The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases

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I. INTRODUCTION

When an employer's facially neutral practice disproportionately harms minority or women workers, the workers may sue for disparate impact discrimination under Title VII. An employer whose practice is found to have such an impact may avoid liability by proving that the challenged discriminatory practice is required by "business necessity." Long the subject of case-law colloquy, the business necessity defense secured a statutory foundation in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Although the new provision aspired to provide statutory guidelines for the business necessity defense, it ultimately left open precisely the questions that antecedent case law had failed to resolve. The overarching issue continues to be whether the term "necessity" in the business necessity defense literally requires that the discriminatory practice be essential to the continued viability of the business, or whether it requires something less. This Article argues for the former interpretation.

Those who argue that the defense requires a demonstration of something less than true necessity generally rely on one of two rationales. One rationale compares disparate impact analysis with

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5 I use "continued viability" to mean that relinquishing the discriminatory practice will compel the employer to cut back its business, resulting in employee layoffs.
the disparate treatment analysis applicable to cases of intentional discrimination. This argument focuses generally on perceived distinctions between the levels of culpability involved in the two types of cases and calls for a lighter defense burden in impact cases (where there is said to be less culpability) than the strict necessity usually required by the bona fide occupational qualification defense (BFOQ) available in treatment cases (where there is said to be greater culpability).

The other rationale relied on by those advocating a diminished showing of business necessity in impact cases focuses on the deliberative process. This argument contends that factfinders in impact cases should apply a balancing test in lieu of a strict necessity approach. Advocates of this methodology assert that balancing is the most effective way to safeguard the business-autonomy interests Congress recognized as important when it enacted Title VII.

This Article explores the foundations of these two rationales. It challenges the distinctions that are assumed to exist between the level of culpability involved in impact cases and the level of culpability involved in treatment cases. It also questions the fairness of a balancing approach in lieu of a strict necessity requirement. The Article concludes that both rationales actually point more readily toward an absolute necessity requirement than toward a lighter defense burden.

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6 Title VII has yielded two major theoretical frameworks for employment discrimination cases: disparate impact and disparate treatment. The Supreme Court has stated that these Title VII schemes, in addition to allocating burdens, "establish ... an order for the presentation of proof" at trial. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993).

With respect to relative strengths of the BFOQ and business necessity defenses, the Supreme Court's pre-1991 Act decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls actually included dictum which expressly stated that business necessity is more lenient than the BFOQ defense. 115 S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1993). Johnson Controls reflected the same Supreme Court view of business necessity that was advanced in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and which was expressly legislatively overruled in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See infra text accompanying note 22.

7 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7246-47 (1964) (stressing important business-autonomy interests that Title VII should not infringe upon).
II. THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE

A. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory and its business necessity defense in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.\(^8\) Prior to passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Duke Power Co. hired black workers in only one of its five departments—the “labor department.”\(^9\) After the 1964 Act forbade segregation in hiring, Duke Power adopted a facially neutral policy requiring applicants for work in the four “white” departments to have a high school diploma and satisfactory scores on both a standardized general intelligence test and an aptitude test.\(^10\) These requirements excluded black workers from the four departments at a far greater rate than they excluded whites.\(^11\) A unanimous Supreme Court held that facially neutral practices with such disproportionate impacts on blacks violated Title VII unless justified.\(^12\) To justify the practices, the Court required Duke Power to show both business necessity and job relatedness, apparently equating the two concepts: “The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”\(^13\)

Many of the lower court cases following Griggs required that the challenged practice be essential, not just efficacious, to the defen-
dant’s business. “[The] doctrine of business necessity ‘connotes an irresistible demand.’ The system in question must not only foster safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that goal.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s own decisions in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody and Dothard v. Rawlinson characterized the business necessity defense as a narrow one, requiring that the discriminatory practice be “necessary to safe and efficient job performance.” “[The] concurrences and dissents in the Albemarle and Dothard decisions[, however,] showed the beginnings of a breakdown of the consensus regarding . . . [the business necessity standard].”

The Court’s full retreat from Griggs’s strict business necessity

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15 422 U.S. 405 (1975).


18 Perry, supra note 17, at 15. This breakdown developed further in New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). In Beazer, the Court found the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a sufficient disparate impact in the employer’s practice, but noted it would have allowed the business necessity defense if the employer showed merely that its “legitimate” goals would be significantly served, even if they do not require[],” the practice. Id. at 587 n.31. Arguably, the lighter burden proposed by the Court was a function of the safety purpose underlying the drug abuse-related practice challenged in Beazer.

Ironically, while the Griggs Court stated of the defense that “the touchstone is business necessity,” in a subsequent decision, the Court repeated the “touchstone” language but altered the standard to lessen the burden on defendants. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), the Court stated that “the touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the challenged practice.” Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
standard finally materialized in *Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio*. In *Wards Cove*, the Court espoused in dictum a far lighter burden on the employer than it had applied in earlier impact cases. Under *Wards Cove*, the challenged practice need not be “‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business for it to pass muster.” This aspect of *Wards Cove* met with congressional disapproval. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress reinstated the stricter standard.

**B. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS: THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT**

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided the first express legislative authority for disparate impact analysis and its business necessity defense. The 1991 Act imposes on defendants the burden of proving “that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Even if the
defendant succeeds in making this showing, the Act still imposes liability if the plaintiff demonstrates the availability of a less discriminatory alternative business practice which the defendant refuses to adopt.\textsuperscript{24}

Although the 1991 Act purports not to alter the business necessity doctrine that pre-existed \textit{Wards Cove}, the Act’s language facially suggests three changes from earlier case law. First, Congress’s conjoining of job relatedness and business necessity in the Act represents a departure from some earlier case law that allowed a defendant to prevail by showing \textit{either} job relatedness or business necessity.\textsuperscript{25} The language “consistent with business necessity,” on the other hand, could be interpreted as weaker than its precursors, requiring something less than absolute “necessity.” Finally, codification of the less-discriminatory alternative doctrine clarifies the allocation of proof burdens and suggests that necessary does indeed mean essential.

The only legislative history available to explain the meaning of the statutory terms is contained in an interpretive memorandum.\textsuperscript{26} That memorandum provides that “the terms ‘business necessity’ in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.


\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Id.} § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). “The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’” \textit{Id.} § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).

One commentator has observed that the Act’s language providing for establishment of a less-discriminatory alternative may be read as a potential substitute for the plaintiff’s initial establishment of a practice’s disparate impact. Alito, \textit{supra} note 14, at 1016. While the language of the provision may be ambiguous, such a reading is illogical. It would not make sense for Congress to impose on courts the obligation of considering every less-discriminatory alternative without requiring the plaintiff to make some showing that the current practice has a discriminatory impact. \textit{But see id.} at 1038 (stating such interpretation is consistent with logic and policy).

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{See Business Necessity, supra} note 14, at 387 n.47 (providing relevant case law).

\textsuperscript{26} Section 105(b) of the 1991 Act instructs courts to ignore any legislative history that purports to elucidate the business necessity defense, but permits reference to an accompanying “interpretive memorandum.” Section 105 provides that in no statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at \textit{Vol. 137 Congressional Record} S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of the Act that relates to \textit{Wards Cove} Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
'business necessity' and 'job relatedness' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to *Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.* Because the Court's decisions preceding *Wards Cove* were not consistent among themselves, however, definitions for these seemingly straightforward statutory terms must be derived from the theoretical and policy underpinnings of the business necessity defense. The memorandum does nothing to explain how "necessary" the practice must be or how the less-discriminatory-alternative concept interplays with other components of the defense. This Article examines the business necessity defense in order to aid the task of deriving such doctrine.

C. THE ELEMENTS OF DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS

A disparate impact case begins with the plaintiff's establishment...
of a statistical prima facie case.\textsuperscript{30} At this initial stage, the plaintiff must prove that the challenged practice "select[s] applicants for hire or promotion in a . . . pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants."\textsuperscript{31} Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer either may disprove the existence of the alleged disparate impact by challenging the verity or significance of the plaintiff's statistics or may affirmatively prove that, despite the disparate impact, the practice is justified because it is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."\textsuperscript{32} Should the defendant succeed by establishing the latter defense, the plaintiff may nevertheless prevail by introducing evidence that there is a less-discriminatory alternative which the defendant cannot successfully rebut but refuses to adopt.\textsuperscript{33}

Application of these elements to particular facts requires clarification of three issues. One is the overarching degree of need

\textsuperscript{30} In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), Justice O'Connor, in a plurality opinion, stated that there is no hard and fast test for establishing the impact of a practice, but rather, courts must make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 995 n.3. Cf. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d 549, 604-06 (1st Cir. 1995).

