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# A Study of Civil Disorder in Detroit

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Civil disorder is defined by Bowen and Massoti[1] as violence directed against the people or property which are the representations or agents of the established political or civil order. Riots can be a form of civil disorder distinguishable from revolutions or *coups d'etat* in that they are spontaneous, disorganized, unplanned, and are not attempts to overthrow or to seize state power.

The history of such outbursts in the United States is the history of the conflict between those ethnic and religious groups which first held the land and those which came later to claim their stake in it. Mob violence in which Negroes and whites are the antagonists has been of two types. The first is the white-dominated, black-body-oriented riot which began following World War I, in which white mobs responded to the threat of black competition by direct assault with intent to murder or mutilate. The Detroit riot of 1943 is a case in point, although Negroes who were recent migrants to this city fought back. The riots of the sixties on the other hand have been black-dominated and white-property-oriented, and assaults upon persons have been infrequent. Beginning with the Watts riot of 1964, a riot ideology has spread across the land to every northern city with a large Negro population. Tomlinson[2] was the first to predict this epidemic and his prophecy that black rioting in American cities would inexorably have to run its course was astonishingly correct.

Attempts to explain black rioting in the sixties have varied from the "mad dog," "hoodlum" hypotheses of the conservative right, to the revolutionary ideology of the new left emphasizing the moral supremacy and courage of those who take to the streets to oppose exploitation and oppression.

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1. D. BOWEN & L. MASSOTI, CIVIL VIOLENCE: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW (1968).

2. Tomlinson, *The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes*, 2 AMER. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (March-April, 1968).

The psychological states which are proposed as precursors for street violence have been described on a spectrum from hopelessness, apathy, and despair, to the exhilaration of rising expectations and emerging self-esteem. These unitary points of view so obviously dependent upon the political persuasion and belief system of the observer have been less than objective, even among academicians who have displayed a remarkable tendency to become emotionally over-involved in a process which they were expected to study with some scientific detachment. It is difficult, however, to be dispassionate about violence whether one is throwing rocks through store windows or attempting to understand its seeming irrationality at scientific meetings.

Political science and sociological models for civil disorder have stressed the purposive behavior of the mob and the relationship of civil disorder to a general movement with political, economic, and psychological goals. Thus the rising expectation, relative deprivation model conceptualizes civil disorder in this decade as resulting from real progress with concomitant hopefulness but a sense of distance between either the real and ideal or the Negro and white as regards affluence and life style. According to Davies,[3] when an economic downturn occurs following a period of progress and hope, impatience becomes greater and behavior more extreme.

Another theory relates civil disorder to the absence of institutionalized channels for the expression of grievances and to feelings of political impotence; the inability to control or even influence those vital governmental decisions which affect one's life. Street violence is then seen as a form of expressive communication in which dissent and protest are dramatically acted out in an effort to alter a social system which the mob deems intolerable. Spiegel[4] has described the dynamics of the riot as communication. According to Spiegel, there are four social conditions which usually precede urban riots. The first is a severe conflict of values or the failure to apply egalitarian values to all ethnic groups. The second is the existence of a "hostile belief system" in the minds of an aggrieved group as among the Detroit arrestees toward merchants and the police. The third precondition is a failure of communication between the hostile and the dominant group as exemplified by the notion that all rioters are hoodlums, or the inability to acknowledge the frustration, deprivation, and inequalities of ghetto life.

3. Davies, *Toward a Theory of Revolution,* 27 AMER. SOCIOL. REV. (Feb., 1962).

4. Spiegel, *The Nature of the Riot Process,* PSYCHIATRIC OPINION (June, 1968).

Finally, there is a failure of social control. It becomes a police matter, although police do not have the power to correct the conditions which underlie a riot. The police may then under or overcontrol, leading to an expansion of the riot. The riot then begins with a precipitating incident, perhaps a brutal arrest or some act which confirms the hostile belief system of the aggrieved group. The second phase occurs when a crowd gathers and a confrontation results between police and citizens. The riot may die or escalate here dependent upon police behavior or the provocative presence of militants who exhort the mob to further action. Phase three, the "Roman Holiday," develops if police action is ineffective and here the participants are youths, according to Spiegel, who in a state of angry intoxication, taunt the police, burn stores with molotov cocktails, and set the stage for looting. This "Roman Holiday" may then progress to an all-out war between militants and police, National Guard, and federal troops. Civil disorder in Detroit was a classic example of Spiegel's general system theory of riot evolution and mob interaction with counter-riot forces.

The Detroit riot began in the early hours of Sunday morning, July 23, 1967, following a routine raid on a "blind pig." As the arrested were being escorted to paddy wagons, the onlooking night people became unruly and berated the police, accusing them of brutality. By 5:00 a.m., a large crowd had gathered and, after exhortations by various members, it suddenly became unified and swept up Twelfth Street breaking store windows and looting. There were only 193 patrolmen on the streets at that time, a minimum force allocated to a period in which an outbreak of civil disorder was deemed highly unlikely. By 8:30 a.m., the riot-trained mobile task force was on duty and was sent to the area. By 10:00 a.m., these units were recalled because their presence was considered to be provocative and a lull occurred during which crowds wandered without direction exchanging rumors and shouting abusive epithets at the police. Just before noon United States Congressman John Conyers together with some well-known Negro clergymen attempted to disperse the crowd, only to be shouted down. Riot control techniques utilizing restraint combined with an imperviousness to the goading of the crowd (so highly successful in the aborted Kercheval Street riot of the year before) could not defuse the mob. A sweep was tried, but the police were so few in number and the mob so large that the tactic was utterly ineffective. Looting began anew followed by arson while the police stood passively by

powerless to control a surging, heedless mob of nearly five thousand people running from one side of Twelfth Street to the other as in a wild carnival orgy. Later it was said that a field decision was made not to fire upon looters because of the presence of so many women and children and in order not to arouse even greater violence. Deputy Police Commissioner Hubert Locke was later to state that "human life was given priority over property," evidently in the hope that avoiding a massive confrontation with shooting would allow the riot process to run its course without escalation. The enforced passivity of the police under these circumstances must have had its psychological effects upon their later behavior. Policemen are not robots and although professionalism dictates that personal feeling never interfere with proper conduct, the fear and rage building in those early riot hours must have been expressed in a variety of ways after prolonged exposure to danger and sleep deprivation. Hatred and anxiety usually suppressed in the cool civility of day-to-day conduct broke through in vulnerable officers although their number was considered to be small. According to Locke, the crucial time occurred somewhere between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, perhaps when fatigue was greatest and impulse control accordingly diminished.

Following the pattern of previous civil disturbances, the violence of the second night of the riot exceeded that of the first. Sniper fire was reported by police and National Guardsmen, and fire stations and police posts were said to be under attack. Arsonists set twice as many fires that night as they had on Sunday.

Monday night and through the succeeding three days the riot settled into a grim war between rioters and arsonists on the one hand and police, the National Guard, and federal troops on the other. Forty-three deaths, predominantly Negro, resulted from that awful carnage together with an estimated sixty-four million dollars in property damage. Seventy-two hundred men, women and children were arrested and detained in jails, state and federal prisons, bath-houses, garages, and buses.

Detroit did not anticipate its burning. Unlike Newark and Watts, it had a progressive mayor sensitive to racial injustice, and innovative in the construction of model programs to rehabilitate the inner city. Of all the large northern cities, Detroit had a reputation as a place where the Negro could make it. Ghettoes as they could be found in Newark or Chicago were said not to exist in Detroit. Negroes were

scattered widely over the city, often in pleasant, solid brick homes in attractive neighborhoods. J. A. Lukas[5] reported in the *New York Times* that "Detroit has no slums to match New York's Harlem or Bedford Stuyvesant, Chicago's southside or Cleveland's Hough section." Attempting to describe the area in which the riot began, Lukas said, "Even by Detroit's standards, 12th Street and the West side neighborhood around it are several notches up the pole."

Relationships between Detroit Negroes and city government were said to be among the most harmonious in the urban North. A quotation from an article[6] by the distinguished urbanologist, D. P. Moynihan, is illustrative:

> Detroit had everything the Great Society could wish for a municipality. A splendid mayor and a fine governor. A high paying and, thanks to the fiscal policies of the national government, a booming industry, civilized by and associated with the handsdown leading liberal trade union of the world.
>
> Moreover, it was a city whose Negro residents had every reason to be proud of the position they held in the economy and government of the area. With two able and promising Negro congressmen, Detroit, at the time the rioting broke out, actually had one-half the Negro membership of the House of Representatives. Relations between the Negro community and City Hall could hardly have been better. Detroit Negroes held powerful positions throughout the city administration, and to cap matters, the city was equipped with the very model of a summer task force, with a solid program and a 24-hour watch to avert violence.

All of this was true but there were other, less favorable forces operating in Detroit that summer whose peace disturbing potential went unrecognized by its citizenry. Rapport between police and Negroes left much to be desired despite community relations programs and the presence of a capable Negro clergyman as an assistant commissioner. The killing of a Negro prostitute, in 1963, by a police officer attempting to make an arrest still had its effect four years later and its memory was reactivated by the unsolved murder of another prostitute in the spring of 1967, a murder for which the police were held culpable by some in the Negro community. Negroes were so sensitive to the issue

5. Lukas, *Whitey Hasn't Got the Message*, N. Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1967 (Magazine).
6. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 7, 1967 (Magazine).

of police brutality that the *Michigan Chronicle*, a black newspaper, employed a reporter solely to document instances of verbal or physical abuse of black people by police officers.

