious questioning in judicial nominations if we take this as an occasion for crafting non-constitutional rules—albeit rules that are crafted in the shadow of the Constitution—that might guide and constrain the conduct of public dialogue on religion in the context of nominations.¹⁸ We might call this an effort to craft a “constitutional etiquette” for talking about religion in the public square.¹⁹ Alternatively, we could label it an effort to create an etiquette of pluralism, reflecting our politically and religiously pluralistic society.²⁰ In other words, I will ask: In light of our constitutional and political traditions, and in light of the religiously and politically diverse and pluralistic nature of our society, is there a set of rules, however loose, that we can formulate to govern how we talk to each other about religious beliefs and their intersection with politics and judicial decision-making?²¹ I propose five such principles as a starting point.²²

To bring things back to the topic of this Symposium, as I have retitled it for my own purposes, I will conclude that the rules of etiquette I propose below ultimately will not end, and in some cases may actually foment, our divisions on these issues.²³ But we may hope that in the end our discussion will be more thoughtful, meaningful, and genuinely respectful than the shallow sort of divisiveness that has characterized the rhetoric surrounding religion and adjudication in the judicial nominations we have seen recently.²⁴

I. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN RECENT JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS

A. Precursors

For purposes of this article, I focus primarily on the successful nomination to the Supreme Court of Chief Justice John Roberts and the unsuccessful nomination of Harriet Miers. It is worth noting, though, that these case studies hardly represent the

¹⁷ See *infra* Part II.

¹⁸ See *infra* Part III.

¹⁹ See *infra* note 377 and accompanying text.

²⁰ See *infra* Part III.A.

²¹ See *infra* Part III.

²² See *infra* Part III.B–F.

²³ See *infra* Conclusion.

²⁴ See *infra* Conclusion.

first time religion has surfaced as a factor in the selection of a Supreme Court Justice or lower federal court judge, or in the debate surrounding the confirmation of a nominee to an Article III judgeship.

The discussion of religion in connection with a federal judicial nominee can be traced back to at least the mid-nineteenth century, and the nomination of Roger Brooke Taney as Chief Justice of the United States. Taney's nomination faced substantial, although fruitless, public criticism "on the ground that he was a Catholic, and therefore subservient to a 'foreign potentate.'"²⁵

Of course, the participation of Catholics in American public office, and the role of Catholicism in the American public sphere more generally, historically has often been subject to vigorous and even vicious criticism.²⁶ Nevertheless, Catholicism has in fact played a positive role in the selection, if not always the confirmation, of a number of Justices between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Generally, this was because the nominating President was looking to shore up political support among Catholic American voters.²⁷ Of the 1939 nomination of Justice Frank Murphy, for example, Barbara Perry writes that Murphy's Catholic faith "must be considered one of the two or three leading factors in making Murphy the choice to fill [Justice Pierce] Butler's so-called 'Catholic seat.'"²⁸

Presidents have thus often deployed a nominee's religion for political purposes, whether or not the nominee's selection was in fact motivated by any deeper regard for that person's faith. At the same time, religion has not always been a plus factor in the nomination or confirmation of Justices or federal judges. For example, President Hoover expressed concern over the nomination of Benjamin Cardozo to the Supreme Court, noting that Cardozo would be the second Jewish member sitting on the Court.²⁹ Similarly, President Nixon suggested that he was tempted to tell Justice William Rehnquist "to change his religion and try to get him baptized" before nominating him.³⁰

These are largely bygone examples, and they do not fit neatly into the context at issue in this Article: the use and discussion of religion in the judicial nomination process, and especially in the senate confirmation process for judicial nominees. But recent history does offer some salient examples that fall more clearly under this rubric. One of the first and clearest examples of the use of religion in interrogating judicial

²⁵ Barbara A. Perry, *The Life and Death of the "Catholic Seat" on the United States Supreme Court*, 6 J.L. & POL. 55, 60 (1989) (quoting CARL SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 317 (1935)).

²⁶ See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, *SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE* (2002); NOAH FELDMAN, *DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT* (2005).

²⁷ See Perry, *supra* note 25, at 71–81 (discussing the nominations of Justices Pierce Butler and Frank Murphy and referencing the earlier nominations of Justices Edward White and Joseph McKenna).

²⁸ *Id.* at 80.

²⁹ See Calvert, *supra* note 3, at 1134.

³⁰ *Id.* (quoting JOHN W. DEAN, *THE REHNQUIST CHOICE* 231 (2001)).

nominees comes from the nomination of Justice William Brennan. In his confirmation hearings, Brennan was queried by Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming, himself a Catholic.³¹ O'Mahoney passed along to Brennan a question put forward by the National Liberal League, a group "purportedly devoted to the separation of church and state," but which argued that no Catholics should sit on the Court, given the nation's "predominantly Protestant" status.³² The question ran as follows:

You are bound by your religion to follow the pronouncements of the Pope on all matters of faith and morals. There may be some controversies which involve matters of faith and morals and also matters of law and justice. But in matters of law and justice, you are bound by your oath to follow not papal decrees and doctrines, but the laws and precedents of this Nation. If you should be faced with such a mixed issue, would you be able to follow the requirements of your oath or would you be bound by your religious obligations?³³

Brennan replied to O'Mahoney by assuring him that he would follow his oath first and foremost in carrying out his judicial duties, and that "there isn't any obligation of our faith superior to that."³⁴

A more recent example of the use of religious discourse in the judicial nomination arena, and a rare example of a senator stating explicitly that he would refuse to vote for a nominee on at least partially religious grounds, comes from Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama. Heflin explained his decision to vote against the confirmation of Robert Bork as a Justice of the Supreme Court by saying that he was "disturbed by his refusal to discuss his belief in God or the lack thereof."³⁵ This example is all the more striking given the full context in which it occurred. Heflin himself had raised Bork's religion in the course of his opening statement during the Bork hearings, noting that "[t]here are those who charge that Judge Bork is an agnostic or a non-believer."³⁶ Heflin then reminded his colleagues of the existence of the Religious Test Clause, telling them that it "should be observed in pursuing any inquiry, whether it be legitimate or not, as to one's personal religious feelings."³⁷

³¹ SANFORD LEVINSON, *WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY* 210 (2003).

³² *Id.*

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ *Id.* at 211.

³⁵ ETHAN BRONNER, *BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA* 295 (1989).

³⁶ *Id.* at 294.

³⁷ *Id.* In discussing Heflin's statements, Professor Levinson quite rightly questions whether Heflin was sincere in reminding his colleagues of the Religious Test Clause, given his later reference to religion in explaining his vote against confirmation. See LEVINSON,

Similar questions came up, albeit more briefly and perhaps more subtly, in more recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings—all of them, perhaps tellingly, involving nominees who were Catholic or assumed to be Catholic. Thus, in the confirmation hearings for then-Judge Antonin Scalia, one senator, noting Scalia's apparent prior criticism of *Roe v. Wade*,³⁸ asked how judges should deal with "a very deeply held personal position, a personal moral conviction, which may be pertinent to a matter before the Court."³⁹ Scalia, anticipating a statement later allegedly made by Chief Justice Roberts in the process leading to *his* confirmation,⁴⁰ answered that he considered himself obliged to set aside his personal moral convictions in judging a case, and if he could not do so in a particular case would recuse himself.⁴¹

Similarly, although more directly, during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Anthony Kennedy was queried about a conversation he had allegedly held with Senator Jesse Helms, in which Kennedy was asked if he knew how Helms stood on abortion and answered, "Indeed I do and I admire it. I am a practicing Catholic."⁴² Kennedy answered the question regarding that conversation by saying he "admire[d] anyone with strong moral beliefs," but that "it would be highly improper for a judge to allow his or her own personal or religious views to enter into a decision respecting a constitutional matter."⁴³

Finally, the religious beliefs of Clarence Thomas were raised during his nomination, although not in the hearings themselves.⁴⁴ Upon his nomination, then-Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia observed that, although Thomas was "qualified" to sit on the Court, "he's indicated he's a very devout Catholic, and that issue is before us. . . . The question is: How much allegiance does [Mr. Thomas] have to the Pope?"⁴⁵ In fact, Wilder was wrong: Thomas was not then a practicing Catholic, having converted to Episcopalianism, although he returned to the Catholic faith during his tenure on the Court.⁴⁶ Wilder quickly retracted his remarks in the face of critical

supra note 31, at 221–22.

³⁸ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

³⁹ LEVINSON, *supra* note 31, at 212.

⁴⁰ See *infra* notes 80–81 and accompanying text.

⁴¹ LEVINSON, *supra* note 31, at 212.

⁴² *Id.* at 213.

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ This statement needs some qualification. Although Thomas was not queried about his faith directly, he was questioned at length about his views on the relationship between his views of judging and his views of the "natural law" approach to jurisprudence; natural law, of course, is for many a religiously derived approach to jurisprudence. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson, *Thomas Disavows Old Stance*, B. GLOBE, Sept. 11, 1991, at 1. To the extent that Thomas's views on natural law were religiously derived, we might call this a religious line of inquiry. But much might depend on the questioner's motive, and it is not clear to me that these questions represented a clear inquiry into Thomas's religious beliefs.

⁴⁵ Sidak, *supra* note 3, at 9 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).

⁴⁶ See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS

reaction.⁴⁷ It is worth noting, however, that Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah responded to the controversy by suggesting that “it’s fair to ask if [Judge Thomas’s] Catholic faith means he would blindly follow the Pope. You can ask the question in a sophisticated way that would be less offensive than what Wilder said, but I don’t think he’s out of line to raise these questions.”⁴⁸

These examples demonstrate that questions about a nominee’s religion, or the treatment by a President of a potential nominee’s religion as a “plus” or “minus” factor in selecting that individual for appointment to the Court (albeit more for political than spiritual reasons), are hardly novel. But they do not capture either the extent of the heat involved in recent invocations of religion in the judicial nomination process, or the rapidity with which religion has surfaced as a prominent topic of discussion in the latest nominations of federal judges and Justices.

B. Recent Precedents: The Bush Administration’s Lower Federal Court Nominations

The invocation of religion in the context of judicial nominations truly began to heat up in recent years, in the context of a series of fiercely contested nominations by President Bush of judges to various lower federal courts. Religion played a significant factor in the nomination of Leon Holmes to the Eastern District of Arkansas and Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit. But the full flowering of the use of religion in a contemporary debate over a federal judicial nominee came with the extended debate over the confirmation of William Pryor, a nominee for a seat on the Eleventh Circuit.

As a nominee, Holmes was criticized for an article he had co-written with his wife criticizing the use of gender-neutral language.⁴⁹ In that article, he quoted from the Biblical language suggesting that in a marital relationship, “the wife is to subordinate herself to her husband.”⁵⁰ The nomination of Judge Pickering provides a far less straightforward case. Judge Pickering was not, in truth, especially subject to criticism for his faith. The brunt of the criticism of this nominee had to do with arguments that his career demonstrated “a history of racial insensitivity.”⁵¹ Whatever the merits of these arguments, his faith had little if anything to do with the public face of

285–86 (2004).

⁴⁷ See Sidak, *supra* note 3, at 10.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 10–11 (alteration in original). Sidak cites Senator Hatch’s remark as evidence that he was “as unfamiliar with the Religious Test Clause as . . . Governor Wilder.” *Id.* at 11.

⁴⁹ E.g., Press Release, People for the American Way, Leon Holmes Should Not be Confirmed to Federal Bench (July 5, 2004), <http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=16188> (quoting Leon Holmes & Susan Holmes, Editorial, *Gender Neutral Language: Destroying An Essential Element of Our Faith*, ARK. CATH., Apr. 12, 1997, at 10).

⁵⁰ See *id.*; accord *Ephesians* 5:24 (King James) (“Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing.”).

⁵¹ Neil A. Lewis, *Senate Panel Approves Judge’s Nomination*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at A18.

the opposition to his confirmation. Nevertheless, supporters of his nomination suggested, implicitly and explicitly, that Pickering's religion, among other factors, had figured in the opposition to his confirmation.⁵²

Surely the most prominent case of the use of religion and religious rhetoric in the recent history of the judicial nomination process, at least until the Roberts and Miers nominations, is that of William Pryor, who now sits on the Eleventh Circuit. Pryor is a devout Catholic⁵³ and, unsurprisingly, the opposition around his nomination centered on abortion, although Pryor's other public statements also gave rise to arguments that he would seek more broadly to advance Christianity as a judge.⁵⁴ In the course of his initial nomination to a seat on the Eleventh Circuit, some Democratic senators, led by Senator Charles Schumer of New York and Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, questioned whether Pryor would be able to set aside his personal views in ruling on abortion cases.⁵⁵ Thus, Senator Schumer asked the nominee, "[Y]ou feel this so passionately, and you have said repeatedly abortion is murder. . . . Many people believe abortion is wrong, but when you believe it is murder, how can you square that with—or how can you give comfort to women throughout America . . . that you can be fair or dispassionate?"⁵⁶ Senator Schumer also suggested, in words that would be raised against him repeatedly, that Pryor's "deeply held" views would influence his decisions on the bench.⁵⁷ Similarly, Senator Kennedy asked Pryor whether "many of the positions which [Pryor] ha[d] taken reflect not just an advocacy but a very deeply held view."⁵⁸

⁵² See, e.g., John Cornyn, *Restoring Our Broken Judicial Nomination Process*, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 24–25 (2003) (lumping Pickering's status as a "deeply religious man" together with other factors, such as the fact that he is "also a man of the South," to describe the opposition to his confirmation).

⁵³ Note, however, that the Democratic senators opposing Pryor pointed out that the first senator to actually mention Pryor's Catholic faith during the senate confirmation process was Senator Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time. See Helen Dewar, *Appeals Court Nominee Again Blocked*, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at A2 ("Democrats complained that they did not even know Pryor was a Catholic until Hatch asked his religious affiliation at a confirmation hearing earlier this summer. Hatch said he asked the question because Democrats had questioned Pryor's 'deeply held' personal beliefs.").

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, *Judicial Pick Faces Tough Senate Fight; Pryor Criticized Justices' Rulings on Abortions, Gays*, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2003, at C12 (noting a speech at a public rally in which Pryor said, "God has chosen, through his son Jesus Christ, this time and place for all Christians—Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox—to save our country and save our courts.").

⁵⁵ E.g., *Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of William H. Pryor, Jr. to be Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit and Diane M. Stuart to be Director, Violence Against Women Office, Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 108th Cong. 72, 92 (2003) (statements of Sens. Charles Schumer and Edward Kennedy).

⁵⁶ *Id.* at 72 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer).

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 11–12.

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 92 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).

These questions were met with a swift reaction from Pryor's supporters. They argued that opposing a judicial nominee because he strongly holds religious views that influence his position on abortion constitutes a form of disqualification of religious individuals for judicial office.⁵⁹ At the Senate Judiciary Committee's party-line vote to send Judge Pryor's nomination to the Senate floor, for example, Senator Hatch charged that "the left is trying to enforce an anti-religious litmus test. It appears that nominees who openly adhere to Catholic and Baptist doctrines, as a matter of personal faith, are unqualified for the federal bench in the eyes of the liberal Washington interest groups."⁶⁰ And Senator Jefferson Sessions of Alabama asked, "[A]re we saying that if you believe in that principle [abortion is not justified in cases of rape or incest], you can't be a federal judge? . . . [A]re we not saying . . . good Catholics need not apply?"⁶¹

Supporters of Pryor's nomination outside the Senate took a similar tack. Most prominent among these statements was an advertisement released by a group called the Committee for Justice. Illustrated with a sign on a courthouse door reading, "Catholics Need Not Apply," the ad suggested that Pryor's opponents were playing politics with religion by opposing him due to his "'deeply held' Catholic beliefs."⁶² It asked, "Don't they know the Constitution expressly prohibits religious tests for public office?"⁶³

Similar criticisms were raised elsewhere, both by senators and by other groups and individuals, many of them sounding in the rhetoric of the Religious Test Clause. For example, the Archbishop of Denver, Charles Chaput, cited the Pryor nomination as evidence that "a new kind of religious discrimination is very welcome at the Capitol, even among elected officials who claim to be Catholic."⁶⁴ Hugh Hewitt, a conservative commentator and law professor, quoted Chaput and added that the opposition to Pryor amounted to "[t]he resurrection of anti-Catholic bigotry in the form of a bar to professing Catholics joining the federal appellate bench."⁶⁵ Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania alternated between calling the opposition to Pryor a "de facto" religious test⁶⁶

⁵⁹ E.g., David G. Savage, *Fight Gets Political Over Religion*, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2003, at A17.

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ Byron York, *Catholics Need Not Apply?*, NAT'L REV., July 30, 2003, available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york073003.asp>.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ Hugh Hewitt, *The Catholic Test, Part 2*, DAILY STANDARD, Aug. 6, 2003, available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/002/963mcxzo.asp>.

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ Josh Marshall, *No, Sen. Santorum, Catholics Aren't a Protected Class*, THE HILL, Aug. 6, 2003, at 13; see also *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* (PBS television broadcast July 23, 2003) (quoting Sen. Jeff Sessions) ("I would just say it this way. Yes, we have a prohibition on a religious test for this body, and I don't think any member on either side would be prejudiced against a person because of the faith that they have. But what if their personal views are consistent with their faith? What if their personal views are sincerely [sic] to the [effect] that

and calling it an actual religious test.⁶⁷ Others also suggested that the opposition to Pryor's confirmation had been a "de facto" religious test.⁶⁸ Nor did the furor die down after Pryor, having been successfully filibustered for the seat, was eventually given a recess appointment to the Eleventh Circuit. When he was finally confirmed for a permanent position on the court, Democrats and Republicans on the Judiciary Committee again traded blows on the issue.⁶⁹

The Pryor nomination thus set the tone for much of what we would see again in the Roberts nomination. First, we heard more or less indirect suggestions that a nominee's "deeply held" beliefs might affect his ability to faithfully follow the law, particularly on issues such as abortion. This was followed by charges that such a position constituted either a religious test forbidden by the Constitution, or a "de facto" religious test that would amount to the same thing. Finally, the debate devolved into a heated argument over which was more offensive: the religiously tinged opposition to the nominee, or the efforts by the nominee's supporters to characterize the opposition as religiously motivated.

C. John Roberts: Religion as Disqualification

Immediately upon the nomination of John Roberts to fill the seat of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and before his subsequent nomination to fill the center seat occupied by the late William Rehnquist, newspaper reports noted Roberts's faithful adherence to his Catholic faith.⁷⁰ These observers quickly wondered whether this fact would affect his rulings on abortion.⁷¹ But the first real discussions of religion and its role in Roberts's nomination and confirmation were not volleys: they were preemptive strikes.⁷²

Following the controversy over Pryor's nomination, the first strong efforts to tie religion to Roberts's nomination were made primarily by conservative groups eager to warn Democrats against mentioning Roberts's faith or using it as a disqualifying

abortion is morally wrong and it's the taking of innocent life, need they not apply?").

⁶⁷ FED. NEWS SERV., *Media Availability With Republican Senators*, Aug. 1, 2003 ("And so we have set in motion something that our Founding Fathers would find absolutely despicable, so despicable they wrote it in the Constitution—a religious test for office in the United States of America.").

⁶⁸ See, e.g., *Scarborough Country* (MSNBC television broadcast July 30, 2003) (statement of William Donohue, President, Catholic League) ("I am not certain that there is [a] de [jure] test here, which says that if you're a Catholic and accept the church's teachings, you're automatically gone. But that's the effect of it. It's a thinly veiled de facto religious test.").

⁶⁹ See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S6243, 6245–83 (daily ed. June 9, 2005) (statements of Sens. Patrick Leahy, Jeff Sessions, Edward Kennedy, and Dianne Feinstein).

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum et al., *Court Nominee's Life Is Rooted In Faith And Respect for Law*, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A1 ("He was raised and remains a practicing Roman Catholic.").

⁷¹ See, e.g., Robin Toner, *Catholics and the Court*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, § 4, at 4.

⁷² See *id.* ("All this fury is largely pre-emptive.").

factor. Indeed, the first real discussion of this issue came even *before* Roberts had been nominated. In the run-up to a nomination, a “Catholic-based organization” called Fidelis was formed to fund advertisements “defend[ing] Supreme Court nominees who will likely be attacked because of their faith and deeply-held beliefs.”⁷³ Similarly, immediately after Roberts’s nomination, William Donohue of the Catholic League warned that “[a]ny scratching around this area would suggest that there’s a veiled religious test by asking questions about his deeply held views.”⁷⁴

The Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee disclaimed any intention of querying Roberts on his religious views, although they left open the possibility of quizzing him on his “personal views.”⁷⁵ That did not mean, however, that everyone agreed Roberts should *not* be questioned on his religious views. Thus, in the online publication *Slate*, the writer Christopher Hitchens suggested that it was not only fair to ask Roberts about his religious views, but it was fair to ask *Catholic* nominees specifically, as opposed to nominees of other faiths, about their beliefs.⁷⁶ Hitchens argued:

[W]e have increasingly firm papal dogmas on two issues that are bound to come before the court: abortion and the teaching of Darwin in schools. So, please do not accuse me of suggesting a ‘dual loyalty’ among American Catholics. It is their own church, and its conduct and its teachings, that raise this question.⁷⁷

Hitchens added that although “[t]he Constitution rightly forbids any religious test for public office,” it is still legitimate to ask “what happens when a religious affiliation conflicts with a judge’s oath to uphold the Constitution.”⁷⁸

One feature was largely absent in the early days of Roberts’s nomination: any use of his faith as a positive indicator of his likelihood of ruling in ways his supporters might favor, rather than as a basis for questioning his ability to fulfill his office. One example did present itself, however. Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma “unabashed[ly]” made clear his hope that Roberts’s faith *would* influence his views on abortion,

⁷³ Press Release, Fidelis, New Ads Accuse Dean of Religious Bigotry (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.fidelis.org/press/press_63005.php.