\textsuperscript{31} Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975). In order to make this showing, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a discrete employer selection practice (or if no discrete practice is severable from the selection process, the process itself) (2) disproportionately excludes people of the plaintiff's class. Whether the degree of disproportion is adequate to constitute "impact" is determined on a case-by-case basis. Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3. However, one type of practice that cannot be challenged based on its disproportionate impact is an employer's bona fide seniority system. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977) (discussing Title VII's seniority-system exception). It is unclear whether an employee who is a member of the racial or gender (typically male) majority may utilize the disparate impact theory. Perry, supra note 17, at 10 n.33. But see Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 1986) (recognizing impact claim for white male plaintiff); cf. Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 890 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (apparently accepting that white males may mount disparate impact challenge).

\textsuperscript{32} 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993); see EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d 549, 604 (1st Cir. 1995). In Watson, a plurality of the Court concluded the defendant's burden at this stage was one of production rather than persuasion. Although the Court espoused this view the following year in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Congress rejected it in the 1991 Act and established the defendant's burden as one of production and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m).

issue that Part III of this Article addresses. The other two questions pertain to the relationship between business necessity and job-relatedness and the role of the less-discriminatory element of the defense.

1. Business Necessity and Job-Relatedness. The common and statutory law creating the business necessity defense has developed a two-part test, culminating in the language of the 1991 Act: “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” This duality raises the question of the relationship between business necessity and job relatedness. The question consists of two sub-issues: first, whether employer practices can be defended as necessary to the business even though they are not job-related; and second, whether the business necessity defense can insulate practices that are job-related, even though the job itself is


An earlier version of the 1991 Act would have divided challenged practices into two categories: those pertaining to employee selection, which had to bear “a significant relationship to the successful performance of the job,” and those not related to selection, which had to bear “a significant relationship to a manifest business objective of the employer.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H9552 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990).

Although Professor Belton argues against a two-step business necessity analysis, the strict, BFOQ-type standard he advocates in fact lends itself to the two steps in question—looking at the relationship between the requirement and the task to be performed; and looking at the relationship between the task to be performed and the ultimate purpose or nature of the business. See Belton, supra note 27, at 937 (discussing analytical steps of BFOQ).
not shown to be essential to the business.

The language and purpose of the 1991 Act suggest that job-relatedness and business-necessity are both required and should be treated as two facets of the same requirement. Supreme Court and congressional choice of conjunctive language to join the two elements counsels in favor of requiring that both elements be met if the two can logically work together. The two can work together. In fact, the business necessity analysis actually lends itself more readily to a dual requirement than to an either-or approach.

In order for the job-related requirement to constrain employers at all, it must incorporate a necessity requirement. Thus, the employer that demonstrates that a practice measures the ability to do particular tasks must also establish that the task in question is necessary to the ultimate business goal sought and that the ultimate goal is essential to the business. If this interpretation were not imposed, employers would be able to prevail by submitting as evidence job definitions incorporating tasks for which the challenged practice accurately measured, even though performance of the tasks was not necessary to the business.

On the other hand, there cannot logically be a showing of business necessity without job-relatedness. In order to be "necessary," a practice must somehow measure the worker's ability to perform some function (broadly defined) that the employer wants done. Perhaps the employer defines the job to include the "task" or "function" of "contributing to the appearance of a well-educated work force." To create that appearance, then, is a "task" that the employer has assigned, just as much as a more mechanical function would be. In either case, the employer must demonstrate both that the practice accurately measures for the ability to create the desired appearance and that creation of that appearance is

\[36\] Cf. Belton, supra note 27, at 932 (positing "job-relatedness is simply one way an employer can prove business necessity"). But cf. Cynthia L. Alexander, Note, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 595, 599 (1991) (suggesting Supreme Court has equated business necessity with job-relatedness and job-relatedness is established by showing practice is necessary to business). Professor Belton further argues that the unified business necessity/job-relatedness test established in Griggs was unnecessarily bifurcated by the 1991 Act's language, compelling an initial inquiry into job-relatedness followed by an inquiry into the necessity of the practice. Belton, supra note 27, at 936.
essential to the business.\textsuperscript{37}

2. \textit{Less-Discriminatory Alternative}. The statutorily created role for the less-discriminatory alternative provides important information about the contours of the defense. The codification of the less-discriminatory alternative element confirms that the "necessity" required by the Act to establish the defense is true \textit{necessity}, rather than mere efficacy. Under the terms of the 1991 Act, a practice cannot successfully be defended as "necessary" if a less-discriminatory alternative is available. Because the Act requires employers to adopt the least discriminatory alternative, the Act permits retention of only those practices that are \textit{essential} to the business.\textsuperscript{38}

In addition, the codification clarifies the order of proof that applies in impact cases. It suggests that the defendant's burden is not initially to prove absolute necessity, but something less. Because the 1991 Act refers only to those less-discriminatory alternatives which the plaintiff introduces, the Act stops short of imposing on the defendant the burden of showing initially that all conceivable less discriminatory alternatives are unworkable.\textsuperscript{39} The defendant should be put to the task of showing that such alternatives are unworkable and thus that the challenged practice is \textit{essential} only after the plaintiff has introduced evidence of less-discriminatory alternatives. At the outset, then, the defendant must show simply that the practice significantly and efficiently achieves an essential goal.

Some courts and commentators would absolve the defendant of having to adopt less-discriminatory alternatives that are deemed

\textsuperscript{37} Because any job may be defined in such a way that any desired employee ability or trait is incorporated into the job description, the element of job-relatedness should form a part of every business necessity analysis.

\textsuperscript{38} The "less discriminatory alternative" language thus supports my contention that the business necessity defense requires the employer to show its practice is essential, rather than merely effective. However, the language lends support only at the choice-of-practice level of the business necessity analysis, and not at the necessity-of-the-goal level, which is a far more difficult issue. \textit{See infra} notes 35-45 and accompanying text (discussing levels of business necessity analysis).

overly costly. Although tenable at one time, this position currently poses problems. As explained in the next section, parallels between business necessity analysis and disparate treatment analysis demonstrate that the defenses available under the two schemes should be treated comparably. The Supreme Court’s decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. suggested, in the context of disparate treatment and its BFOQ defense, that the expense of eliminating a discriminatory practice must be ignored with the possible exception of where the expense would threaten the very survival of the defendant’s business. If the BFOQ and business necessity defenses are comparable, then, at most only ruinous costs may be invoked in support of the business necessity defense as well.


It is frequently argued that employers will be caught in a quandary: facing liability for unlawful affirmative action if they adopt quotas, facing liability for unlawful impact discrimination if they do not. See, e.g., Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 470. Given Title VII’s primary goal of ending discrimination against those who have historically been victims of discrimination, it is appropriate to construe the Act in a way that yields affirmative action liability, rather than impact liability if some type of liability cannot be avoided. See, e.g., Donald O. Johnson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to Factionalism, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 472-73 (1992) (discussing history of discrimination that Title VII was intended to end). The law should be interpreted in a way that will cause employers to err on the side of including traditionally excluded groups.


See generally Zimmer et al., supra note 42, at 440-42 (discussing role of cost justification in employer defenses); Brodin, supra note 14 (same).
3. **Summary of Business Necessity Analysis.** The elements an employer must demonstrate to establish the business necessity defense are:

(1) the ultimate business goal which the employer seeks to achieve through the practice is essential to the business;  
(2) the tasks for which the practice measures ability are essential to achievement of that ultimate business goal;  
(3) workers selected for the positions in question must be able to perform the tasks; and  
(4) the practice selected is necessary to measure the ability to perform those tasks.

The analysis may be depicted as follows with each arrow indicating a point at which the employer must establish that the occurrence on the bottom is necessary to the occurrence immediately above:

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Thus, depending on the vagaries of the particular case, the employer must show that the practice measures ability to perform a task, which measurement assures that employees selected will be capable of performing the task, which ability to perform assures
that the task will, indeed, be performed, and so on. These elements may be divided into two categories. At the top is the ultimate business goal asserted by the employer and the arrow connecting it with the business's survival. With respect to this element, this Article posits that achievement of the goal must be truly essential to the continued viability of the business rather than simply beneficial to the business. The second category of elements (represented by all other arrows in the chart) consists of all of the sub-elements pertaining to the challenged practice and the traits it seeks to measure. With respect to such intermediate goals and the relationships between the practice and these goals, this Article similarly advocates a strict necessity showing, but suggests that the defendant's unrebutted demonstration that the practice significantly and efficiently achieves the ultimate goal may create a presumption that the practice is essential to the goal's achievement. Only when the plaintiff introduces evidence of the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives, as described in the 1991 Act, must the defendant demonstrate why retaining the more discriminatory alternative is essential to the business.\textsuperscript{45} If the defendant adopts the practice identified by the plaintiff as a less-discriminatory alternative, the defendant may avert liability under the terms of the 1991 Act.