Separation between Negroes and whites both in residential and interactional terms was also widening. Unpublished research reported in the *Detroit Free Press* by sociologist Ralph Smith[7] of Eastern Michigan University demonstrated a pattern of increasing social distance between white and Negro citizens of the Detroit metropolitan area. Segregated housing and social insularity were correlated so that little inter-racial social contact occurred. Acquisition of the data began in 1965, and its analysis contradicted a persisting myth that integration was progressing in this city at a rate exceeding that of any other community in the country.

The findings of the Transportation and Land Use Study conducted by Irving Rubin also indicated that all was not well.[8] The white population of Detroit was found to be considerably older than the Negro, further evidence of young white exodus to the suburbs and accelerating separation. Little difference was discovered between white and Negro income for those people living within the city limits, but marked disparities were noted between suburban white income and Detroit Negro and white income. The most impressive statistic was the comparison between the median income for whites in the three county area surrounding Detroit and the income for Negroes. According to Rubin, "[m]edian income of Detroit area Negro families in 1950 was 79 percent that of white families. By 1960 it had declined to 61 percent. In 1965 it was 62 percent."

A study of unemployment in the inner city by Helling, Faber, and Isajiw[9] was completed a few months prior to the riot and actually involved a part of the riot area and sections of the city contiguous to it. They confirmed Rubin's finding that young whites are deserting the city while older retired whites remain. On the other hand, the city for the Negro becomes a place of permanent residence and he, for a multitude of reasons, does not have comparable mobility. Among the

7. Detroit Free Press, Sept. 10, 1967.
8. The Transportation and Land Use Study was conducted by the University of Michigan in 1965 and 1966, under the direction of Irving Rubin. Its purposes were the acquisition of data on the social, economic and demographic characteristics of a three county metropolitan area, together with information about all travel behavior within the area on any given day. The data is to be used in expressway and other urban planning.
9. HELLING, FAVER & ISAJIW, UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INNER CITY CODE AREA (1967).

more important information supplied by this study was the high un-
employment rate of Negro males between `14 and 24 (21 percent)
and the relatively low (five percent) rate for white males in the same
age group. More than twice as many Negroes as whites were found
to be receiving public aid. Despite substantially the same level of edu-
cation, many more whites than Negroes in the sample were in pro-
fessional, managerial, or clerk-sales occupations. Occupational mobility
for Negro males was restricted to blue collar jobs while females were
more mobile into white collar positions. Entry into the middle-class
for Negro families in this geographical area was dependent upon the
upward mobility of the female, unlike suburban white families where
achievement opportunities for males allowed them to earn this dis-
tinction.

Finally, white businesses such as groceries, credit furniture stores,
dry cleaners, drug stores, and pawn shops, many with the familiar
steel gates to protect windows, could be found on main thoroughfares
in predominantly black sections. These are the establishments which
Kenneth Clark[10] accused of keeping Negroes in economic serfdom,
and which black nationalist leaders depict as the agents of an oppres-
sive white colonialism. Black civil disorder in every major American
city has been characterized by attacks upon these establishments and
Detroit was no exception.

Despite racial distancing and growing Negro animosity toward po-
lice and merchants, white Detroit in the period immediately preceding
the riot had a self-image as an enlightened, socially conscious com-
munity with reasonably decent housing and well compensated em-
ployment available to those who wanted to work. The events of the
last week in July, 1967, came as an enormous and terrifying surprise
to the citizens of this city.

## METHODOLOGY

We have deemed it useful to study the Detroit riot by approaching
individual participants and determining their demographic character-
istics, political, and social attitudes and their developmental histories.
The understanding of a riot as a system would then be complemented
by some knowledge of those who were on the streets and predis-
posed to violence. Comparison of such an action group with a ran-
domly selected community sample might result in a greater compre-

10. K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965).

hension of those long-term factors which build toward violence and the construction of both public and private programs to prevent it. This was one major focus of our riot aftermath research. Another focus to be described in this paper deals with community responses to the riot.

A number of studies[11] have already defined the self-reported rioter and the arrestee in several cities across the country. He has been described as Negro, between the ages of 15 and 24, and a life-long resident of the city in which the riot occurred. His education was somewhat superior to the inner city average and economically he was on the same level as his neighbors. He was also characterized as unskilled and only intermittently employed at menial jobs. Noted also were his racial pride, his hostility toward whites, and his greater awareness of politics than those not involved in rioting. Family structure was also not significantly different from the non-activist at least as far as being brought up in a home with a father is concerned. As will be seen, the profile of the male Detroit riot arrestee is somewhat at variance with this description and in some respects dissimilar to the community from which he comes.

There are serious doubts that the arrestees fully represent those who rioted. A number of observations suggest that indeed they do not. The peak intensity arrest period occurred between 6:00 p.m. on the first day and 2:00 a.m. the following morning. Relatively few people were detained during the onset stage Sunday morning and in the following ten hours until the police and National Guard were able to mount sufficient force to move into the riot area. Additionally, the largest number of fires were set on the second night at a time when the arrest rate abruptly declined. Thus the members of the riot vanguard went unapprehended together with that segment of rioters who probably committed the more serious offenses. Finally, the number of women arrested does not accurately reflect female involvement because of the reluctance of police to place them in custody. Nevertheless the arrestees were on the streets and as close as we could come to an action group.

From a total of 7,200 who were arrested, we randomly selected a seven percent sample. Eighty-seven and seven-tenths percent of that sample was male and 12.3 percent was female; 90.3 percent was Negro

11. *See, e.g.,* REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).

and 9.7 percent was white. For the purposes of this paper, we selected from this sample only Negro males 18 and over providing us with a total of 233 subjects. Our community sample of Negroes and whites was drawn from the entire city of Detroit plus several small cities surrounded by or adjacent to Detroit. (These were Hamtramck, Highland Park, the various Grosse Pointes, and Harper Woods.) Within Detroit we sampled at triple density within the "riot area," an area which included most of the apparently riot-relevant fires.

We drew our sample primarily from a directory of all addresses (in the city of Detroit and in the additional cities mentioned above). We randomly selected about five hundred points of entry in the directory and selected up to four apparent residential addresses at each point (we selected the first, 11th, 21st and 31st address at each point, if each appeared to be residential). Having about eighteen hundred addresses, we divided our set of sampling points into (a) those within our riot area, and (b) those outside. We selected sufficient points in (a) and (b) so that, by selecting all four addresses at each point in (a) and the first two of our addresses at each point in (b), we would have five hundred addresses inside the riot area, and five hundred outside. We then randomly selected from the five hundred addresses inside the riot area, to give us addresses to add in direct proportion to those outside the riot area to provide a random sample of address pairs in the cities.

When we needed more addresses we randomly drew into our two samples, which we called (1) city-wide sample and (2) riot area supplement sample.

Since the directory was not up-to-date, we obtained additional interview addresses via a block-supplement technique. Our interviewers and race-matching technique were similar to those above.

In setting up control groups of Negro males, we sometimes used all male respondents from (2) the riot-area supplement sample, and sometimes chose from (1) the community sample. When arrestees' addresses were plotted on a map of Detroit, it was apparent that large numbers came from outside the "riot areas," as we defined them. This suggested that, with some constraints such as geographical proximity to areas of riot activity, rioters were drawn from the geographical bulk of the Negro community in Detroit. (Departures from this might make an interesting paper in itself.) For this reason, it didn't seem necessary to confine our controls to the riot area. Also, we found

as we compared interviews of riot-area respondents with those from outside that there were, for the great bulk of items, only small differences in response frequencies. The community control group finally comprised some 153 Negro males. The total community sample consisted of 850 interviews, almost evenly divided between white and black respondents. The interviewers were those with previously survey-interview experience, school-teachers from central city schools, and individuals sent by local civil rights organizations. The race of the interviewer was matched to the race of the respondent. Respondents were seen in their homes.

Our interviewing instrument covered such areas as basic demographic variables; awareness of and attitudes toward Negro leaders and institutions; feeling about community forces as storeowners, police, etc.; involvement in federal programs; attitudes toward and explanations of the riot; beliefs about the future of race relations in Detroit; and, finally, past and present family structure data. In this paper, comparisons are drawn between those who were on the streets and arrested and those Negro men from the riot area who were not arrested and presumably avoided the riot on key variables as age, region of socialization, employment, level of grievance, education, organizational affiliation, possession of white friends, past and present family structure, knowledge of political groups or leaders, and progress and hope.

White sociologists and black militants have been critical of riot research carried out by white, middle-class scientists. Their position seems to be that only Negroes can understand Negroes and that our perspective will necessarily be biased by our own social class and color. Such a white perspective probably influenced the manner in which this research was conceptualized, the selection of variables to be studied, and the methods utilized for their measurement. Our discipline biases are obvious to the reader. Our biases of language, of form and of abstraction we have tested in part by having various persons (both black and white, middle and lower-class, militant and conservative) rework, administer, interpret, and code some of our interviews. Generally it appears that the information we were able to obtain from respondents is stable, does not depend upon peculiarities of language or choice of concepts and abstractions. At least our interviews got at what we were seeking and what we report here as data.