⁷⁴ Kevin Eckstrom, *Conservative Catholics on Watch for Questions on Nominee’s Faith*, RELIGION NEWS SERV., July 20, 2005; see also David D. Kirkpatrick, *For Conservative Christians, Game Plan on the Nominee*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A14 (quoting Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council) (“We are going to be vigilant to make sure that there is not this religious litmus test imposed . . . ‘Are you a Catholic? Do you really believe what the Catholic church teaches?’ These kinds of things shouldn’t be part of the discussion.”).

⁷⁵ Eckstrom, *supra* note 74 (quoting Sen. Edward Kennedy).

⁷⁶ Christopher Hitchens, *Catholic Justice*, SLATE, Aug. 1, 2005, <http://www.slate.com/id/2123780/>.

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ *Id.*

saying, "If you have somebody . . . who has that connection with their personal faith and their allegiance to the law, you don't get into the *Roe v. Wade* situation."⁷⁹

It did not take long for religion to work its way into the formal and informal proceedings in the Senate concerning Roberts's nomination. Almost as soon as he began the rounds of senate offices to meet with the senators who would vote on his nomination, and perhaps in reaction to the public discussion of his faith taking place outside the Senate, Roberts was asked about his faith by senators on both sides of the aisle. Most prominently, the law professor Jonathan Turley reported in the *Los Angeles Times* that Roberts was asked, during an informal interview with Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois, what he would do if faced with a conflict between his faith and the law in ruling as a judge.⁸⁰ According to Turley's account, Roberts "appeared nonplused and . . . answered after a long pause that he would probably have to recuse himself."⁸¹ Turley suggested that this was "the wrong answer. In taking office, a justice takes an oath to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the United States. A judge's personal religious views should have no role in the interpretation of the laws."⁸² Senator Durbin's office subsequently challenged the story, acknowledging that Durbin had asked Roberts about his faith, but saying Roberts's remarks about recusal had come in response to a question that did not involve religion.⁸³ Turley, revealing that Durbin had been one of his sources, stood by his story.⁸⁴

Durbin's question, at least as it was reported, led Senator John Cornyn of Texas to complain, "We have no religious tests for public office in this country. . . . And I think anyone would find that sort of inquiry, if it were actually made, offensive. And so I hope we don't go down that road."⁸⁵ But Senator Cornyn himself raised the issue of Roberts's faith in an informal meeting with the nominee, albeit defensively, asking him whether "anything about [his] faith or religious views . . . would prevent [him] from deciding issues like the death penalty [or] abortion."⁸⁶ Roberts replied, "Absolutely not."⁸⁷

Similar questions were raised during the confirmation hearings themselves, again by senators on both sides of the aisle. The first such question was posed by the Republican chair of the Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, who asked whether Roberts agreed with John F. Kennedy's statement "that he did not

⁷⁹ E.J. Dionne, *God's Place on the Supreme Court*, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 3, 2005, at A7, available at 2005 WLNR 12871520 (italics added).

⁸⁰ Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed, *The Faith of John Roberts*, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at B11.

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² *Id.*

⁸³ *Editor's Note*, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at B13.

⁸⁴ *Id.*

⁸⁵ Dionne, *supra* note 79.

⁸⁶ David D. Kirkpatrick, *Skirmish Over a Query About Roberts's Faith*, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A13.

⁸⁷ *Id.*

speak for his church on public matters and the church did not speak for him.”⁸⁸ Roberts replied that “nothing in my personal views based on faith or other sources . . . would prevent me from applying the precedents of the court faithfully under the principles of stare decisis.”⁸⁹ Roberts gave a similar reply to a question from Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein of California.⁹⁰

The discussion of religion in the course of Roberts’s nomination and confirmation hearings sparked a variety of reactions. A number of commentators suggested that some questions about a nominee’s religion, or its connection to his judicial work, might be acceptable, if pointless. Thus, Senator Hatch, who earlier had criticized the opposition to Judge Pryor as a form of religious test, said during the Roberts episode that a nominee can be asked about his religious views, although “it’s a ridiculous question,” since any nominee who rose to the level of consideration for the Supreme Court surely would deny holding the view that his religion would take precedence over conventional secular sources of law.⁹¹ And Stephen Presser and Charles Rice allowed that a nominee might be questioned on his views on the relationship between law and morality, while arguing that any more specific questions about a nominee’s religion would be barred by the Religious Test Clause.⁹² Others took a still harder line, asserting that any questions about a nominee’s religious views would violate the Religious Test Clause.⁹³

I will not lengthen this Article unnecessarily by canvassing all of the views on the Religious Test Clause that were aired during the Roberts nomination. But one example is worth special notice, and that is a letter issued by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a Washington-based religious liberty litigation group.⁹⁴ The letter, which was also printed in the *New York Times*, argued that while the days of explicit religious tests might be behind us, “many are urging the United States Senate to apply a subtler form of religious test in the confirmation process, one that would serve to disqualify fervent believers.”⁹⁵ It said that it was “appalled by the misuse of religion some are

⁸⁸ Scott Shepard, *Senate Confirmation Hearings: Roberts Deflects Pointed Queries*, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 14, 2005, at A1, available at WLNR 14439842.

⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁰ See *Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 109th Cong. 227 (2005) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).

⁹¹ Paul Singer, *Roberts and the Religious Right—and Left*, 37 NAT’L J. 2610, 2610 (2005).

⁹² Stephen B. Presser & Charles E. Rice, *Religious Tests*, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2005, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NWMwYzc3MjE1YmJjYzZjNDdkZGNkYjUwYmI2ZDYyODI>.

⁹³ See, e.g., Singer, *supra* note 91 (quoting Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council).

⁹⁴ See Letter from Kevin J. “Seamus” Hasson, Chairman, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, to U.S. Senators (Sept. 6, 2005), available at <http://www.becketfund.org/files/c5222.pdf> [hereinafter Hasson letter].

⁹⁵ *Id.*

urging on the United States Senate.”⁹⁶ And it added that “a decision to disqualify a nominee based on his or her religion still violates Article VI, and thus the Senator’s oath of office.”⁹⁷ It then threatened to file an ethics complaint against any senator who, in the confirmation process, “uses religion as a disqualification for federal office.”⁹⁸ The conclusion of the letter is worth citing in substantial part:

To be sure, not every mention of religion is improper. Religion, like ethnicity or race, is a natural part of one’s background and may be referred to as naturally—and as respectfully—as those other things are. Then too, the rare nominee whose record provides specific factual evidence of past religious discrimination may be questioned about that evidence. But using fervent religious faith, of any tradition, as itself a disqualification for public office is unconstitutional.⁹⁹

I will return to The Becket Fund’s letter later in my discussion.

In sum, the Roberts nomination is noteworthy for the unusually vocal and expansive discussion of religion and its potentially disqualifying role in the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice. I can think of no other High Court nomination up to that point in which religion was so openly and frequently, if clumsily, discussed, and certainly none other in which the participants in the debate so frequently referred to the strictures of the Religious Test Clause.

The Roberts nomination should be no less noteworthy for the fact that, as this discussion indicates, most of the discussion of Roberts’s Catholic faith as a potential disqualification was not on the part of his opponents, but rather was part of a preemptive move on the part of his supporters to ensure that religion did *not* feature in the nomination. That move, of course, had the dual effect of both placing Roberts’s faith front and center in the confirmation process, and accusing Democratic senators before they had actually done anything. I do not mean to accuse those senators or outside groups of strategically, or even cynically, using religion as a political ploy in the management of the nomination, although certainly that is a plausible reading of the evidence. There is, after all, no doubt that the Pryor nomination had primed the expectations of many interest groups that Roberts’s Catholicism would be used against him—although, again, the responsibility for that appears to be shared between both supporters and opponents of those earlier nominees. In any event, the Roberts nomination now stands as one of the most prominent examples of the discussion of religion as a potentially disqualifying factor for a Supreme Court nominee.

⁹⁶ *Id.*

⁹⁷ *Id.*

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ *Id.*

D. Harriet Miers: Religion as Qualification

Of course, Roberts ultimately sailed through the Senate.¹⁰⁰ Less than a week later, President Bush named Harriet Miers, his White House counsel, as his choice to replace Sandra Day O'Connor on the Supreme Court.¹⁰¹ Almost as quickly, religion and the Religious Test Clause again became a key subject of the public conversation. This time, however, there was a significant difference: religion this time featured as a *qualification* for office rather than a disqualification.

Miers converted to an evangelical form of Christianity in her mid-thirties, and by all accounts has been significantly influenced by her faith.¹⁰² And the Bush administration was not shy about promoting Miers's faith in advancing her nomination. The process started even before the announcement of her nomination, when, according to news reports, the White House sought the advance approval of religious leaders with standing in the conservative movement before going public with its pick of Miers.¹⁰³ Once Miers's nomination began running into resistance among conservative groups—that is to say, almost immediately—the Bush administration deliberately sought to “regain the upper hand by focusing on the nominee's conversion to evangelical Christianity.”¹⁰⁴ It is worth noting, though, that according to one account the promotion of Miers's conversion story had less to do with the view that Miers's faith was a qualification for service on the Court and more to do with the hope that, by stirring up liberal opposition, the White House might galvanize conservative support for the nominee.¹⁰⁵

The administration's outreach strategy yielded some positive early results. The televangelist Pat Robertson used his perch on the “700 Club” to threaten conservative

¹⁰⁰ See Tom Brune, *Hail to the New Chief*, *NEWSDAY*, Sept. 30, 2005, at A3 (noting Roberts's confirmation by the Senate on Sept. 29, 2005, by a vote of 78–22).

¹⁰¹ See Elizabeth Bumiller, *Bush Names Counsel as Choice for Supreme Court*, *N.Y. TIMES*, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1.

¹⁰² See, e.g., Edward Wyatt & Simon Romero, *In Midcareer, a Turn to Faith to Fill a Void*, *N.Y. TIMES*, Oct. 5, 2005, at A1. Although this and other stories report that Miers was born into the Catholic Church, some reports suggested she attended Episcopalian and Presbyterian services as a young girl. See Michael Grunwald et al., *Strong Grounding in the Church Could Be a Clue to Miers's Priorities*, *WASH. POST*, Oct. 5, 2005, at A1. Others stated she had attended both Catholic and Episcopalian services as a young adult. See Robert Little & Jonathan D. Rockoff, *Faith Seen as Guiding Force in Miers' Life*, *BALT. SUN*, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1A, available at 2005 WLNR 16136950.

¹⁰³ See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, *Conservatives Are Wary Over President's Selection*, *N.Y. TIMES*, Oct. 4, 2005, at A24.

¹⁰⁴ Terry M. Neal, *Political Capital Running on Low*, *WASH. POST*, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/06/AR2005100600571_pf.html.

¹⁰⁵ See *id.* (“[One] Republican strategist involved in the front lines of the battle for the Miers nomination [observed that] . . . [c]onservatives love a fight with liberals. . . . And one of the things liberals are scared to death of is organized religion. And Harriet Miers is a born-again Christian. When liberal groups and others begin to read about her affirming the Texas sodomy law, contributing to pro-life groups and her religious faith, they're going to go crazy.”).

senators who voted against Miers with retaliation if they voted “against a Christian who is a conservative picked by a conservative president.”¹⁰⁶ Marvin Olasky, a popular conservative Christian writer, explained his support for Miers by writing, “Maybe it’s the judicial implications of her evangelical faith, unseen on the court in recent decades. . . . Friends who know Miers well testify to her internal compass that includes a needle pointed toward Christ.”¹⁰⁷ And Jay Sekulow, a well-known litigator for conservative religious causes, said on Robertson’s show that the Miers nomination was “a big opportunity for those of us who have a conviction, that share an evangelical faith in Christianity, to see someone with our positions put on the court.”¹⁰⁸

Perhaps most famous was the supportive testimony of James Dobson, Chairman of Focus on the Family, who told Brit Hume of Fox News, “We know people who have known her for 20, 25 years, and they would vouch for her. . . . I know the church that she goes to and I know the people who go to church with her.”¹⁰⁹ In announcing his support of the nomination, Dobson added in talking to reporters, “Some of what I know I am not at liberty to talk about.”¹¹⁰ Dobson later clarified that some of the information he was holding back came from a telephone call with President Bush’s advisor, Karl Rove, who had told him other potential picks had declined to be considered for the nomination.¹¹¹ He added:

What [else] did Karl Rove say to me that I knew on Monday that I couldn’t reveal? Well, it’s what we all know now, that Harriet Miers is an Evangelical Christian, that she is from a very conservative church, which is almost universally pro-life, that she had taken on the American Bar Association on the issue of abortion and fought for a policy that would not be supportive of abortion, that she had been a member of the Texas Right to Life.¹¹²

¹⁰⁶ Charlie Savage, *Bush, Promoting Miers, Invokes Her Faith*, B. GLOBE, Oct. 13, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 16595742.

¹⁰⁷ E.J. Dionne Jr., *Faith-Based Hypocrisy*, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2005, at A23. Olasky’s reference to “[f]riends who know Miers well” may include the testimony of her friend Nathan Hecht, a member of the Texas Supreme Court, who reportedly was put by the White House “on at least one conference call with influential social conservative organizers” to describe Miers’s faith. *Id.*

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* (alteration in original).

¹¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹¹ See *Another Look at the Miers Nomination* (radio broadcast Oct. 12, 2005), available at <http://www.family.org/welcome/press/a0038214.cfm>.

¹¹² *Id.*; see also Terry Eastland, *A Faith-Based Nomination*, WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 17, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 16850657 (noting that an aide to Dobson told him, “There are some things we learned about her Christian commitment.”).

Pressed on the extent to which the White House had been using Miers's religious faith as a selling point in talking with supporters, President Bush admitted that Miers's faith had been part of an "outreach effort" to conservatives, but described the effort in fairly innocuous terms, saying, "People ask me why I picked Harriet Miers. . . . They want to know Harriet Miers's background, they want to know as much as they possibly can before they form opinions. And part of Harriet Miers's life is her religion."¹¹³ In effect, the President suggested that while Miers's faith was relevant to an understanding of the nominee as a whole person, he had not chosen her specifically because of her religion and was not championing her faith as such. That assurance might, however, be treated skeptically in light of the President's earlier statement that he intended to nominate judges who understood that "rights were derived from God."¹¹⁴

The President's assurances notwithstanding, most observers—including those who usually supported the administration—concluded that the White House was indeed selling Miers as a nominee through her religious faith, and objected strenuously.¹¹⁵ Jan LaRue, chief counsel for the anti-abortion group Concerned Women for America, wrote to her organization's members that the actions of the White House and its representatives and supporters were "patronizing and hypocritical."¹¹⁶ She added that "most of those emphasizing Miss Miers's faith have [previously] resisted any attempt to impose a religious test on any person seeking public office. The Constitution forbids it."¹¹⁷ The director of another anti-abortion group, the Christian Defense Coalition, told a reporter, "Groups and leaders cannot say religion is off-limits during the Roberts confirmation, and then promote religion during the Miers confirmation for the sole purpose of political gain."¹¹⁸ Cal Thomas, a conservative newspaper columnist, wrote that the President's use of Miers's faith was troubling given that supporters of the

¹¹³ Elisabeth Bumiller, *Bush Criticized Over Emphasis on Religion of Nominee*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A23.

¹¹⁴ Calvert, *supra* note 3, at 1137. The President's statement came in the wake of the Ninth Circuit decision holding that it was unconstitutional to require school children to use the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. *See Newdow v. U.S. Congress*, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), *rev'd sub nom.*, *Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow*, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).

¹¹⁵ I cannot say whether all of those protests were sincerely motivated by the belief that the administration was wrong to promote Miers on the basis of her faith. Another possibility is that the administration's use of religion to promote Miers merely provided a convenient hook to attack the nomination by individuals or groups who were, by this time, already predisposed to oppose Miers as a nominee to the Supreme Court, fearing that she would not be sufficiently conservative on various issues, or sufficiently skilled on the Court. Of course, some combination of both factors could have played a part in the criticism of the President's use of religion to promote Miers.

¹¹⁶ Savage, *supra* note 106.

¹¹⁷ *Id.* (alteration in original).

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

Roberts nomination had already “invoked the constitutional clause prohibiting a ‘religious test’ for high office.”¹¹⁹

Similarly, Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council, who had been out front in criticizing (or anticipating) the use of religion in the Roberts nomination, said, “There should be no religious test. We have argued against those on the Senate that try to disqualify people based on religion, and on the same hand I don’t think it should be used to qualify someone.”¹²⁰ E. J. Dionne, focusing on those individuals who had supported Miers while invoking her faith, suggested that they would “play religion up or down, whichever helps them most in a political fight.”¹²¹

Again, this sampling must stand in for a far greater volume of discussion and criticism of the use of religion by the Bush administration in championing the cause of the Miers nomination. It might be worthwhile for later purposes to quote just one last player, Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois, who had been criticized for discussing the faith of nominees Pryor and Roberts. Interviewed during the fuss over Miers, Durbin said that asking a nominee about her religion “is a legitimate inquiry as long as it doesn’t go too far and too deep. Each of us respect[s] a person for their religious beliefs and it [sic] should never be a disqualification from office.”¹²²

In sum, the Miers nomination stands as a fairly startling example of the use of religion and religious rhetoric in the context of a judicial nomination that serves as an almost exact mirror-image of its use in the Roberts nomination. While Roberts’s faith was treated—or, more accurately, while supporters of his nomination warned that it *would* be treated—as a potential disqualifying factor in his nomination, Miers’s faith was treated by the administration, mostly in behind-the-scenes discussions but also somewhat openly, as a qualifying factor. While Roberts’s faith was raised by his opponents—or, more accurately, while Roberts’s supporters warned that his opponents *would* raise the issue of his religious faith—Miers’s faith was retailed by her supporters. In either case, the result was the same: the nominee’s faith was quickly declared off-limits to public discussion.

E. Samuel Alito: Denouement

By contrast to the Roberts and Miers nominations, religion was largely absent from public discussion of the subsequent and successful nomination of Samuel Alito as President Bush’s subsequent nominee to replace Sandra Day O’Connor. To the extent that Alito’s Catholic faith was discussed, it was primarily in the context of the observation that with his confirmation, Roman Catholics would comprise a five-member

¹¹⁹ Cal Thomas, Editorial, *Faith and Harriet Miers*, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 17, 2005, at A11.

¹²⁰ *Hardball* (MSNBC television broadcast Oct. 12, 2005) (transcript available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9679820>).

¹²¹ Dionne, *supra* note 107.

¹²² *The Situation Room: Harriet Miers Nomination*, *supra* note 1.

majority of the Court.¹²³ As one reporter noted, the response to this prospect was largely a “collective ho-hum.”¹²⁴ This fact might suggest the extraordinary degree to which Catholic Americans have become viewed as a fully integrated part of American society, as Richard Garnett has suggested.¹²⁵

It is also possible that, as one scholar of the Supreme Court nomination process suggested, “the religion factor no longer matters” in the process.¹²⁶ This statement is surely overstated, given the degree to which religion had played a significant role in the nominations that had occurred immediately before Alito’s own nomination.¹²⁷ Still, the fact that religion largely dropped out of sight in the course of the Alito nomination might suggest that the religion issue, and by extension the invocation of the Religious Test Clause, has lost political traction as a useful argument in public debate over judicial nominations, at least for the time being.

In itself, this is a significant fact. It suggests that to the extent one is concerned about the use of religion as either a qualifying or a disqualifying factor in judicial nominations, one may be reassured that the political costs involved in raising religion in a judicial nomination, whether in support of or in opposition to a nominee, mean that the problem is self-limiting. Nevertheless, it should be evident by now that it is unlikely that we have seen the last invocation of religion to support or oppose a nominee. It is thus equally unlikely that we have seen the last invocation of the Religious Test Clause. In particular, as long as either abortion or church-state issues loom large on the American judicial and political agenda, religion will continue to be an important factor in how the public views nominees and, perhaps, a useful tool for those who seek to advance or thwart a particular nominee. Accordingly, it is still worth considering precisely how religion may be used in the course of a judicial nomination, whether as a matter of constitutional law or otherwise.

II. DOES THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE LIMIT THE USE OF RELIGION BY SUPPORTERS OR OPPONENTS OF JUDICIAL NOMINEES? OR, THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE

A. Prelude: The “Penumbral” Reading of the Religious Test Clause

As this recent history suggests, a number of individuals, including elected officials, academics, representatives of interest groups, and commentators, have turned to the

¹²³ See, e.g., Lynette Clemetson, *Alito Could Be 5th Catholic on Current Supreme Court*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A23.

¹²⁴ Jeff Diamant, *A Catholic-Majority Court Would Be a Moot Issue*, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Nov. 4, 2005, at 13.

¹²⁵ Tom Baxter, *Alito Would Form Catholic Majority*, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 1, 2005, at A10 (quoting Prof. Richard Garnett), available at 2005 WLNR 17618015.

¹²⁶ Clemetson, *supra* note 123 (quoting Prof. Barbara A. Perry).

¹²⁷ See *supra* Part I.C–D.

Religious Test Clause in the wake of the increased use of religion and religious rhetoric in judicial nominations. These individuals have argued that the Clause prohibits some or all uses of religion either in nominating or in questioning candidates for the federal bench. Before we ask whether they are right in their reading of the Religious Test Clause, however, we must first flesh out exactly what sorts of arguments have been made in favor of this reading of the constitutional language.