\textbf{III. WHY THE PRACTICE MUST BE CRUCIAL TO THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS}

As stated above, arguments opposed to a strict necessity requirement rely on two rationales. One is that distinctions between disparate treatment cases and disparate impact cases warrant a lighter defense burden in the latter. The other is that a balancing test comports with the goals of Title VII better than a strict necessity test does. The remainder of the Article examines the assumptions underlying these two positions.

\textsuperscript{45} But see Greenberger, supra note 39, at 320 (arguing employers should be required to show affirmatively that they have conducted survey of alternatives as part of business necessity proof); George Rutherglen, \textit{Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination}, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1327 (1987).
A. IMPACT AND TREATMENT—ANALOGIES AND CONTRASTS

1. Disparate Treatment Analysis. Unlike disparate impact discrimination, which may result inadvertently from a seemingly benign practice, disparate treatment discrimination entails adverse employer decisionmaking actually motivated by an employee’s membership in a Title VII-protected class. For this reason, disparate treatment is often called “intentional” discrimination. There are three types of disparate treatment cases: (1) individual inferential proof cases, using the burden-shifting scheme adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; (2) group (or systemic) inferential proof cases, using statistics to establish that the employer engages in a system-wide “pattern and practice” of discrimination; and (3) direct evidence cases, in which an individual or group plaintiff establishes discriminatory intent through direct evidence, either in the form of an overt (admitted) discriminatory practice or through direct evidence regarding the defendant’s motives or state of mind.

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Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). While the business necessity defense is available in impact cases involving any of the five prohibited categories of discrimination, the BFOQ defense is not available in treatment cases involving race or color. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).

47 See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of intent and motive in Title VII context).

48 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also infra note 52 (providing factors required to establish prima facie case).

49 E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In explaining why it is permissible to infer discriminatory intent based on statistical disparities, the Teamsters Court stated, “[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired.” Id. at 339-40 n.20. The disparity established by the plaintiff’s statistics in a systemic treatment case is greater than that needed to establish discrimination in an impact case. Id. at 339 n.20.

50 E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s treatment of employer’s state-of-mind in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks). There is not a clear demarcation between direct evidence and “high quality circumstantial evidence.” Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2321 n.290 (1995); Charles Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment After Title VII, 56 BROOK.
In a direct-evidence treatment case, the ultimate issue of discrimination turns simply on whether the plaintiff's direct evidence of discrimination is more persuasive than the defendant's countervailing evidence. In an individual inferential case, by contrast, the Court has developed a burden-shifting scheme to assist the factfinder in resolving the ultimate issue of discrimination.\(^{51}\) In such cases, the *McDonnell Douglas* scheme requires the plaintiff to persuade the factfinder that four specific facts exist. Proof of these four facts creates a presumption of discrimination.\(^{52}\) A burden of production then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision.\(^{53}\) If the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff may then submit evidence that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. The factfinder considers all of this evidence in deciding whether the plaintiff in an individual inferential case has proven the ultimate fact of discrimination. If a pattern-and-practice plaintiff, by contrast, mounts an adequately strong statistical case that his

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"It is unrealistic . . . to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker . . . ." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing plaintiff's difficulty in proving employer intent when challenging selection practice).

\(^{52}\) The four elements that comprise this "prima facie case" are as follows: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a Title VII-protected group; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite the plaintiff's qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with the plaintiff's qualifications. *McDonnell Douglas*, 411 U.S. at 802. Of course, the specific facts falling within each of the elements will vary, depending on the circumstances of the plaintiff's case. *Id.*

The Teamsters Court further elucidated the nature of the prima facie case, explaining:

*[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination, [but] it does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.*

*Teamsters*, 431 U.S. at 355 n.44.

\(^{53}\) By placing a burden of production on the defendant, the defendant is compelled to introduce evidence sufficient to permit an inference of the fact it is attempting to prove. This is a lesser burden than the burden of persuasion, which means that if the defendant fails to prove the existence of the fact at issue, the plaintiff immediately prevails.
group is underrepresented in the defendant's workplace, the defendant typically responds by challenging the statistics rather than by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. For purposes of the present discussion, the only relevant treatment-based affirmative defense is the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The BFOQ defense succeeds

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54 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.24 (holding general statements that defendant hired best-qualified applicants insufficient to rebut prima facie case of systemic discrimination); cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977) (noting defendant may also respond by showing that racial disparities revealed in plaintiff's statistics are result of discrimination occurring prior to enactment of Title VII). But see EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant's informal evidence that women were less interested than men in holding certain sales positions was sufficient to rebut Agency's statistical prima facie case).

55 This aspect of disparate treatment presents an anomaly. When an employer implements an overtly discriminatory practice, such as the open exclusion of all women, a BFOQ defense is readily available as a defense. However, when the employer, perhaps inadvertently, treats an employee adversely because of her sex, the BFOQ defense—though theoretically available—is unlikely to help the employer. This renders overt discrimination more easily defensible than negligent discrimination. Of course, if the plaintiff establishes in the course of an inferential case that the employer indeed did exclude her based on her sex, the employer can, in theory, invoke the BFOQ to argue that women cannot do the job.

The Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), suggested the availability of an additional affirmative defense. In Price Waterhouse, the Majority held that a defendant could avoid liability entirely by proving that legitimate reasons would have compelled the defendant to make the same adverse decision even in the absence of the discriminatory reason. Id. at 237. However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act eliminated the availability of this affirmative defense. Under the Act, the defendant's proof that it would have made the same decision absent its discrimination limits the remedies for which the defendant may be held liable, but does not serve as an absolute defense. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).


Another affirmative defense to disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII is a bona fide affirmative action program. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding affirmative action program did not violate Title VII). Because this defense applies only where the employer's action is predicated on an express policy recognizing the existence of discrimination, it has no analog in the disparate impact context.
only when the employer establishes that “the essence of the business operation would be undermined by [not hiring members outside of the plaintiff's protected group].”57 To establish this defense, the employer might prove, for example, (1) that only men can perform the central tasks of the job and (2) that the performance of the tasks which require a male-only workforce are crucial to the essence of the employer's business.58 The BFOQ defense, then, is available only where an employer's business could not operate at all if it were forced to include the plaintiff's protected group.59 In the BFOQ context, “necessary” means “essential.”

The following chart sets forth a simplified synopsis of the various types of analysis used in Title VII cases to facilitate comparisons between them:


58 To show that only people of one sex can do the job, the employer may show that there is “reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all [members of the excluded sex] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.” Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).

Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981), demonstrates the meaning of “essence of the business.” The Wilson court rejected a contention by the defendant airline that the essence of its business entailed using only female flight attendants who would appeal to male passengers, concluding instead that the essence of an airline’s business is transporting passengers. Id. at 302.

59 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210; see supra note 42. But see id. at 216-17 (White, J., concurring) (proposing lighter employer burden when asserting safety-based defense to treatment claim).
# Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Discrimination: Steps in the Analysis

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<th>Stage in Analysis</th>
<th>Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case</th>
<th>Defendant's Rebuttal</th>
<th>Additional Proof from Plaintiff on Question of Discrimination</th>
<th>Defendant's Affirmative Defense—Once Discrimination Is Proved</th>
<th>Plaintiff's Last Word</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>Statistics showing facially neutral practice has disproportionate impact</td>
<td>No disparate impact (overcome plaintiff's inference of impact by challenging statistics)</td>
<td>Prove: Practice is job related and consistent with business necessity</td>
<td>Less restrictive alternatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic Treatment Inferential</strong></td>
<td>Statistics and direct evidence creating inference that discrimination is occurring systematically</td>
<td>Overcome inference of discrimination by challenging statistics</td>
<td>Prove: Discriminatory characteristic is BFOQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Treatment: McDonnell Douglas Inferential</strong></td>
<td>Plaintiff, member of protected group, applied for open position, was rejected, and job stayed open</td>
<td>Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (production burden only)</td>
<td>Show pretext—prove the ultimate issue of motive</td>
<td>Prove: Discriminatory characteristic is BFOQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Treatment: Direct</strong></td>
<td>Overtly discriminatory practice or direct evidence of discriminatory animus</td>
<td>Show overtly discriminatory practice not in existence or overcame inference of discriminatory animus</td>
<td>Prove: Discriminatory characteristic is BFOQ</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The Discriminator's State of Mind in Impact and Treatment Cases: No Rewards for Benign Intent. Commentators have used the differences between impact and treatment analysis to support arguments that the stringent level of business need required to establish the BFOQ defense in disparate treatment cases is greater than the level of need required to establish the business necessity defense in impact cases. They argue that treatment defendants have discriminated “intentionally” and are therefore more culpable than impact defendants, who have merely employed facially neutral practices. This distinction is not accurate. Disparate treatment does not necessarily entail any greater culpable intent than the typical impact case. If employer culpability is to be the measure, then the same strict necessity standard that controls in the BFOQ context should apply to the business necessity defense in impact cases as well.