RESULTS

*Age*

The median age of those arrestees over 18 was 24, some 17 years younger than the median age of the community riot area sample of Negro males which was 41. Not surprisingly, youth was a significant factor in determining who would be on the streets and, perhaps, who the police would be most likely to arrest.

*Marital Status*

The arrestees were also significantly less married than the controls, 39.2 percent as contrasted with 61.4 percent. Naturally their youth would be expected to influence their marriage rate.

TABLE 1

MARITAL STATUS

|  | Arrestees | Riot Area Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Married.............................. | 39.2% | 61.4% |
| Single............................... | 46.5% | 19.0% |
| Divorced............................. | 3.4% | 5.9% |
| Separated............................ | 9.0% | 7.8% |
| Widowed............................. | 1.7% | 3.9% |

However, even when age was controlled, the arrestees were still discovered to be significantly more disposed to remain in the single state.

*Employment*

Unemployment rates of 16 percent for the arrestees and 7.2 percent for community males appear to be significantly different. When age is controlled, however, unemployment rates are very much the same in the 30 to 49 age group but slightly higher for the arrestees in the 20 to 29 age group. Thirteen and seven-tenths percent of the arrestees were students, one-half of whom were working full or part-time while only 1.7 percent of the riot area Negroes were still in school.

TABLE 2

EMPLOYMENT

|  | Arrestees | Riot Area Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Employed............................ | 70.3% | 82.4% |
| Unemployed.......................... | 16.0% | 7.2% |
| Retired............................. | 0% | 8.5% |
| Students............................ | 13.7% | 1.3% |
| Non-Codable......................... | 0% | .6% |

Eighty-two percent of the non-student arrestees were fully employed. It is hardly surprising that unemployment increases as age decreases and that the most serious problem resides in the 17 to 24 age group among both arrestees and controls. The lower overall unemployment rate for the controls simply reflects the fact that their median age is some 17 years older than the arrestees. Joblessness then can hardly be considered as a crucial factor determining who would assume the risk of being on the streets during a major riot and after a curfew had been imposed. All of the arrestees were unskilled or semi-skilled workers, a large percentage of whom were working in an automobile factory and making an average of $115 weekly for which they put in more than 40 hours. Although we do not at this time have the exact percentage, there were a few white-collar and skilled workers in the control group but, unfortunately, information about their income was not analyzed.

## Area of Socialization

The arrestees were more frequently socialized in large urban settings than the riot area control group. Only five percent were raised on a farm as compared to 15 percent of the controls. Eighteen percent of the arrestees were brought up in small towns, a figure reasonably close to the 22 percent for the riot area controls. However, 77 percent of the arrestees were socialized in a small or large city (predominantly large), while only 58.8 percent of the controls grew up in an urban environment.

TABLE 3

AREAS OF SOCIALIZATION

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Farm................................. | 5.0% | 15.0% |
| Small Town.......................... | 18.0% | 22.0% |
| Small City........................... | 16.0% | 14.4% |
| Large City........................... | 61.0% | 44.4% |

The arrestees also were more likely to have spent their early, developmental years in Detroit, than were the controls who were more likely to have been born or raised elsewhere and to have migrated to this city at a much later age. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4

HOW OLD WHEN CAME TO DETROIT

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Born in Detroit or came under the age of 11 | 59.4% | 36.4% |
| Migrated after age 11.................. | 36.9% | 58.4% |

However, when we attempted to achieve equivalency between arrestees and riot area subjects by controlling for age, differences in area of socialization diminished. Arrestees were found to be more likely to have been born in the South and equally likely to have been raised in the North as comparably aged controls. The proportion raised in large cities were also found to be about the same for the two groups. Moreover, when we examine the control group alone, a connection can be noted between migration to Detroit during the early socialization years (*i.e.,* prior to age 15) and a tendency towards militancy as defined by a self-expressed readiness to participate in a riot. In addition, respondents who were early-aged migrants from the South were more likely to express this form of "militancy" than those who were born and raised in the city of Detroit. These data suggest that movement between cultural milieus with such widely disparate values and expectancies as exist between South and North during crucial child-

hood years predisposes to "militancy." It was interesting that the group who came to Detroit after the fifteenth year were least likely to express this form of "militancy." The circumstances under which the older migrants came to Detroit may well have been different inasmuch as some might have left the South without family.

*Education*

The community sample was better educated at the time of the riot. Table 5 below shows that 8.5 percent either completed or had some college education while no arrestees progressed this far. The percentage completing high school was almost precisely the same.

TABLE 5

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Completed College..................... | 0% | 2.0% |
| Some College......................... | 0% | 6.5% |
| Completed High School................ | 39.0% | 39.9% |
| Some High School..................... | 43.0% | 24.8% |
| Grade School......................... | 18.0% | 22.0% |

Yet many arrestees were still students and a much higher percentage had some high school training than the community controls. In order to determine if these differences in attained formal education might be a function of the fact that a higher percentage of arrestees were still in school, we controlled for age between the two groups. In all age groupings the arrestees had less formal education than the controls.

TABLE 6

PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL

| SAMPLE | 20–29 | 30–39 | 40–49 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arrestees.................. | 58% (46/79) | 38% (20/53) | 35% (15/43) |
| Control Males............. | 67% (24/36) | 68% (21/31) | 53% (27/51) |

*Affiliation*

Affiliation with organizations which might implement personal or racial goals was considerably greater among the community sample than it was in the arrestee group. Church membership did not differ but the arrestees were otherwise strikingly unaffiliated, belonging to few organizations supporting racial and neighborhood solidarity or improvement.

TABLE 7

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Church............................ | 39.0% | 42.1% |
| Race Groups....................... | 8.0% | 27.1% |
| PTA............................... | 2.0% | 19.7% |
| Block Club........................ | 12.0% | 26.1% |

We suspected that such disaffiliation was a function of age rather than motivation or interest, but cross-tabulation of age with affiliation did not reveal the expected correlation other than for church membership. Here, church affiliation was lowest in both groups for the youngest respondents.

*Grievance Level*

The level of grievance in a particular group would logically be expected to influence its protest or violence threshhold. The Detroit ar-

TABLE 8

GRIEVANCES

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Jobs.............................. | 54.1% | 55.6% |
| Landlords......................... | 23.9% | 28.1% |
| Housing........................... | 21.1% | 37.9% |
| Education......................... | 16.0% | 26.8% |
| Welfare........................... | 6.0% | 3.3% |

restees are anomalous in this sense. Other than for their intense antipathy to police, in the main determined by their riot experience, they were no more aggrieved than their community counterparts. Being younger, they had less opportunity to experience discrimination in housing. Encounters with discriminatory practices in employment were almost precisely comparable in the two groups, even when age was controlled.

The arrestees, in the main, clearly were not impelled to leave their homes in the face of obvious danger and curfew proclamations by a heightened sense of protest against social injustices personally experienced. (A small segment of some 13 percent were intensely aggrieved, however, and will be the subject of a separate paper.) Indeed the control males could be said to have suffered more from the inequities of the system than the men who were arrested, probably because they were older. It is possible, however, that the young are more sensitive to injustice and more likely to actively oppose it.

*Family Structure*

Hypotheses about civil disorder based upon family structure are necessarily inadequate but developmental factors must be considered in any theory which purports to explain the behavior of the arrestees or the mass violence which erupted in Detroit. The mothers of both the arrestees and the control group were consistently present during their first eleven years of life to a remarkably similar extent.

TABLE 9

PRESENCE OF MOTHER

|  | *Arrestees* | *Controls* |
|---|---|---|
| First eleven years..................... | 83.0% | 83.3% |
| Not at all............................ | 4.2% | 8.5% |

Eighty-four and four-tenths percent of the arrestees were raised by their own mother and 83.3 percent of the riot area controls were similarly privileged. Fathers are quite another matter. Only 56.1 percent of the arrestees had a father present during these first eleven developmental years while their control counterparts were significantly less

deprived, inasmuch as 72 percent of them had a father with them during this time.

<div style="text-align:center">

TABLE 10

PRESENCE OF A FATHER

</div>

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| First eleven years..................... | 56.1% | 72.0% |
| Not at all............................ | 21.5% | 16.3% |

Additionally, 21.5 percent of the arrestees never lived with their natural father. This compares to 16.3 percent for the community controls who were so denied. These results hold with age controlled. The adult male felt closest by the control Negro males was more often the father (58.8 percent) than the adult male to whom the arrestee best related (48.8 percent).

## White Friends

Some observers of the racial scene have proposed that urban rioting is a result of increasing social distance between Negroes and whites. However, both arrestees and controls had white friends in roughly the same proportion. The cross-tabulations, however, find significances which these frequency distributions do not show.