Perhaps the most fully developed argument in favor of a reading of the Religious Test Clause that prohibits senators from inquiring into a judicial nominee's religion is that of J. Gregory Sidak, who wrote presciently before either the recent series of Supreme Court nominations or the spate of lower federal court nominations that gave rise to the profusion of contemporary discussions of religious tests.¹²⁸ Although Sidak's argument is not perfectly clear, its basic outlines are. He argues that the Religious Test Clause, at its core, "guarantee[s] that a nominee for national office [will] not be made to *divulge* or disavow his understanding of God."¹²⁹

As we will see, whether the Religious Test Clause in fact prohibits senators from asking judicial nominees to "divulge" their faith is a more difficult question than Sidak's blunt statement would suggest. In any event, even that description of the paradigmatic rule of the Religious Test Clause is not enough to suit his purpose of ensuring that judicial nominees, and specifically Catholic nominees, not be questioned on whether their adherence to Church teachings on abortion would preclude them from voting to uphold abortion rights.¹³⁰ So Sidak makes a crucial logical leap, arguing that *any* questioning of a nominee on the subject of his religious beliefs—for instance, questioning a nominee on "his religious beliefs on abortion"¹³¹—violates the Religious Test Clause. Responding to Senator Hatch's one-time suggestion that it is possible to question a nominee on conflicts between his faith and his judicial duty "in a sophisticated way that would be less offensive" than the crude questions raised by Governor Wilder in the wake of the Thomas nomination,¹³² Sidak asserts that "more 'sophisticated' and 'less offensive' religious testing of Supreme Court nominees would draw the Senate more deeply into precisely the territory that the Religious Test Clause forbade the government to enter."¹³³

Sidak offers a host of strictly pragmatic reasons why it might not be wise or useful to question nominees on either their religious beliefs or the intensity of their beliefs.¹³⁴ He argues that such questions violate the presumption that judges can set aside their personal beliefs in ruling on the law; that it is both impractical and improper to dig

¹²⁸ See Sidak, *supra* note 3.

¹²⁹ *Id.* at 49 (emphasis added).

¹³⁰ See *id.* at 25.

¹³¹ *Id.* at 49.

¹³² *Id.* at 10–11.

¹³³ *Id.* at 24.

¹³⁴ See *id.* at 33–40.

into such issues; that such scrutiny will only lead to an enforced homogeneity of religious belief among office-seekers;¹³⁵ and that the divide between religion and faith is such that it would be “specious and self-important for those in political life to scrutinize a Supreme Court nominee’s adherence to religious doctrines according to principles of rational human thought.”¹³⁶ I do not mean to criticize these arguments at present; later in the article,¹³⁷ I will in effect suggest that these arguments are overbroad, and will explore the possibility that we might come up with a set of principles that could lead to more thoughtful discussions of religion in the context of judicial nominations. For now, it is important to note that Sidak does not raise these arguments on behalf of the view that senators *ought* not question nominees on any aspect of their faith. Rather, he deploys them to support an expansive view of the Religious Test Clause as *prohibiting* virtually any mention of religion in questioning a judicial nominee.¹³⁸ His argument is not simply that, as a practical matter, “any theologically rigorous testing of a Supreme Court nominee by the Senate would be intractable, if not also excruciating.”¹³⁹ It is that “[t]he Framers wisely foreclosed the possibility entirely.”¹⁴⁰

Similar arguments for a broad reading of the Religious Test Clause have been raised by a host of other serious writers, in addition to the more casual efforts to extend the scope of the Clause that arose in the public discussion of religion during the lower federal court and Supreme Court nominations that I have already recounted. For example, Professors Stephen Presser and Charles Rice argued in the wake of the Roberts nomination that the Religious Test Clause “reflects the belief of the framers that one’s religion is a matter between one’s God and one’s self, and should not play a role in determining suitability for public office.”¹⁴¹ While they conceded that “[i]t is legitimate for the Senate to explore with Judge Roberts his philosophy of judging, and perhaps even his beliefs about the connection between law and morality,”¹⁴² they argued that any suggestion that Roberts’s adherence to any particular faith “is a disqualification for office would be to embrace, *at least analogously*, the evil sought to be prevented by the Constitutional prohibition of religious tests.”¹⁴³ Accordingly, religious questions ought to be utterly “off-limits” for any judicial or other federal nominee.¹⁴⁴

Likewise, Senator John Cornyn has argued that the Religious Test Clause prohibits senators from questioning or opposing judicial nominees on the basis of their “deeply

¹³⁵ *Id.*

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 39.

¹³⁷ *See infra* Part III.

¹³⁸ *See* Sidak, *supra* note 3, at 24.

¹³⁹ *Id.* at 50.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

¹⁴¹ Presser & Rice, *supra* note 92.

¹⁴² *Id.*

¹⁴³ *Id.* (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*

held personal beliefs,"¹⁴⁵ religious or otherwise, on issues such as abortion, the death penalty, or indeed any other issue.¹⁴⁶ He has argued, in short, not just that it is wrong to require a nominee to divulge or disavow his religious faith, but that a nominee's religious faith, or any beliefs that follow from it, can never be relevant to a consideration of whether to oppose a nominee; *any* "use [of] religious beliefs against" a nominee is prohibited, in his view.¹⁴⁷

The Becket Fund, whose letter to the members of the United States Senate I quoted from at length above,¹⁴⁸ takes a similarly expansive view. Like Sidak, Kevin Hasson, Chairman of The Becket Fund, argues that the Religious Test Clause does not simply prohibit core instances of religious tests.¹⁴⁹ Rather, it extends further to bar "subtler form[s] of religious test[s]" that "would serve to disqualify fervent believers."¹⁵⁰ In Hasson's view, any use of "fervent religious faith" as "a disqualification for public office is unconstitutional."¹⁵¹ Given the context in which this letter was issued—immediately following the Roberts nomination, and in the wake of the debate over the use of religion in the confirmation battles over Judge Pryor and others—it is difficult to read this letter as referring only to senators' demands that a nominee, under oath, divulge or disavow his faith. It seems clear that when Hasson referred to "subtler form[s] of religious test[s]," he meant to refer to the possibility that a senator might object to a nominee on the grounds that his deeply held religious views made it impossible to fulfill his judicial office.¹⁵²

In short, a variety of individuals have argued that the Religious Test Clause must be read expansively.¹⁵³ If we agree that the Clause bars clear examples of religious tests, they argue, then surely more subtle questioning designed to smoke out a nominee's religious beliefs, or to examine whether a nominee's beliefs affect his views on substantive issues before the courts, or even to explore the relationship between his beliefs and his ability to rule on the cases before him, must also violate the Religious Test Clause. Thus, Sidak quickly moves beyond the view that the Religious Test Clause simply prohibits requiring a nominee to disavow his religion.¹⁵⁴ He argues that "the demand that a judicial nominee explain his religious beliefs on abortion to

¹⁴⁵ Cornyn, *supra* note 52, at 16.

¹⁴⁶ *See id.* at 19–20.

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ *See supra* notes 94–99 and accompanying text.

¹⁴⁹ Hasson letter, *supra* note 94.

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*

¹⁵¹ *Id.*

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ Cf., e.g., John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, *Catholic Judges in Capital Cases*, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 349 (1998) ("[W]e should guard against understanding the religious test clause too narrowly.").

¹⁵⁴ *See Sidak, supra* note 3, at 49–50.

the Senate is,” at worst, “a call to discard the protections of the Religious Test Clause,” and says that,

by virtue of his oath to support the Constitution, each member of the Senate has a duty to respect that document’s guaranty that a nominee’s religious beliefs will play no part whatsoever in the evaluation of his qualifications to sit on the Supreme Court.¹⁵⁵

We might describe such arguments as counseling a “penumbral” reading of the Religious Test Clause. Like Justice Douglas in *Griswold v. Connecticut*,¹⁵⁶ these advocates argue that the Religious Test Clause cannot be understood simply on its terms, for if read that way it would hardly be worth the ink.¹⁵⁷ Instead, we must read the provision in light of the “emanations from [that guarantee] that help give [it] life and substance.”¹⁵⁸ We must read it not only on its terms but, as Professors Presser and Rice suggest, as extending to those cases that seem “analogously” to present the same kinds of perils that the core terms of the provision were designed to prevent.¹⁵⁹

We are thus left with two central questions: What is the operational scope of the Religious Test Clause? And how does it affect the proper scope of questioning or voting by senators, or the choice of nominee and the manner of promoting that nominee by the President? In other words, to what conduct, whether by the person choosing a judicial nominee (the President) or by the person scrutinizing and voting on that nominee (the members of the Senate), does the Religious Test Clause extend? And does it serve equally to preclude the use of religion or religiously derived beliefs as a *qualification* for judicial or other federal office, and the use of religion or religiously derived beliefs as a *disqualification* for the same office?

It would appear, from the debate this nation has just experienced, that many of the most prominent voices in the debate believe that the scope of the Clause should be wide indeed, and that it should apply equally to the use of religion as a qualification or as a disqualification. On this view, the Senate would have been wrong to consider nominee Roberts’s religious views in any way—indeed, to discuss them at all; and the President was equally wrong to invoke nominee Miers’s faith in promoting her as a worthy choice for the Supreme Court.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ *Id.*

¹⁵⁶ 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

¹⁵⁷ See, e.g., Presser & Rice, *supra* note 92.

¹⁵⁸ *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 484.

¹⁵⁹ Presser & Rice, *supra* note 92.

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., *Hardball*, *supra* note 120 (quoting Tony Perkins, Family Research Council) (“[Religion] [s]hould not be a qualifying factor. There should be no religious test. We have argued against those on the Senate that try to disqualify people based on religion, and on the same hand I don’t think it should be used to qualify someone.”).

Whether recent advocates of that view have taken that position out of principle or for reasons of political convenience, the argument at least has the seeming virtue of consistency. But is that a sufficient argument for the complete prohibition of discussions of religion in the context of judicial nominations, whether in supporting or in opposing them? In short, even if the position is consistent, is it *correct*? Does the Religious Test Clause in fact demand a rule of silence where religion is concerned in considering the fitness of nominees for judicial or other federal offices? To answer that question, we begin by examining the history of the drafting and ratification of the Religious Test Clause.

A few words about method may be appropriate here. In canvassing the history of the Religious Test Clause at some length, I may appear to be adopting a substantially originalist approach to interpreting this constitutional provision—appropriately so for some, excessively or improperly so for others. I do not count myself as a strict originalist, in the sense that I do not believe history is the sole permissible tool of constitutional interpretation, and I believe it is often not even the primary or best tool of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, much of this article suggests that the reading of the Religious Test Clause that I offer below is sound for reasons having little to do with history.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, I think a substantial focus on history is appropriate in this article, for several reasons. First, it is the ground on which much of the recent public discussion of the Religious Test Clause has taken place, and I want to meet the advocates of a penumbral reading of the Clause on their own turf. Second, given the paucity of modern interpretations of the Clause, I think history is an especially useful interpretive tool in this field, even if it might be less useful in other cases. Finally, to say that I do not believe history is the only legitimate source of constitutional interpretation is not to say that it cannot be a profoundly valuable resource in understanding the Constitution.¹⁶² In this case, a close look at the history of the Religious Test Clause has much to teach us.

B. Four Central Facets of the History of the Religious Test Clause

As Gerard Bradley has noted in his seminal discussion of the Religious Test Clause, the drafting history of the provision is scanty.¹⁶³ Few people advocated such a provision in the period before the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787. It was not until well into the deliberations of the convention that anyone

¹⁶¹ See *infra* Part II.C.

¹⁶² See Paul Horwitz, *The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory*, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459 (1997) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, *THE STRANGE CASE OF LEGAL LIBERALISM* (1996)) (discussing problems with various uses of history in constitutional interpretation, but concluding that it remains one of a number of important tools in the lawyer's toolkit).

¹⁶³ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 691 (“There was much discussion of article VI among those who inserted it into the Constitution, but not until *after* they adjourned.”).

broached the subject.¹⁶⁴ That occurred on August 20, when Charles Pinckney proposed a variety of provisions that included the statement that “[n]o religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of office under the authority of the United States.”¹⁶⁵ Pinckney’s proposals were referred to a committee without any recorded comment, and there is no record of any action on Pinckney’s plan.¹⁶⁶ But the issue arose again on August 30, when the Convention agreed to add the words “or affirmation” to the oath required of all government officers in what would become clause 3 of Article VI.¹⁶⁷ Pinckney then rose to move the addition of the words, “but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the authority of the U[nited] States.”¹⁶⁸

Pinckney’s proposal occasioned little debate.¹⁶⁹ Roger Sherman of Connecticut spoke against the proposed language, arguing that it was “unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a sufficient security [against] such tests.”¹⁷⁰ Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania and General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina both spoke in its favor.¹⁷¹ The motion was agreed to without dissent,¹⁷² and the convention swiftly proceeded to approve Article VI in its entirety, with only North Carolina dissenting, and the delegates of either one or two other states offering divided votes.¹⁷³ And that, as far as the convention itself was concerned, was that.¹⁷⁴

While the convention hardly troubled itself with the Religious Test Clause, the provision occasioned considerable debate in the post-convention period, as the states debated the issue in their ratifying conventions.¹⁷⁵ Most of the efforts to mine this history for some interpretive clues on the meaning of the Religious Test Clause have focused on two questions. First, *why* did the arguments of the Federalists in favor of the Religious Test Clause succeed in the face of opposition to the Clause raised by its Antifederalist opponents? In other words, what were the successful arguments

¹⁶⁴ *Id.* at 692.

¹⁶⁵ *Id.*; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 335 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].

¹⁶⁶ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 692; Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 270.

¹⁶⁷ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 692; Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 270–71.

¹⁶⁸ 2 RECORDS, *supra* note 165, at 468.

¹⁶⁹ See *id.*

¹⁷⁰ *Id.*

¹⁷¹ See Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 271 (citing 2 RECORDS, *supra* note 165, at 468; 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 498 (Jonathan Elliot ed., reprint 1987, 2d ed.) (1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]).

¹⁷² 2 RECORDS, *supra* note 165, at 468.

¹⁷³ *Id.* at 468 & n.26 (observing that Madison’s notes of the convention record Maryland as casting a divided vote, while the *Convention Journal* also records Connecticut’s delegation as divided on the question).

¹⁷⁴ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 693.

¹⁷⁵ For thorough discussion of these debates, see, for example, Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 694–711; Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 273–84.

in favor of the Clause? Second, what do these successful arguments reveal about the ultimate implications of the Religious Test Clause for broader debates about church-state relations in the United States?

The scholarly treatments of these questions have come up with a variety of answers. Gerard Bradley, who has written perhaps the most distinguished exegesis of the Religious Test Clause, offers a pluralistic account of the Clause, arguing that the provision ultimately passed not because of any deeply substantive vision of the Clause as prohibiting the consideration of religion in general, or seeking to relegate religion solely to the private sphere.¹⁷⁶ Rather, those who engaged in combat over the value of the provision agreed that the best way to guarantee religious liberty was to ensure equality of sects.¹⁷⁷ The best guarantee of the flourishing of any one sect was to guarantee that a multiplicity of sects could flourish and counteract one another.¹⁷⁸ Bradley ties his reading of Article VI to the broader question of the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, arguing that just as the Religious Test Clause “guarantees sect-equality in public office holding,” so the Establishment Clause guarantees sect equality “more broadly”¹⁷⁹—and that is *all* it does. The Religious Test Clause and the Religion Clauses erect a perpetual motion machine, with the motive engine being the competition among a multitude of religious sects, but they do not require the Supreme Court to enforce visions of neutrality or other substantive goods under the Establishment Clause once the machine is underway.¹⁸⁰

Similarly, Daniel Dreisbach argues that sect equality was at the heart of the Religious Test Clause.¹⁸¹ Further, he argues that the best understanding of the Clause’s ratification has little to do with religion, and much more to do with federalism.¹⁸² The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution ultimately agreed to deny the federal government the power to impose religious tests because they believed that “religion was a matter best left to individual citizens and the respective state governments,” which in turn would remain free to impose religious tests as a condition for accession to public office.¹⁸³ And Robert Natelson has gone a step further, arguing that the Clause’s ratifiers would not have thought that it would prevent the Constitution from effectively limiting access to public office to theists, a limitation that he argues is imposed by the requirement in the remainder of Article VI, section 3, that office-holders take a constitutional oath.¹⁸⁴ Like Bradley, he suggests that this is consistent

¹⁷⁶ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 703.

¹⁷⁷ *Id.* at 712.

¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 703.

¹⁷⁹ *Id.* at 712.

¹⁸⁰ See generally *id.* at 724–47.

¹⁸¹ See Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 294.

¹⁸² See *id.*

¹⁸³ *Id.*

¹⁸⁴ See Robert G. Natelson, *The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause*, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 101–12 (2005).

with a reading of the history of the Establishment Clause itself, which he views as protecting only the rights of those who held some theistic belief.¹⁸⁵

Some scholars have drawn conclusions that are almost directly contrary to those drawn by Bradley and Dreisbach, and far more separationist in their orientation to church-state issues. For example, James Wood takes the Religious Test Clause as evidence that its ratifiers viewed “the new Republic as a secular state,”¹⁸⁶ and argues on this basis that the resurgence of religion as a subject and a credential in political debate “is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States.”¹⁸⁷ He echoes William Lee Miller, whose own history of the discussions concerning religion in the framing and ratification of the Constitution concludes that “in the framing of Article VI . . . the new nation was electing to be nonreligious in its civic life.”¹⁸⁸ Others have argued that the Framers taught us through the Religious Test Clause that “religion and politics . . . should be rigorously separated.”¹⁸⁹ And Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore have outflanked even these writers, citing the Religious Test Clause as evidence that the founding generation intended a secular order characterized by the title of their book: *The Godless Constitution*.¹⁹⁰

I agree that the history of the Religious Test Clause can teach us much about its meaning. Perhaps it can teach us something about the operation of the Religion Clauses as well, although that question is beyond the scope of this Article.¹⁹¹ But I want to take

¹⁸⁵ See *id.* at 138. Professor Natelson is careful to separate his reading of the Establishment Clause’s original meaning from his views on how the Clause should be read today in light of the vastly increased conditions of religious pluralism in America. See *id.* at 81, 138–39.

¹⁸⁶ Wood, *supra* note 3, at 206.

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at 207–08.

¹⁸⁸ WILLIAM LEE MILLER, *THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC* 108–09 (1985).

¹⁸⁹ GEORGE ANASTAPLO, *THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY* 207 (1989) (describing such views as common, while disagreeing with them). These views at least have a venerable provenance. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, *COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES* § 1841, at 705 (Boston, Hilliard Gray & Co. 1833) (arguing that the Religious Test Clause “cut[s] off for ever every pretence of any alliance between church and state in the national government”).

¹⁹⁰ ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, *THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS* (1996); see *id.* at 29–30 (discussing the Religious Test Clause).

¹⁹¹ Because I have been asked, when presenting this Article, whether the reading of the Religious Test Clause I offer here has any implications for a sound reading of the Establishment Clause, perhaps a brief word in response is in order. I am not sure my reading of the Religious Test Clause does, in fact, carry any implications for a sound reading of either the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. In particular, since the Establishment Clause has been at the root of the questions I’ve received, it seems to me that the narrow reading of the Test Clause I offer here—a clause that, as I explain below, is closely tied to the remainder of the text of Article VI, clause 3—does not offer any *strong* clues about whether the Establishment Clause itself must be read broadly or narrowly. If, as I argue, the Test Clause narrowly bars the formal

a different approach. Rather than focus on *why* the Clause succeeded in the ratification process, I want to ask, simply, *what* the Clause *does*. What, if anything, do the text and history of the Religious Test Clause tell us about its actual operative scope? Professor Bradley, arguing that Article VI and the Religious Test Clause instituted a self-regulating machine of religious pluralism, suggests that “it helps to think of article VI as function, not meaning.”¹⁹² For this reason, he and the others focus on the “why” and not the “what” of the Religious Test Clause, on why it passed rather than what it does. I propose to examine the Religious Test Clause by confining my focus to its narrow “meaning” and not its broader “function” in the Constitution—to focus only on what it does and, for the most part, not on what role it plays in the larger constitutional firmament. Despite this narrow focus, it should become evident that thinking about what the Religious Test Clause actually does should tell us something about the broader issue of religion, division, and the Constitution.

To understand the precise operative meaning of the Religious Test Clause, it is necessary to keep in mind four central facets of the history of the Clause, each of which are ultimately related to the other. First, we must begin where virtually everyone who studies the Religious Test Clause, and those few courts that have addressed it,¹⁹³ does: with the historical evil that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution surely held fresh in their memory as they met in Philadelphia and in the states to debate the proposed national charter. This was the use of religious test oaths to restrict the assumption of civil office in England to those individuals who were loyal to the established Church of England, and specifically to restrict Catholics and a wide range of Protestant dissenters from participating in the councils of the state.¹⁹⁴ It is important to note how these tests operated: not as general inquiries into the potential office-holder’s faith, but as absolute requirements that the office-holder

imposition of religious tests, that conclusion tells us little about how and when government can aid or invoke religion in other circumstances. It is possible that the Religious Test Clause could bar certain formal uses of religion in the context of federal office-holding, while leaving room for argument on the separate question of what other sorts of formal steps by government—formal invocations, endorsements, aid to religion, or other actions—are barred by the Establishment Clause. Although it is true that Professors Bradley and Dreisbach suggest that the Religious Test Clause and the Establishment Clause are both provisions of limited jurisdiction, and for the same historical reasons, *see supra* notes 179–83 and accompanying text, my approach to the historical analysis of the Religious Test Clause is different here, and I take no final position on that question.

¹⁹² Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 678–79.