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60 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 17, at 60-62 (noting disparate impact is viewed as less objectionable than disparate treatment; harm to employees resulting from impact is less wide spread than harm resulting from treatment; potential for harm to employers is greater if facially neutral policy is eliminated than if overtly discriminatory policy is eliminated; and for these reasons the BFOQ defense imposes stricter standard).

61 See Belton, supra note 27, at 938 (discussing close relationship between BFOQ and business necessity test and advocating that courts treat them similarly).

62 There are other problems with viewing discrimination liability from a culpability standpoint. There is a growing need to see employment discrimination law less as a system for catching “bad” decisionmakers and more as a system for encouraging decisionmakers, specifically those with the power to impose systemic changes, to think about how to create employment structures that will foster substantive equality. Martha Chamallas, *Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences*, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2370, 2398 (1994) (stating that employer would be held liable if it failed to guard against stereotyping); cf. Perry, supra note 17, at 57-60 & n.294 (asserting impact- and treatment-based discrimination are essentially indistinguishable); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 659 (1987) (concluding discriminatory animus is unnecessary to establish liability in treatment-based claim). But see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (holding Equal Protection Clause of Constitution imposes no liability unless purpose of discrimination is to harm women). An impact case is as likely to entail “intent” to discriminate as a treatment case; even the Court has recognized that impact analysis is sometimes used to “get at” intentional discrimination that can not be effectively proved through treatment analysis. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 980 (1988).

63 See Brodin, supra note 14, at 358 (noting Griggs recognized “employers can do as much harm to minorities and women by unintentional acts as they can by acts designed to discriminate . . . . Given the equation of purposeful discrimination and practices which are its functional equivalent, the affirmative defenses in both types of lawsuits should be substantially similar.”); Perry, supra note 17, at 56 (arguing same standards should apply
Arguments to the contrary, predicated on the idea that the stricter standard is appropriate when a defendant is shown to have discriminated intentionally, misunderstand the concept of intent in Title VII doctrine. For purposes of Title VII, an employer intentionally discriminates when, for example, it treats a woman differently from how it would treat a similarly situated man.\(^\text{64}\) "Intent to discriminate" will be found even if the employer is not aware that it is motivated by discrimination. The employer's discrimination (and perhaps some underlying prejudice against the protected group) may be entirely unconscious but is nevertheless deemed disparate treatment (that is, intentional) discrimination for Title VII purposes.\(^\text{65}\) Title VII, then, requires neither that the employer intend to treat the employee differently because of her sex nor that the employer realize its decision was actually motivated by sex.\(^\text{66}\)

In reality, the distinctions in culpability drawn between the impact and treatment analyses have more to do with imprecise


\(^{65}\) As Professor Lawrence has noted:

*Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right. While our historical experience has made racism an integral part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects racism as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from consciousness.*


\(^{66}\) *Lukens Steel*, 482 U.S. at 669. But see *Fessney*, 442 U.S. at 278-79 (requiring initial finding of intent to harm protected group in order to establish equal protection violation).
language used in discussions of the treatment doctrine than with any true differences between the two approaches. What courts actually require in Title VII disparate treatment cases is not properly denominated "intent" at all, but is instead "motive." "Motive," as Professor Don Welch explains, "is the underlying [possibly unconscious] cause or reason moving an agent to action ..., [whereas] [i]ntent is the conscious purpose with which one acts to effect a desired goal or result."

Professor Welch demonstrates that courts and commentators have confused the concepts of intent and motive in the Title VII context. He confirms that the actual test applied in Title VII disparate treatment cases has been a test of motive, although it has been called one of intent. Because the "intent" requirement in disparate treatment cases does not necessarily entail culpability at all, it does not serve as a means for distinguishing between treatment-based and impact-based discrimination.

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68 D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 (1987) (emphasis added). Professor Welch further notes:

Motive is a causal concept. It comes into play when a concern exists that decisions were made "because of" or "on the grounds of" certain factors. Motive addresses reasons for actions, realities that shape and influence actions, regardless of whether the actor is fully aware of these realities. Intent, on the other hand, is a state of awareness concept. An actor's intent speaks to the purpose that is being consciously pursued—the goals one has in mind as choices are being made.

Id. at 739.
69 Id. at 763-72. Welch furthers asserts that a test of motive, rather than one of intent, is appropriate in the Title VII context. Id. at 775-78. The 1991 Act has confirmed this view in the mixed-motives context, stating that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
70 Both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact are based on a statistical demonstration of discrimination. Arguably, though, courts require statistical significance to establish a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment, but not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977) (stressing, in systemic disparate treatment case, the importance of statistical analysis in Title VII cases) with Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating, in disparate-impact case, that no particular test of statistical significance is required in Title VII cases). This difference may
The Supreme Court’s decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks\(^{71}\) potentially increases the amount of evidence a plaintiff must introduce on the question of motive, but does nothing to diminish the claim that treatment may be established without a showing of conscious intent. In Hicks, the Court rejected the view that a disparate treatment plaintiff who proves that the defendant’s proffered reason is not the true reason for the defendant’s action automatically prevails.\(^{72}\) Thus, the Hicks decision permits, but does not require, the factfinder to conclude that the lying defendant has discriminated.\(^{73}\) Although for some plaintiffs Hicks increases the difficulty of establishing motive, it does not alter, or in any way add to, the definition of discrimination. Discrimination continues to be defined as differential treatment based on membership in a protected class.\(^{74}\) If employer consciousness of the reasons for its treatment was not a requirement before Hicks, neither is it a requirement afterwards.

3. Disparities in Remedies Available for Impact and Treatment Cases. Linda Hamilton Krieger carries Welch’s intent/motive distinction one step further.\(^{75}\) She suggests that, because the levels of culpability in impact and treatment cases are often indistinguishable, the remedies available in the two types of cases create the impression that treatment cases involve greater culpability, but this is not necessarily correct. Cf. Thomas v. Metroflight, 814 F.2d 1606, 1610-11 n.4 (10th Cir. 1987) (requiring plaintiff to show statistical significance in order to establish prima facie impact case). Even if the prima facie systemic-treatment case requires statistical significance and the prima facie impact case does not, the fact remains that any employer “intent” to discriminate that can be inferred from the plaintiff’s systemic-treatment case may well be an intent unknown to the defendant, which is to say the defendant lacks motive.

\(^{71}\) 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).

\(^{72}\) Id. at 2751 (“[N]othing in law would permit us to substitute for the required finding that the employer’s action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer’s explanation of its action was not believable.”).

\(^{73}\) Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998 (1994); Malamud, supra note 50, at 2254.

\(^{74}\) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987); see also ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 42, at 110 (noting Court’s decisions suggest it does not believe most discrimination is animus-based).

should be the same.\textsuperscript{76}

Such a conflation of the two types of cases for remedial purposes would represent a change of direction from the 1991 Act, which added levels to the remedial hierarchy to include additional compensation for willful offenses. The current structure appears as follows:

Disparate Impact: equitable relief, including non-compensatory monetary damages;\textsuperscript{77}
Disparate Treatment (non-willful): equitable relief and compensatory damages;
Disparate Treatment (willful): equitable relief and compensatory damages;
Disparate Treatment (malicious or reckless disregard of rights): equitable relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.\textsuperscript{78}

Professor Robert Belton apparently would agree with Krieger. In response to the distinctions drawn by the 1991 Act, Professor Robert Belton has stated:

The exclusion of disparate impact . . . claims [from those for which compensatory and punitive damages are available] has the effect of creating first- and second-class cases of unlawful discrimination. Even

\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 1243. Krieger would bifurcate the remedy scheme at a different point than that chosen by Congress. Although Krieger argues that similarities in the level of culpability between impact and systemic-treatment cases call for a reduction of systemic-treatment remedies, it may be more logical to increase the remedies available to impact plaintiffs. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining that given purposes of Title VII, defendant in impact case should not be faced with less-drastic remedies).

\textsuperscript{77} Back pay, for example, is available in disparate impact cases. Albemarl Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d. Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3151 (1989).