<div style="text-align:center">

TABLE 11

WHITES AS FRIENDS

</div>

|  | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Yes.................................. | 61.8% | 58.8% |
| No................................... | 36.8% | 40.5% |

## Political Awareness

Political awareness can be evaluated by questions which tap the respondents' knowledge of Negro leaders or groups. The Detroit arrestees are not as informed about Negro political leadership or organi-

zations as the riot area controls, although both groups are, in the main, quite knowledgeable. Over 90 percent of the community males knew the national leaders and organizations purporting to represent them. They were least aware of local leaders and, surprisingly, the Black Muslims.

TABLE 12

KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL LEADERS OR GROUPS

| Do Not Know About | Arrestees | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Nicholas Hood[1] | 23.4% | 6.5% |
| Rev. Albert Cleage[2] | 20.7% | 12.4% |
| James Del Rio[3] | 22.5% | 13.7% |
| Martin Luther King | 0.0% | 0.7% |
| John Conyers[4] | 17.7% | 7.2% |
| Stokely Carmichael | 14.8% | 3.3% |
| Adam Clayton Powell | 19.3% | 0.7% |
| NAACP | 7.7% | 0.7% |
| SNCC[5] | 12.1% | 14.4% |
| Black Muslims | 25.0% | 0.7% |
| Urban League | 22.5% | 2.0% |

1. Councilman.
2. Militant Black Nationalist.
3. State Senator.
4. U. S. Congressman.
5. Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

Eighty percent of the arrestees were similarly informed and also knew the local leadership less.

*Progress and Hope*

Discontent and hopelessness are psychological states which are often popularly related. Hopelessness as a feeling that one's life is irreversibly fixed at a level of dismal poverty, devoid of reward, self-respect, or relief from anguish, is a term applied with great frequency to the urban ghetto inhabitant. Would such entrapment, without promise of success, lead to activist, violent behavior, perhaps as a last desperate measure? We attempted to assess dimensions of progress and hope among both arrestees and community Negroes by asking them to place themselves on Cantril's "Self-Anchoring Striving Scale" five years ago,

now, and five years in the future. It is apparent from the following table that both arrestees and community males feel that they have made substantial progress during the past five years and are remarkably optimistic about what the next five years will bring.

| | TABLE 13 | | | | | |
| | PROGRESS AND HOPE | | | | | |
| RUNGS | 5 YEARS AGO | | Now | | 5 YEARS FROM Now | |
| | Arrestees | Controls | Arrestees | Controls | Arrestees | Controls |
| 10-8.... | 9.3% | 4.6% | 7.6% | 17.6% | 63.7% | 52.3% |
| 7-4.... | 36.1% | 38.5% | 66.9% | 62.7% | 32.6% | 35.9% |
| 3-0.... | 53.9% | 54.3% | 25.1% | 17.7% | 3.3% | 7.3% |

Five years ago both groups clustered on the lower rungs of the ladder, but now place themselves halfway up on the middle four. Five years from now with soaring optimism they expect to be viewing the world from the very top of the ladder. The self-assessed progress and extraordinary hopefulness are much the same for the two groups and cannot be attributed to the exuberance of youth. When asked how these goals might be achieved, the answers were "jobs and education." Not all of these Negro males were optimistic, however, and we are preparing a report on a particularly aggrieved, militant, and pessimistic segment of the arrestees comprising some 13 percent of that group. Entrapment in a life setting without progress or hope can hardly be said to define the circumstances of either the arrestee or community male. No attempt was made to relate such progress or hope to the perceived status of the white community.

*Cross Tabulations*

These frequency distributions reveal that the arrestees are much younger, less married, less affiliated with organizations of any kind through which they might work to further racial or personal goals, and

less conscious of political leadership than are the controls in the community riot area. Additionally they were more often raised in the urban North and were either born in or came to Detroit much earlier during their developmental years than the community males. They were significantly more often raised in a family in which the father was not present during the critical first eleven years. Finally, the level of grievance and unemployment were much the same.

Cross tabulations among these frequencies were of considerable interest. The younger the arrestee, the more likely he was to have spent more years with his mother, less with his father, and to be socialized in the urban North. These findings are not startling and hardly new, inasmuch as they tend to confirm the observations of Myrdal,[12] Glazer and Moynihan,[13] and Rainwater and Yancey,[14] but in a riot arrestee group. They are also consistent with our community data. Is there something about lower class, northern urban life which interferes with achievement and upward mobility for the male or predisposes him to riot participation? The cross tabulation within the arrestee group could not discover such a relationship. It seemingly made little difference to the arrestees if a father was present or absent as regards achievement, level of grievance, affiliation, marital status, attitudes toward the riot, or political awareness. Yet the arrestees are a remarkably homogeneous group and the intra-group differences are so small that they might not reflect the influence of paternal deprivation upon these variables. Thus, we ran similar cross tabulations upon the riot area control males who were more heterogeneous and scattered in age and among social classes.

If the community Negroes are divided into three groups based upon their avowed readiness to participate in a riot (high militant, middle militant, and low militant) then some interesting correlations emerge. Higher "militants," on the average, were younger than others. They were more likely to have been raised in a home not having the continuous presence of a father. This association was especially strong in the 20-39 age group. Their childhood families were also, on the average, more impoverished than those of the middle and low militancy responders and their parental heads tended to have less formal education. It would seem logical that such family disorganization and low income would be reflected in poorer education for their high militant

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12. C. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (rev. ed. 1962).
13. N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1963).
14. L. RAINWATER & W. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSY (1967).

offspring and a resultant inability to obtain remunerative employment. Yet the "high militants" had as much formal education, the same rate of employment, and as much income as the middle and low militants. Their hostility and activism apparently do not relate to these often discussed factors but, in part, apparently relate to the very nature of early family life itself without the support of a parental coalition and in the day-to-day struggle to insure economic survival. The "high militants" have also fared less well in their own marriages. Looking just at males between 20 and 39, "high militant" respondents show a higher rate of divorce and separation than their less angry counterparts. Is there a relationship between familial, marital, and social discord among the "high militants?" Are they diffusely enraged and alienated not only because of the realities of Negro life in America but also as a consequence of their socialization experience in broken families? Our data do not permit an answer to this question. The community "high militants" also differ from other members of that sample in that they have more grievances, more experiences with job discrimination, and more feeling about police abuse.

We should note that our "high militants" are verbally more militant than the majority of arrestees. For example, they view more favorably a Negro leader like Stokely Carmichael and Negro organizations like RAM or the Black Muslims. The community controls were not asked whether they took part in the rioting. However, only one community male indicated participation in response to the open ended question, "[D]id you do anything different during the riot?"

One segment of the arrestee population can be described as alienated and as hostile as the "high militant" community controls. Comprising less than 15 percent of the arrestee sample, these were men who were diffusely angry and, perhaps, ideologically driven. They were significantly more hostile to police and white merchants than other arrestees. They also clearly viewed the riot as a protest and felt strongly that it was directed at the white community. Their knowledge of black nationalist political leaders was greater than other arrestees and they also tended to more often express the conviction that another riot was coming unless their grievances were redressed. In contrast to the unbounded optimism of other arrestees, these men were more realistic about their future. Their hostility toward whites was coupled with a tendency to have no white friends. Employment, income, age, and education were much the same in this grossly discontent minority as with other arrestees.

COMMUNITY NEGRO AND WHITE RIOT REACTIONS AND
RACIAL ATTITUDES

Now let us turn to an examination of Detroit residents' reactions to the rioting of July, 1967. One can make a fair guess as to at least "net" white and black reactions to the rioting.

> Question 17: What would you say were the important causes of the riot?

Our respondents, given free rein to name whatever causes each considered of primary importance, gave a variety of causes. Negroes and whites tended to stress different causes. A substantial number of both Negroes (35 percent) and whites (28 percent) mentioned rioters' frustrations, restlessness, feelings of deprivation, or hopelessness. Their references to these rioter characteristics were, if not always supportive, rarely negative. On the other hand, whites (23 percent) more often than Negroes (two percent) felt that the riots were primarily the work of agitators, organizers, and criminals. Similarly, more whites (23 percent) than Negroes (six percent) spoke of rioters as being motivated by jealousy, greed, a desire to get something (not deserved) for nothing, or by some other negative personal motive or trait. As could be predicted from white complaints about the police, 10 percent of whites spoke of the riot as resulting from an atmosphere of laxity or ineffectiveness of law enforcement, lack of respect for authority, etc. This kind of cause was rarely mentioned by Negroes.

Negroes more frequently than whites stressed institutional products of the ghetto environment, such as lack of job opportunities, deficient education, poor housing, and high prices relative to income. Interestingly, Negroes were more apt than whites to put stress on better jobs and incomes, while whites put relatively greater stress on better education and housing as riot preventatives. One wonders whether, given white attitudes toward integration, some white citations of education as a preventative result from the belief that, if Negroes were better educated, they would be less likely to riot.

In net, Negroes were much more likely to give a sympathetic response to the plight of the rioter, or at least mention environmental forces conducive to rioting as a form of protest. Whites were about evenly split between negative, unsympathetic, critical, and "innate" responses, and sympathetic or "environmental" responses. In fact, some whites who offered several causes, offered one from each category.

This summary of Negro and white responses to the open-ended cause question is supported by a perhaps somewhat unfair closed question we asked:

> Question 8: Which of the following comes closest to explaining why the riots took place?
>
> (1) People were being treated badly,
> (2) Criminals did it,
> (3) People wanted to take things.