¹⁹³ *See, e.g.*, *Torcaso v. Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961) (“[I]t was largely to escape religious test oaths and declarations that a great many of the early colonists left Europe and came here hoping to worship in their own way.”).

¹⁹⁴ *See, e.g.*, Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 263 & n.8, 264 (collecting sources discussing the history of test oaths in English law); Michael W. McConnell, *Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion*, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2176 (2003).

swear to, or otherwise formally comply with, a set of religious doctrines.¹⁹⁵ Thus, as Michael McConnell writes,

The Test and Corporation Acts required that, in order to hold civil, military, academic, or municipal office, it was necessary to have taken communion in the established church within a certain period and to swear an oath against belief in transsubstantiation, the Catholic doctrine that the bread and wine of communion are transformed into the body and blood of Christ. The right to vote for members of Parliament was limited to those who would take an oath forswearing the “ecclesiastical or spiritual” authority of any foreign prince or prelate, the belief in transsubstantiation, or the veneration of Mary or the saints.¹⁹⁶

Put simply, the path to public office in England was barred to any who would not be willing to make, *under oath*, “positive assertions of denominational affiliation or theological beliefs.”¹⁹⁷ Similar tests were erected by other European powers.¹⁹⁸

This was the historical example that many of the defenders of the Constitution had in mind when they argued that religious tests were “the greatest engine of tyranny in the world,”¹⁹⁹ the “foundation of persecutions in all countries.”²⁰⁰ In a pamphlet distributed in the fall of 1787, after the close of the Constitutional Convention, Tench Coxe contrasted the workings of Article VI and its Religious Test Clause with the experience of Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which barred Protestants from any “public

¹⁹⁵ See Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 263.

¹⁹⁶ See McConnell, *supra* note 194, at 2176 (citing First Test Act, 1673, 25 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.); Second Test Act, 1678, 30 Car. 2, st. 2, c. 1 (Eng.); 6 Ann., c. 23 (1707) (Eng.)).

¹⁹⁷ Calvert, *supra* note 3, at 1145 (referring to European practice generally). It should be noted that these requirements were not always rigorously enforced, see, for example, Douglas Laycock, *Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century*, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1065–66 (1996), although I do not think this fact would have blunted the sense of the founding generation that such tests were dangerous and offensive.

¹⁹⁸ See Calvert, *supra* note 3, at 1145. I take no position on *why* these powers erected such tests. Certainly, as Joel Nichols has pointed out to me, the reason need not have been purely, or even primarily, religious in nature. Rather, the test oaths might have been simply a means for these states to resist the incursions of foreign and domestic *political* forces (including the Roman Catholic Church, which during this era was as much a temporal as a spiritual force). See generally Laycock, *supra* note 197. Although this point offers a useful reminder that religious and political persecution were closely tied in the founding era, it does not affect my analysis in this Article—particularly since the test oaths still operated in large part through the *religious* force of oaths, see *infra* notes 207–18 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁹ 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, *supra* note 171, at 148 (quoting Rev. Isaac Backus).

²⁰⁰ 4 *id.*, at 200 (quoting Samuel Spencer).

trust,” and England, in which every person “not of the[] established church, is incapable of holding an office.”²⁰¹

Professor Bradley argues that this line of argument by the federalists was “predictable, unimaginative, and presumably had little effect.”²⁰² If one’s concern is with *why* the Religious Test Clause ultimately won approval, that may be correct. But our concern here is different: it is with whether those who debated the Clause had in mind a core example of conduct that violated the proposed provision. The historical record suggests that, in England’s test legislation, they clearly did.²⁰³ For present purposes, what is significant about these paradigmatic examples of obnoxious test legislation is how they operated: through the sanction of an *oath*, the office-holder was required to avow a specific set of religious beliefs, and effectively disclaim any others.²⁰⁴ Unlike the modern-day advocates of a penumbral reading of the Religious Test Clause, these test oaths did not trouble themselves with intensity of belief, or with the separation between one’s faith and one’s political office, for these questions simply were not relevant for their purposes.²⁰⁵ They simply and narrowly required, as an absolute condition, that the office-holder swear to the doctrines of the established church before entering into his office.²⁰⁶

That leads us to the second important fact we must keep in mind in examining the history and meaning of the Religious Test Clause: the profound importance with which most of the members of the founding generation viewed oaths themselves.²⁰⁷ As Michael Stokes Paulsen has observed, “oaths and extratemporal consequences for lying were taken very seriously indeed by the founding generation.”²⁰⁸ Oaths had “a profound, almost covenantal, significance for the framers—a significance that may be difficult for some fully to understand and appreciate today.”²⁰⁹

The root of their importance lay in two aspects of the oath.²¹⁰ First, to swear an oath was a deeply significant act for religious reasons. It was, as one nineteenth century

²⁰¹ Tench Coxe, *An Examination of the Constitution*, in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 639, 639 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION].

²⁰² Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 707.

²⁰³ See, e.g., McConnell, *supra* note 194, at 2176.

²⁰⁴ *Id.*

²⁰⁵ See *id.*

²⁰⁶ *Id.*

²⁰⁷ See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan, *The Very Faithless Elector?*, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 136–37 (2001) (offering examples).

²⁰⁸ Michael Stokes Paulsen, *Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution*, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1487 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, *THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES* (1997)); see *id.* at 1487 n.57 (collecting sources).

²⁰⁹ Michael Stokes Paulsen, *The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is*, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 257 (1994).

²¹⁰ For excellent discussions of the history and nature of the oath, see generally Helen Silving, *The Oath: I*, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959); Helen Silving, *The Oath: II*, 68 YALE L.J. 1527 (1959).

writer observed, “truly a sacramentum,—an outward and visible sign of the swearer’s present conviction of his responsibility to God.”²¹¹ Extratemporal punishment for falsely swearing an oath was *presumed*: the oath thus served “not to call the attention of God to man[,] but the attention of man to God . . .—not to call on Him to punish the wrong-doer[,] but on man to remember that *He will*.”²¹² A would-be office-holder who thus swore to a set of religious beliefs that he did not hold understood that he held his soul and his self in his hands.²¹³ The founding generation understood this well.²¹⁴

Second, the religious aspects of the oath, those aspects that made the swearing of a religious proposition a sacred matter, were buttressed by the founding generation’s keenly felt sense of honor. As with the religious importance of oaths, the importance of honor to the founding generation may seem increasingly alien.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, scholars attempting to recreate the world of the Founders as they experienced it have emphasized the degree to which “[c]haracter was enormously important to the Founders.”²¹⁶ The founding generation, operating in a system in which many of the traditional sources of social stability had been upset and in which there was no official aristocracy, relied substantially on a “culture of honor as a source of [social] stability” and a route to social standing and fame.²¹⁷ To falsely swear an oath would have been

²¹¹ Francis S. Reilly, *Judicial Oaths*, in PAPERS READ BEFORE THE JURIDICAL SOCIETY: 1855–58, at 435, 438 (London, V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 1858) (emphasis omitted); see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, *GOD’S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS* 64 (2000) (observing that test oaths “had special force” in “the Christian tradition”).

²¹² 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, *A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE* § 364(a), at 504 (16th ed. 1920) (1899) (emphasis added), quoted in Eric G. Andersen, *Three Degrees of Promising*, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 848 n.64.

²¹³ See ROBERT BOLT, *A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS* 139–40 (1962).

²¹⁴ See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the “sanctity of an oath” taken according to the Oath or Affirmation Clause); Michael W. McConnell, *The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion*, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467 (1990) (“At a time when perjury prosecutions were unusual, extratemporal sanctions for telling falsehoods or reneging on commitments were thought indispensable to civil society.”); Stephen B. Presser, *Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?*, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666, 680 (1999) (quoting President Washington’s Farewell Address, in which he asked, “[W]here is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice?” (alteration in original)).

²¹⁵ See, e.g., Peter Berger, *On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour*, 11 EUR. J. SOC. 339 (1970), reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).

²¹⁶ David McGowan, *Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court*, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 836 (2001). For especially important studies of this issue, see DOUGLASS ADAIR, *FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS* (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974); JOANNE B. FREEMAN, *AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC* (2001).

²¹⁷ See FREEMAN, *supra* note 216, at xv.

to damage or even destroy one's own name and standing. Thus, whether for spiritual or reputational reasons, there is no doubt that those who debated the Religious Test Clause and the oath component of Article VI understood full well the gravity of the matter.²¹⁸

Our focus thus far on the historical example provided by England and other European countries, and on the sacredness of the oath, might lead a casual observer to conclude that the modern-day penumbral interpreters of the Religious Test Clause are right. Surely, given this combination of factors, the provision must be read expansively to prohibit any hint of religious inquiry into the fitness of judicial or other nominees. But to these two central facts concerning the origins of the Religious Test Clause, we must add two more observations that may shift our perspective considerably.

The third fact we must take notice of, then, is simply that, notwithstanding the stark language of the Religious Test Clause and the background of English and European test oaths against which it arose, the founding generation was utterly comfortable with the use of religious tests. In the period leading up to the framing and ratification of the Constitution—and, indeed, long after—virtually every new state, following longstanding tradition, imposed religious tests for office.²¹⁹ As Professor Bradley writes, “[R]eligious belief stood at the door of practically every state political office in 1787 America.”²²⁰

Given the religious makeup of early America, it is no surprise that the religious tests that existed in the states at that time served primarily to restrict public office to those of the Protestant faith. Some of these tests were positively worded. For example, the New Jersey Constitution drafted in 1776 stated that only those persons “professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect” were fully entitled to hold public office.²²¹ Similarly, Georgia’s 1777 Constitution required that all members of the legislature “be of the Protestant religion.”²²² South Carolina’s Constitution drafted in 1778 used

²¹⁸ For a discussion of the role of constitutional oaths in yoking government officials’ sense of personal honor to the performance of their offices, see AKHIL REED AMAR, *AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY* 62–63 (2005).

²¹⁹ It should be noted that, as in England, see Laycock, *supra* note 197, the states did not always observe the strictures of these test oaths religiously, so to speak. See, e.g., MENENDEZ, *supra* note 3, at 8, 11–12 (noting voters’ disregard of test oaths in South Carolina, Maryland, and North Carolina); Joel A. Nichols, *Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in Colonial and Early National Georgia*, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1693, 1722–34 (2005) (discussing Georgia’s allowance of affirmance over oaths for voters). Again, I do not think the occasional non-enforcement of these provisions buries the broader point that the states were largely comfortable with the imposition of religious tests.

²²⁰ Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 679.

²²¹ N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2597–98 (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., 1909) [hereinafter *FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS*].

²²² GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

identical language to restrict a variety of offices to Protestants.²²³ New Hampshire took a similar approach.²²⁴ Other states took a more circuitous route to the same end. For example, North Carolina's Constitution stated that those who "shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State," were ineligible for public office.²²⁵ Other states—particularly those states whose citizens belonged to a variety of Christian denominations—were more liberal in nature, though perhaps not by our lights: they simply restricted office-holding privileges to those of *any* Christian faith,²²⁶ or those who adhered more specifically to a Trinitarian brand of Christianity.²²⁷

In sum, only *one* state—Virginia, whose Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom, penned by Thomas Jefferson, made clear that the "civil capacities" of citizens should not be affected by "their opinion in matters of religion"—clearly permitted citizens of any faith to hold public office at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.²²⁸ Nor did this situation simply vanish after the ratification of Article VI and its Religious Test Clause. Although the new Constitution and its novel provision did appear to spur "a liberalizing trend in the states,"²²⁹ that trend took some time to come to fruition, and some states actually reinstated religious tests for public office.²³⁰ As

supra note 221, at 779. For a rich discussion of the nature of religious liberty in colonial and early post-Revolutionary Georgia, see Nichols, *supra* note 219.

²²³ S.C. CONST. of 1778, arts. III (governor, lieutenant-governor, and privy council), XII (senate), XIII (house of representatives), *reprinted in* 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, *supra* note 221, at 3249–52.

²²⁴ See Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 267.

²²⁵ N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII, *reprinted in* 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, *supra* note 221, at 2793. As Bradley notes, this wording did not stop Catholics from taking office in North Carolina, as at least two public officials did (including one who became governor), "on the theory that [they] merely did not affirm that truth." Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 682.

²²⁶ See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXXV, *reprinted in* 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, *supra* note 221, at 1690 (requiring office-holders to make a "declaration of a belief in the Christian religion").

²²⁷ See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII, *reprinted in* 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, *supra* note 221, at 566 (requiring office-holders to swear an oath asserting belief in "God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore").

²²⁸ As Bradley and Dreisbach note, with some disagreement between them and relying on different sources, New York's 1777 Constitution did not provide for a religious test, but state legislation enacted in 1788, and similar legislation enacted in 1801, did require office-holders to swear an oath abjuring allegiance to any "foreign king, prince, potentate and state, in all matters ecclesiastical as well as civil"—an oath that, if taken seriously, would have been taken to bar Catholics from public office. *Id.* at 268 n.38; Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 682. Other states, such as Vermont and Massachusetts, carried similar anti-Catholic oath requirements. See *id.*

²²⁹ Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 272.

²³⁰ See *id.* at 272–73.

late as 1961, the Supreme Court was faced with a Maryland law requiring those holding state office to declare their belief in the existence of God.²³¹ Perhaps tellingly, other restrictions specifically barring clergy from serving as public officers took still longer to disappear, and were part of two states' laws as late as the 1970s.²³² Clergy disqualification statutes might be treated as a somewhat different category than the general religious tests imposed by the states. Still, taken together, these state constitutional provisions and statutes make clear that "the founders believed in religious tests for office both before and after they ratified article VI."²³³

Note that, in describing Virginia's Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom, I wrote above that it "permitted citizens of any faith" to serve in public office.²³⁴ It is just possible, on the basis of that statute's text, that it would have permitted citizens of any faith or of *no* faith to hold public office.²³⁵ But what was possible in theory was unthinkable in practice. This leads us to the fourth and final central facet of the history of the Religious Test Clause: its Framers and ratifiers, and certainly the citizens of the several new states, thought it unimaginable that non-Christians should hold public office.²³⁶ Indeed, most of them would have agreed that even the thought of non-Protestants holding public office was disagreeable.²³⁷ As to atheists, it would have been close to inconceivable to the founding generation that such men would even wish to attain public office, let alone that they should succeed in doing so.²³⁸

This sentiment in favor of the holding of public office only by those of sufficient moral character to merit such an honor and responsibility—moral character generally being taken to be synonymous with allegiance to a Christian sect²³⁹—can be found in a profusion of statements during the period in which the nation debated the Religious Test Clause, a selection of which will have to stand in here for the whole. It is evident, for instance, in Theophilus Parsons's speech in the Massachusetts ratification debate, in which he said, "No man can wish more ardently than I do that all of our public offices may be filled by men who fear God and hate wickedness."²⁴⁰ It is found in the Reverend David Caldwell's statement to the North Carolina convention that "even those who do not regard religion, acknowledge that the Christian religion is best calculated, of all religions, to make good members of society, on account of its morality."²⁴¹ And it can be seen in the statement of Colonel William Jones to the

²³¹ See Wood, *supra* note 3, at 206 (referencing *Torcaso v. Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)).

²³² See *id.* at 205–06.

²³³ Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 683.

²³⁴ See *supra* text accompanying note 228.

²³⁵ See Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 268 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57–1 (1619)).

²³⁶ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 680.

²³⁷ *Id.*

²³⁸ See *id.* at 697.

²³⁹ See Natelson, *supra* note 184, at 102.

²⁴⁰ 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, *supra* note 171, at 90.

²⁴¹ 4 *id.*, at 199.

Massachusetts convention that “if our public men were to be of those who had a good standing in the church, it would be happy for the United States, and that a person could not be a good man without being a good Christian.”²⁴² In short, “[i]n a society in which it was widely accepted that civil government depended upon religion and upon the morality it inculcated,”²⁴³ it was self-evident that belief in God, whether or not one was willing so to swear in public, was a precondition of fitness for public office.²⁴⁴

This was, of course, a key ground of Antifederalist opposition to the Constitution and its Religious Test Clause.²⁴⁵ In keeping with the Christian demographics of the young nation, and the unthinkable nature of atheists attaining public office, the prime concern was that the Clause would admit to the councils of state untrustworthy persons of a variety of alien faiths—or, in firmly Protestant states, that it would admit to federal office Catholics whose first allegiance was to the will of that foreign potentate, the Pope.²⁴⁶ Countless state ratification debates rang with worries that the Clause would lead to the prospect that a “Turk, a Jew, a Rom[an] Catholic, and what is worse than all, a Universal[ist] may be President of the United States.”²⁴⁷ In the face of such opposition, the Federalists offered a host of responses, such as the argument that a test oath was unnecessary to stave off this eventuality because “a good and pious people ‘will choose for their rulers [only] men of known abilities, of known probity, of good moral characters.’”²⁴⁸

The difficulty of understanding how the Federalists could have overcome such settled objections has led other scholars, such as Professor Bradley, to ask why and how the Federalists succeeded in arguing for the Religious Test Clause.²⁴⁹ But our purposes here are different. We can, for now, rest with the conclusion that whatever arguments won the day for the Federalists, they surely had nothing to do with convincing the Antifederalists that men of no religious faith, or the wrong faith, were fit for public office.²⁵⁰ For both the proponents and the opponents of the Clause, the

²⁴² 2 *id.*, at 119.

²⁴³ HAMBURGER, *supra* note 26, at 66; cf. CARTER, *supra* note 211, at 5 (“Politics needs morality, which means that politics needs religion.”).

²⁴⁴ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 697.

²⁴⁵ See, e.g., Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 281–84; Natelson, *supra* note 184, at 102.

²⁴⁶ Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 696–97.

²⁴⁷ *Id.* (quoting II C. WINGATE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF PAINE WINGATE 487 (1930) (letter of Sullivan to Belknap on Feb. 26, 1788)); Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 283.

²⁴⁸ Dreisbach, *supra*, note 3, at 281 (quoting 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, *supra* note 171, at 119 (speech of Reverend Mr. Daniel Shute to the Massachusetts ratifying convention)) (alteration in original).

²⁴⁹ E.g., Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 697–99.

²⁵⁰ The failure to fully recognize this point may sometimes lead to amusing errors in our own day, as the recent invocation of the history of the Religious Test Clause in the context of the judicial nomination debates suggests. For example, during the initial debate over the Pryor nomination, Hugh Hewitt, a law professor and commentator, argued that the Clause suggested that the Framers had “agreed that this country would not be burdened by such bigotry against

debate was not over “the desirability of staffing the new government with orthodox Protestants”—or perhaps, for some of the debaters, orthodox Christians—but only whether the Religious Test Clause was the proper means of doing so.²⁵¹

In sum, we can draw four central propositions from the history surrounding the framing and ratification of the Religious Test Clause, and, indeed, from much of our subsequent history. First, the founding generation had before it a historical example of pernicious test oaths, drawn from the European powers and especially England.²⁵² Those measures drew their power precisely from the fact that they required public office-holders to *swear* to particular religious doctrines.²⁵³ Second and relatedly, the founding generation took oaths seriously, both for religious reasons and because the swearing of oaths was closely tied to the centrality of honor to good conduct and future fame.²⁵⁴ Third, notwithstanding the first two principles, the founding generation was entirely comfortable with the use of religious tests, at least in the states themselves.²⁵⁵ Finally, they were comfortable with such tests, despite the example of England’s test

Catholics or any other unpopular religious group.” Hugh Hewitt, *The Catholic Test*, DAILY STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2003, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/963mcxZ0.asp>. Professor Hewitt cited in support of this proposition a letter from Luther Martin to the Maryland legislature in which Martin stated,

[T]here were some members [of the Constitutional Convention] so unfashionable as to think, that a belief in the existence of a Deity, and of a state of future rewards and punishments would be some security for the good conduct of our rulers, and that, in a Christian country, it would be at least decent to hold out some distinction between the professors of Christianity and down-right infidelity or paganism.

Id. Hewitt cites this statement as evidence that “the majority of Framers couldn’t even conceive of a situation where atheists would be denied office on the basis of their non-belief.” *Id.* The same statement by Martin was picked up by the *New York Sun*, editorializing against the use of religious tests in the course of the Roberts nomination. See Editorial, *The Religious Test*, N.Y. SUN, July 27, 2005, at 8. In fact, Martin, who appears to have opposed the Religious Test Clause in the Convention, was speaking sarcastically. See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 689 & n.83; Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 271; Natelson, *supra* note 184, at 102 n.150 (placing Martin’s statement in the column of evidence of Antifederalist opposition to the Religious Test Clause); MENENDEZ, *supra* note 3, at 8 (also counting Martin as an opponent of the Religious Test Clause). Thus, far from supporting Hewitt or the newspaper’s point, Martin’s sarcastic outburst underscores the degree to which severing religion from public office-holding was unthinkable to many of the founding generation. As to the argument that the majority of the Framers could not conceive of a situation where atheists would be denied office, it is more accurate to say that they could not have conceived of atheists being nominees for public office in the first place. See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 699.

²⁵¹ Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 699.

²⁵² See *supra* text accompanying notes 194–97.

²⁵³ See *supra* text accompanying notes 195–96.

²⁵⁴ See *supra* text accompanying note 215.

²⁵⁵ See *supra* text accompanying note 219.

oaths, because they were convinced that religion was essential to morality, and morality was essential to fitness for public office.²⁵⁶

C. The Narrow, but Deep, Religious Test Clause

Drawing on these intertwined principles, we can now arrive at a sound interpretation of the Religious Test Clause itself. The proper conclusion to be drawn from this history is that the operative force of the Religious Test Clause is significant but narrow. The Religious Test Clause does what it says; it prohibits the use of religious tests as a formal requirement for would-be federal office-holders. That is, the Clause prohibits Congress or the President from formally requiring office-holders to swear (or foreswear) allegiance to some particular faith, or some particular set of religious doctrinal propositions, as a condition for attaining public office, or from requiring actions, such as taking communion in a particular church, that have the same operative effect. The Clause bars the imposition of the kinds of test oaths that were prevalent in the laws of England and the European powers in the founding era, and that were present in the states in the founding era, but were rejected at the federal level by virtue of the ratification of Article VI. That is *all* it does.

