Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil-piercing. However, neither absolutism nor marginalism is inevitable. Reform can be sweeping and yet maintain fidelity to the core idea of limited liability. The essential problem is one of financing. This Article stakes a middle ground in the debate: liability should be limited against all creditors, but cost externalization to tort creditors can be substantially minimized, if not eliminated, through mandatory bonding that in the aggregate capitalizes a compensation fund. A bond would be minimally burdensome on individual firms, but business enterprise is made to bear risk more fully. Importantly, bonded limited liability is practically administrable and politically feasible. The idea is based on well developed intellectual foundations of enterprise liability and risk retention. This scheme does not substantially undermine the efficiency of limited liability since the rule is preserved, but it promotes equity and justice.