The results appear in Table 14.

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### TABLE 14

PERCENT OF WHITES AND BLACKS WHO SELECTED EACH OF THREE
GIVEN STATEMENTS AS THAT WHICH "COMES CLOSEST TO
EXPLAINING WHY THE RIOTS TOOK PLACE"

|  | Whites | Negroes |
|---|---|---|
| 1. People were being mistreated............ | 28.0% | 64.0% |
| 2. Criminals did it........................ | 30.0% | 10.0% |
| 3. People wanted to take things............ | 35.0% | 17.0% |

---

When asked, in the succeeding question, which of these three "explanations" is furthest from the correct explanation, nearly half of whites chose "people were being mistreated." On the other hand, half of our black respondents chose "criminals did it."

Thus, our data suggest there is no single, generally shared white view of the causes of rioting. There is more agreement among Negroes, but this agreement does not mean that a majority of the Negroes we interviewed would take part in a riot, nor does it mean that most Negroes were supportive of, and sympathetic to, the rioters.

> Question 9: Do you sympathize with the people who took part in the rioting?

A majority of our respondents did not sympathize with the rioters. Eighty percent of whites answered "No" to this question, as did 53 percent of Negroes. Only 30 percent of our black respondents, and 10 percent of whites replied "Yes." (The rest said "somewhat.")

Among Negroes, sympathy is greater among younger adults, greater among men than women, and greater among persons who have experienced job discrimination and those who have complaints about police treatment. Among whites, these characteristics do not distinguish the sympathetic from the unsympathetic. For whites and Negroes sympathy is sympathy and does relate to other attitudes about the riot to which it should relate. For example, 38 percent of whites who chose "people were being treated badly" in answer to Question 7 said they were either "sympathetic" or "somewhat sympathetic" to the rioters (vs. less than 10 percent of those who endorsed the other two possible causes). For Negroes, the relationship ran in the same direction. Sixty percent of Negroes who endorsed "mistreatment" as the best of the three explanations for the riots said they were either "sympathetic" or "somewhat sympathetic" to the rioters, versus only 22 percent of those Negroes who endorsed "criminals did it," or "people wanted to take things."

From looking at the questions considered so far, one gets the impression that the respondents see a distinction between the problems existing in the inner city and especially in the Negro "riot area," and in the riots themselves. We have seen that many Negroes who attest that they are aware of and sympathetic to the problems of the poor and the discriminated against, also are opposed to the riot as a form of protest.

*Separationists vs. Integrationists*

Having described the more "militant" members of the Negro community, it would be of some interest to characterize the more extremist segment of the white community. Those white people who assume the most intransigent position in favor of racial separation deserve our scrutiny inasmuch as they represent as powerful a conflict-inducing force in our society as the black "high-militant." It would be of considerable interest to know who they are, how they feel, and what they want. For purposes of contrast we will examine white Separationists and Integrationists. Separationists and Integrationists are defined on the basis of their response to the following questions:

Question 1: Speaking in general terms, do you favor racial integration, total separation of the races, or something in between?

Question 2: Some people feel that white and Negro children

should go to the same schools; others feel that they would learn more and be happier in separate schools. What do you think?

Question 3: Here in Detroit, as in many places, different races of people are living together in the same communities. Now I would like you to think about the very best way that Negroes and whites could live in the same place together. In other words, what would be the very best kind of race relations, the most perfect, you could imagine?

Separationists are those who opted for total separation of the races on Question 1, separate schools on Question 2, and then specifically indicated on Question 3 that they desired something less than total integration. A combination of these responses left little doubt as to the direction of their sympathies. Integrationists, on the other hand, favored racial integration on Question 1 and school integration on Question 2. Question 3 was not used to define the Integrationists. These groups are not polar opposites on a spectrum of racial mixing, but they do represent definite and meaningful contrasting strategies for achieving racial balance in this country. Remember that white Separationists comprise 16 percent of the sample while Integrationists comprise some 26 percent. The "in between" group, 58 percent of the sample, can accept partial integration and their responses to all of our questions invariably fell somewhere in the middle.

*Attitudes of Separationists and Integrationist Whites Toward Negroes*

Some whites who oppose integration do so with the conviction that Negroes are intellectually and morally inferior. We attempted to tap this belief by asking:

Question 36: On the whole, do you think that white people are smarter than Negroes, Negroes are smarter than whites, or are they about the same?

As anticipated, 67 percent of the Separationist group held the belief that whites are smarter than Negroes. Integrationists were much less likely to take this point of view, only 28 percent believing in white superiority. Perceived differences in racial characteristics, as the above, represent judgments which can be related to the concept of racial distance.

TABLE 15

RESPONDENTS COMPARE WHITE AND NEGRO INTELLIGENCE

*Question:* On the whole, do you think that white people are smarter than Negroes, Negroes are smarter than whites, or are they about the same?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Whites are smarter than Negroes......... | 28.0% | 67.0% |
| 2. They are about the same................ | 69.0% | 25.0% |
| 3. Negroes are smarter than whites......... | 1.0% | 6.0% |

Another measure of such distance is the frequency or strength of social involvement across races. We asked:

> Question 37: Do you have any fairly close friends who are Negro?

Here again an impressive but predictable difference is found between the two groups. Separationists (see Table 16) are much less likely to have black friends than Integrationists, probably indicative of fewer meaningful social contacts and less opportunity to evaluate Negroes in reality rather than fantasy. When age is controlled by comparing

TABLE 16

PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WITH NEGRO FRIENDS

*Question:* Do you have any fairly close friends who are Negro?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Yes..................................... | 53.0% | 19.0% |
| 2. No...................................... | 47.0% | 81.0% |

people in the 20-39 bracket the differences remain the same but ten percent more of both groups are found to have black friends.

Black power as seen through the eyes of our white respondents

provides another assessment of their attitudes toward Negroes. We asked:

Question 34: What do the words "Black Power" mean to you?

We found our groups differing in response. Respondents in our Integration group were more likely than those in the Separation group to speak of the term meaning "a fair share for Negroes," or "Black Unity" or the like (24 percent vs. seven percent in the other group) and less likely to speak of "Black Racism," or "black rule over whites," or "trouble and disorder" or the like (43 percent vs. 64 percent in the other group).

Whites who wish to live apart from Negroes then appear to be personally threatened by them, tend not to know them socially, and view them as intellectually inferior. These statistically derived conclusions about the attitudes of Separationists are strongly supported by anecdotal material found in their interviews. Yet the Separationists have allowed themselves the least opportunity to learn about Negroes first-hand through social relationships and many of their impressions must be a product of fantasy.

## Riot Attitudes of Separationists and Integrationists

As the two groups differed in their responses to various questions about race relations, they also differed on their perceptions of the riot. To begin with, let us look at respondents' perceptions of causes of the riot. As you recall, we asked this question in two forms, a closed-end form and an open-ended form. First, we will consider the closed-end form of the question.

Question 8: Which of the following comes closest to explaining why the *riot* took place? (1) People were being treated badly; (2) Criminals did it; (3) People wanted to take things?

Table 17 shows the responses for our two white groups. These data indicate a difference between the members of the integration group and those who have separationist beliefs.

It is, however, clear that the Integrationists and Separationists are in no sense diametically opposed in response to this question. Only 47 percent of the Integration group answered mistreatment in preference

TABLE 17

CAUSES OF RIOT AS SEEN BY WHITE RESPONDENTS VARYING IN
THEIR SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

*Question:* Which of the following comes closest to explaining why the *riot* took place: (1) People were being treated badly; (2) Criminals did it; or (3) People wanted to take things?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. People were being treated badly.......... | 47.0% | 20.0% |
| 2. Criminals did it........................ | 18.0% | 32.0% |
| 3. People wanted to take things............ | 31.0% | 40.0% |

to the other two alternatives, whereas slightly more than half indicated that they felt that either criminals did it or people wanted to take things. If we look at the open-ended form of this question we see a similar pattern of responses.

Question 17: What would you say were the important causes of the riot?

About twenty percent of each group indicated that agitators, hoodlums, or communists were responsible for the riot. A higher proportion of Separationists emphasize negative motives for the riot. They speak of greed, jealousy, laziness, and similar motives. The Integration group, on the other hand, is more likely to mention frustration, and anger, without apparent negative reference. The Separationists speak of the temper of the times. ("Riots were occurring all over.") The Integrationists are more likely to mention economic factors, education, housing, and other social needs. Again in response to this question, the Separation group sees the least justification for the riot. They make the most negative references to Negroes and to black rioters.

Question 9: Do you sympathize with people who took part in the *riot?*

The data for this question is presented in Table 18. As can be seen, a majority of whites, even in the Integration group, answered "No" to this question, and that percentage is higher in the Separation group.

TABLE 18

DEGREE OF SYMPATHY WITH RIOTERS IN GROUPS OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
VARYING IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

*Question:* Do you sympathize with the people who took part in the
*riot?*

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Yes..................................... | 21.0% | 3.0% |
| 2. Somewhat............................. | 12.0% | 8.0% |
| 3. No...................................... | 64.0% | 86.0% |

(It seems hardly necessary or surprising to point out here that there
were white respondents who blamed the riots on Negro frustration,
socio-economic ills, and deprivation but who, at the same time, said
that they were not at all sympathetic to the rioters.)