This reading of the Religious Test Clause is consistent with the first two facts that I have highlighted in this section: the existence of the Religious Test Clause as a rebuke to European practice, and the seriousness with which the founding generation took oaths.²⁵⁷ That the Founders were aiming at precisely, and *only*, formal requirements that an office-holder swear to a proposition with which he could not agree²⁵⁸—and thus that the office-holder risk both his soul and his sacred honor—is evident in the language used to describe the dilemma faced by office-holders in the face of religious tests. Perhaps the most famous example of this is a letter written by Jonas Phillips, a Jewish resident of Philadelphia, to the President and members of the Constitutional Convention in September 1787.²⁵⁹ Phillips urged the Convention to avoid placing any religious test in the Constitution that might resemble the test applied to Pennsylvanians by that state's constitution, which required a statement of belief in the truth of the New Testament.²⁶⁰ Phillips wrote:

[T]o swear and believe that the new testament was given by devine inspiration is absolutly against the religious principle of a Jew[.]

²⁵⁶ See, e.g., Natelson, *supra* note 184, at 102.

²⁵⁷ See *supra* text accompanying notes 195–96, 215.

²⁵⁸ To similar effect, I think, would be a formal requirement that, for instance, a putative office-holder attend a particular church or take part in a particular ceremony, such as the Catholic sacrament of communion.

²⁵⁹ Letter from Jonas Phillips to President and Members of the Convention (Sept. 7, 1787), in 4 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 201, at 638.

²⁶⁰ *Id.*

and is against his Conscience to take any such oath—By the above law a Jew is deprived of holding any publick office or place of Government²⁶¹

In one of his *Landholder* articles, published in the wake of the Constitutional Convention, Oliver Ellsworth, a member of the First Congress and later Chief Justice of the United States, effectively agreed with Phillips's description of the dilemma of the religious test.²⁶² Ellsworth described religious tests in this way:

A religious test is an act to be done, or profession to be made, relating to religion (such as partaking of the sacrament according to certain rites and forms, or declaring one's belief of certain doctrines,) for the purpose of determining whether his religious opinions are such, that he is admissible to a publick office.²⁶³

And although there is good reason to conclude that the views advanced by Thomas Jefferson on the relationship between religion and public office were not representative of those of his fellow citizens,²⁶⁴ he captured the same idea of the precise problem with test oaths when he described them as "laying upon [an office-holder] an *incapacity* of being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion."²⁶⁵ The same thought was voiced by another Virginian, Edmund Randolph, who told that state's ratifying convention that, under the Religious Test Clause, federal officers would be "*bound*" by oath to support the Constitution, but would not be "*bound* to support one mode of worship, or to adhere to one particular sect."²⁶⁶

We thus can draw from the words of those writing and speaking at the moment of ratification the clear understanding that the Religious Test Clause was meant specifically to apply to any imposed oath, or its formal equivalent, that would require the oath-taker to *swear* to a religious belief, or to disavow such a religious belief, as an absolute condition of public office in the new federal government. This is the core meaning of the Religious Test Clause.

Contrary to the views of some scholars,²⁶⁷ and the public pronouncements of many of those who spoke out in the wake of the Pryor, Roberts, and Miers nominations,²⁶⁸

²⁶¹ *Id.*

²⁶² Oliver Ellsworth, *Landholder*, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), in 4 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 201, at 639.

²⁶³ *Id.* at 640.

²⁶⁴ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 688; Dreisbach, *supra* note 3, at 282–83.

²⁶⁵ Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 688 (quoting Jefferson's 1776 draft Bill for Religious Freedom) (emphasis added).

²⁶⁶ Edmund Randolph, *Virginia Ratifying Convention* (June 10, 1788), in 4 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, *supra* note 201, at 644 (emphasis added).

²⁶⁷ See, e.g., Garvey & Coney, *supra* note 153, at 349.

²⁶⁸ See *supra* Parts II.B–D.

that is as far as we should be willing to go. The Religious Test Clause admits of no penumbral emanations. Whatever arguments can be made by analogy²⁶⁹ or otherwise for its extension to other situations, it does not reach an inch further than its core prohibition.

That this is so should be evident from the two other historical facets of the Religious Test Clause that I have highlighted above: the founding generation's profusion of state religious tests, and their belief that persons without faith, or who professed the *wrong* faith, were simply not fit for public office because they lacked the appropriate moral character for office. Whatever else may be said about the founding generation's decision to approve the Religious Test Clause, it can hardly be said that the Clause's ratification signaled a clear rejection of the view that religion was irrelevant to fitness for public office. No more did it support the view that citizens and legislators were obliged to utterly ignore a potential office-holder's religious beliefs when considering whether that person was an appropriate candidate for public office. They may have agreed not to impose a religious test as a formal barrier to public office; but they certainly did not agree to banish such considerations from their own scrutiny of those seeking public office.

We may draw a similar conclusion if we ignore history for the moment, or keep it only in the background, and focus on the text of Article VI, clause 3, itself. Much may be gleaned simply from reflection on the placement of the Religious Test Clause in the Constitution. Recall that the whole text of clause 3 reads:

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.²⁷⁰

The Religious Test Clause was thus a bookend to the requirement in clause 3 that holders of public office "under the United States" swear an oath of allegiance, or affirm their loyalty to, the Constitution.²⁷¹ That fact again underscores that what the Framers

²⁶⁹ See Presser & Rice, *supra* note 92.

²⁷⁰ U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

²⁷¹ *Id.* As Professor Bradley and others have noted, while the Oath Clause of clause 3 binds both federal *and* state officers to take an oath to support the Constitution, the Religious Test Clause itself applies only to federal officers, not state officers. See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 693. That fact is of little relevance to this Article. But it is consistent with the arguments I have advanced above: that the founding generation was largely comfortable both with religious tests and with the motivation behind them, that only good men should attain public office; and thus that the Clause should be read as narrowly as possible, to prohibit only officially imposed religious test oaths, narrowly understood, for federal office.

and ratifiers were concerned with was the requirement that individuals swear religious *oaths* as a requirement for the attainment of public office.²⁷² In short, it is no accident that the Religious Test Clause was a part of Article VI, clause 3. That clause deals with the single subject of oaths, and it is precisely with oaths, or their equivalent, that the Religious Test Clause is concerned.²⁷³

One objection that might be raised by advocates of a penumbral reading of the Religious Test Clause is that the text itself refers to “*test[s]*,” not “*oaths*.”²⁷⁴ To the extent that this objection reminds us that *some* other requirements besides the imposition of a narrowly defined test oath might fall afoul of the Religious Test Clause, the point is well-taken, and I have been at some pains to suggest that some other requirements might violate the Clause. For example, as Judge McConnell’s example of the English Test and Corporation Acts suggests, it would have been equally objectionable to the founding generation if a nominee had been required to attend a particular church and take communion there.²⁷⁵

But this objection should not be taken to a point of excess. It would be wrong to conclude on this basis that *any* “test” of a potential office-holder’s faith, broadly construed to include simple *inquiries* into his or her faith, violates the Religious Test Clause, just as it would be wrong to assume that the First Amendment’s bar against the abridgement of “the freedom of speech” absolutely precludes the criminalization of any utterance that forms part of the crime of blackmail.²⁷⁶ The phrase “religious test” must be read in the context of what we understand the Founders to have meant, and their evident concern with the religious and other virtues of putative office-holders suggests that they cannot have believed that “no religious test” meant “no religious *inquiry* of any kind.” The phrase surely has more content than that. As I have argued, it finds its content in the kinds of *formal* requirements imposed on office-holders that were the object of the founding generation’s concerns.²⁷⁷ Those who drafted and ratified

²⁷² See *id.* at 692.

²⁷³ See *id.* (noting that “the ‘subject of religion’ is not mentioned [in the Constitutional Convention] at all until after, *and only because of*, proposals to bind all state and federal officers to the Constitution by ‘oath’”) (emphasis added).

²⁷⁴ U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

²⁷⁵ See McConnell, *supra* note 194, at 2176.

²⁷⁶ See Frederick Schauer, *The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience*, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (2004) (citing blackmail among other forms of legally regulated conduct that constitute “speech” and concluding, “That the boundaries of the First Amendment are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech’ is simply implausible.”); see also Paul Horwitz, *Citizenship and Speech*, 43 MCGILL L.J. 445, 450 (1998) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, *THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH* (1996), and OWEN M. FISS, *LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER* (1996)) (noting that the phrase “the freedom of speech” suggests “that the drafters of the First Amendment had a particular vision in mind of the freedom involved, and thus expected that some speech would fall outside of the guarantee”).

²⁷⁷ See *supra* text accompanying notes 194–96.

the Religious Test Clause were thinking of a narrow category of tests, such as requiring an individual to attend a particular church, or test oaths, both of which had the effect of absolutely and formally requiring an office-holder to choose between his office and his soul and sacred honor, and which thus subjected the office-holder to an absolute incapacity to hold an office.²⁷⁸ There is no evidence that, by using the word “test,” they intended to expand the field so far that they would be unable to ensure that the office-holders they selected and approved were of sound character.²⁷⁹ Rather, read in its proper historical and textual context, it is clear that “no religious test” was language that held a specific and narrow meaning.

The narrow reading that I have offered of the Religious Test Clause, as applying only to a narrow category of requirements that office-holders swear oaths subscribing to or denying particular faiths or faith tenets, is thus arguably consistent with the best available understanding of the text, history, structure, and purpose of this provision of the Constitution.²⁸⁰ And this reading should be no disappointment to those who have argued for a broader reading of the Religious Test Clause, for it is also the soundest approach to that Clause, for several reasons.

First, it is a sound approach because, to return to the theme of the Constitution *outside* the courts, it “distributes responsibility for constitutional law broadly.”²⁸¹ By “constitutional law,” in this instance, I am not referring simply to the provisions of our Constitution itself, but more broadly to “the fundamentals of our political order.”²⁸² An expansive reading of the Religious Test Clause like that offered by Sidak²⁸³ and others effectively reduces the scope of *popular* responsibility for our “political order.” By drawing a broad constitutional boundary around an ever-expanding set of inquiries into the fitness of various potential federal office-holders, it reduces the discretion of those elected officials who are responsible for selecting and passing on those nominees.²⁸⁴ Moreover, in so doing, it assigns the role of monitoring the conduct of those elected officials to the courts, or to various other official mechanisms for monitoring and disciplining the decisions of those officials.²⁸⁵ As the boundary of what is “constitutional” or “unconstitutional” expands, the realm of *political* accountability perforce must diminish. To constitutionalize every question that ought to be

²⁷⁸ See *supra* text accompanying notes 196–99.

²⁷⁹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 239–44.

²⁸⁰ See *supra* text accompanying notes 196–99.

²⁸¹ MARK TUSHNET, *TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS*, at x (1999).

²⁸² *Id.*

²⁸³ See Sidak, *supra* note 3, at 40, 50.

²⁸⁴ See *id.*

²⁸⁵ See generally *id.* at 40–50 (examining remedies that might be available either in the courts or in the rules of the Senate itself for disciplining senators who violate Sidak’s expansive version of the Religious Test Clause); Hasson letter, *supra* note 94 (threatening to bring complaints against any senators who violate the Religious Test Clause under the Senate’s disciplinary process).

left for popular resolution in the political arena is thus to diminish the scope of popular ownership of and responsibility for the conduct of our national politics.

To say that the President may nominate an individual to public office for religious reasons, or that a senator may oppose the confirmation of that nominee for religious reasons, is thus not the same thing as saying that either the President or individual senators *ought* to do so. Sidak may be right that such inquiries are, more often than not, “intractable, if not . . . excruciating.”²⁸⁶ If so, voters remain free to lobby against such misuses, to speak out loudly against them, and to cast votes in elections or run for office themselves. But, outside the narrow scope of the intolerable test oaths that the Religious Test Clause clearly prohibited, the best remedy—the *only* appropriate remedy—for the perceived misuse of religion by elected officials is a *political* remedy. And that is as it should be in any vigorous and properly functioning political system. Those who have deliberately drawn on the language of the Religious Test Clause to argue that the Constitution precludes the exercise of discretion by elected officials in any area touching on the religion of judicial or other nominees, and who would thus diminish the realm of *political* accountability for such officials, do no favors for our constitutional order.

This reading of the Religious Test Clause is also sound because, as I hope I have shown, those who crafted and agreed to the Religious Test Clause hardly intended to suggest that religion was irrelevant to a nominee’s fitness for federal office.²⁸⁷ And, however much things have changed in the intervening two centuries, they were right to think so.

That this proposition is true might be illustrated by two hypothetical examples, one perhaps a little more far-fetched than the other. First, imagine that, to fill the next vacancy on the Supreme Court, the President turns to an ardent worshiper of Satan.²⁸⁸ Assume, further, that this Satanist’s beliefs take the form of advocating and working toward “the triumph of evil forces over good in the universe.”²⁸⁹

I assume under my reading of the core meaning of the Religious Test Clause that the Senate could not impose an oath requirement demanding that this nominee renounce Satan and all his works. But what if individual senators were uncomfortable with the idea of confirming such a nominee (an otherwise qualified one, let us assume) to a seat on the nation’s highest court? More importantly, what if the senators were willing to

²⁸⁶ *Id.* at 50.

²⁸⁷ See *supra* text accompanying notes 219–33.

²⁸⁸ That the example is far-fetched can perhaps be seen in the observation of Michael Newdow, the plaintiff in the notorious Pledge of Allegiance case, in oral arguments before the Court, that even openly atheist individuals are unlikely to win election to public office. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, *Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow*, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02–1624), available at 2004 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 27.

²⁸⁹ WIKIPEDIA, *Satanism*, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satanism> (last viewed March 26, 2006). As the entry goes on to note, many of those who advocate some form of Satanist philosophy eschew any such goals.

accept the *fact* that the nominee worshiped Satan, but remained concerned that rooting for the triumph of evil over good is inconsistent with the judicial office the nominee was set to assume? Or that such a nominee would be unable to fairly judge the religious or other legal claims of Christians, Jews, or other religionists? Or that any promise made by the nominee that his Satanist views would not affect his judging would be untrustworthy, since someone who is committed to evil might make false assurances in order to obtain power? An expansive reading of the Religious Test Clause in effect demands that these questions be swept off the table—that a senator would be barred even from *asking* any of these questions, let alone acting on them. But they are hardly irrelevant to the considerations a reasonable senator would have to take into account in deciding whether to confirm such an individual to an office that carries with it lifetime tenure.²⁹⁰

To take a far less far-fetched example, assume that a nominee holds the view that she is obliged, for religious reasons, to oppose the death penalty in every way, and that this obligation must take precedence over any obligation to follow the requirements of the civil laws. Could such a nominee, if sitting as a district court judge, fairly preside over a trial in a capital crime, and particularly over the sentencing phase of that trial? If sitting as a Justice, could she fairly review appeals from capital convictions, or impartially judge claims that the death penalty is unconstitutional, in whole or in part? Or, if the judge took the view that recusal was required in all capital cases, would the fact that the judge was effectively precluded from sitting in a number of cases of this magnitude be just cause for concern about this individual's suitability for judicial office?²⁹¹

Would a senator be disabled from pursuing these questions? Or could that senator reasonably conclude that because capital cases are a significant and important part of the work of the federal courts, she is entitled either to assure herself that the nominee would be able to hear such cases, or to decline to confirm such a nominee? Particularly given the fact that at least one sitting Justice has taken the view that any judge holding such a view might be obliged to resign his or her office,²⁹² I do not think it would be

²⁹⁰ Cf. CARTER, *supra* note 211, at 65 ("The notion that I, as a voter, should never take into account the religious affiliation of a candidate means that I would be acting in an illiberal fashion were I to oppose a nominee who belonged to the Christian Identity movement or the World Church of the Creator, both adamantly racist groups that consider themselves religious. If the religious beliefs of the candidate give me serious and relevant information, I, as a voter, will surely take that information into account.").

²⁹¹ Ironically, given that his nomination was one of the first to give rise to arguments that the Religious Test Clause precludes any discussion of religion in questioning a judicial nominee, Judge William Pryor has stated that recusal is the appropriate remedy for judges who face "situations in which [their] religious convictions [come] into conflict with the law." Marlin Caddell, *Pryor: Faith Helps His Role as Judge*, CRIMSON WHITE, Apr. 3, 2006, <http://www.cw.ua.edu/vnews/display/v/ART/2006/04/03/4430b7b0abe39>. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that Pryor's own position neatly tracks that of the judge in the hypothetical offered above.

²⁹² Antonin Scalia, *God's Justice and Ours*, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17; Antonin Scalia,

correct, or sound, to conclude that a senator could not openly and reasonably take such considerations into account in questioning a nominee and in casting a final vote for or against such a nominee.²⁹³

In either case, the point of these hypotheticals should be evident: a nominee's religious beliefs *may* be relevant to the performance of his or her judicial office, in ways that are sufficiently clear and significant that a President choosing a nominee, or a senator questioning or voting on a nominee, is entitled to consider them. It is one thing to say that a nominee may not be forced to adopt or disclaim particular religious views under oath. It is quite another to say that no one else is entitled even to consider that nominee's views.²⁹⁴ To the extent that an expansive reading of the Religious Test Clause bars such inquiries, it is inconsistent with both the loudly expressed views of the founding generation and our own common sense.²⁹⁵

Third, an expansive reading of the Religious Test Clause as prohibiting any and all "subtle[] form[s] of religious test[s]"²⁹⁶ is unsound—and conversely, a narrow reading

Religion, Politics, and the Death Penalty, Address at University of Chicago Religion & the Death Penalty Conference (Jan. 25, 2002), available at <http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php3> [hereinafter Scalia, *Religion*] (suggesting that the choice for such judges "is resignation rather than simply ignoring duly enacted constitutional laws and sabotaging the death penalty").

²⁹³ Despite the reference to Justice Scalia and his discussion of the relationship between Catholicism and the death penalty, I do not think this hypothetical actually tracks the situation for Catholic judges. Scalia, for one, argues that because the Church's teachings on this issue are not binding, Catholic judges are not subjected to this Hobson's choice. See Scalia, *Religion*, *supra* note 292. For thoughtful discussions of this issue, see, for example, Garvey & Coney, *supra* note 153, at 305–06 (arguing, *pace* Scalia, that Catholic judges "are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty" in some cases, and should recuse themselves if they believe it is morally impossible to enforce the death penalty, although Catholic judges should not be forced to self-recuse simply because they identify as Catholic); Douglas W. Kmiec, *Roberts and Rome*, OPINION JOURNAL, July 29, 2005, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/taste/?id=110007034>; Kenneth Williams, *Should Judges Who Oppose Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply to Justice Scalia*, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 317 (2003).

²⁹⁴ In a different context, discussing clergy disqualification statutes, Kent Greenawalt offers another example. See KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 43–45 (2006). He asks, if the President nominated an individual to head the Environmental Protection Agency whose religious beliefs tell her "that the world will end in twenty years," whether the Senate would be entitled to reject that nominee because she might be indifferent to the long-term impact of environmental issues. *Id.* at 44. He concludes, rightly in my view, that the Senate would be able to reject such a nominee, even if she assured the senators during her confirmation hearing that her religious beliefs would "have no effect on her performance in office." *Id.* It follows reasonably from this that, if the Senate is entitled to be concerned about her views, and even to cast a vote based on those views, they ought to be able to inquire into them.

²⁹⁵ Cf. CARTER, *supra* note 211, at 61 ("If, as Teddy Roosevelt said, the President has a responsibility to go to church, we would violate no solemn principle by asking him which one.").

²⁹⁶ Hasson letter, *supra* note 94.

of the Clause *is* sound—because the line between religious beliefs and religiously derived beliefs is so blurred that an expansive reading risks constitutional metastasis.²⁹⁷ Religious beliefs themselves easily shade into—indeed, may be inseparable from—“beliefs on political issues” that are themselves grounded in religious beliefs.²⁹⁸ And these are issues that often lie at the heart of a senator’s reasonable decision to confirm or oppose a nominee, not to mention the President’s decision to nominate an official, not just to the federal judiciary but to all manner of other offices, to which the Religious Test Clause would be equally applicable.²⁹⁹ It cannot reasonably be the case that *all* such inquiries are placed beyond the pale by the Constitution.³⁰⁰ Such a reading simply does too much damage to too many things: to our understanding of the Founders’ own view that religion was relevant to fitness for public office; to our own view that Presidents and senators may reasonably consider how various nominees’ views would affect their policy positions or their ability to carry out their office; and to the view that such concerns are best left to the realm of political discretion rather than being addressed by a broad and absolute constitutional prohibition.

Again, I do not argue that all such inquiries, whether by a nominating President or by a senator scrutinizing that nominee, would be wise or well-advised. I simply want to argue that the Religious Test Clause could not possibly be understood, then or now, to have such wide jurisdiction that it would absolutely prohibit any decisions involving, or inquiries concerning, a nominee’s religious beliefs, let alone concerning that nominee’s religiously derived beliefs on political or legal issues.³⁰¹

Finally, for broader reasons rooted in a sound understanding of the role of religion in public debate, the narrow reading of the Religious Test Clause is sound because it honors the view that there is nothing about religious beliefs that presumptively

²⁹⁷ For a careful discussion of religiously derived beliefs, see Michael J. Perry, *Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy*, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 225–26; see also Robert Audi, *Religiously Grounded Morality and the Integration of Religious and Political Conduct*, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 251 (2001) (exploring several ways in which morality may be derived from religion).