\textsuperscript{78} The 1991 Civil Rights Act adds compensatory and punitive damages to the equitable relief Title VII has always allowed. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. V 1993). Compensatory damages are available only in cases of intentional (that is, disparate treatment) discrimination. Id. Moreover, punitive damages are restricted to disparate treatment cases in which the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Id.
though [their] exclusion was deemed necessary to reach a compromise bill, there is no principled basis on which to distinguish disparate impact . . . and disparate treatment cases when a plaintiff has proven that she has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. . . . The unfairness [of this distinction] is underscored by the fact that Congress has not made the same distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment in cases not involving employment. 79

Although both Krieger and Belton both suggest that similarities between treatment and impact warrant conflation of the remedies for the two, Krieger's rationale could actually support the conclusion that the impact defendant should bear a lighter justification burden than the treatment defendant. Krieger advocates proportionality between the level of culpability and the scope of the remedy available in Title VII cases. If, as this Article contends, there should also be proportionality between the level of culpability and the degree of need required to justify the employer's action, then there must also be a correlation between the scope of the remedy available under Title VII and the level of need required to justify the practice. The gap which the 1991 Act created between remedies available in treatment and those available in impact cases could be argued to indicate congressional perception of differences in culpability levels between the two types of cases, which could then be argued to call for requiring different levels of justification in the two types of cases. In fact, however, the 1991 Act's bifurcation of remedies actually weighs in favor of strengthening the business necessity defense, bringing it more in line with the level of business exigency required by the BFOQ defense. In treatment cases, courts may rely on the specter of compensatory and punitive damages to assure that the defendants will be motivated to defend their actions. Because a losing defendant in an impact case faces considerably less-drastic remedies than a comparable defendant in a treatment case, the proof structure itself must be relied upon more heavily to assure the defendant is forced to defend the

79 Belton, supra note 27, at 948-49.
practice.\textsuperscript{80}

4. Confusion of Business Necessity with the Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason in Treatment Cases. Just as some arguments for requiring a lighter demonstration of business necessity have rested on perceived differences between impact and treatment cases, other arguments have turned on perceived similarities between the two. Beginning early in the development of the disparate impact doctrine, and culminating in the \textit{Wards Cove} case, some judges have analogized the business necessity defense not to the BFOQ, but to the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason phase of treatment cases.\textsuperscript{81} The confusion centered on two issues. The first issue was whether the defendant's burden in establishing business necessity was one of production comparable to the articulation or production of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in the disparate treatment context.\textsuperscript{82} This issue was resolved by the 1991 Act, which established that the employer's business-necessity burden is one of persuasion.\textsuperscript{83} The second issue, not resolved by the 1991 Act, concerns whether any distinction exists between the content of a qualifying successful legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the content of a business necessity defense.\textsuperscript{84} Purporting to apply the “business necessity” standard,

\textsuperscript{80} Such reliance is consistent with the twofold purpose of the Title VII remedial scheme: (1) “to serve as a ‘spur or catalyst’ to cause employers ‘to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges’ of discrimination”; and (2) compensation for injuries. \textit{McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.}, 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) (quoting \textit{Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody}, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).


\textsuperscript{82} \textit{See} \textit{Malamud, supra note 73, at 2254-64} (discussing Court's efforts to prevent stricter business necessity defense from being incorporated into \textit{McDonnell Douglas} concept of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason).


\textsuperscript{84} \textit{See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters}, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1978) (holding treatment analysis relied on necessity of defendant's practice of not hiring people who, like plaintiff, applied at work site); \textit{cf. Chandler, supra note 44, at 934} (asserting courts should accept any good-faith business justification employers offer); \textit{Johnson, supra note 41, at 495} (stating that effectiveness of placing burden of persuasion on defendant will turn on how “necessity” is defined, as the 1991 Act leaves this open).
some courts have accepted from impact defendants any “reasonable” business justification for practices, just as they would have from a treatment defendant, rather than requiring a showing of real need for the practice.\footnote{See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (“The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the challenged practice.”).
\footnote{EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d 549, 607 (1st Cir. 1995); Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 398 (D. Me. 1994), aff’d, 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995). A recent example of an age discrimination impact court apparently applying the McDonnell Douglas legitimate nondiscriminatory reason standard to an impact case is Graffam, 870 F. Supp. at 389. In Graffam, the district court treated the impact inquiry as a search for intent to discriminate. 870 F. Supp. at 398. It thus permitted the defendant to justify, in part, by demonstrating that there were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the decisions against the individual members of the group impacted. Id. at 400, 405. Although disparate impact analysis is often employed in ADEA cases, the 1991 Act’s modifications of the doctrine apparently do not extend to ADEA cases. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1099, 1150 (1993); see also Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 507.}}

Differences between the postures of the treatment defendant and the impact defendant render comparisons between legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and business necessity inapposite. The legitimate nondiscriminatory reason requirement asks the defendant to \textit{state the reason} why the defendant took the actions of which the plaintiffs complain. In the impact case, by contrast, by the time business necessity is at issue, everyone is already fully aware of the \textit{reason} why the defendant took the actions of which plaintiffs complain. The defendant took those actions because of the facially neutral practice, a practice we may assume for present purposes entails no discriminatory motive and thus would easily qualify as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason in a treatment case. What the defendant must show is \textit{need} for the practice.

In looking at the issue of need for the practice, some courts—again—have sought a mere business justification for the practice, again frequently referring to the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason context.\footnote{EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d 549, 607 (1st Cir. 1995); Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 398 (D. Me. 1994), aff’d, 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995). A recent example of an age discrimination impact court apparently applying the McDonnell Douglas legitimate nondiscriminatory reason standard to an impact case is Graffam, 870 F. Supp. at 389. In Graffam, the district court treated the impact inquiry as a search for intent to discriminate. 870 F. Supp. at 398. It thus permitted the defendant to justify, in part, by demonstrating that there were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the decisions against the individual members of the group impacted. Id. at 400, 405. Although disparate impact analysis is often employed in ADEA cases, the 1991 Act’s modifications of the doctrine apparently do not extend to ADEA cases. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1099, 1150 (1993); see also Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 507.} Yet, to permit the employer to prevail simply by proving that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adopting the practice is to change impact analysis into a search for intent to discriminate. Again, impact analysis \textit{assumes} the
employer adopted the practice for legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason. The impact inquiry does not ask whether the employer had a legitimate reason for adopting the practice, but asks how dire the employer’s need for the practice is.

Moreover, the 1991 Act’s confirmation that the defendant in an impact case has a burden of persuasion rather than merely a burden of production further signifies that such a defendant should likewise be required to show that its practice is a true business necessity. Professor Hannah Furnish has explained the distinction in meaning between establishment of a prima facie case in each of the types of claims. 87 At this stage of a treatment case, the plaintiff has merely raised a presumption of discrimination, which the defendant may rebut by merely producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 88 In contrast, once a prima facie case of impact is established, the existence of discrimination is considered proven and the defendant must therefore establish an affirmative defense to avoid liability. 89 Once discrimination has been established as a factual matter, the remedial purposes of Title VII demand that the defendant establish actual necessity, whether the context be treatment or impact. 90 The 1991 Act’s confirmation that the impact defendant must bear a burden of persuasion, rather than production, supports the conclusion that the fact of discrimination has at this juncture been established, calling for the defendant to establish true necessity to justify the practice.

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88 In fact, the burden imposed on the defendant at this stage in a treatment case is so minimal that its reason need not even be lawful (as long as the statute violated is one other than that under which the claim was brought). Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1707 (1993).

89 Griggs established that impact-based discrimination is no less discrimination than treatment-based discrimination. “[T]itle VII requires] the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).

90 But see Brodin, supra note 14, at 343 n.138 (suggesting mere business reason defense would be more appropriate when defendant must negate discriminatory intent, rather than when issue is “whether the exclusionary effect of a practice can be tolerated because the practice produces a more productive workforce”).
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH BALANCING

1. The Types of Balancing. As an alternative to requiring employers to show absolute necessity for a challenged practice, some commentators have advocated a balancing approach to the business necessity defense.\(^9\) Balancing approaches fall into two categories. In the first, a court assesses whether the gain the defendant derives from the discriminatory practice is sufficient to outweigh the loss of employment opportunity the practice inflicts on the plaintiff class.\(^9\) Such a "sliding-scale" balancing approach enables "courts to correlate the likely harm to equal employment opportunities with the employer's justification burden on a case-by-case basis."\(^9\)

For example, suppose a plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of impact discrimination. She has demonstrated that her employer's discriminatory practice excludes women at a rate significantly greater than the rate at which it excludes men; thus, she has met whatever impact test the court deems applicable.\(^9\) At this juncture, advocates of interest balancing would require additional scrutiny of the plaintiff's case before any burden is imposed on the defendant. Such scrutiny might reveal, for example, that the plaintiff's case is relatively weak in not identifying which part of the defendant's indivisible hiring process has caused the impact or in not demonstrating that the impact affects

\(^9\) E.g., Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 492. Such commentators recognize that the present system does not involve balancing. E.g., id. Under current doctrine, a plaintiff's statistical showing either establishes or fails to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. Once established, the burden falls on the defendant to demonstrate business necessity. At present, business necessity is a unitary standard and does not take into consideration the extent of the impact the plaintiff has established. Id.; see also infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing type-one balancing further).