We asked what could be done to prevent future riots. Here the dif-
ferences in attitudes were quite striking (Table 19).

TABLE 19

PROPOSALS FOR PREVENTING FUTURE RIOTS ADVOCATED BY WHITE
RESPONDENTS VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

*Question:* What things could be done so that there will not be another
*riot?*

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Programs improving socio-economic and/or educational status of Negroes; ending discrimination............................ | 48.0% | 14.0% |
| 2. Self-determination for Negroes; fair share.. | 3.0% | 3.0% |
| 3. Stronger police action; improved police methods; stronger law enforcement....... | 20.0% | 56.0% |
| 4. Closer race relations.................... | 11.0% | 8.0% |
| 5. Nothing can be done; nothing will work... | 4.0% | 11.0% |
| 6. Don't know; no answer................ | 12.0% | 8.0% |

Nearly half of the Integrationists spoke of helping the Negroes, setting up programs to improve their life, ending discrimination, and programs for economic, educational, and housing upgrading. Only 14 percent of the Separation group agreed with this point of view. Fifty-six percent of the Separation group responded to this question in terms of stronger police action, improved police methods, more stringent enforcement of the laws (although the latter response was given less frequently than the first two responses). Only 20 percent of the Integration group made a response categorizable in this way. The Integration group was less likely to see the situation as hopeless or to feel that nothing could be done (although this difference among the groups was not significant). One future analysis we have in mind will separate what one could call the punitive from the efficiency responses in terms of police action; to separate the "use more force," "stiffer sentences" responses from those framed in terms of "better training," "more police," "improved methods." We would like to see whether these two kinds of augmentation of police effectiveness relate to other responses on the questionnaire, so that we can better characterize the white population. We certainly have a significant proportion of whites who desire more police activity and control.

We asked why people thought another riot was coming. The major difference here resulted from the fact that Separationists continued to speak of riot causation in negative terms, either negatively categorizing the persons involved (agitators, hoodlums, gangsters, etc.) or by ascribing unfavorable personal characteristics to them. Sixty-one percent of the Separation group made those mentions as opposed to only 22 percent of the Integrationists.

As we discussed the variation among our two white groups on points of view on the riot and on race relations we have noted that our groups differed in the strategies they endorsed for improving race relations and preparing for future urban racial violence. We noted above that whites generally viewed the black community as violent and the rioters as criminals but that this attitude was found most often among the Separationists. When we asked about prevention of future riots, we noted that the Integration group was much more likely to talk about social and economic improvement programs, whereas the Separation group was the most likely to see future riot prevention in terms of improved training, more policemen, stricter enforcement of law, and heavier penalties for violation of the law. The only question we asked which mentioned a policy toward dealing with urban problems was:

Question 32: Do you feel that more money or less money should
be spent on trying to improve conditions?

Responses to this question are consistent with the two questions on the
causes of the riot and the means for preventing future riots (Table
20).

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TABLE 20

ATTITUDES TOWARD FUNDING OF FUTURE PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE
CONDITIONS (IN THE INNER CITY), HELD BY WHITE RESPOND-
ENTS VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

*Question:* Do you feel that more money or less money should be
spent in trying to improve conditions?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. More money.......................... | 72.0% | 25.0% |
| 2. The same amount of money............. | 15.0% | 25.0% |
| 3. Less money.......................... | 9.0% | 50.0% |

---

If one assumes, as the context of this question suggests, that improving
conditions means improving the lot of the Negro or his way of life
in the inner city, almost three-quarters of the Integration group would
be willing to spend more money to achieve this purpose. Only nine
percent said less. On the other hand, only 25 percent of the respondents
in the Separation group said that they felt more money should be spent
and half of this group said that they felt less money should be ap-
propriated for this purpose.

*Personal and Social Characteristics of White Separationists and Inte-
grationists*

We attempted to see whether at least some potential "predisposing"
factors can be found in the personal histories of whites differing in
support for separation. Let us look first at the personal histories of the
respondents. The Separationist is much older than the Integrationist.
His median age is 55 compared to 41 for the Integrationist. We asked
about place of birth, area of socialization, and parental education, etc.
At the beginning of the study we expected that there would be a

higher proportion of persons born in the South or in a border state among the whites favoring separation than there would be among those whites who favored racial integration. There was no difference among our groups in portion of respondents born in Michigan, born in the North, born in the South or born in a foreign country. However, when we look at the responses to the question:

> Question 33: Were you brought up mostly on a farm, in a town, in a small city or in a large city or a suburb of a city?

we find that a significantly higher proportion of Integrationists were raised in a large city (generally, this city was Detroit). This difference among the groups appears to be partly associated with the difference in age. When we control for age, these differences diminish. If we look at the respondents' reports of their fathers' education we find a slight and non-significant tendency for the parent of the Separationist to be less educated. Again, we should note an association between age of the respondent and father's reported education. (We have noted above an association between respondent's age and his own education.)

When we look at the formal education for the two groups (Table 21), members of the Integration group have, on average, the most

TABLE 21

EDUCATION OF WHITE RESPONDENTS VARYING IN
SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

| Respondent Education | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1.  8 grades or less* | 16.0% | 31.0% |
| 2.  From 9 to 11 grades* | 14.0% | 36.0% |
| 3.  12 grades* | 31.0% | 31.0% |
| 4.  Some college or college degree | 33.0% | 3.0% |

*These categories include persons who have had non-college education in addition to that defining category (such as special job training, etc.).

formal education and respondents in the Separation group have the least. For example, 33 percent of the Integration group report having at least some college education; the percentage for respondents in the

Separation group is three percent. In addition, 30 percent of the Integration group had less than 12 years of formal eduaction as opposed to some 67 percent of the respondents in the Separation group. Younger respondents tend to have more formal education, on the average than those who are older. For this reason, we controlled for age across the groups, selecting the 20 to 39 category. We did not look at males alone because the proportion of males and females in the three samples is roughly equal. For this restricted group we found that 57 percent of those in the Integration group had at least some college education as opposed to about ten percent of the respondents in the Separation group. Seventeen percent of the respondents in the Integration group had less than twelve years of formal education versus 50 percent of the respondents in the Separation group. When we control for age, we create smaller samples, so these data should be considered only suggestive.

We noted in the arrestee section of this paper that a strong majority of black respondents felt that they would approach their conception of the best life for them in the next five years. This was not the case for white respondents. Slightly less than half of our white respondents felt that their lives would improve within the next five years with respect to their view of the ideal. Our two white groups differered on this question, but not significantly. The Integration group was slightly more optimistic than was the Separation group. Fifty-eight percent of the Integration group said they felt their lives would get better, versus 47 percent of the Separationists. Eleven percent of the Integrationists felt their lives would get worse as opposed to 22 percent of the Separationists. When we controlled for age and looked only at respondents between the ages of 20 and 39, we find these younger respondents generally more optimistic than those who are older and we find that differences among the groups halve. In this age group about 70 percent of respondents felt that their lives would get better over the next five years. About seven to eight percent thought that their lives would get worse. When we asked our respondents to rank their present life from zero to ten on a Cantril ladder (ten indicating that their present life is the same as their ideal, zero indicating that their present is as far as possible from the ideal), we find that, on the average, whites rate their present lives slightly higher than do Negroes. The median rating is about six. We again find, looking at our two groups, that Integrationists tend to rate their present lives

slightly higher than do respondents favoring racial separation. (The median rating for the Integration group was seven, that for the Separation group was six.) If we look only at respondents between the ages of 20 and 39 we find roughly the same difference. These differences appear to hold for respondents in their 40's and 50's, but in those age groups the number of respondents in the Separation group is quite small, the figures for this group are, therefore, relatively unstable. When asked to describe their best life in their own words the respondents who favor racial separation are more likely than others to speak of tranquility, peace, the ending of conflict, war, and violence. On the other hand, the Integration group is more likely to speak of their best life in terms of better income and better-paying or more satisfying jobs.

*Trust, Political Attitudes and Behavior of Separationists and Integrationists*

Belief in the reliability and good will of others may be both a measure of security and a willingness to engage people socially. We asked the question:

> Question 34: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Separationists are a suspicious group, inasmuch as only 35 percent felt that most people could be trusted. Integrationists are far more willing to believe in others. Seventy-five percent thought that most people could be trusted. Similar percentages were obtained in response to a question about trust in government.

The Separationists were even more doubtful about the reliability of the federal government, only 25 percent expressing the feeling that it could be trusted, as compared to 70 percent for the Integrationists. Similar differences held when we looked at only one sex and controlled for age. Confidence in city government ran in the same direction for both groups, although the differences were not as great. For example, 53 percent of the respondents in the Integration group were trusting of city government to do what is right "just about always" or "most of the time," as compared with only 30 percent of Separationists.

Knowing that Separationists are suspicious and wary of government and that Integrationists are far more trusting, we were interested in the political behavior of both groups.