²⁹⁸ See Perry, *supra* note 297, at 225–26.

²⁹⁹ See Eugene Volokh, *Religious Test Clause*, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2005, 17:16 EST), available at http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_04_24-2005_04_30.shtml#1114707103.

³⁰⁰ For example, given the centrality of a judge’s views on the nature of legal interpretation to his or her fitness for office, the Religious Test Clause could hardly be read to forbid questioning a judicial nominee who has advocated, for religious reasons, a natural law approach to judging. See, e.g., Robinson, *supra* note 44.

³⁰¹ See Calvert, *supra* note 3, at 1166 (arguing that the Religious Test Clause permits inquiry into a nominee’s “religiously motivated ideological beliefs”). Calvert also argues that the Clause does prohibit inquiry concerning judicial nominees’ “religious affiliations and theological beliefs.” *Id.* Since I believe the Clause, properly read, only prohibits the narrow category of official test oaths designed to force a nominee either to subscribe to or to disavow particular religious faiths or religious tenets, I part company with him here.

disqualifies them from inclusion in any aspect of public discussion. The literature on this issue is voluminous,³⁰² and this is not the place to fully develop those arguments. Suffice it to say that I proceed from the position that religion, and the perspective of religious believers speaking authentically in their own voices, has a wealth of contributions to make to our own public dialogue.³⁰³ Religious groups can be a site of resistance and social change;³⁰⁴ and, because religion may draw on sources of belief and argument that fall outside the sphere of common liberal concepts, religious groups and individuals may offer a source of new ideas to a public debate that would otherwise grow stale.³⁰⁵ Thus, as Martha Minow has written, “religiously inflected arguments and perspectives bring critical and prophetic insight and energy to politics and public affairs.”³⁰⁶

Nor should religion and religious talk be valued simply for the extrinsic benefits they provide to liberal democracy. They should also be valued because our liberal polity itself is composed of millions of individuals who wish to speak in a religious voice.³⁰⁷ In my view, nothing in our system of democracy prevents them from doing so,³⁰⁸ and nothing *should* prevent them from raising religious arguments if they wish. At the very least, to the extent that it is true that many participants in the public dialogue surrounding judicial nominations, along with the dialogue on every other political issue, are in fact acting in part from religious motivations, it is better that such motivations be fully aired—both to ensure that those who proceed from such motivations are fully represented in the public debate, and to ensure that others may critically examine and engage with those ideas.³⁰⁹

³⁰² See *infra* Part II.D.

³⁰³ See Paul Horwitz, *The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond*, 54 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 48–53 (1996).

³⁰⁴ *Id.* at 50–52.

³⁰⁵ *Id.* at 52–53.

³⁰⁶ Martha Minow, *Governing Religion*, in ONE ELECTORATE UNDER GOD? A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 144, 147 (E.J. Dionne Jr. et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter ONE ELECTORATE].

³⁰⁷ See Jean Bethke Elshtain, *God Talk and the Citizen Believer*, in ONE ELECTORATE, *supra*, note 306, at 94 (“God talk, at least as much as rights talk, is the way America speaks. American politics is indecipherable if it is severed from the interplay and panoply of America’s religions.”).

³⁰⁸ See Perry, *supra* note 297.

³⁰⁹ See, e.g., *id.* at 230 (“Because of the role that religiously grounded moral beliefs inevitably play in the political process, then, it is important that such beliefs, no less than secular moral beliefs, be presented in public political argument *so they can be tested there.*”); J. David Bleich, *Godtalk: Should Religion Inform Public Debate?*, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (1996) (favoring “full and frank dialogue” over requiring religious individuals to mute or rephrase religiously derived arguments).

Although I address these arguments at somewhat greater length below,³¹⁰ there is no doubt that much more has and could be said about such questions. Nevertheless, I take it as a given for present purposes that welcoming religious believers and religious arguments into the public square is a positive good. It may seem ironic that this proposition counsels in favor of a narrow reading of the Religious Test Clause, when that reading would allow Presidents or senators to oppose or exclude certain nominees on the basis of their faiths. But the appearance of irony is misleading. From the normative perspective I adopt here, it is better that religion be allowed into the public debate, even if it may sometimes lead to what seem like anti-religious arguments against a nominee (although those arguments might themselves be religiously derived). That risk should, for religious believers who wish to engage in the public square, be far preferable to the alternative of excluding religion and religious inquiry from the terms of debate altogether. Thus, those who adopt the perspective that religion ought to be permitted in public debate, and that public officials ought to be able to speak or act out of religious motivation,³¹¹ ought also to agree that religion cannot be excluded from the particular public debate surrounding judicial nominations. They should perforce favor the narrow reading of the Religious Test Clause I have offered here.

I therefore must conclude that the best reading of the Religious Test Clause is the narrowest. The Religious Test Clause does what it says—it prohibits the official imposition of test oaths requiring nominees for federal public office, as a condition of that office, to claim or disclaim a particular religion or a particular set of religious propositions. It does nothing more.³¹² If we are to seek any more help in this area in situations that lie outside the narrow scope of the Clause, it must come from the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment—if there is any help at all.

This may seem a bitter pill to some of the advocates of the penumbral reading of the Religious Test Clause.³¹³ The Religious Test Clause would seem to cover hardly anything of importance if it is to be understood on the narrowly drawn terms I have offered here. It *must* mean something more.

³¹⁰ See *infra* Part III.

³¹¹ E.g., Bleich, *supra* note 309, at 1516; Perry, *supra* note 297, at 230.

³¹² Careful readers may discern an irony in what I have written so far, although this irony was not commented on much, if at all, during the public debate over the role of religion in the Roberts and Miers nominations, or during the debate over the role of religion in the nominations of the lower federal court judges who preceded them. Many of those who argued for the most expansive interpretations of the Religious Test Clause, what I have labeled a “penumbral” reading of the Clause, were the same individuals—both public commentators and elected officials—who regularly have argued for narrow interpretations of the rest of the Constitution, based on the original understanding of the constitutional text or on a narrowly textualist reading of the Constitution. Given the ample historical material suggesting a narrow reading of the Religious Test Clause, and its fairly plain terms, it is curious that they should have argued in this context for what can only be called a “living Constitution” interpretation of this constitutional language.

³¹³ See *supra* Part II.A.

To this there are two responses, I think. The first is that the Religious Test Clause carries so little weight today because it is a victim of its own success. As Professor Bradley has observed, "Congress has abided the pluralistic settlement" Bradley describes in the Religious Test Clause: it simply has not imposed the kinds of religious tests, narrowly understood, that the Clause was intended to prohibit.³¹⁴

The second response is to remind advocates of an expansive reading of the Clause that if it seems as if the Clause accomplishes little, it is not because *it* has changed, but because *we* have. To its Framers and ratifiers, it would have seemed revolutionary to discard in the constitutional plan the ability to force nominees to attest to their moral fitness for office by means of a religious oath. The debate over the Clause confirms that those who witnessed its birth *did* understand it as revolutionary.³¹⁵ If we see things differently today, it is because we are far more casual about the significance of oaths themselves—their compulsive powers and the threat they pose, if sworn falsely, to one's soul and one's honor.³¹⁶ As I observed above,³¹⁷ the footprint of the Religious Test Clause may be small, but its importance within that narrow scope was profound, at least to its progenitors. If we see the Religious Test Clause today as insignificant, or largely irrelevant, or of impossibly small scope, this view has little to do with the Clause itself, and everything to do with the success of the Clause—and the reduced seriousness with which we regard oaths in the present day.³¹⁸ That may mean

³¹⁴ Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 715.

³¹⁵ See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, *A Heritage of Religious Liberty*, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1576 (1989) ("Given the long history of test oaths, [the Religious Test Clause] represented a significant achievement."); Robert A. Destro, *The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee*, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 355, 359 n.15 (1995) ("The decision by the Convention that the federal government should have no religiously-based conditions for office-holding was, therefore, a significant advance for religious liberty at the federal level."); Carl H. Esbeck, *Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic*, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1513 n.450 (quoting John Leland, *The Rights of Conscience Inalienable* (1791)). Leland states that the Religious Test Clause is one of the features of the Constitution that make it "a novelty in the world" and "the best national machine that is now in existence." *Id.*; cf. Laycock, *supra* note 197, at 1095 ("Even if [Kathleen Sullivan] were right that the war of all against all continues 'by other means,' the change in means would be one of the greatest advances of human history.").

³¹⁶ See Sherman J. Clark, *Promise, Prayer, and Identity*, 38 TULSA L. REV. 579, 583 (2003) (raising the possibility that "formal oaths are simply irrelevant [today]—anachronistic holdovers from bygone ages, with neither meaning nor significance apart from the legal consequences we choose to attach to the breach of certain sworn obligations").

³¹⁷ See *supra* text accompanying note 315.

³¹⁸ See, e.g., Berger, *supra* note 215; Paulsen, *supra* note 209. The fact that loyalty oaths aimed at Communism were so hotly contested in the 1950s might indicate that the importance of oaths has not faded as much as I suggest in the text. See Clark, *supra* note 316, at 583. But there is reason to think that the opposition to the 1950s loyalty oaths stemmed more from the broader political principles involved in those debates than from the fact that *oaths* were involved in those controversies. See *id.* at 590.

the Clause has little to do in the present day. So be it. This does not change the fact that we do not honor the true nature and meaning of the Religious Test Clause by extending it beyond its narrow scope, as some proponents have suggested.

D. Present-Day Implications: Of Roberts, Miers, and Others

With the proper interpretation of the Religious Test Clause in hand, we can now proceed to a sound examination of the use of religion in the Roberts and Miers nominations. Recall the questions asked above:³¹⁹ To what conduct, whether by the person choosing a judicial nominee (the President) or by the person scrutinizing and voting on that nominee (the members of the Senate), does the Religious Test Clause extend? Does it preclude the use of religion as either a disqualification or a qualification for judicial or other federal nominees? Recall, too, that a number of voices in the recent debate suggested that the Religious Test Clause was, or would have been, violated by both the President's selection and promotion of Harriet Miers based on her religion, and the Senate's questioning and/or rejection of John Roberts based on his religion or religiously derived beliefs.³²⁰ We can now ask whether this consistent view was also the right one.

Given what I have argued so far, my conclusion should be evident. Neither case falls within the core of classic Religious Test Clause violations. Thus, neither case—nor the cases of William Pryor and the other lower federal court judges whose confirmation hearings provoked a controversy—raised real Religious Test Clause concerns. Those who argued for an expanded reading of the Religious Test Clause, and thus argued that the Clause was implicated by both the Roberts and Miers nomination and confirmation controversies, had the virtue of consistency. Unfortunately, they were consistently wrong.

Take the Roberts nomination first. Remember that the concern here was that, in the words of one commentator, “[a]ny scratching around th[e] area [of faith] would suggest that there’s a veiled religious test by asking questions about [Roberts’s] deeply held views.”³²¹ On this view, individual members of the Senate who inquired into the nature or intensity of Roberts’s beliefs, in order either to find out what his stance was on questions involving abortion or to ask whether he could faithfully follow the law when such questions arose, would violate the Religious Test Clause.

I think, given what I have said so far, that the Religious Test Clause cannot be said to extend to such inquiries. The Clause prevents the formal imposition of true religious

³¹⁹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 159–60.

³²⁰ See, e.g., *Hardball*, *supra* note 120.

³²¹ Eckstrom, *supra* note 74 (quoting Bill Donohue); see also Kirkpatrick, *supra* note 74, at A14 (quoting Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council) (“We are going to be vigilant to make sure that there is not this religious litmus test imposed . . . ‘Are you a Catholic? Do you really believe what the Catholic church teaches?’ These kinds of things shouldn’t be part of the discussion.”).

tests as a precondition to the assumption of public office. But it does not, as a matter of text, history, or sound policy, prohibit inquiries about a nominee's beliefs on issues likely to come before the federal courts, or inquiries into his faith as a means of ferreting out those views. Nor does it prohibit inquiries designed to smoke out whether a nominee with deeply held beliefs—religious or otherwise—can nevertheless faithfully apply the applicable law. None of these inquiries amount to a requirement that a nominee literally pledge his allegiance to a particular faith or a particular set of religious doctrines.

It is true that such inquiries would require the nominee to answer *under oath*, and a central feature of the Religious Test Clause is its relationship to oaths.³²² But such inquiries would not amount to a literal requirement that a nominee *subscribe* to a particular faith or faith tenet, under penalty of extratemporal punishment. Thus, a senator who wished to inquire into nominee Roberts's religious beliefs, or into the nature and intensity of his religiously derived beliefs concerning policy matters likely to come before the Supreme Court, would face only a possible political penalty for doing so; she would not run afoul of the Religious Test Clause.

Would that calculus change if a senator instead demanded that Roberts avow or disavow particular beliefs about abortion, whether religious or secular, policy-oriented or legally-oriented, during confirmation hearings? Would it change if the senator cast a vote against him on the basis of his religiously derived beliefs (saying, for example, "I feel so strongly about abortion rights that I cannot support any nominee who fervently believes that abortion is wrong")? More strongly, would it change if the senator cast a vote against Roberts on the basis of his *religion* (saying, bluntly, "I will not vote for any Catholics")?

Again, I think the answer must be no in all cases. On a strictly formal basis—but that is, of course, precisely the sort of reading of the Religious Test Clause that I have argued is appropriate—none of these actions would involve the precise evil the Clause was aimed at: the *formal* requirement of "sectarian affiliation as a precondition for public office."³²³

It is true that some of these actions would involve a step of some consequence: the casting of a vote. But an individual senator's "no" vote is not the same thing as the *Senate* imposing a test oath as a *formal* condition applicable to any or all nominees as the cost of admission to the bench; and it is this, and only this, that the Clause prohibits. Moreover, as the history of the Clause suggests, the Founders and ratifiers surely believed that, notwithstanding the elimination of formal test barriers, they were fully entitled to judge the fitness of would-be office-holders, including their moral fitness, which would have involved considerations of faith.³²⁴ To suggest they would therefore be barred from voting against a nominee whom they were convinced was,

³²² See *supra* text accompanying notes 270–71.

³²³ LEVINSON, *supra* note 31, at 197.

³²⁴ See *supra* text accompanying notes 239–44.

whether for religious reasons or for any other reason, unfit for the sacred trust of public office, stretches the Religious Test Clause too far. Again, a senator might be expected to incur a *political* cost for casting such a vote, or at least for saying that he had voted against a nominee for religious reasons. That is as it should be. But the Religious Test Clause itself would not speak to the propriety of such votes.

The conclusion is no different if we shift our focus to the question whether the President would have been entitled to nominate Harriet Miers simply because of her faith, whether in whole or in part; or whether he would have been entitled to nominate her because he thought her faith signaled her religiously derived position on particular legal questions, whether they involved abortion, gay rights, or something else altogether; or whether he would have been entitled to promote her, however grossly, by publicly invoking her membership in a particular religious faith. Indeed, the conclusion would be no different if the President had pledged in 2002 not just to nominate only judges who understood that “rights were derived from God,”³²⁵ but to nominate only judges who believed in God, or in a particular faith tradition. Simply to promote a nominee based on her faith ranges far afield from the substantive evil of a test oath. While it may seem like a closer question whether a President can limit himself to religious nominees, or select particular nominees based on their faith, the history of the Clause makes clear that those who made up the federal government were fully entitled to seek individuals of good character to fill public offices, and that religious beliefs, or even particular religious affiliations, were assumed to be a sterling mark of good character.³²⁶ That evidence is buttressed by the blunt fact that Presidents have in fact long selected nominees on a variety of bases, *including* faith, well after the Religious Test Clause became part of our Constitution.³²⁷ The fact that it was not until well into the nineteenth century that a Catholic Justice joined the Court, and not until the twentieth century that the Court saw its first Jewish Justice, is surely strong circumstantial evidence that Presidents took such matters into consideration all the time.³²⁸

So a President who acted in this manner would not violate the Religious Test Clause either.³²⁹ This should not occasion too much concern, however. The Miers

³²⁵ Calvert, *supra* note 3, at 1137 (quoting President Bush).

³²⁶ See *supra* text accompanying notes 239–44.

³²⁷ See *supra* text accompanying notes 27–28.

³²⁸ See generally Perry, *supra* note 25.

³²⁹ Mark Scarberry has asked the interesting question whether it matters, for purposes of my analysis, whether a President uses religion in selecting and promoting a nominee not because he is seeking to advance the nominee’s religion as such, but because he believes the Supreme Court, or the federal judiciary in general, would benefit from nominees who come from a diverse set of religious backgrounds, just as a President might consciously seek to select judges from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. Given my narrow reading of the Religious Test Clause, it does not. On the other hand, it seems to me that if one takes seriously the penumbral reading of the Religious Test Clause that I have attempted to refute in this Article, that reading would bar the use of religion in judicial nominations for *any* purpose, including this one. After all, it is not clear that, to the extent that President Bush selected and promoted Harriet Miers on the basis of

nomination richly suggests that when the President is viewed by the public as having displayed religious favoritism in his nomination choices, or as having misused religion in promoting a particular nominee, he risks facing significant political penalties. But that does not alter the fact that the Religious Test Clause would not preclude the President from so acting.³³⁰

It would thus seem that many of the loudest voices in the debate over the use of religion during the Roberts and Miers nominations were simply and consistently wrong. If President Bush selected Harriet Miers in part because of her faith, and promoted her

her religion, he was doing anything other than promoting her for the sake of providing representation on the Supreme Court bench for evangelical Christians. Yet he was still criticized for mentioning religion at all in the context of that nomination. *See supra* notes 115–22 and accompanying text.

³³⁰ In commenting on a draft of this Article, Kent Greenawalt has suggested that there may in fact be an important distinction between using religion as a *disqualification* for public office, and using it as a qualification. That distinction is based on the idea, developed at length in Greenawalt's writing, that judges, more so than private citizens or even other public actors such as the President or members of Congress, are constrained in the sources to which they may turn in performing their judicial function. *See* KENT GREENAWALT, *PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS* 141–50 (1995). Greenawalt argues that, with a few exceptions, judges generally should not rely on religious convictions in their deliberations. *Id.* If that is true, he has suggested to me, then religion should not usually count as a qualification for judicial office; on the other hand, if they would interfere with a nominee's performance of her judicial office, a nominee's religious beliefs may properly be a cause for concern and thus a potential disqualification.

The argument that judges generally should not consult their religious beliefs in carrying out their duties is a complex question on which there is some disagreement. *See supra* note 38. Assuming that Greenawalt is correct in this, though, it still seems to me that some responses are available.

First, it is important to note that this argument depends on a broader normative view of the relationship between religion and public deliberation, and has less to do with the specific meaning of the Religious Test Clause itself. If we focus more closely on that clause in its historical context, I think it is hard to conclude that the Test Clause was intended to apply differently to judges than to other public officials. As I have argued above, the founding generation appears to have believed in the value of selecting honorable and virtuous individuals to occupy public offices, which for them would have allowed at least some consideration of these individuals' religious beliefs. *See supra* note 324 and accompanying text. I do not think these considerations of virtue are so different for judges, as compared to other office-holders, that we can judicial religion could never, under the Test Clause, be treated as a valid qualification for public office.

Second, even if we take an approach to the question that is unmoored from the history and text of the Religious Test Clause itself, and even if we assume that judges are limited to secular sources in carrying out their deliberations, a President or senator might still reasonably conclude that a judicial office-holder ought to possess such qualities as public probity, fairness, equal regard for persons, and perhaps compassion and mercy, over and above whatever talents they possess at the craft of judging. They might conclude that religion offers the best source of these qualities, and select or approve nominees accordingly. I do not believe the Religious Test Clause can or should be read as precluding such conduct. As I have already suggested, whether this approach would be wise, or politically saleable, is a different question.

on that basis, he did nothing wrong, at least as far as the Religious Test Clause is concerned. Nor would any senators have been wrong, constitutionally speaking, to question John Roberts on the relationship between his faith and his conduct as Chief Justice, or even to vote against him on the basis of that faith. Both actions might quite properly have been condemned politically, but should not be condemned on the grounds of the Constitution's commands. This means that Senator Cornyn,³³¹ Professors Presser and Rice,³³² the leaders of The Becket Fund,³³³ the Family Research Council,³³⁴ the Christian Defense Coalition,³³⁵ and Concerned Women for America,³³⁶ among others, were wrong in their comments on the occasion of one or both of the recent nominations. (On the other hand, this reading of the Religious Test Clause vindicates the behavior of such figures as Senator Durbin, who allegedly quizzed Roberts about conflicts between his faith and the law,³³⁷ and confirms the views of such figures as Senator Hatch, who said senators were fully entitled to ask a nominee about his religious views.³³⁸

Beyond these most recent examples, my reading of the Religious Test Clause also suggests that a number of other writers on the Clause—both academic and judicial—have overstated the scope of the Clause, or misapplied it. To take one prominent example, Sanford Levinson has written some of the most thoughtful, rich examinations of the nature of loyalty oaths and religious tests in the academic legal literature.³³⁹ And Levinson says much, I think, that is exactly right about the relationship between faith and judicial duty, and the permissible scope of questioning about a nominee's faith.³⁴⁰ In particular, as what I have written here should make clear, Levinson is right to say that despite the Religious Test Clause, a senator may question a nominee about her "religious views as the basis of further conversation about their implications relative to public office."³⁴¹ But it follows from my discussion so far that Levinson is wrong to write that "it would be illegitimate to make dispositive a nominee's belief—or lack thereof—in God, since a conscientious senator should be unable to take into account any given answer to that question."³⁴² This is a minor error compared to the wealth

³³¹ See Dionne, *supra* note 79.