\(^9\) Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 492. But cf. Note, A No-Alternative Approach, supra note 40, at 116 (rejecting balancing approach as allowing employer increases in safety or efficiency to be "balanced away").

\(^9\) The EEOC Guidelines, for example, provide for a four-fifths rule to establish disparate impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1995) (establishing minority-group selection rate less than four-fifths of selection rate for majority group is evidence of adverse impact).
a large number of minority or female workers. Even though the law recognizes the practice as discriminatory enough to establish the fact of discriminatory impact, the relative weakness of the plaintiff's case would, under a balancing approach, lessen the degree of business need the defendant must show for the practice.

The second type of balancing disregards the plaintiff's case entirely once it is made, looking instead at the relationship between the employer's practice and its ultimate goal. Under this approach, the greater the importance of the goal the employer seeks to achieve through use of the practice, the lower the level of correlation required between the practice and the goal. This type of balancing focuses on whether an employer's strong demonstration of its ultimate goal offsets a weak demonstration of the practice's efficacy.

The second type of balancing is exemplified by Spurlock v. United

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56 See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981) (permitting lesser showing of manifest relationship between practice and goal because goal was one of safety); Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding employer's burden to demonstrate job-relatedness of employment criteria varies with skills required for job and consequences of hiring unqualified people).

57 See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text (discussing this second type of balancing further).
Airlines. In *Spurlock*, an airline imposed as minimum qualifications for its flight officers 500 hours of flight time and a college degree. A black applicant who had accumulated 204 hours of flight time and two years of college challenged the qualifications for their disparate impact on blacks. The court established a "sliding scale" of business necessity, imposing on the defendant a lighter burden to demonstrate business necessity when "the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great." The court, in effect, permitted the importance of the employer's goal to compensate for weaknesses in the means used to achieve it.

2. Balancing Employee Harm Against Employer Harm
   a. Theoretical Rationales for Imposing a Per Se Test. Several commentators have argued that courts should adopt a balancing test that would weigh the degree of impact on the protected group against the degree of employer need for the practice. Advo-

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98 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973); see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (noting where ultimate goal was passenger safety, business necessity defense required that criterion significantly serve, though not necessarily be required by, that goal).
99 *Spurlock*, 475 F.2d at 219.
100 Id.

As one study of employment discrimination law states:

The analysis in *Spurlock* could lead to the ironic situation that the higher the level of the job, the less the burden on the employer to show that the qualifications are actually related to the ability to perform that job.... [However,] the *Spurlock* approach has been narrowly limited to jobs involving high risk to life and limb.


Moore and Braswell posit the case in which an employer uses a subjective decisionmaking process with a discriminatory impact and in which the "degree of impact is not devastating" and the "precision of plaintiff's evidence is obscured by the inability to isolate the impact separately by practice." Moore & Braswell, *supra* note 35, at 491. In this case, they argue, the employer should have to show merely "the existence and consistent use of job-related [i.e., not absolutely necessary to the business] guidelines for [its] discretionary performance appraisals, and an overall relationship between the promotion system and legitimate employment goals.... In each instance, the magnitude of the potentially troublesome
icates of such balancing suggest that this approach would successfully account for Congress’s concern with reconciling the employee’s interest in equal opportunity and the employer’s interest in preserving business autonomy.\textsuperscript{102}

In the business necessity context, a hard and fast “rules” approach is preferable to such sliding scale balancing.\textsuperscript{103} A rules or “classificatory” approach\textsuperscript{104} inquires first whether the effect of the defendant’s practice may properly be classified as “disparately impacting a protected group.” If so, then a straightforward application of the rule requiring absolute business necessity resolves the case.

The rules approach does not ignore congressional concern for business autonomy. Rather, it is itself the product of a balance already struck by Congress.\textsuperscript{105} The task of the courts is to apply the resulting rule. The preference for a per se rule in the business necessity context finds support in the reasoning that generally underlies choices between rules and balancing and specifically in

\textsuperscript{102} Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 485; cf. Chandler, supra note 44, at 922 (positing purpose of business necessity defense is to protect goals of economic efficiency and entrepreneurial freedom). \textit{But see} Note, A No-Alternative Approach, supra note 40, at 116 (rejecting balancing approach as permitting employer increases in efficiency and safety to be offset by correspondingly larger impact on plaintiff group). Similarly, some who assert that impact analysis is in reality a way of redressing covert intentional discrimination likewise argue for a sliding scale of burden on the defendant. The greater the impact, the greater the likelihood that intent is at work; therefore, the burden should be greater on the defendant to show that its practice is effective in meeting its business goal. Perry, \textit{supra} note 17, at 26 n.128.

\textsuperscript{103} Professor Sullivan has distinguished balancing tests from a rules-oriented or “categorization” approach. Balancing, she notes, “explicitly considers all relevant factors with an eye to the underlying purposes or background principles or policies at stake.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, \textit{The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards}, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 60 (1992). Professor Sullivan explains that a balancing test equates with the concept of standard-based decisionmaking, whereas a classificatory or “categorical” approach equates with a rules approach. \textit{Id.} at 60.

\textsuperscript{104} The term “classificatory” derived from discussions of the rules-versus-balancing approach in the first amendment context. \textit{Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment}, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 844 (1969) [hereinafter \textit{Note, Civil Disabilities}] (discussing Professor Emerson’s description of “classificatory approach”).

\textsuperscript{105} Chandler, supra note 44, at 922 (asserting the “degree of protection [the business necessity] defense provides depends on weight given to competing goals—a legislative value judgment”).
the Title VII context.\textsuperscript{106}

Most importantly, the employment discrimination arena is inappropriate for balancing because of the danger that decision-maker bias may affect the outcome.\textsuperscript{107} Professor Frederick Schauer has explained how the potential for bias counsels against utilization of balancing tests:

We understand that any decision-making procedure will make errors. When rule-based decision-making is in place, the most noteworthy error is the failure on some number of occasions to make the best or optimal decision in the particular case. But when particularistic [e.g., balancing] decision-making prevails, the most noteworthy errors will be those in which misguided decision-makers—whether biased,

\textsuperscript{106} Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules—A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 151-52 (1991); Duncan M. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 28-30 (1987); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179-80 (1989); Sullivan, supra note 103, at 60. But see Note, Civil Disabilities, supra note 104, at 846 n.16 (noting application of balancing in context of indirect speech regulation-based discrimination). In addition to the danger decisionmaker bias poses to application of a business necessity balancing test, theorists offer another rationale that tends to call for a per se rule in the business necessity determination. A per se rule better addresses the goal of instilling vigilance in potential parties to avoid precisely the problem that gave rise to the suit. See Rose, supra, at 591 (asserting use of rules in lieu of standards causes people to guard against problems sued upon by rendering actors extra vigilant). According to Professor Louis Kaplow, the advantage of rules in affecting parties' primary behavior (such as the behavior that ultimately results in the lawsuit) is that people who know what the law is will conform to it, and people are more likely to know what the law is when rules are applied because it is less expensive to learn the content of rules than of standards. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 564 (1992).

\textsuperscript{107} See Maria L. Marcus, Wanted: A Federal Standard for Evaluating the Adequate State Forum, 50 Md. L. Rev. 131, 205 n.368 (1991) (noting tendency of courts applying balancing approach to assign heavy weight to whatever interest defendant proffers, thereby defeating plaintiff's claim); Scalia, supra note 106, at 1179-80 (arguing that rules approach more effective than balancing approach in providing "check upon arbitrary judges"); Sullivan, supra note 103, at 65 (describing Justice Scalia's arguments in favor of rules and noting "[b]alancing tests permit the expression of 'political or policy preferences.'"). But see Note, Civil Disabilities, supra note 104, at 846 n.16 (noting courts' application of balancing where speech regulation discriminated indirectly, but not where regulation discriminated intentionally).
ignorant, incompetent, or simply confused—will make decidedly non-optimal decisions. In attempting to design a decision-making procedure, we assess as best we can the expected frequency and consequences of these two types of errors. When the result of that assessment is a preference for rules, there is implicit in the preference a judgement that the errors that might be made by misguided decision-makers are more serious or more likely than the rule-based errors that come from a built-in failure to reach the very best decision in every case.\footnote{SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 154. Moreover, where there is reason to distrust a set of decisionmakers with certain kinds of decisions, “the problems of inflexibility that rules pose are less prevalent than problems that too much discretion will yield.” Id. at 152. \textit{But cf. id.} at 153 (explaining that “the choice of rule-based decision-making ordinarily entails disabling wise and sensitive decision-makers from making the best decisions in order to disable incompetent or simply wicked decision-makers from making wrong decisions”).}