TABLE 22

POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. "Strong" Democrat..................... | 15.0% | 22.0% |
| 2. "Not-Strong" Democrat............... | 20.0% | 19.0% |
| 3. Independent........................... | 42.0% | 28.0% |
| 4. "Not-Strong" Republican............... | 12.0% | 14.0% |
| 5. "Strong" Republican.................. | 4.0% | 3.0% |
| 6. Apolitical............................. | 7.0% | 14.0% |

Their loyalties to the two major parties are quite similar. However, the Integrationists are independent voters more often while Separationists tend to be more often without political ties of any kind, although this apolitical group is small.

In terms of political awareness, neither group is particularly knowledgeable about our system. Many more Integrationists than the Separationists knew the correct length of a United States senatorial term. Both were equally as ignorant of the results of the 1966 congressional elections.

Another measure of political attitudes and behavior, probably related to trust in government, is a citizen's sense of his political power as an individual. We asked:

Question 25: How much political power do you think people like you have; a great deal, some, not very much or none?

Eighty-one percent of the group espousing separation felt that people like themselves had either "not very much" or "no" political power. This sense of political powerlessness was communicated by only 50 percent of the group for integration. Another question tapping feelings about political power was asked:

TABLE 23

INDICATORS OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

(A)  *Question:* About how many years does a United States Senator serve: two, four, six, or eight?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1.  Two years | 5.0% | 11.0% |
| 2.  Four years | 38.0% | 41.0% |
| 3.  Six years | 37.0% | 20.0% |
| 4.  Eight years | 5.0% | 5.0% |
| 5.  Don't know | 15.0% | 19.0% |

(B)  *Question:* Do you know which political party elected the most Congressmen in the national election of 1966?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1.  Democratic | 37.0% | 28.0% |
| 2.  Republican | 46.0% | 42.0% |
| 3.  Don't know | 15.0% | 31.0% |

Question 28: Suppose a law were being considered by the Detroit Common Council that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do about it?

Responses to this question reveal even more acute differences between these two groups of whites than those which resulted from the answers to questions on governmental trust and political power. Sixty-nine percent of the Separation group felt that nothing could be done, that they had no influence on or power to control vital governmental decisions which might affect their lives. Only 19 percent of these respondents favoring integration considered themselves to be so politically impotent. Such a finding cannot be translated into psychological helplessness or powerlessness on other levels because the question dealt only with political referents.

TABLE 24

STRATEGIES TO COMBAT PASSAGE OF HARMFUL LAW, SUGGESTED
BY WHITE RESPONDENTS VARYING IN SUPPORT
FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

*Question:* Suppose a law were being considered by the (Detroit) Common Council that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do about it?

| Response | Integration Group | Separation Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Non-violent demonstration.............. | 3.0% | 0% |
| 2. Violent protest, rioting................. | 0% | 0% |
| 3. Work through formal, or informal group... | 12.0% | 8.0% |
| 4. Work as individual; writing; contacting officials, etc............................ | 57.0% | 14.0% |
| 5. Nothing could be done; nothing would do any good.............................. | 19.0% | 69.0% |

*Attitudes Toward Leaders and Organizations of the Two White Groups*

The Separationists viewed more positively those leaders and groups identified with anti-Negro and anti-civil rights stances. They were more supportive of Mary Beck, a conservative Detroit Councilwoman, and Breakthrough, a radical right organization which has repeatedly associated Communism with the civil rights movement.

Separationists were even less in favor of racial moderates as Martin Luther King than the Integrationists. In neither group was there any support for Black Nationalists as Stokely Carmichael or the Detroit-based Rev. Albert Cleage.

DISCUSSION

It would be foolhardy to derive some grand design or conceptual schema to explain contemporary American urban civil disorder from data gathered in one city and so limited in its scope. As psychiatrists and psychologists, our concerns and constructs tend to emphasize individual psychological states. It is obviously impossible from these data to irrefutably support any single, meaningful hypothesis which explains why, at this time in our history, collective violence has become

endemic in our cities. With the caveat that we probably missed a significant segment of activitist rioters, we have been able to interview a large number of persons who were on the streets and to compare them on a number of important variables with a control group of men drawn randomly from the community. We have also been able to assess the attitudes and characteristics of non-participant Negroes and whites in the community.

It has always been an almost reflex assumption that civil disorder issues from accumulated grievances which the protest group, perhaps because of some precipitating injustice, suddenly finds no longer bearable. A logical corollary of such an assumption would seem to be the stronger the grievance the more powerful the protest. The riot was a form of protest, yet the grievance level of our arrestees, on the average, was no higher than the community controls and in some areas was of even less intensity. Both groups were deeply concerned about job discrimination and both felt exploited by the profit strategies of inner city merchants. The police were far more a source of concern to the arrestees but this antipathy was, in the main, determined by riot experiences. Powerful grievances exist in the Detroit Negro community but the arrestees were not impelled to take to the streets by any more heightened sense of injustice.

Additionally, when one considers that 82 percent of the non-student arrestees were employed and earning $115 weekly, the motivation of the great majority cannot be attributed to joblessness. There was much employment uncertainty in this group but again no greater than that which exists in the riot area community.

This data can be organized in another manner. The arrestees and the "high militant" riot prone controls are similar in many important respects and do differ from those men in the community who could not see themselves as active in any future civil disorder. Although the control "high militants" and the arrestees are not precisely alike, their commonalities justify their inclusion in a group which we shall label "activist," a term defined by either arrest or an avowed willingness by a control subject to riot, should the occasion present itself.

The area in which a man spent his childhood socialization years seems to relate to "activism" as we have defined it. It further seems to matter whether persons born in the South came to a northern city prior to or after the age of 15. There are several possible explanations for these correlations:

(1) By the age of 15 an aggression control mechanism based upon white supremacism has been well incorporated, resulting in a more passive posture and acceptance of the social structure.

(2) Exposure to two different and conflicting systems of self-assessment, expectations, rewards, and punishments prior to the time when one has been fully internalized may lead to a continuing search (as testing the white power structure through rioting) for an appropriate assumptive system and identity formation to resolve the conflict.

(3) Persons who come North prior to the age of 15 are more likely than those who migrate after that age to experience family disruption during early developmental years under the stress of urbanization.

Regardless of which theoretical notion seems most applicable, regulation of aggression toward whites is determined by different psychological mechanisms in the northern Negro as compared to the Negro raised in the South. A self-concept organized around the social justice attitudes of the North may also be a factor in that Negroes socialized in the North justifiably feel entitled to a fair share distribution of the rewards and resources of our society. The whole concept of deprivation is related to what one feels he deserves and should be allowed to work toward. The southern Negro indoctrinated by a value system which has deemed him innately inferior to whites will not experience deprivation in a social, economic, or political setting in which the northern-raised Negro would feel profoundly thwarted and deprived. It is our contention that the childhood years of socialization and self-concept formation are among the more important determinants of a subordinate group's willingness to remain passive or to assert itself aggressively in protest or revolution. That northern urbanization contributes to militancy in the conventional sense has already been demonstrated by Marx.[15] In *Protest and Prejudice*, he described the social and psychological context of middle-class militancy which involved membership in organizations devoted to the implementation of racial goals and effort within the rules of the established political system. The Detroit riot arrestees were not, in net, the civil rights militants described by Marx. Although when contrasted with the total community

15. G. MARX, PROTEST AND PREJUDICE (1967). *See also* J. Fischoff, "The Effects of Poverty and Urbanization on Family Life" *contained in* THE DETROIT RIOT, A STUDY OF BLACK ACTIVISM AND WHITE RESPONSE, ch. — (in press); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950).

control group, arrestees showed pride in being black, only a minority seemed politically aware or ideologically oriented. The arrestees, when compared with controls, were unaffiliated in almost every sense, belonging to fewer organizations which might implement personal or community goals. This disaffiliation was not attributable to their youth and together with their lack of ideological fervor marked them as being, in the main, apolitical, unlike the "high militant" controls who were joiners and ideologically aware. Both arresteees and "high militants," however, had little faith in the efficacy of the political process and tended to view themselves as having little or no power to influence government at any level.

Loss of father is another variable which is correlated with our type of "activism." Relationships between the disruption of family life and northern urbanization have already been drawn in this paper. Such disruption is significantly greater among the "activists" than it is among the less "militant" controls. The finding that in Detroit, at least, the younger Negro arrestees did not have a father continuously in the home until the age of eleven as often as their older counterparts would indicate that such family disruption is increasing in the lower class. Extended kinship families in which aunts or grandparents act as surrogate mothers or fathers may well be adequate socialization units where closeness and affectional attachments are greater than in many white middle or upper-class families. Our findings do not represent value judgments, and the significance for the arrestees of early family life disrupted in the conventional sense is difficult to determine. However, a number of studies have described the deleterious effects of paternal deprivation upon the personality development of young children in both black and white families.[16] However, it must always be borne in mind that paternal deprivation tends to be accompanied by various forms of social and economic deprivation.