³³² See Presser & Rice, *supra* note 92.

³³³ See Hasson letter, *supra* note 94.

³³⁴ See Singer, *supra* note 91.

³³⁵ See Savage, *supra* note 106.

³³⁶ See *id.*

³³⁷ See Turley, *supra* note 80.

³³⁸ See Singer, *supra* note 91 (noting that Senator Hatch added that such questions were unlikely to yield fruitful results, and so were "ridiculous").

³³⁹ See, e.g., LEVINSON, *supra* note 31; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).

³⁴⁰ See generally LEVINSON, *supra* note 31, at 192–232.

³⁴¹ *Id.* at 223.

³⁴² *Id.* at 221. Taken in the context of Levinson's argument, it is clear that he is saying that such a position would be *constitutionally* illegitimate, due to the Religious Test Clause, and not just that such a position would be illegitimate in a broader sense that is untethered to the Constitution.

of important observations about the Clause that Levinson contributes in his work; but it is an error nonetheless.

Similarly, where the Religious Test Clause is concerned as in other areas, the Supreme Court may be final, but it is not infallible.³⁴³ In *Girouard v. United States*, one of the few judicial opinions discussing Article VI,³⁴⁴ the Court addressed a provision of the Naturalization Act of 1906 that had been read to bar from citizenship those aliens who were unwilling to take up arms on behalf of the United States.³⁴⁵ The provision challenged by *Girouard* did not itself mention religion.³⁴⁶ Rather, it required anyone seeking citizenship to be willing to "support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic."³⁴⁷ A portion of the citizenship application form promulgated pursuant to the statute asked, "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?"³⁴⁸ *Girouard*, a Seventh Day Adventist, answered that he was not willing to do so.³⁴⁹

Upholding *Girouard's* claim, the Court said it would avoid any construction of the statute that would require anyone to "forsake his religious scruples to become a citizen."³⁵⁰ In so ruling, it drew in part on the Religious Test Clause, arguing that the Clause would have prohibited a similar provision barring the petitioner from holding public office, and that the naturalization statute similarly must be read narrowly in light of the nation's traditions, which view test oaths as "abhorrent."³⁵¹

Professor Bradley observes that the history of test oaths in the states hardly demonstrates that they were clearly viewed as "abhorrent" in every circumstance.³⁵² Beyond this, however, the reading of the Religious Test Clause I have offered suggests that the Court in *Girouard* need not—could not, really—have appealed to the Clause in service of its reading of the naturalization statute. The statute did not require those wishing to naturalize to claim or disclaim any religious faith as a condition of citizenship; indeed, new citizens take substantially the same oaths as office-holders, as the Court noted.³⁵³ Rather, it simply asked the would-be citizen whether he was able to fulfill what Congress apparently saw as a key condition of fitness for citizenship. Nothing about this smacks of the kind of religious test that the Clause actually forbids.

³⁴³ Cf. *Brown v. Allen*, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").

³⁴⁴ See Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 679.

³⁴⁵ 328 U.S. 61 (1946).

³⁴⁶ See Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596 (1907).

³⁴⁷ *Id.*

³⁴⁸ *Girouard*, 328 U.S. at 62.

³⁴⁹ See *id.*

³⁵⁰ *Id.* at 66.

³⁵¹ *Id.* at 69.

³⁵² Bradley, *supra* note 3, at 679.

³⁵³ See *Girouard*, 328 U.S. at 65.

I doubt, in fact, that the Court was right even to suggest that the Clause would have forbidden asking similar questions of putative federal public office-holders. Would it actually forbid a President from requiring that those who occupy the office of, say, Secretary of Defense be willing in theory to carry out the same actions as the nation's soldiers?³⁵⁴ Could the President not conclude that an individual who, for religious reasons, refused to take another's life under any circumstances should not direct the nation's soldiers—and therefore seek to satisfy himself that a candidate for that office had no such religious compunctions? For the reasons I have offered above, I think he clearly could undertake such an inquiry, and would not be precluded from doing so by the Religious Test Clause. The same is true of Congress's inquiry in *Girouard*, asking whether prospective citizens would be able to live up to their obligation to defend their new nation.³⁵⁵

I do not say that the decision in *Girouard* was utterly wrong. For one thing, it might have been a fair reading of the statute. More importantly, the same result might have been reached by a fair reading of the statute in light of the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or some other constitutional provision. My point is simply that the Court should not have reached its result through a strained reading of the Religious Test Clause.

A more prominent example, at least for students of the Religious Test Clause, is the order of Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit, who is also an accomplished scholar of law and religion,³⁵⁶ in *Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti*.³⁵⁷ In this case, plaintiffs demanded that Judge Noonan recuse himself from an appeal involving a racketeering action against anti-abortion protestors who were picketing an abortion clinic, apparently on the grounds that his religious beliefs (Noonan is Catholic) prevented him from impartially hearing the appeal.³⁵⁸

Judge Noonan quite rightly rejected the motion.³⁵⁹ But he took a curiously circuitous route to get there. His order does not base his decision directly on the federal judicial recusal statute,³⁶⁰ although the only substantive case cite he offers in his brief order is to a Ninth Circuit case discussing judicial recusal.³⁶¹ Instead, Judge Noonan turns the opinion into a discussion of the Religious Test Clause, arguing that any

³⁵⁴ Cf. Volokh, *supra* note 299 (observing that Presidents often condition executive branch appointments on a nominee's policy views or deeply held beliefs, in ways that would run afoul of a broadly interpreted Religious Test Clause).

³⁵⁵ See *Girouard*, 328 U.S. at 61.

³⁵⁶ See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., *THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM* (1998).

³⁵⁷ 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995).

³⁵⁸ *Id.*

³⁵⁹ *Id.*

³⁶⁰ See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).

³⁶¹ See *Codispoti*, 69 F.3d at 400 (citing *Moideen v. Gillespie*, 55 F.3d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1995)).

contention that he recuse himself because of strongly-held religious beliefs "stands in conflict with the principle embedded in Article VI."³⁶² Judge Noonan argues that, to the extent the motion is based on the fact that his beliefs are "fervently-held," it is impossible to arrive at an objective measurement of that standard: "No thermometer exists for measuring the heatedness of a religious belief objectively. Either religious belief disqualifies or it does not. Under Article VI it does not."³⁶³ He concludes by rejecting the argument that the disqualification motion would be no less objectionable if it would apply only in abortion cases, since such a "proviso effectively imposes a religious test on the federal judiciary."³⁶⁴

For the reasons I have offered, Judge Noonan cannot be right. Of course an individual judge's religious beliefs *may* (or may not) disqualify him from hearing and deciding a case, just as any opinion or belief that rises to the level at which a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" may disqualify him.³⁶⁵ Not every case rises to this level, and certainly not every instance of religious belief, even one that touches on an issue before the court, does. But the Religious Test Clause does not preclude judges or parties from raising this issue simply because religion is involved. The Clause simply prohibits a particular, and *formal*, use of religious test oaths as a barrier to public office. It does not suggest that religion is always and everywhere irrelevant to fitness for office, or to a judge's ability to sit in a given case, as both sitting justices³⁶⁶ and scholars³⁶⁷ have recognized. Judge Noonan appears to have invoked the Religious Test Clause in search of a more comprehensive ruling precluding future parties even from raising the question of disqualification.³⁶⁸ But he is still mistaken: the Religious Test Clause of Article VI "embed[s]" a rule, not a "principle."³⁶⁹

I save for last the Supreme Court's decision in *Torcaso v. Watkins*,³⁷⁰ the Court's most important and complete statement about the Religious Test Clause. Given that the Court was ruling on a *state* appointment,³⁷¹ the Religious Test Clause was technically unavailable to it, because that provision only applies to federal office-holders.³⁷² The Court nevertheless employed the history of Article VI, and its abhorrence of test oaths, in striking down the state test oath at issue in that case as a violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.³⁷³

³⁶² *Id.*

³⁶³ *Id.*

³⁶⁴ *Id.* at 401.

³⁶⁵ 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).

³⁶⁶ See, e.g., Scalia, *Religion*, *supra* note 292.

³⁶⁷ See, e.g., Garvey & Coney, *supra* note 153.

³⁶⁸ See *Codispoti*, 69 F.3d at 400.

³⁶⁹ *Contra id.*

³⁷⁰ 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

³⁷¹ See *id.* at 489.

³⁷² See *supra* note 271.

³⁷³ See *Torcaso*, 367 U.S. at 490–96.

I have no particular objection to this ruling, save perhaps for its unduly romantic and brief history (somewhat characteristic of the Court's approach to history during this era³⁷⁴) of the Religious Test Clause itself. But *Torcaso* forms a nice companion to *Codispoti*, and the two form a nice ending to this section. Both serve as useful reminders that a legal system without an expansive Religious Test Clause is not without other tools to achieve similar ends where they are appropriate. As Professor Tribe remarked long ago now, in some cases the Religion Clauses themselves will do the work that a penumbral Religious Test Clause would.³⁷⁵ Thus, a similar result could have been reached in *Torcaso* through the Religion Clauses without any need to rehearse the history of the Religious Test Clause. Similarly, whatever his intent, Judge Noonan's opinion does not lead to the conclusion that the recusal statute is inapplicable to cases involving judges' decisions whether to sit or not in a given case where their religious beliefs might be relevant.³⁷⁶ Rather, it reminds us that the recusal statute in fact offers a finer-edged tool than the Religious Test Clause to distinguish between those cases that genuinely affect a judge's ability to sit impartially in a case and those that do not. Finally, as I have been at some pains to urge, the political process itself is the first and best remedy to the misuse of religion by and with regard to public officials—including the use of religion in and around the Roberts and Miers nominations themselves.

In sum, an expansive reading of the Religious Test Clause is as unnecessary as it is unsound. Ultimately, a narrow reading of the Religious Test Clause, one that confines it to the precise evil it was aimed at, is not only the reading compelled by the text, history, and structure of the Constitution; it is also the best and wisest reading of that provision.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ETIQUETTE OF RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS

A. Introduction

The previous part has argued, in effect, that the Religious Test Clause has little to say about the use of religion and religious rhetoric in and around judicial nominations. Apart from what little work, if any, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment might do here, the broader point is that, for the most part, we can simply take the Constitution out of the equation altogether in this context. For those who believe the Constitution's footprint ought not be so large that it leaves us with

³⁷⁴ For the classic contemporary criticism of the Court's treatment of history in its mid-twentieth century church-state opinions, see Alfred H. Kelly, *Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair*, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 137–42.

³⁷⁵ See TRIBE, *supra* note 4, at 1155 n.1.

³⁷⁶ See *Codispoti*, 69 F.3d at 399.

little room to work out these issues in the political arena, with what little wisdom we as a people can muster, this should not be a bad thing.

Just because constitutional law runs out before this point, however, that does not mean that our sense of constitutional propriety should as well. Even if the Religious Test Clause itself does not speak to the use of religion in the discourse surrounding the nomination and confirmation of federal judges, it still ought to be possible for us to come up with *some* principles that might productively govern our discussion of religion in such circumstances. Call it "constitutional etiquette," if you will.³⁷⁷ Or, to put it slightly differently, call it the "etiquette of pluralism." Whatever the label, the point is the same. The Constitution, or at least the Religious Test Clause, does not preclude the use of religion as a qualifying or disqualifying factor for judicial nominees, or the employment of religion and religious rhetoric in discussing those nominees. But we who live under the Constitution, and who attempt every day to fulfill the promise of the society it has begotten, a society of diverse, passionately held views and of extraordinary religious pluralism, should not take that as a release from our own responsibilities. We ought to be able to craft guidelines for public discussion that provide some model of *how* to use, or evaluate the use of, religion in this context.

In this brief section, I offer five principles that might help improve the use of religion and religious rhetoric in this area, and employ them to evaluate whether or not the use of religion in the Roberts and Miers nominations lived up to what should be our guiding principles of discussion in this area.³⁷⁸ In doing so, I note that this discussion necessarily stands in the shadow of a much larger discussion concerning the role of religion and religious dialogue in a liberal democracy.³⁷⁹ That discussion concerns the question whether either the Constitution itself, or general principles of liberal democracy, "prohibit[] the use of religiously grounded arguments in public life or about public matters."³⁸⁰ Similarly, much has been written about the proper use of religious language in public discussion.³⁸¹ Very little has been written, however, specifically

³⁷⁷ As with the last time I attempted to coin a phrase to describe a new idea in constitutional law, see Horwitz, *supra* note 10, at 563 n.472, I found late in the game, well after I had patted myself on the back for my neat phrasing, that someone else had already coined the same phrase. See Alan E. Brownstein, *Prayer and Religious Expression at High School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society*, 5 NEXUS 61 (2000).

³⁷⁸ A similar, though not identical, set of guiding principles is offered by Ronald Thiemann. See RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 135–41 (1996).

³⁷⁹ The literature on this subject is voluminous. For a mere sampling, see, for example, Richard Garnett, *Religion, Division, and the First Amendment*, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1718 n.317 (2006).

³⁸⁰ *Id.* at 1718.

³⁸¹ For a small but exemplary sample of this discussion, see, for example, Theodore Y. Blumoff, *The Holocaust and Public Discourse*, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 591 (1994–95); Anthony E. Cook, *God-Talk in a Secular World*, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435 (1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, *THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS*

about the use of religious language in the narrower context of judicial nominations.³⁸² I write, then, on what is practically a blank slate, as one removed from the din of voices arguing on closely related subjects.

I want to use this fact to my advantage by acknowledging frankly that I bracket much of this larger debate. I proceed from the assumption—one that is well borne out by the evidence I have mustered above in my discussion of the recent uses of religion in the context of judicial nominations—that religion will often, perhaps inevitably, be a part of the discussion of judicial nominations and confirmations. I thus do not bother to discuss here the broader normative question of whether and when religion may enter into our public dialogue, or into the decision-making of public officials. Speaking practically, religion does, and *will*, enter into that dialogue. It does, and *will*, influence the public and private decision-making of public officials.³⁸³ We are left, then, with the question of what rules of constitutional etiquette might govern this dialogue.³⁸⁴ Thus, although this discussion surely is influenced by my reading of the broader body of literature on the role of religion in public debate, I put it largely (although not entirely) to one side here.³⁸⁵

Finally, and on a related point, let me emphasize that I do not offer these rules of etiquette in a strongly normative fashion, and do not suggest that they ought to *bind* the participants in the public debate in any strong sense. No one supposes that any rule of etiquette—what fork to use, when to open doors for others, and so on—will or should apply invariably to every situation, or that there are no occasions on which

TRIVIALIZES RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)); Eugene Garver, *Why Should Anybody Listen? The Rhetoric of Religious Argument in Democracy*, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353 (2001); Sanford Levinson, *Religious Language and the Public Square*, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)); Jay D. Wexler, *Framing the Public Square*, 91 GEO. L.J. 183, 201–06 (2002) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000)).

³⁸² See LEVINSON, *supra* note 31, at 209 (noting, for example, that Kent Greenawalt, who is, in my view, the foremost scholar writing in this area, leaves the judicial confirmation process “basically undiscussed” in his work).

³⁸³ Steven Shiffrin takes a similar approach. See Steven Shiffrin, *Religion and Democracy*, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1999); see also CARTER, *supra* note 211, at 7 (“Religion, in short, will be in politics. It cannot reasonably be kept out.”).

³⁸⁴ See Perry, *supra* note 297, at 236 n.46 (“It is not *whether* but *how* people should talk [when they bring religion into political debate]; what qualities of character and mind should they bring, or try to bring, to the task.”).

³⁸⁵ Similarly, the question of whether judges may themselves draw on religion in their decision-making is outside the scope of this article. For discussions of that question, see, for example, GREENAWALT, *supra* note 330, at 141–50; Stephen L. Carter, *The Religiously Devout Judge*, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989); Teresa S. Collett, “*The King’s Good Servant, But God’s First*”: *The Role of Religion in Judicial Decisionmaking*, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277 (2000); Scott C. Idleman, *The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking*, 91 VA. L. REV. 515 (2005).

good manners are best left unobserved. Still more, then, we should not suppose that every full-throated use of religion that violates one or another of the principles I offer below will always be inappropriate. Plain talk, bluntness, and even rudeness are sometimes valuable aspects of our public dialogue, even if at other times they retard or distort that dialogue. This is as true of religious talk as of any other kind of political talk.³⁸⁶ The principles of constitutional etiquette I offer here are not meant to turn the public arena into the equivalent of a college seminar or a debating society.³⁸⁷ I thus offer these rules of constitutional etiquette as criteria by which we can aspire to a sounder public dialogue, and against which we can assess the value and propriety of various participants in the public dialogue, and nothing more.

B. Transparency

The first principle that might govern our use of religion and religious rhetoric in the context of judicial nominations is *transparency*. That is to say, if religion is to factor into the thinking and decisions of public officials deliberating on whom to nominate and whether to confirm, it ought to do so clearly and openly. More particularly, public officials who decide privately to nominate an individual because of his or her religion, or who decide privately to support or oppose a judicial nominee because of that nominee's religion, should say so publicly.³⁸⁸ Of course, the principle of transparency is not unique to this narrow set of circumstances.³⁸⁹ But it may be particularly important in this setting, for reasons I will suggest below.

The transparency principle arguably was most crucial to, and most violated in, the case of the Miers nomination. Here, my criticisms specifically concern the conduct of the Bush administration. I do not believe that a President, or his administration,

³⁸⁶ See Scott C. Idleman, *Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics, and American Constitutionalism*, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 992 (1996) (noting "our constitutional commitment to unrestrained religious participation in law and politics, no matter how offensive or imprudent its manifestations.").

³⁸⁷ See M. Cathleen Kaveny, *Religious Claims and the Dynamics of Argument*, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 423, 428 (2001).

³⁸⁸ Although my terminology and emphasis are different, Ronald Thiemann proposes a similar principle as a subset of a proposed governing principle of "moral integrity" in religious public discourse, arguing that moral integrity entails, among other things, "consistency of speech" by public officials when speaking to different constituencies, and "consistency between speech and action." See THIEMANN, *supra* note 378, at 137 (emphasis omitted). The transparency principle is also consistent with the argument I have offered above, *see supra* note 309 and accompanying text, that religion should be permitted in public debate because, as long as many people in fact act out of religious motivation, we ought to be able to confront and discuss those views in public.

³⁸⁹ For a discussion of government transparency in somewhat different circumstances, see, for example, Gia B. Lee, *Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech*, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005).

is barred from discussing a nominee privately, including holding private discussions about that nominee with religious supporters such as Dr. Dobson. Nor do I think an administration should be unable specifically to discuss a nominee's *religion* privately with its religious supporters. But the content of those discussions should not differ materially from the discussions it is willing to hold, and the arguments it is willing to make, in public.

In the case of the Miers nomination, if the reported evidence is to be believed, the Bush administration failed this simple rule of constitutional etiquette. The administration appears to have offered one set of justifications for its nomination of Ms. Miers *publicly*, and to have offered another set of justifications—this time, an explicitly religious set of justifications—*privately*, in its discussions with Mr. Dobson and other religious supporters.³⁹⁰ Nothing prevents, or should prevent, an administration from advancing religious arguments privately with religious supporters. But it is disturbing if an administration offers one set of arguments for a nominee *publicly*, and another set of arguments—including the nominee's faith and the implications of that faith for his or her jurisprudence—through private channels.

These violations of the rule of transparency are significant for at least two quite different reasons. First, if we believe the Religious Test Clause does not apply in the context of judicial nomination rhetoric in part because we believe religion and religious reasons ought to be as welcome in the arena of public debate and decision-making as any other reasons, then failing to transparently discuss religion when it is a motivating factor does a disservice to this value. Although the government decision-maker (in this case the President) may be acting for plausible tactical reasons, he is implicitly saying by his actions that religion is shameful in public life, that it *ought* to be relegated to the sphere of private thinking and private discussion.

Second, as I have argued, the fundamental force constraining the misuse of religion in the judicial nomination context is not the Constitution. Rather, it is the simple constraining pressure of ordinary politics. A public official ought to discuss the role of religion in judicial nominations in ways that are broadly acceptable to his or her electorate; failing that, the official ought to be held accountable for the failure to do so. A violation of the rule of transparency seeks to circumvent this constraint.

If the evidence is to be believed, the Bush administration in the case of Harriet Miers was willing to use religion in selling her privately, but largely unwilling to say so publicly, and largely unwilling to bear the political cost of its seeming private conviction that her religion *was* relevant to her fitness for office.³⁹¹ This serves neither the valued and welcome role that religion ought to play in political dialogue in a liberal democracy, nor the principles of political accountability that ultimately constrain *all* publicly voiced reasons for decision-making by public officials.

³⁹⁰ See *supra* text accompanying notes 110–12.

³⁹¹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 110–14.