Professor Sullivan has also identified the potential for bias as a reason for avoiding balancing tests: If “rules are fairer than standards [because] rules require decisionmakers to act consistently, treating like cases alike, [then] rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by preventing decisionmakers from factoring the parties’ particular attractive or unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus.”\footnote{Sullivan, supra note 103, at 62. Professor Tribe likewise notes that judicial decisions are a function of the characteristics of the people elevated to judgeships. Lawrence H. Tribe, \textit{Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?}, 98 HARV. L. REV. 582, 588-89 n.37 (1985).}

Similarly, Professor Kennedy has identified the “social virtues of [rules in lieu of standards] to [include] the restraint on official arbitrariness.”\footnote{Kennedy, supra note 106, at 1688. Kennedy defines “official arbitrariness” as “the sub rosa use of criteria of decision that are inappropriate in view of the underlying purposes of the rule, . . . rang[ing] from corruption to political bias.” \textit{Id.} He argues that a person’s consideration of the desired outcome in choosing whether a rule or standard should govern a particular situation does not fully explain the selection of one over the other. \textit{Id.} at 1710. Rather, such a choice additionally is founded on the view of the world held by the selector: generally, the altruist chooses principles and the individualist chooses rules. \textit{Id.} Kennedy cautions, however, that adoption of rules rather than standards imposes a different sort of arbitrariness on judicial decisionmaking: over- and underinclusiveness at the margins or borders of the rules’ coverage. \textit{Id.} at 1689.}
approach" to lawmakers' decisions to adopt rules in lieu of standards, Kennedy explains that rules are chosen when there is concern that the person charged with implementing the rule will be unsympathetic to the policies underlying the rule. If in Title VII cases there is an unusual danger that courts will place too much importance on the employer's profit motive and too little importance on the plaintiff's right to equal opportunity, then "formally realizable general rules . . . would function much better than standards to force the [court] to put the [legislator's] view of the issue into practice." 112

Even if it is correct that balancing is inappropriate in situations posing an unusual danger of bias, what is it about employment discrimination that increases the likelihood of decisionmaker bias? Why is bias more likely to taint balancing in the employment discrimination context than it is in, say, torts suits? Ideally, judges who (at least at the federal level) are carefully screened by both the executive and the legislative branches 113 either are not prejudiced or can rise above their prejudices. 114

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111 Id. at 1706. Kennedy draws a parallel between rules and individualism (Ralph Waldo Emerson's doctrine of self-reliance) and between standards and altruism. Id. at 1713-1778. Still, Kennedy notes that an altruistic judge may do well to apply a strict rule when doing so protects the most vulnerable classes of people from exploitation. Id. at 1777.

112 Id. at 1706. To advocate a per se business necessity rule in impact cases does not state any general position on the overall efficacy of rules over standards. Professor Kennedy further notes:

In assessing a proposal to change a regime of rules to standards, or vice versa, we should ignore all claims about the intrinsic merits of formal positions and demand an accounting of effects. What is the substantive objective? How does the choice of form affect the likelihood of embodying the objective in law?

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113 As a rule, juries are available in disparate treatment cases, but not disparate impact cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (1991) (allowing juries in cases seeking compensatory and punitive damages but allowing such damages only in intentional cases). Although the facts in impact cases are determined by judges, not juries, the same confidence seemingly could be placed in jurors as well, given that voir dire should eliminate prospective jurors possessing bias against the group in question.

114 See SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 137 (noting that balancing yields more just decisions than strict rules when decisionmaker is just).
Regardless of the caliber and good faith of decisionmakers, problems of bias are likely to occur whenever matters focus on race, sex, or other bases of discrimination. According to Professor Minow, the potential for bias in cases involving "difference," whether racial, sexual, or some other form of difference, heightens the significance of "tension between formal, predictable rules and individualized judgments under discretionary standards."\(^\text{115}\) Racial and sexual bias is too firmly rooted in both the conscious and subconscious mind of this country and its judiciary to permit a cavalier dismissal of the prospect that it plays a role in judicial decisionmaking in discrimination cases.\(^\text{116}\)

Legal and social norms have eliminated the most visible manifestations of prejudice, creating the misleading appearance that we have cured ourselves of prejudice altogether.\(^\text{117}\) In reality, prejudice has merely "gone underground." We may or may not be conscious of it, but prejudice remains a strong, motivating force in the citizens and judiciary of this country.

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\(^{115}\) Minow, supra note 106, at 26. Thus, imposition of a strict rule rather than a balancing test addresses the perceived need to "exclud[e] from the calculus of decision specific factors likely to be misapplied by some class of decision-makers, substituting cruder but less likely to be abused factors." Schauer, supra note 106, at 151-52.


Precisely because we so abhor our prejudice, we are likely to suppress our knowledge of it in order to avoid the pain of knowing about it. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 357 (1958); Kenneth B. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child 78 (1963); Joseph Jastrow, Freud: His Dream and Sex Theories 12 (1948); see also Susan L. McCoin, Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1251 (1985) (discussing prejudice in jury selection).

That unconscious prejudice is rampant in this country is exemplified by the results of a 1994 housing segregation study reported in the *American Sociological Review*. That study identified a gap between attitude and behavior among whites in this country. [The study concluded that] most whites today endorse the principle of equal opportunities for blacks in the housing market, but [the researchers'] analysis of 232 metropolitan areas "suggests that most whites are uncomfortable when numerous blacks enter their neighborhoods."

Because we are not on guard against unacknowledged prejudice, it poses a far more ominous threat to fair decisionmaking than articulated, challengeable prejudice. Our prejudice is rendered more invidious by its subconsciousness.

*b. The General Rejection of Balancing in Title VII Adjudica-

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120 See CLARK, supra note 116, at 70, 72 (positing that prejudiced individuals show less self-insight than non-prejudiced individuals and that people with "acceptable" levels of prejudice, although outraged by open, bigoted behavior, usually respond passively and silently in its face). It is argued that balancing "[satisfies] a civic republican commitment to 'resolving normative disputes by conversation, a communicative practice of open and intelligible reason-giving.'" Sullivan, supra note 103, at 68 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, *The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government*, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 34 (1986)). Civic republicans argue that a balancing test compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them—more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of . . . absolutes. . . . [T]his approach should make it more difficult for judges to rest on their predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason. It should make their accounts more rationally auditable.

Id. (quoting Wallace Mendelson, *On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance*, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 821, 825-26 (1962)). To the extent balancing tests require decision-makers to reveal the ideas leading to their decisions, this is true. However, when an unusually strong subconscious bias exists against the parties having the least power to begin with, full and open reason-giving is defeated. The bias is present, but surely not articulated.
tion. Consistent with the above rationale, most Title VII decision-making has eschewed a balancing approach in favor of a rules approach. For example, once the fact of disparate treatment is found and no defense can be established, liability is certain. No consideration is given to the strength of the plaintiff's established case in deciding whether the defendant has established its defense. No balancing of harms occurs.\textsuperscript{121} Rather, Title VII directs courts, for the most part, to find facts to which law can then be applied. The suggestion, then, that business necessity should be the subject of balancing by the factfinder proposes an exception to Title VII's general mandate.

In the few Title VII cases where courts have purported to balance interests, such balancing essentially masked what turned out to be straightforward decisions for employers. Perhaps the best example is Title VII's requirement that an employer reasonably accommodate practices required by a worker's sincerely held religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{122} In \textit{Trans World Airlines v. Hardison},\textsuperscript{123} the Supreme Court created a balancing test for determining whether an employer had met its duty to accommodate its employee's religious practices. The Court appears to have relied, at least in part, on the fact that religious practitioners are physically capable of modifying their practices.\textsuperscript{124} The Court concluded the employer had adequately accommodated Hardison's religious practices when adopting a more accommodating practice would have "assure[d] Hardison... of getting the days off necessary for strict observance of [his] religion, but... only at the expense of others who had strong, but perhaps nonreligious, reasons for not working on weekends."\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{121} Balancing of evidence occurs in the process of factfinding, which is different from determining the ultimate outcome of a case by balancing plaintiff's harm with defendant's harm. In the latter, the ultimate issue is not whether unlawful discrimination has occurred, but instead it is who would suffer the most from an adverse decision.


\textsuperscript{123} 432 U.S. 63 (1977).

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id.} at 74.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} at 81 (emphasis added).
Although Title VII’s use of “reasonableness” language in the religious accommodation context supports a balancing test and although the accommodation test is often described as balancing, the Hardison Court in fact imposed a per se rule, albeit one so de minimis as to require almost no showing by the employer at all. Once a worker has established that an employment practice interfered with his sincerely-held religious practices, the employer is required merely to show that any alternative practice accommodating the worker would have involved some cost to the employer. Regardless of the extent of interference with the plaintiff’s religious practices, the de minimis burden on the employer remains the same. It is not a balancing test at all. In effect, the decision to apply a balancing test in the Title VII context is akin to the decision to apply rational-basis scrutiny in the equal protection context: The case is decided in selection of the standard rather than in its application. It is a defendant-favoring mechanism.