First, the father's absence can place an intolerable burden on the lower-class Negro mother. Without support from a husband, she may have to be both the breadwinner and the guide and tutor of her children. If harassed and overwhelmed by what is often a daily battle for survival, she may offer her children only insufficient emotional and cognitive stimulation. Lower-class Negro children tend to enter the school system disadvantaged in several respects. Middle-class families are likely to better prepare their children for school, for there is more

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16. *Supra* note 15.

time and money. Because the lower-class Negro mother may not have the time or sometimes even the strength, the early learning of the disadvantaged child is often grossly neglected, resulting in deficits in the use of and understanding of formal language and abstract thinking.[17] When he enters the school system, he may be further handicapped by an inflexible bureaucracy organized around certain assumptions as to the kind of readiness and ability to learn of the lower-class child. The ensuing clash between the child and the system can produce a repeated cycle of failure, humiliation, apathy, defeat, and a growing reactive defiance. The relative inadequacy of inner city schools together with the defeatism and low-achievement expectancies of some teachers contributes to the cycle. Education has always been a vehicle for upward mobility in America, and if the lower-class Negro child cannot compete in our educational system, he may not be allowed to compete as an adult for certain skilled jobs and high levels of economic security. Secondly, a stable male figure in the family provides a sense of security, discipline, and a model for identification. Boys raised in disorganized, fatherless families perceive their mothers' image of men as not trustworthy or reliable, and as elusive figures who come and go and do not care for the children. These boys grow up with a sense of isolation and minimal self-esteem.[18] These early experiences within an impoverished family lacking a parental coalition and an educational system unable to meet his needs, together with repeated exposure to the vocabulary of militancy, may provide the setting for riot activism.

It is impossible to determine the extent of social relatedness, the quality or enduring nature of friendships and affectional attachments and the loyalties of either the arrestees or the "high-militant" community controls. We do know that for some reason these "activists" did not affiliate. They were more likely than were the non-riot prone controls to remain single and apparently did not believe in the value of organizations as systems for achieving personal goals: at least not racial or community goals. A majority were not the street corner man of "Talley's Corner," [19] being steadily employed and living with family. Yet, were a significant number, perhaps, suffering from a type of big city anomie, a type of normlessness and lack of identity which Liebow observed in his street corner group and whose origins can be

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17. *See generally* Anderson, *Where's Dad?*, A.M.A. ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. (June, 1968).

18. *See generally* E. SILBEMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE (1964).

19. E. LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER (1967).

partly found in the destructive impact of urbanization upon lower class family life? Was the riot then for many an opportunity for self-assertion, for the protest, identity-reaching, and limit-testing so often found in adolescent behavior? Was it not only expressive black self-assertion but also a way of seeking a better definition of the relationship of blacks to whites, a relationship much less structured and more distant in the North than in the South?

The interpretation of the riot as inter-racial communication and rapprochement-seeking may seem patently absurd upon first examination. However, segregation in the North, in all of its forms, has been increasing. In education, housing, and social intercourse, contacts between Negroes and whites in Detroit have been diminishing and probably occur with much less frequency than they do in the southern communities. Although social distance from whites is approximately the same among both the arrestees and the riot area controls there is a positive correlation in the arrested group between a favorable view of the riot and alienation from whites. In addition, a majority of both the Negro arrestees and controls anticipate that the riot will effect not only a greater awareness among whites of the Negro plight but also compassionate white responses in the direction of alleviating black suffering.

If the riot for the great majority of arrestees was an expressive, disorganized, and anomic uprising, were there men among the "activists" with a revolutionary animus? We have no way of assessing the extent of their participation in the riot, but those men with the highest level of protest animosity comprised some 15 percent of the "activist" group and had the following profile: (1) born in Detroit or migrated before the age of 15, (2) lost his father prior to the age of eleven, (3) raised in greater poverty than other respondents and by more poorly educated parents, (4) 20 to 24 years of age, (5) experienced discrimination by employers, (6) felt exploited by white merchants, (7) felt intense animosity toward police, probably motivated by some humiliating personal encounter, (8) was socially alienated from whites, (9) acknowledged progress during past five years in Detroit but is less optimistic about future than others, (10) was exposed to the rhetoric of black militancy through black nationalist leadership and programs, (11) considered himself to be without political power, (12) was unaffiliated with racial or community organizations, and (13) thought that another riot was coming unless the system changed. Education,

employment, income, or marital status of these intensely aggrieved "activists" were not distinguishing variables.

It is obvious that the complexity of the Detroit riot does not allow for simplistic explanatory hypotheses. The participants were too varied in motivation, character, and background. In this paper we have focussed upon those factors which seem to contribute to "activism," defined either as arrest or the expressed willingness of a non-arrestee control to riot at some future time. The usual causal notions as poverty, apathy, hopelessness, unemployment, urban shock, or hoodlumism are not generally applicable to the mass violence which erupted in Detroit during July of 1967. Such a statement does not deny the existence of poverty, unemployment, or apathy, in urban ghettoes or the great need for programs to relieve the very real anguish which is endemic there. If Detroit is at all representative, civil disorder in America is a consequence of the coming of age of the first sizeable black generation socialized in the egalitarian North, raised with hope and promise, exposed to the rhetoric of black militancy but suffering from the effects of urbanization upon family structure and contact with a more subtle, covert form of white hostility. One can speculate that the riot has become the expressive or emotive mode of protest for the young blue-collar Negro male, unaffiliated, alienated but increasingly black-conscious, upwardly mobile and no longer fearful of expressing his aggression. The Detroit "activist" was not a committed revolutionary in the summer of 1967, but black nationalism may continue to attract his advocacy and loyalty in growing numbers.

In the face of this perplexing onslaught of black activism and its destructive effect upon their cities, whites and Negroes have responded in diverse ways.

Despite the exhortations and posturing of black separatists, the overwhelming majority of Negroes in Detroit are still convinced that integration is the only way to resolve racial conflict and to achieve egalitarian goals. Most Separatists are whites who still resist full acceptance of Negroes, although more than sixty percent can live with a partial form of integration (whatever "partial" means). Among many white Detroiters, the belief still exists that Negroes are less intelligent, inclined to violence and criminality and must be educated and upgraded in their life style before racial mixing can be successful. A substantial number of whites would like to see Negroes gain better housing, employment, and education, but are still desirous of maintaining

protective racial barriers about their own homes. The 26 percent of whites who expressed the desire for closer personal contact with Negroes were younger and better educated and probably represent that segment of the community most likely to abandon the city for the suburbs.

The riot surprised most of the white community. Many whites, perhaps in part as a result of surprise, tended to assume that it had a conspiratorial basis and was the work of hoodlums, or agitators (perhaps communists). Not only were whites opposed to the riot as a form of protest but they were generally unsympathetic to the rioters to whom they attributed venal motives, such as greed, laziness, and criminality. Although these negative ascriptions were in the majority, there was a sizeable minority of whites who understood the riot as an outburst of frustration and rage, resulting from years of mistreatment and discrimination.

From our white interviews we were able to distinguish two contrasting groups in profound disagreement as to the manner in which black and white Detroiters should live together (one espousing complete separation of the races, the other advocating integration). The majority of whites were somewhere in the middle. Although the Separatists were but 16 percent of the sample, they represent a force for divisiveness and conflict in this city which should be better understood. It is apparent from our data that Separatists are deeply threatened by the black community, particularly by the potential for violence and power which they ascribe to it. They were naturally most unsympathetic to rioters whom they described as criminals, hoodlums, and communists, and had little understanding or emphathy for Negroes living in the inner city. They also saw widespread support for the riot in the black community, far more than actually exists, at least from our data. Tending to oppose government programs for the improvement of black lives through educational and economic measures, they supported rigorous law enforcement as the only way to control civil disorder. Their opposition to both militant and moderate civil rights leaders was striking, as was their approval of conservative "law and order" leaders as Detroit councilwoman Mary Beck and even the local radical right organization called Breakthrough.

Separationists were also older and more often raised in a rural environment than Integrationists. They were less educated and less knowledgeable about political leaders or groups. Of considerable importance was

the finding that they saw themselves as poorly represented by their leaders. Separationists were mistrustful and suspicious of government at all levels and viewed themselves as being politically powerless, unable to influence decisions which might personally affect them. For those persons advocating complete racial separation in Detroit in 1967, the Negro revolution is, perhaps, a terrifying and foreign force threatening to overwhelm and destroy them. We are in no position to say what personal psychological forces are at work here, but this group considers itself to be profoundly vulnerable to the massive and rapidly moving egalitarian social forces of this decade. The Separationists apparently feel deserted and forgotten by a government whose attentions, energies and, perhaps, affections have been usurped by the interloping newcomer, the urban Negro, who is threatening to displace them. A most striking similarity between white Separationists and black militants were feelings of relative political powerlessness, and impotence to influence those external forces which governed and controlled important aspects of their lives.

These "Separatist" whites and "Militant" Negroes are, in a sense, polarizing factions within Detroit. One can speculate that they are remarkably alike in terms of how they view their position in this community, especially with respect to power. In a sense they tend to see themselves as vulnerable and powerless, and at the mercy of external and malevolent forces. For many white "Separatists" these external and evil forces are "black power" and a government which seems to support and encourage it. For many of the black "High-Militants" they are white racism and a government which covertly maintains it. Both groups sharpen the conflict and reduce it to simple terms in a remarkably similar way. For most other Detroiters the solutions to racial conflict are not quite as simple. Many in all groups wish the race problem away. It is doubtful that such wishes will be fulfilled in Detroit or any other major American city.