C. Consistency

The second rule of constitutional etiquette that should govern in this specific area is *consistency*. An argument for or against the use of religion in the context of a particular judicial nomination ought to apply consistently in the case of later nominations.³⁹² Again, this principle is not unique to the context of religious discussion, let alone the use of religion in judicial nominations. But the fact that we have been presented recently with two judicial nominations—Roberts's and Miers's—that presented mirror images of each other, with religion serving as a disqualification in the former case and as a qualification in the latter, makes this principle particularly relevant to this discussion. For purposes of the Religious Test Clause—indeed, regardless of that Clause—qualification and disqualification are obviously two sides of the same coin. One may argue that religion is relevant as a qualifying *and* a disqualifying factor, or as neither, but not that the use of religion is permissible in one case and forbidden in the other.³⁹³

Many of the voices in this debate passed the test of consistency by opposing the use of religion in either case.³⁹⁴ I have already argued that these arguments were wrong; the use of religion was permissible in both cases.³⁹⁵ But at least those arguments had the virtue of consistency. Those who had argued that religion could not be used to disadvantage a nominee they might support in the case of Roberts were willing to constrain themselves from using religion to their advantage in the case of Miers.³⁹⁶

Not every group that spoke out was as consistent. Recall the letter sent to the members of the Senate by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty during the Roberts nomination, which argued that any senator who used fervent religious belief as a disqualification for public office would violate the Religious Test Clause.³⁹⁷ One would have expected a similar outcry when the mirror image of this tactic appeared in the Miers nomination. Yet when the administration apparently sold Miers to its supporters

³⁹² Again, Thiemann arrives at a similar point, arguing that his proposed norm of moral integrity requires "integrity of principle," meaning that "[c]itizens should seek in their public lives to apply their moral principles consistently across a variety of cases." THIEMANN, *supra* note 378, at 137 (emphasis omitted).

³⁹³ For more on this point, see *supra* note 330 (considering, and ultimately rejecting, the argument that one should distinguish between religion as a qualification for public office and religion as a disqualification for public office).

³⁹⁴ See *supra* notes 160, 320 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁵ See *supra* notes 320–23 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁶ Of course, I may be too charitable in this description. Perhaps these advocates argued against the use of religion in the Roberts case because it would disadvantage a nominee they favored, and argued against the use of religion in the Miers case because it embarrassed and hamstrung the Bush administration, hurting the nomination of a nominee they actually disfavored. But given the consistency of their outward actions, I am willing to concede the compliment to them.

³⁹⁷ See Hasson letter, *supra* note 94.

privately on the basis, in part, of her faith and its relation to her likely jurisprudence, no threat letters were forthcoming. Both actions must be improper, or both must be proper. I think the Fund was wrong on the merits of that question. But if, as the Fund suggested, we *should* be concerned about “subtler form[s] of religious test[s]”³⁹⁸ when they are used as *disqualifications* for public office, we ought to be equally concerned about subtler forms of religious tests as *qualifications* for office. Thus, the Fund, at least, failed this second principle of constitutional etiquette.³⁹⁹

D. Nuance

The third principle I wish to offer here is a plea for *nuance*. Religious faith plays a profoundly important role in people’s lives, yet a profoundly complicated one. Discussions of religion in political contexts, and particularly in the context of judicial nominees—whether a nominee’s religion affects the formation of his policy views, whether those views in turn influence his capacity to fulfill his office as a judge, and whether it matters how “deeply held” those beliefs are—should account as much as possible for nuances in religious belief, and for nuances in the relationship between one’s personal religious beliefs and one’s official conduct.⁴⁰⁰ Our public discussions ought to at least attempt to capture some of the full flavor of these complications.⁴⁰¹ Both the senators raising questions about nominees’ faith in the case of the Roberts nomination and its precursors, *and* their critics, fared poorly indeed if judged by this rule of constitutional etiquette.⁴⁰² For a nation in which faith is so important to so many, in such complicated ways, this is dispiriting.

A genuinely nuanced understanding of the role of faith in a nominee’s life, had it been in evidence during the recent nominations, would have involved a greater appreciation of at least three nuances involved in the relationship between religion and official conduct.⁴⁰³ First, it would have entailed an appreciation for the nuances involved in

³⁹⁸ See *id.*

³⁹⁹ In Thiemann’s terms, as I read them, the failure to follow up on The Becket Fund’s earlier letter with an equally full-throated statement during the Miers nomination warning the President that he was acting improperly would violate the norms of consistency between speech and action, and of integrity of principle. See THIEMANN, *supra* note 378, at 137.

⁴⁰⁰ Cf. Steven D. Smith, *Augustinian Liberal*, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673, 1678 (1999).

⁴⁰¹ See Cook, *supra* note 381, at 444–47 (offering an example of how such discussions might be conducted).

⁴⁰² This point is perhaps captured best by Senator Durbin’s statement, during the Miers nomination, that asking a nominee about her faith “is a legitimate inquiry as long as it doesn’t go too far and too deep.” *The Situation Room: Harriet Miers Nomination*, *supra* note 1. The real problem, in fact, is that, having raised such questions, many of those public officials were *too* shallow in their questioning. They did not go far or deep *enough*.

⁴⁰³ The first two nuances I discuss here are thoughtfully examined in Richard W. Garnett, *Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine*, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (2004).

religious doctrine itself. For example, it was only with the Roberts nomination that public discussion really began acknowledging the potential differences in obligation between Catholic lawmakers and Catholics who interpret and enforce the law,⁴⁰⁴ let alone the different forms of obligation that may affect Catholic judges carrying out different functions in different cases.⁴⁰⁵ It is far from clear that the senators who questioned Roberts,⁴⁰⁶ let alone public commentators such as Christopher Hitchens,⁴⁰⁷ appreciated these fine distinctions.

Second, in discussing religion, we should appreciate the differences in how individuals understand, interpret, and *apply* doctrine, even in hierarchical faiths.⁴⁰⁸ To say generally that a nominee is an adherent of a particular faith may not reveal much about her own views about what this faith demands, or about which demands she is willing to obey or disobey. I suspect that some of the supporters of Miers, who assumed and stated publicly that her faith told a complete story about what sort of Justice she would be and who later soured on her as a nominee,⁴⁰⁹ did not fully appreciate this nuance.

Finally, both supporters and opponents of a judicial nominee who are intent on discussing the role of religion in evaluating that nominee's fitness should appreciate the nuances apparent in the difference between a nominee's sense of his religious beliefs and his sense of his judicial duty.⁴¹⁰ Whatever a nominee's own religious beliefs are, that individual may have a very different sense of whether and how those beliefs should affect his conduct as a judge. It is not clear that critics of nominees like Roberts fully understood this fact. Nor is it clear that the religious supporters of nominees like Miers fully appreciated this distinction either. In sum, a lack of appreciation for

⁴⁰⁴ See, e.g., CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE (2002), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021124_politica_en.html; Posting of Ramesh Ponnuru to The Corner, <http://corner.nationalreview.com> (November 4, 2005, 14:11 EST).

⁴⁰⁵ See, e.g., John H. Garvey, *The Pope's Submarine*, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 (1993); Garvey & Coney, *supra* note 153, at 317–31; Stephen Bainbridge, *Judges' Faith Does Matter*, BELIEFNET, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story_17839.html; Frank-Paul Sampino, *The Moral and Legal Obligations of Catholic Judges*, DAPPLED THINGS, Lent/Easter 2006, <http://www.dappledthings.org/lent06/essay03.php> (suggesting that “confusion about the moral obligations of Catholic judges is understandable,” because the Church has offered no clear answers on this point and “there has been precious little discussion of this problem even among lay Catholic intellectuals” (emphasis omitted)).

⁴⁰⁶ See *supra* notes 75, 79–80, 86–90 and accompanying text.

⁴⁰⁷ See Hitchens, *supra* note 76.

⁴⁰⁸ See, e.g., *Thomas v. Review Bd.*, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981); Garvey & Coney, *supra* note 153, at 344–47; Horwitz, *supra* note 303, at 10.

⁴⁰⁹ See *supra* notes 103–22 and accompanying text.

⁴¹⁰ For general discussion, see, for example, GREENAWALT, *supra* note 330, at 141–50; MICHAEL J. PERRY, *RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES* 102–04 (1997); Carter, *supra* note 385.

the principle of nuance in discussing the religious beliefs of judicial nominees can afflict both critics and supporters of a nominee who holds a particular faith.

E. Genuine Respect

The fourth principle that should guide the public discussion of religion where judicial nominees are concerned may prove slightly more controversial, although it sounds attractive enough: the principle of *genuine respect* for religion.⁴¹¹ One of the reasons that religion should not be excluded from public discussion, or from the public square more broadly, is that to do so fails to show genuine respect for the vital role of religion in people's lives, and for all that it contributes to our public dialogue.⁴¹² Such policies of exclusion are disrespectful to the religious individuals who make up a substantial part of the polity, and who wish to participate equally in our political dialogue without being constrained to remain silent about those values and motivations that drive them the most deeply. To ask them to do so is more than disrespectful; it is a form of violence. As Michael Perry has observed, asking a religious individual to bracket her religious convictions as a price of entry into political discussion is the same as asking her "to bracket—to annihilate—essential aspects of [her] very self."⁴¹³ Thus, genuine respect for religion involves welcoming it into the terms of debate in the public square, including discussions of judicial nominees, whether by office-holders or by members of the broader public.

But it is no more respectful of religion's role, its importance, to demand a sanitized version of public discussion of religion, one that always praises and never critiques. If religion is relegated to little more than "superficial use[s] of God, as a nice bow to wrap around the public official's package of promises,"⁴¹⁴ that can hardly be called real respect. If religion is to enter into public dialogue, it is appropriate to understand and expect that some criticism—hopefully thoughtful, but quite possibly stringent nonetheless—will be mixed in with the praise.

⁴¹¹ For a somewhat different take on the role of respect in crafting principles for sound inclusion of religion in public dialogue, see THIEMANN, *supra* note 378, at 146–47. For a valuable gloss on Thiemann's proposal, see Kaveny, *supra* note 387, 431–32.

⁴¹² See generally Horwitz, *supra* note 303, at 48–53; John A. Coleman, *Public Religion and Religion in Public*, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 279 (2001). I should make clear that, in pointing to the ways in which religion may contribute to our politics, I am not suggesting that there are not other, less pragmatic and more intrinsic reasons to value religion. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, *An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom*, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996) (arguing that we protect religion because it is important in its own right); Horwitz, *supra* note 303, at 53–56 (offering reasons to protect religion as core self-expression, as compulsion, and for its own intrinsic value).

⁴¹³ MICHAEL PERRY, *MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY* 181–82 (1988).

⁴¹⁴ Cook, *supra* note 381, at 438.

The failure fully to observe this principle of genuine respect is exemplified by at least one of the arguments raised during the Roberts nomination, in this case by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.⁴¹⁵ The Fund concluded its letter to the members of the United States Senate, warning them of disciplinary action should they engage in “subtle[]” religious tests, by writing that

not every mention of religion is improper. Religion, like ethnicity or race, is a natural part of one’s background and may be referred to as naturally—and as respectfully—as those other things are. . . . But using fervent religious faith, of any tradition, as itself a disqualification for public office is unconstitutional.⁴¹⁶

As I read the letter, the Fund seems to suggest that it is permissible to mention religion in public discussion only if that discussion is lightly and trivially complimentary.⁴¹⁷ It seems to suggest that any non-anodyne, *critical* mention of religion is impermissible.⁴¹⁸ That is only a seeming show of respect; it is not *genuine* respect. If anything, this rule of dialogue seems to me to be closer to condescension than to genuine respect.

Rather, a genuinely respectful treatment of religion in the public square, one that takes religion seriously, as we should, means that religious views, and the policy or jurisprudential conclusions that they may imply, ought to be entitled to be subjected to praise *and* criticism. Religion is a profound force in public life, and like any powerful force, there is no reason to think it may not be harmful as well as beneficial.⁴¹⁹ Thus, The Becket Fund was wrong: religion is *not* like ethnicity or race.⁴²⁰ For these purposes, it more closely resembles ideology, politics, and other strongly held beliefs. As with those factors, we should agree that religion may quite properly, as a price

⁴¹⁵ See Hasson letter, *supra* note 94. If I have focused unduly on The Becket Fund’s letter in this Article, it is not a sign of enmity or disrespect. In fact, I have ties of friendship to the Fund and applaud much of its work on behalf of religious claimants. My criticisms of the Fund’s letter to the members of the Senate reflect honest disagreement with the arguments made there, not lack of respect for the work the Fund does.

⁴¹⁶ *Id.*

⁴¹⁷ *See id.*

⁴¹⁸ *See id.*

⁴¹⁹ Although I disagree with many of her other claims, I think this point is carefully and fully substantiated by Marci Hamilton in her recent book. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, *GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW* (2005); see also Blumoff, *supra* note 381, at 623–24; William P. Marshall, *The Culture of Belief and the Politics of Religion*, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 453, 462 (2000); William P. Marshall, *The Other Side of Religion*, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993); William P. Marshall, *Religion As Ideas: Religion As Identity*, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 388–91 (1996). To say that religion, or religious individuals or groups, may be harmful, however, is not to say that they are *uniquely* harmful. See CARTER, *supra* note 211, at 19, 21.

⁴²⁰ *Contra* Hasson Letter, *supra* note 94.

of admission to the public square, be equally subject to both praise and honest and (hopefully) thoughtful criticism. It should be recognized for both its benefits and its dangers.⁴²¹ Under a principle of genuine respect, the President, senators, and public commentators were fully entitled to praise judicial nominees such as Roberts and Miers for the moral character their faiths suggested. But they were also fully entitled, if they believed it was appropriate, to criticize the effects those faiths might have on the soundness of their judicial views.⁴²²

F. Humility

Finally, in thinking about how each of us can engage in religious talk in the public square, or how those of us who are non-religious can engage *with* religious ideas in the public square, we might keep in mind a virtue that one might hope always characterizes our efforts to enter public dialogue: that of humility.⁴²³ Humility does not counsel us to refrain from any religious or secular judgments at all, or to disengage from the public square altogether. But it reminds us that we are, each of us, “finite and sinful men, contending against others who are equally finite and equally sinful.”⁴²⁴

Humility may be the greatest virtue anyone can bring to public debate, and the most difficult to attain. Certainly it may be the most difficult to evaluate—in ourselves as well as others. Nevertheless, it is well worth including in any sound set of principles of etiquette for the discussion of religion in the judicial nomination process. And it is a virtue that applies alike to the religious and the non-religious, to those who promote

⁴²¹ See KRAMNICK & MOORE, *supra* note 190, at 169 (“Religious leaders are free to say whatever they like in this country and to enter politics if they like. There are very few religious actions in politics that are unconstitutional. There are simply religious actions that are wise and unwise, generous and ungenerous, informed and uninformed.”).

⁴²² As Michael Perry notes, applying a principle of genuine respect to the use of religion in public debate is not only good for the polity at large; it may also be good for the religious believer. See PERRY, *supra* note 413, at 183 (“We [who bring religion into public political argument] must be willing to let our convictions be tested in ecumenical dialogue with others who do not share them. We must let ourselves be tested, in ecumenical dialogue, by convictions we do not share. We must, in short, resist the temptations of infallibilism.”).

⁴²³ I am humbly indebted to Joel Nichols for reminding me of the importance of this virtue.

⁴²⁴ Thomas C. Berg, *Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr*, 73 N.C.L. REV. 1567, 1606 (1995) (quoting Reinhold Niebuhr, *Zeal Without Knowledge*, in BEYOND TRAGEDY: ESSAYS ON THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 246–47 (1937)). Professor Berg argues that a Niebuhrian approach to the question of religious participation in lawmaking might lead to a requirement that religious individuals participating in politics “present . . . arguments in accessible . . . terms”—that is, that they present their arguments in terms that can be understood by others outside their faith tradition. *Id.* at 1620. I am not sure that humility requires any such thing; rather, it requires those who offer public arguments to think searchingly and self-critically about *any* arguments they offer, whether secular or religious in nature, without limiting the kinds of arguments they can make.

nominees on the basis of their faith and to those who raise questions about particular nominees based on their faith.

For a person who wishes to bring his faith to the task of judging, or who wishes to promote a nominee on the basis of his faith, humility requires that he remember that he “see[s] through a glass, darkly,”⁴²⁵ and that a nominee’s effort to live his faith through judicial office will be subject to “his own limits, [and] the difficulty in applying general religious truths to complex real-world problems.”⁴²⁶ For those who would criticize a nominee’s faith, or argue that the nominee’s “deeply held beliefs” would prevent him from serving the judicial office with honor, humility requires that these critics remember that things are not always as simple or as dire as they seem; that a religious nominee may act far differently than a non-religious critic is eager to assume; and that the would-be critic of such a nominee needs to proceed with caution, understanding that the nominee’s religious faith, and the manner in which he attempts to live that faith, may be far more nuanced than the critic may have initially assumed.

Nothing in the principle of humility, I think, means that a nominee may not be promoted or criticized, selected or voted against, on the basis of his faith. But it reminds us that in our “world of multi-lingual discourse,” in which both religious and non-religious individuals engage each other in the public square, we ought always to be conscious of our own limits, and strive to make our arguments with “humility and tolerance.”⁴²⁷

CONCLUSION: RELIGION, DIVISION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ETIQUETTE

In this contribution, I have suggested that the mirror-image versions of the use of religion in judicial nominations that we witnessed in the Roberts and Miers nominations provide us with a fruitful opportunity to re-examine the scope of the Religious Test Clause. I have argued that while the force of the Clause is deep, its footprint is small, its scope limited. Properly read, it is confined to a narrow, now largely abandoned, set of circumstances in which government imposes *formal* test oaths, or their equivalent, requiring public office-holders to swear allegiance to or observe a particular faith, or a particular set of religious tenets and practices, or requires them to swear an oath disclaiming a faith or a set of religious tenets and practices. And that is all it does. Past this point the writ of the Religious Test Clause does not run.

Thus, contrary to the loudest voices in the debate surrounding the Roberts and Miers nominations, the President was fully entitled to nominate and support Miers on the basis of her faith, and the members of the Senate would have been fully entitled

⁴²⁵ 1 *Corinthians* 13:12 (King James).

⁴²⁶ Berg, *supra* note 424, at 1624.

⁴²⁷ Daniel O. Conkle, *Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America*, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 337, 368 (1995–96).

to question and oppose Roberts on the basis of his faith. If there are any remedies for this state of affairs, they must lie in the political process itself.⁴²⁸

With the question of religion in judicial nominations thus placed largely outside the writ of the Constitution, I have suggested that we might nevertheless craft rules of “constitutional etiquette” to govern the ways in which we discuss religion in such contexts, and have offered five such principles: principles of *transparency*, *consistency*, *nuance*, *genuine respect*, and *humility*.

Of course, there is no guarantee that we can properly formulate the rules that ought to govern our discourse when religion enters the lists of public debate, whether in the context of judicial nominations or elsewhere—let alone that, even if we could come up with such a list of rules, anyone would observe it. The evidence I have offered from the Roberts and Miers nominations and their predecessors suggests that we regularly fail to pass even the most basic tests when we seek to hold such conversations.⁴²⁹ One response to this state of affairs might be despair.⁴³⁰ We might react by suggesting that we ought to shut up entirely—an approach that we seem to have opted for by default during the nomination of Samuel Alito—or to limit ourselves to talking only in terms of generally available liberal dialogue.

Neither of these options is really satisfactory. The latter option, which simply excludes distinctly religious arguments from public dialogue, is troubling because it ignores the important role that religion plays in public dialogue and public action, and disservices those whom such a requirement might force from the public square altogether.⁴³¹ The former option has its evident merits.⁴³² But it too ignores the profound importance of religion to democratic dialogue. And it is, finally, unrealistic: as the Roberts and Miers nominations suggest, this kind of talk is inevitable. It is better,

⁴²⁸ See Idleman, *supra* note 386, at 1031 (“The Constitution ultimately entrusts We the People, whether directly or by our representatives, with the final responsibility of judging the propriety and merit of religious activism in the political sphere, no matter how unseemly or unwarranted that activism may be.”).

⁴²⁹ Cf. Wexler, *supra* note 381, at 205 (“It may be unfair and un-American to craft a procedural bar to religious arguments in the public square, but that does not necessarily mean that lifting the bar will result in a public discourse that is substantively any better than the one we have now.”).

⁴³⁰ Cf. LEVINSON, *supra* note 31, at 231–32 (“What is interesting is not whether law and morality are inevitably and inextricably connected in the practical doing of constitutional analysis, for surely the answer is yes, but how we come to terms with this fact on those occasions when it is most important to state the fundamental creed of our constitutional order, such as confirmation ceremonies. Generally speaking, I think we do a fairly terrible job of it. A process that leads men and women of undoubted intelligence and integrity to say things that they cannot possibly wish to have represented as their genuine reflections on complex and important matters scarcely provokes admiration.”).

⁴³¹ CARTER, *supra* note 211, at 2.

⁴³² Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, *TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS* § 7, at 189 (C.K. Ogden ed. & trans., 1922) (“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”).

then, that we at least begin the task of attempting to develop and encourage some set of meaningful rules, or etiquette, for talking about religion in a useful way in the public square.

Allow me to conclude with the theme of this collection of articles: religion and division. The rules of etiquette I have suggested will not eliminate the potentially divisive nature of religion in a pluralistic society. In particular, if treating religion with *genuine* respect means subjecting it to criticism as well as praise, it is possible that the approach I have suggested—one in which the Constitution bars nothing from discussion, in which religion is subject to wise or unwise invocation and subject to wise or unwise attack, and we have only the rules of constitutional dialogue and the constraining force of politics to guide us—would ultimately produce *more* division, rather than less.

In my view, though, at least in the realm of the public and political dialogue in which we all engage, differences and divisions concerning religion are simply inevitable, as they are on any other important topic.⁴³³ And so they should be, if we are to have discussions that are worth our time. If we can nevertheless encourage that public dialogue to include religion within the scope of the terms of debate, while doing so in a way that is at least somewhat more transparent, consistent, nuanced, genuinely respectful, and humble than is currently the case, we may find that we are far better off. Our discussions will be less anodyne but also less antiseptic, less polite but richer and more honest. In those perhaps Utopian circumstances, a little more division will be a very acceptable price to pay for a lot more meaningful discussion.

⁴³³ See, e.g., Garnett, *supra* note 379, at 1724.