If balancing is fraught with bias potential generally in Title VII cases, it is especially problematic in the business necessity context. In matters of business judgment, courts are likely to afford particular deference to the employer. When the court assesses not the importance of the practice but the importance ascribed to it by the employer, the test becomes one of good faith—the same test rejected in Griggs. Deference to employers’ business

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126 See supra note 122 (citing supporting sources).
127 The actual reason why the religion test must not heavily consider the worker’s interest in her religious practice is to avoid judicial entanglement in religion. Silbiger, supra note 122, at 857 n.136.
128 Id. at 847.
129 Id. at 857 n.136.
130 Cf. Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 145 (positing courts’ attempts to balance extent of governmental burden on religion cannot accurately quantify religious experience because such experience is not reducible to rational terms).
131 See Brodin, supra note 14, at 364-65 (arguing courts are ill-equipped to conduct cost-benefit analysis of business practices).
132 Courts’ increased deference to an employer’s judgment on business efficacy of a practice as the employer’s business goal increases in importance is reminiscent of the mentality that, in times of crisis, human rights must give way when something else very important is at stake. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 957 (1982) (noting at upper levels of employment, “where courts feel that the quality of performance really matters, they may be reluctant to interfere
judgment destroys the impact concept entirely,\textsuperscript{133} for the idea of
impact analysis is that good faith is no defense to a neutral practice
with discriminatory impact.\textsuperscript{134}

Balancing tests, moreover, invite deference to the party whose
situation most closely approximates that of the judge.\textsuperscript{135} Judges,
who often share the perspective of the employer more than that of
the employee, are likely to find the employer’s actions acceptable as
long as they are not too far removed from what the judge himself
would do in comparable circumstances.\textsuperscript{136} Such deference verges
on creating a standard of reasonableness or rationality. Yet, one
cannot ask simply whether the employer was being rational;
going businesses do not stay profitable by making irrational
decisions.

3. Balancing the Importance of An Employer’s Goal Against the
Efficacy of Its Practice. In the second type of balancing, courts
impose on the employer a lesser burden because the employer’s goal
is deemed especially important. For example, courts are willing to
assume the need for safety.\textsuperscript{137} The fact that an employer’s safety

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\item \textsuperscript{133} See Bartholet, supra note 132, at 1026 (“[P]utting the stamp of judicial approval on
racially exclusionary systems is seriously unjust if in fact the ‘finding’ that the systems are
job related is based simply on judges’ views that systems with which they are personally
familiar make sense.”).
\item \textsuperscript{134} Id. But cf. Rutherford, supra note 45, at 1320 (“[T]aken together, the plaintiff’s
evidence of adverse impact and the defendant’s evidence of business justification must reveal
a significant risk that the disputed employment practice could be used as a pretext for
discrimination.”).
\item \textsuperscript{135} Cf. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (noting
in BFOQ context inappropriateness of accepting employer’s decision of what makes
candidates qualified).
\item \textsuperscript{136} See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1552 (1983) (stating antidiscrimination laws, by suggesting
that instances of discrimination are irrational and capricious departures from normal
objective operation of markets, disguise systemic nature of bias in favor of dominant (i.e.,
white male) workers); see also Barbara A. Hocking, Is the Reasonable Man the Right Man for
the Job?, 17 ADEL. L. REV. 79, 86 (1995) (arguing “it is implicit within an organizational
structure that like will recruit and promote like, that difference is disadvantage”); Margaret
(positing “homogeneity is a central value of any organizational culture since it is conducive
to the maintenance of bureaucratic control and efficiency”).
\item \textsuperscript{137} See generally Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973) (permitting
business necessity defense where employer could not establish direct relationship between
requirement of minimum flight time and training success).
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motif justifies deference to its need for the ultimate safety goal, however, does not justify deference to the means chosen by the employer to achieve safety when that means is discriminatory.\textsuperscript{138} Courts do not owe employers deference on the choice of means, even if deference is owed on the choice of ends.

Moreover, the same reasons not to give deference to employer judgment generally, as described above, apply with equal force in the choice of means. The problem with deferring to an employer's business judgment about what practices it may utilize is that management decisions to employ particular hiring criteria are the products of a subconscious point of view that envisions a workplace full of people like the manager.\textsuperscript{139} The manager may not deliberately choose a criterion excluding people dissimilar to himself, but when the manager envisions the type of worker the criterion aims to select, he imagines a person like himself.\textsuperscript{140} Thus, the manager charged with assessing the efficacy of a practice may not adequately guard against his own subconscious expectations of the people to be selected and against the disparate impact the selecting

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Not all safety goals may be assumed to qualify as proper business purposes. In the disparate treatment context, for example, the Court held that the goal of protecting workers' fetuses was not within the essence of battery manufacturing and therefore was not a BFOQ. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 205-06 (1991).


\textsuperscript{139} Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 970 (1993); see also Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 140-61 (1987) (suggesting white-dominated workplace that admits minorities will halt such admissions to maintain white dominance); Bartholet, supra note 132, at 1026 (asserting system has failed to consider alternative methods of selection due to tendency of those who are "in" to perpetuate systems that got them there); Minow, supra note 106, at 13 ("By granting discretion to... private decisionmakers,... judges... allow[ing] those decisionmakers to give significance to differences."). If courts "cede discretion to other decisionmakers[,]...[they allow] the decisionmaker with the discretion to take difference into account in an impermissible manner." Id. at 26. Professor Minow discussed the tension among the Supreme Court Justices during the 1986 Term, between those wanting to preserve the discretion of decisionmakers and those wanting to avoid the discrimination resulting when decisionmakers are given unchecked discretion. \textit{Id. passim}.

\textsuperscript{140} Chamallas, \textit{supra} note 62, at 2392.
criterion may yield. 141

In fact, cultural-domination theorists argue that as soon as women or minorities begin to satisfy a requirement that had heretofore excluded them (for example, admission to law school), the organization subconsciously responds by adopting a different standard, precisely to keep the number of women or minorities at a level low enough to maintain white-male dominance within the organization. 142 Thus, deference to the defendant's business judgment in this context threatens the integrity of decisionmaking. Deferring to the defendant's business judgment "leaves intact the very managerial prerogative which has built the discriminatory base." 143

IV. CONCLUSION

The 1991 Act's codification of the disparate impact doctrine has opened the door for long needed clarification and strengthening of the business necessity defense. That defense should require an employer to prove that its discriminatory practice is essential to its continued operation. Under the structure created by the 1991 Act,

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141 Professor Chamallas explains that a "focus on the inadequacy of the excluded group" has created a tendency not to scrutinize the criteria that have excluded them. Id. at 2372. This focus on the victim's shortcomings rather than on the criteria that exclude the victims allows "existing organizations [and] professions" to continue to exclude such victims without challenge. Id. at 2374. "In [this] motivational account, responsibility lies with the individual worker; the employer is required only to measure or judge each worker evenhandedly using conventional standards." Id. at 2377.

142 E.g., id. at 2387.

143 Hocking, supra note 136, at 83; see also Chandler, supra note 44, at 934 (arguing Griggs simply prevents employers from using non-economic criteria—criteria unrelated to job performance—that decrease minority opportunities).

Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995), illustrates this point. In Mountain Side, a Title VIII case applying a business necessity test identical to that of Title VII, the defendant argued that inherent limitations on the park's sewer system required it to impose the three-person-per-unit policy challenged as discriminatory against families with children. Although a study commissioned by the defendant itself contradicted the sewer system-based argument, the Tenth Circuit accepted the defendant's additional, unsupported arguments pertaining to "quality of life" and found that business necessity was established. Id. at 1256. The holding seems particularly troubling because the defendant had adopted the policy at the exact time that the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988), rendered discrimination against families with young children unlawful. Id. at 1246.
an employer must prove that the goal it seeks to achieve through the practice is crucial to its continued viability and, in turn, that the practice selected is crucial to the achievement of that goal. The employer may meet the second part of this test by producing evidence that the practice significantly and efficiently achieves the goal and by rebutting the plaintiff’s evidence of the availability of a less-discriminatory alternative.

Moreover, requiring an employer to prove a strict level of need for its discriminatory practice comports with the proof structure in impact cases contemplated by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Parallels between the analytical structure of disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases demonstrate that the stringent BFOQ-defense standard applied in treatment cases is equally appropriate in impact cases. Alternatives to this standard thwart the objectives of Title VII by disproportionately favoring defendants.